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Abstract
This  Thesis  reconsiders  the  prospects  for  an  approach  to  global  justice  centring  on  the
proposal that every human being should possess a certain bundle of goods, which would
include certain members of a distinctive category: the category of capabilities. My overall
aim is to present a clarified and well-developed framework, within which such claims can be
made. To do this, I visit a number of regions of normative and metanormative theorising. I
begin by introducing the motivations for the capability approach, and clarifying some of its
most distinctive features. Next, I focus on Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, and
identify several problems therein. The most important concerns epistemology, and especially
the challenges that constructivist theories pose. The middle part of the Thesis presents an
alternative,  based on the work of  John McDowell,  which I  argue has  superior  prospects.
Then, I turn to two further problems: that of making sense of the universalistic aspirations of
cosmopolitanism, and that  of  integrating the microscopic prescriptions  of  ethics  with the
macroscopic analyses of political philosophy. Using the Aristotelian interpretation of its core
framework  that  I  have  developed,  I  conclude  that  the  capability  approach  can  provide
compelling answers to important questions about global justice.
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Introduction
One recently central  topic  of  discussion in  political  philosophy has  been concerned with
justice at the global level, the level of all humanity; one increasingly popular – and now quite
mainstream – approach to this topic has emphasised the concept of human capability. There
are many questions that might be asked in a philosophy Thesis, against this backdrop: about
the  prescriptions  the  approach  would  generate  when  applied  to  real-world  controversies;
about its precise relationship to the social sciences; about precisely which capabilities are of
normative significance, and for which purposes1. This Thesis, however, seeks to re-examine
the concepts and proposals that are often in the background when academics or practitioners
talk about  the capabilities and their  relevance to  global  justice,  and so aims to  set  out  a
renewed framework within which more fine-grained questions might be pursued. As a result,
while I shall occasionally touch directly on clearly first-order questions – as when I discuss
the appropriate definition of capability in Chapter 2 – most of my work will relate to more
abstract issues in methodology and epistemology, defending a capability approach indirectly
by placing it as a coherent element within a broader philosophical context.
The overarching project of this Thesis aims to set out a normative approach to global justice,
similar though not identical to that of Martha Nussbaum, which centres on a concept of
'capability'. Within this, however, a surprisingly diverse array of philosophical topics emerge
as relevant, and much of the Thesis will be devoted to clarifying and arguing for responses to
a number of these. The areas involved are vast, and so my coverage will often be limited,
1 Robeyns 2006 provides a critical survey of practice-oriented work up to that time; since that time, work in 
different disciplines on capability-related issues has burgeoned further.
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although I try  to give a sense of how the different areas of thought fit together. Most
importantly, almost nowhere will I present full arguments against the major competitors to the
responses I endorse – the disputes I do discuss explicitly are largely2 internecine. This general
broadness of scope also requires me to give no more than sketches of answers to certain
important and relevant questions3. Despite these obstacles, I make progress towards the broad
goal above, in respect of two subsidiary aims. Firstly, to clarify the proper form of capability-
theoretic justice, illuminating the role that the concept of capability plays, and motivating the
resulting approach. Progress is made on this in Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6. Secondly, to place the
universalism and objectivism of the capability approach in a theoretical context, by linking
them to wider philosophical questions. In turn this has two main parts: the connection of the
subjects of capability-theoretic justice to a conception of humanity (Chapters 5 and 6), and
the connection of objectivity of ethical  judgement with metaethical notions of truth,  virtue,
and reality (Chapters 3 and 4). I hope, in the conclusions to these lines of inquiry, to bring out
the deep congruence that I perceive between the capability approach and a broader sort of
philosophical perspective, exemplified by John McDowell and other recent neo-Aristotelians.
While  this  Aristotelian connection was a  major emphasis of  early work in  the capability
approach4, it has since been significantly eclipsed by a move towards more self-consciously
pragmatic  philosophical  stances  such  as  Rawlsian  'public  reason',  Deweyan  ethical
pragmatism5, or a conception of impartiality derived from Adam Smith6. Although I cannot
argue against these developments here,  describing the Aristotelian approach as a  coherent
2 There are a few exceptions. For example, Baber's preferentist interpretation of adaptive preference, argued 
against in Ch.3, is not a remotely close relative of my own.
3 The most important example of this is my inability to make any progress towards a concrete answer to 
questions about the actual extent of the reasons of capability-theoretic justice that any contemporary 
individual has; I settle for the conclusion that everyone has some such reasons. See Ch.6, esp. §1.3.
4 See the Nussbaum references in Ch.2, §2.2; cf. Sen 1993.
5 Anderson (2014) provides the central statement of Deweyan methodology, and she applies this method 
throughout her work on the capability approach, e.g. Anderson 2003, and 2010.
6 Sen 2009 draws heavily on these ideas throughout.
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whole will not only help to remove the motivation for them, but will also make both the first-
order capability-centred account of justice, and the broader philosophical viewpoint in which
I embed it, more attractive in their own right.
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Chapter 1: 
Capability-Theoretic Justice in Context
In this Chapter, I shall  begin  the  overall  project  of  the  Thesis  by introducing the
contemporary family of normative views known as the capability approach, sketching both its
distinctive theoretical contributions and their motivation. I shall begin by saying a little about
the historical context within which the capability approach arose, and the issues with which it
has been concerned. Next I shall introduce two dominant perspectives in contrast to which
capability theorists have defined themselves, and the main criticisms that motivate the turn to
a capability-centric account. This will be summed up in a set of desiderata for normative
theory in the area under consideration. Finally,  I'll  briefly outline  the central concepts of
capability theory itself, and show how a theory using such concepts might begin to meet the
desiderata.
§1 Historical context
The capability approach emerged as a distinctive research program and group of related
theoretical contributions in the late 1980's, primarily as a response to issues in development
economics. In 1990 the UN Development Program (UNDP) released the first Human
Development Report, containing the first instantiation of the Human Development Index.
This index, the report in which it was embedded, and the new approach to global
development that it represented, were inspired by work done at the World Institute for
Development Economics Research (WIDER). Amartya Sen, who had been one of the central
4
researchers there, was also an architect of the index and report. The coalescence of the
capability approach itself can be traced to a conference at WIDER, sponsored by the UNDP,
in 1988. At this conference, and in exchanges and individual research that followed, a general
dissatisfaction with the way that global development had been conceptualised and promoted
was revealed, and a fruitful direction in which it might turn was identified. Complaints raised
by this movement centred around the fact that development had generally been conceived of
as if GDP growth alone mattered; and that existing theoretical alternatives did not seem to be
adequate either1.
Despite this initial focus on the assessment of global development, the capability approach
rapidly expanded to encompass responses to a wide range of theoretical issues. As well as the
construction of indices to measure differential development in the global context, important
subjects include political distribution and social justice; the kinds of freedom and equality
that justice may require; and the proper account of human well-being. The work of
Nussbaum, who has been a major representative of the capability approach since its origin,
has been largely concerned with these latter, broadly philosophical questions. For my
purposes here, the relevant question to which capability approaches provide an answer may
be summed up as: 'What are the goods with whose provision and distribution social justice is
concerned?' Because societies are, prima facie at least, collections of individual
circumstances and relations, the assessment of individual well-being and the justice of
individual circumstances have an obvious relevance to this question.
§2 Resourcism and Welfarism: Two Existing Approaches
1 See Nussbaum and Sen 1993 (1-6).
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As I have said, capability theory as I am concerned with it is centrally concerned with two
related topics: the assessment of the quality of human lives, and the standard of social justice,
especially with reference to the kinds of freedom and equality that it may require. However,
doing more than pointing out topics of interest for capability theory requires more work.
Contemporary normative theory is extremely diverse, exhibiting a trend towards the
complication and interpenetration of traditional normative perspectives such as Kantian
deontology, derivatives of utilitarianism, and the revived, largely Aristotelian2 programme of
virtue ethics3. Moreover, this process is compounded, in the region of normative thought in
question here, because such theorising typically incorporates not only traditional moral or
ethical perspectives such as these, but also theses that have their origin in explicitly political
or otherwise social thought. Indeed, it is typical of some prominent theories in this area (most
notably the 'political liberalism' of John Rawls' later work) to argue that the move to
reflection on life in contemporary (at least European and U.S.) society involves a categorical
shift in the kind of theory required. The great complexity of each family of theories, and the
degree to which individual theorists increasingly draw on insights from many supposedly
distinct families at once, makes the task of providing an adequate analysis of the connected
set of theories known as the 'capability approach' very difficult.
Given this, it is perhaps most helpful, in finding a starting point for an analysis of any given
capability theory, to begin with what capability theories are self-consciously not. In this
2 The primary non-Aristotelian versions are the Nietzschean theory of Christine Swanton (2003), and the 
revived Humean sentimentalist theory of Michael Slote (2010). Throughout the Thesis, my focus is on ideas
from the Aristotelian tradition; it is debatable whether the commonalities which warrant the label 'virtue 
ethic' would make these less traditional theories similarly well-coherent with a capability approach.
3 Perhaps the most extreme illustration of this tendency is Derek Parfit's 2011(a and b) magnum opus, which 
argues that three modern ethical traditions (rule consequentialism, Kantian deontology, and Scanlon-style 
contractualism) can be synthesised. Compare also Driver (2004, esp. Ch.4) on the amalgamation of virtue 
ethics and consequentialism, and Korsgaard (e.g. 1996) on a similar rapprochement between virtue ethics 
and Kantian thinking.
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regard, the 'capability approach' arose as an alternative to Rawls' theory of primary goods as a
metric for assessing the justice of societies. Rawls' view4 involves the identification of a
range of goods the possession of which is necessary for any individual to attain their good.
Importantly, 'good' here refers not to a specific conception of the good life that might be held
by the individual in question, or one that might be predominately held in the particular
societal context in which they live, but rather a broad space of possibilities, representative (at
least for the later Rawls) of the range of 'reasonable' comprehensive images of the good that
are candidate conceptions at this time. This lack of awareness of a specific conception of the
good life, such as will typically (if only vaguely and implicitly) be present in the worldview
of each real-world agent, reflects the process of abstraction from particular, contingent
circumstances that is Rawl's 'Original Position'. Rawls holds that the correct normative
principles to govern life in the polis can be discovered and justified through a method of
reflection on what abstract representatives of the individuals in a society would recommend,
subject to a 'veil of ignorance'. This 'veil of ignorance' is supposed to avoid self-seeking
choices by the representatives, by preventing them from knowing too much about the specific
circumstances in which they would find themselves as individuals. One example of this
comes in Rawls' reasoning that if people know what social position they will have, e.g. if they
know that they will not be impoverished, they are  likely to alter their proposed principles
accordingly. Likewise, Rawls' narrative  continues, if people know exactly which
comprehensive normative worldview they will espouse, the resulting principles will reflect
that perspective in an unjust way: it will no longer be neutral between what Rawls calls
'reasonable' viewpoints in the way that liberal-democratic principles such as tolerance,
4 My presentation is of the later Rawls' theory, as stated especially in Political Liberalism (2005). Although 
many of the criticisms that capability theorists level at Rawls apply equally to his earlier work as to the later
(because what changes is largely a way of interpreting and justifying the basic normative framework, rather 
than the concepts themselves), it is his later work that provides a clear rationale for the restriction to 
general-purpose resources, and so is best juxtaposed against capability theory.
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diversity, and respect for others require. In this way, the 'veil of ignorance' is supposed to
model certain central intuitions about how people should be treated in society, i.e. as free and
equal citizens in a system of fair social cooperation, under terms acceptable to all (to
appropriate typical Rawlsian language). Rawls thinks that the core intuitions that the Original
Position is supposed to embody are subject to an 'overlapping consensus', at least within
contemporary liberal democracies, and at least provided that the citizens concerned have
reflected adequately on their values, commitments, and so on (Rawls 2005, 3-46). Although
the general tenor of Rawls' approach will be important in the following chapters, the essential
thing to note for my current purposes is that Rawls' view is 'Resourcist': it only requires that
each person be provided with a certain quantity of a number of highly generic, multi-purpose
resources, such as an adequate education, opportunities for employment, and basic political
liberties.
The second major group of relevant positions is one against which advocates of Resourcism
and of the capabilities are united. This group consists of theories that are more or less
straightforward applications to political questions of utilitarian or otherwise consequentialist
approaches. Consequentialisms are distinguished from non-consequentialist theories by their
possession of a few key features. Most importantly, consequentialisms aggregate goods. This
can find expression in a variety of different ways. When assessing the rightness of an act
based on its impacts on a number of people, a consequentialist may aggregate interpersonally,
such that an act that makes most affected individuals considerably worse off may be correct
even where an alternative act would make everybody better off (but would result in a lower
total benefit). Similarly, a consequentialist may aggregate across qualitatively different goods,
such that an act that affects one person's life negatively in many separate ways may be right
8
as  long as it improves even one aspect of their life to a sufficient extent. Traditionally,
consequentialisms have been 'Welfarist', in contrast to Resourcist or capability-theoretic: they
have taken the view that the goods that are relevant to evaluation of individual well-being or
societal health  are states of individual welfare, such as happiness, the satisfaction of
preferences, or gains in economic utility. Consequentialisms that are not Welfarist, or
(potentially) Welfarisms that are not consequentialist, are not under consideration at  this
point.
It may be helpful to illustrate these positions with an example (which I shall continue to use
throughout this chapter). Consider the case of the nutrition of a pregnant woman. For a
Resourcist, what is necessary for this woman's situation to be sufficiently good in this respect
is for her to have an amount of food sufficient for the needs of a typical individual. Due to the
Rawlsian requirement that normative theories not presuppose comprehensive conceptions of
the good, Resourcists will be restricted in the depth of detail they can incorporate in assessing
situations such as these.5 It might be that it would be problematically comprehensive to
incorporate standards for who counts as a man or a woman, which would mean that the
'typical individual' here must be gender non-specific;  or  it  might  be  that  we  should  not
privilege pregnancy by allocating extra resources to those who engage in it. Even if, as is
likely, Resourcists do not wish to be this restrictive, it is clear that some restriction is implicit
in the anti-comprehensive stance: that some features of individuals must be invisible to
justice-related action that might otherwise be considered salient for evaluation of given cases.
For a Welfarist, what is necessary for the pregnant woman's situation with respect to nutrition
5 Insofar as Resourcists other than Rawls do not agree with his anti-comprehensive stance on uses of 
conceptions of the good, they will likely be able to incorporate much greater contextual specificity in their 
theories. To that extent, much of the criticism I introduce below may not apply to them. I am here taking 
Rawls as the paradigmatic Resourcist, as has often been standard in motivating the capability approach, 
which may do some injustice to Resourcism as a whole.
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to be adequate will depend on the particular conception of 'welfare' involved. It might be that
the state of being nourished is intrinsically welfare-enhancing, or it might be that it is so only
instrumentally, to the extent that an individual prefers to be nourished, or is made happy
thereby. All Welfarisms, however, are alike in that all they can use in evaluating the woman's
situation are actual results; the etiology of a result is irrelevant. Finally, there will also be
differences between Resourcism and Welfarism when we extrapolate out from the woman's
situation to that of an entire polity. Here, where we may be concerned with the goodness of
the polity simpliciter, or with its goodness specifically in terms of social justice, Resourcists
like Rawls require that each individual have the relevant bundle of resources, while Welfarists
may be more willing to trade off the welfare of individuals in order to ensure a greater good.
While the Resourcist will be concerned with whether each individual has enough (relative to
the generic individual) to eat, the Welfarist might be more concerned with whether the total
amount of nourishment that occurs is as large as it might be, or with other variables such as
GDP, or total levels of happiness.
§3 Problems with Resourcism and Welfarism
Resourcism and Welfarism, as just described, form the theoretical background against which
capability theory emerged. In this section, I shall bring out a number of criticisms that have
been levelled at Resourcism and Welfarism by capability theorists, and which motivate the
move towards a focus on capability.
To begin with, Resourcism has been criticised for being far too coarse-grained to really
inform us about the justice-relevant goods at stake in individual situations and polities. By
restricting attention to what typical individuals would need, they will fail to ensure that
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actual people achieve, or have a realistic opportunity to achieve, states of value in their own
lives. The argument here can take a number of forms. Firstly, Resourcist views do not allow
for tailoring of the quantities of resources allocated to individuals to reflect the differential
capacities of those individuals to convert resources into goods. A person with a disability, for
example, will likely require more resources of many kinds to pursue the same goods as
someone without; a pregnant woman requires more and different kinds of food to achieve the
same level of nutrition as a non-pregnant woman (Nussbaum 1992, 233)6. Secondly, there
may be external factors in the individual's context that affect their capacity to obtain value
from a given bundle of resources. It may be that the pregnant woman has enough rice for her
particular body to be nourished, but that cultural taboos prevent her from gaining access to a
kitchen to cook it, forcing her to give it to a husband who will take some portion of what she
needs for himself (233-4).7 Finally, capability proponents note that it seems strange to include
resources as goods at all when even Resourcists rarely consider many of them to have value
in themselves. Income, wealth, employment (of a generic kind), even insurance contracts8 are
plausible candidate resources, but it is clear that each has little or no intrinsic value. It would
be  strange to conclude that purportedly value-laden concepts like freedom or equality are
constituted solely by conditions that themselves involve no value. If an individual is not
6 This line of anti-resourcist argument remains at the forefront of these disputes, even while some of the 
others have arguably dwindled in significance, as resourcist positions have become clearer and more 
sophisticated. Given this increasing compatibility between capability approaches and resource-focused ones,
some of the arguments here may not motivate capability approaches as powerfully as may first appear. 
Nevertheless, these criticisms are still important to note, even if only to motivate the desiderata identified 
below. The papers in Brighouse and Robeyns (eds.) 2010 provide a good introduction to the contemporary 
state of the resource/capability debate; see especially the papers by Pogge, Anderson, Arneson, Terzi, and 
Robeyns therein.
7 Putting it this way may suggest that I think that e.g. disability status is a fully intrinsic matter of the 
individual constitution, rather than something that arises because of the social signification given to 
attributes which are themselves well-being neutral, or because of the way that such intrinsic features 
interact with social structure. (Cf. Calder 2008; 2011). I do not need to take a position on these issues here, 
because I do not need to put argumentative weight on the distinction between 'internal' and 'external' factors,
although I am inclined to think that a Calder-style interactionist ontology will be plausible for at least most 
states falling under the ordinary-language term 'disability'.
8 See Dworkin 2000.
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inherently brought closer to the realisation of value by being made more free, or more equal
with others, why is it that freedom or equality are of value themselves? (Sen 1993, 32-48;
Nussbaum 1987, 9-10)9. Taken as a whole, the problem with Resourcism is that it isn't
concerned  with  whether people can actually achieve goods with the resources they are
allocated, not least because it (frequently, at least) is  not  oriented  towards  the goods
themselves at all.
Welfarism, on the other hand, is directly concerned with the goods – or, at least, the alleged
goods – that individuals actually realise. The central problem that capability theorists identify
with it is that it ignores the importance of individual agency and other factors having to do
with the etiology of states of welfare. To a large extent the arguments here overlap with the
arguments for the importance of capability rather than functioning, which I shall address in
the next Chapter (§1.2), so I shall leave it until then to draw those out. A pro tanto case,
however, may be made by noting that what seems to be important for social justice is not only
what people in fact do, but what they could have done or can do: opportunities to act are
important as well as, if not rather than, exercises of agency or agency-independent outcomes.
As Welfarisms are interested only in the extrinsic  upshots  of policies, institutions, and
choices, and not in the constitutive processes that they involve, they cannot pay attention to
the opportunities people have if those opportunities never bear fruit. If someone decides to
fast, or to eat an unhealthy diet, this seems very different to a case of unchosen starvation; if
the person could have been nourished had they chosen otherwise, this (at least) lessens the
9 It may seem, in the light of points that I emphasise later (Ch.4, esp. §§1.4-5), that endorsing this line of 
critique is hypocritical on my part, since it may seem to involve a demand that freedom or equality been 
shown to be valuable from without, whereas all explanations of a thing's value must reach explanatory 
bedrock at some point. However, any inconsistency is superficial: Sen and Nussbaum's point can be 
preserved as an insistence that freedom and equality must be located within a broader conception of ethics 
and the human good it accounts for, rather than appearing out of thin air; this Neurathian version of the 
claim is highly congruent with what I say later (cf. especially Chapter 5, §1.1)
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badness and/or injustice of their situation (Sen 1993, 40). Welfarism also has problems at the
societal level, in that it gives no inherent weight to considerations of distribution, abstracting
away from the issue of whether each person is dealt with well. The problem with this cross-
personal (and cross-good) aggregation may be expressed in a number of ways; as a failure to
treat each person as an end, a failure to recognise the separateness of persons, or a blindness
to the irreducible plurality of the good, and to the necessity of all its separate elements for a
valuable life (Nussbaum 1992, 222; 2000b, 106)10. Given that social justice is centrally (if
vaguely) concerned with people being treated as equals, this makes Welfarism ill-equipped to
account for the justice of polities, which is (at least) a central element of their goodness. An
injustice is present if the pregnant woman does not have enough to eat, even if others in her
society get more (in total) as a result; likewise, something is deeply lacking in a life of (at
least unchosen) malnutrition, even if that life is thereby made better overall, by improving
other elements.
These arguments amount to a motivation for a number of desiderata for a theory of social
justice, and of the goodness of societies. It will then be in successfully meeting these
desiderata, without introducing further implausibilities, that capability theories will be
successful over e.g. Resourcist and Welfarist rivals. Firstly, theories should accommodate the
value of choice, and more generally be sensitive to the significance of etiology: there are
many contexts in which it makes an evaluative difference what, how, and whether a person
has chosen, as well as (potentially) other etiological factors. Secondly, theories should pay
very close attention to whether each individual person is actually achieving states of value; it
is not enough to provide for the needs of generic individuals, we need to provide for those of
10 Sen arguably endorses interpersonal and cross-good aggregation (cf. 1982, 1983, 1993; all can be seen as 
advocating a more complex, but still fundamentally aggregative, consequentialism); at any rate, he does not 
seem to share Nussbaum's principled hostility to such.
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actual individuals, and this  is  likely to require expansive examination of each particular
circumstance. Thirdly, theories should seek to include as goods things that are plausibly of
value in themselves, as opposed to things that are mere means; the most straightforward way
to do this is to set up the goods that justice is concerned with as elements in human well-
being. Finally, there is something deeply inadequate about theories which allow aggregation
across persons or across goods to deprive any individual of essential elements of their good;
doing so ought to be judged unjust.
§4 Resources, Capabilities and Functionings
Capability theories build on the above criticisms, attempting to provide an account of what is
valuable for justice-relevant purposes that avoids the flaws of both Welfarist and Resourcist
approaches. Rather than focussing on the states of value that individuals actually realise, or
on the quantity of general-purpose resources that individuals have available, capability
theorists focus on the degree to which a given person is able to immediately realise relevant
states of value. Firstly, some terminology: from this point, I shall frequently talk of
'functionings'. A 'functioning' is any way of being that an individual human may instantiate11,
including relationships that they may have to external objects or individuals, or any activity
that they perform. As David Crocker puts it, functionings are 'ways of doing and being' (1992,
590). Thus, being well educated is a functioning, as is being respected by a friend, as is
playing football. To return to my earlier  example, 'being nourished' would be a functioning
that (roughly)  consists in the body's having sufficient resources and the capacity to convert
11 As I note below, there probably are many such functionings that an individual can only have in 
collaboration with others – or, more radically, if others realise them too. Thus, the only prospect that this 
view excludes would be factors contributing to an individual's good without that individual being in any 
way involved; it does not exclude the possibility that there might be functionings that can only be realised 
by individuals as parts of a group.
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them into the chemicals it needs to perform all of its other functions adequately. For the
normative purposes at hand in this Thesis, I am only interested in those functionings that are
valuable for their bearer.
It is now possible to bring out the concept of 'capability' itself.  My  definition  here  is
preliminary; the next Chapter will introduce some important complications. Capabilities are
capacities, on the part of individuals, to function in some valuable way, such that the only
condition that prevents the individual's actual functioning is  the lack  of a choice of that
individual to do so. Put more technically, a capability is a disposition, of an individual being,
to instantiate a functioning just in case they choose to; if an individual has the capability Cf,
they will instantiate functioning f iff they choose to do so12. Coming to be in this state may
involve many separate conditions. Firstly, an individual's constitution must be such that they
can function in the given way. So, in a situation where a person will have to prepare food
themselves, that person cannot be nourished by rice if they do not have the cooking skills to
transform it into a digestible form. Such skills or technical knowledge, and physical
characteristics of the body itself, such as physical strength, mobility, perceptual capacity, etc.,
are examples of potential 'internal' barriers to capability. Secondly, the individual's 'external'13
situation must also be suitable for their functioning. The cultural taboo that enjoins, with a
background  threat  of  (e.g.)  ostracism,  the woman to give rice to her husband, who will
appropriate some of it for himself, would  be  one such restriction. Another will  be  the
necessary resource that is the rice itself, along with cooking equipment, energy sources, clean
water, and so on. Notably, many of these resources may be collectively owned (or not owned
by anyone), but that does not prevent their being resources for the individual in question as
12 This is a very strict definition – it is harder to possess a capability on this account than on at least most 
others. For some implications of this, and a limited defence of this strictness, see §1.2 in the next Chapter.
13 For the internal/external distinction, see Nussbaum 1987, 20-5.
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long as the individual has permanent unconstrained access to them; this is particularly clear in
the case of clean water, since that is almost always  a common resource14. Overall, then, if
there are neither internal nor external barriers to functioning, and  if  the only thing that
prevents immediate functioning is the lack of a choice to do so, then the individual has the
capability to function. Notably, all of the barriers to functioning may or may not be present
depending on many contingent features of individuals and the environments in which they
live. For the case of nutrition alone, relevant variables in the woman's case will include her
pregnancy, characteristics deriving from her biological sex, her occupation and level of
activity, local disease risk factors, etc., as well as the possible barriers already mentioned.
What is required for one situated individual to function may be very different to that which is
required for another to do so.
Capability theories claim that these kinds of states of individuals are highly relevant to social
justice, and to the assessment of the goodness of individual lives and of societies. Capabilities
and functionings thus take the place of bundles of generic resources for Resourcists, and
states of actual welfare for Welfarists. From what has been said so far, it is clear that
capability theory stands a good chance of being able to satisfy the first two desiderata that I
have identified. That is, because what is relevant here is capability and not merely functioning
alone, capability approaches can  be etiology-sensitive, and will, at least to some extent, be
capable of accounting for the value of choice. And, because of the specificity of barriers to
functioning to individual circumstance, and the wide range of features of individual lives that
are recognised to make a difference here, capability theories will likely be accurate in their
assessment of actual human lives. However, it still needs to be shown that the final two
14 Sen's classic malaria-protection example emphasises this non-individualistic feature. See Sen 1992, 66-8.
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desiderata, dealing with the identification of intrinsic goods, and a non-aggregative structure
respectively, are met by capability theory. I discuss these within the context of Nussbaum's
view of social justice in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 2: 
Nussbaum's Capability Approach: Problems and
Lacunae
In the previous Chapter, I began the task of introducing and motivating a capability approach
to global justice. In this Chapter, I continue towards that end, with a new critical focus on
Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. Much of the Chapter will be spent
explaining the central features of her view, and identifying points at which greater detail is
needed,  or  where  there  are  tensions  which  require  resolution.  Although  the  bulk  of  my
exposition here will be critical of Nussbam's work, it should be clear that the reason for this
critical focus is that I ultimately believe her contributions to be highly important and, in large
part,  correct.  The  Chapter  is  split  into  two  sections,  each  devoted  to  a  major  area  of
theoretical controversy within Nussbaum's work, each of which in turn provides an impetus
for  several  strands  of  the  broader  philosophical  discussion that  comprises  the rest  of  the
Thesis.  The  first  section  is  devoted  directly  to  questions  about  global  justice  and  its
relationship to human flourishing. I begin by bringing out the compelling connections that
Nussbaum's approach incorporates between justice and the individual human good. Next, I
concentrate specifically on the question of why capability is of importance in its own right,
and argue for some minor revisions to Nussbaum's formulation as a result. Finally, I briefly
discuss the universalist and (equivocally) liberal character of Nussbaum's approach to justice,
setting the stage for more detailed development on my own behalf later in the Thesis. The
longer second section turns to consider the ethical epistemology which Nussbaum employs,
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exposing some nascent meta-level issues which will be especially important in what follows.
Firstly,  I  introduce  a  background  distinction  between  'constructivism'  and  'realism',  and
distinguish two aspects of the debate concerning these which are relevant to the justification
of  a  capability  approach.  Then  I  identify  Nussbaum's  most  significant  proposals  about
methodology, making some critical points in the process. Finally,  I describe an important
criticism of Nussbaum by Alison Jaggar, and briefly evaluate its cogency. The problems I
identify as arising from this critique will then form the motive force for Chapter 3.
§1. Justice and Flourishing
§1.1 Justice and Sufficient Good
I have provided – in the previous Chapter – a basic account of the background motivations
for the capability approach, and of its central concepts. As each capability theorist uses these
differently, however, it is necessary to isolate individual thinkers to get a clear picture of how
the capabilities relate to social justice. Because Nussbaum's work will be most important in
my project as a whole, I shall here provide an outline of the way that she does this. I shall
begin by sketching the structure of her account. Then I shall highlight two methodological
considerations that are  at  work  therein.  Overall,  I  shall  conclude  that  an  account  which
preserves key features of Nussbaum's view has good prospects to meet the final desideratum I
identified in the last Chapter: incorporating an element which exposes the ethical limits of
cross-personal and cross-good aggregation.
Central to Nussbaum's approach is the idea that each being who is a subject of justice must
have a certain set of capabilities, if the world is not to be unjust. This set will include some
degree of each valuable capability. This degree constitutes a threshold below which no-one
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should fall. An individual situation, or an entire polity, will not be just (and so cannot be
good) if any person in it is below the threshold on any capability (2000a, 81-6). This provides
a clear framework that relates a view of the minimum capability necessary for an adequate
life (the threshold), to a view of social justice at the global level (inter alia).
Importantly, justice here is an absolute standard. Although a case might be more or less just,
there is some absolute point at which it will tip over from minimal justice to injustice. This
means that the approach maintains a non-aggregative structure in both interpersonal and
cross-good respects. For Nussbaum, a policy (or  individual action) that brings  or  leaves
anyone below the threshold for any kind of good will be unjust, no matter how many others it
might bring or leave above it1. This is not to say that we might not be forced to engage in
such choices, but if we must do so our choice will be tragic, and some irreducible wronging
will remain, no matter how good the aggregated results (2000a, 81). Nussbaum's view, then,
has a strong chance to accommodate all four desiderata, and so seems to have clear
advantages against the Welfarist and Resourcist views that I began with.
Nussbaum provides two ways of thinking about the human good, and so derivatively of the
capability threshold that is relevant to social justice. The earlier method involves asking
which features of our lives function as criteria for humanity itself; what in life is so essential
that a being that lacked it could no longer be fully regarded as a human at all (1990a, 218-9;
1992, 214-16; 1993, 260-7; cf.  Also 2006a,  181-2). The later method instead asks which
features of our lives are necessary for human dignity (2000a, 72-4). It is not entirely clear
1 Notably, many political questions involve aggregations that are plausibly 'above the threshold' – involving 
balancing and weighing considerations, but not in a way which places anyone's sufficient good in the 
balance. Nussbaum's view can wholeheartedly endorse such aggregations. (Cf. 2000a, 211-12, on inter-good
balancing in the context of 'religious freedom' jurisprudence).
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what 'dignity' means here; Nussbaum doesn't seem to think that it introduces any substantial
content of itself2. It seems fair to assume, then, that a life with dignity is a sufficiently good
human life,  in  some sense, although is clear from the demandingness of the standard of
dignity that Nussbaum sets that the absence of dignity doesn't necessarily make a life so bad
as to not be worth living. On the other hand, it is not obvious that the sorts of functioning
which Nussbaum identifies as constituents of dignity are sufficient for a person to live a 'good
life' in the ordinary sense of that phrase3. Nor is it intuitive that an injustice is  necessarily
done to someone if they do not flourish, as such: perhaps it is their fault that they do not
flourish; perhaps their flourishing is something that humanity could not ever ensure, even if
socially-contingent  circumstances  were  very  different.  So,  the  standard  of  sufficiency
involved  in  dignity  is  likely  to  be  a  quite  specific  one:  not  identical  with,  but  lying  in
between, the standard of the life worth living and that of the good life (simpliciter)4. What is
more,  both the  humanity-theoretic  and  the  human-dignity-theoretic  approaches explicitly
involve reflection on our common species, even if that reflection must be overtly related to
the concept of well-being. This has the merit of enabling a clear explanation of why the class
of beings for whom justice is relevant is co-extensive with the class of humans5 – if humanity
is implicated by the notion of dignity itself, it will make no sense to regard justice as having
any other scope6. However,  I need not  consider the possible differences between these two
2 For example, there is no reason to think that dignity in this sense involves conventionally 'dignified' 
conduct.
3 See the list given in Appendix A.
4 Vallentyne 2005 (361-3) argues that approaches which use a notion such as necessity for human flourishing 
to restrict the space of justice-relevant functionings (or capabilities) are inadequate because in principle any 
way of functioning (whether good or bad for human beings in itself) can make a difference to whether or not
an individual has a decent life. This is not well-targeted against Nussbaum, at least as I am developing her 
thought, because although one could use the language of necessity for humanity (/human dignity) here, the 
thought is actually that the relevant bundle of functionings are necessary and sufficient for the relevant 
status as one who is living a good life.
5 All of Nussbaum's early papers, 1987-1995, contain some notable development on or around this view; this 
link to a norm of humanity will be particularly important in my project as a whole.
6 However, cf. Ch.5 fn.12 on this point.
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approaches further here7.
A second methodological feature involves two respects in which judgements about the
goodness of candidate capabilities are constrained. Firstly, because in holding that a given
capability is essential we hold that people have a claim on it (which is presumably matched
by corresponding obligations on the part of institutions and agents), we have to match our
assessment of these values and their demandingness to what is realistically possible in the
contemporary context. One motivation  for  this  is that it makes little sense to think that
humans require things for a dignified  life that few (or  no) humans could  ever actually
achieve. We are reflecting on what is essential for the good of the kind of being we are now,
not what would be so for some other kind of thing (1995, 105-9, 120).  A second is that we
believe that obligations are limited to what people can reasonably be expected to do, and if
valued capabilities are unrealistic or thresholds out of reach, this criterion will not be met
(2006a, 280-1)8. Secondly, because each of the capabilities is required, and we cannot justly
trade-off one against another, we need to consider what effect particular judgements about a
threshold level, or about a candidate capability, will have on others. If one threshold were set
too high, it would make it unrealistic that others could be met  (1987,  37).  There  is  a
potentially devastating tension in Nussbaum's methodology here. On one hand, Nussbaum's
notion of tragic choice concedes that sometimes it may be necessary to act in a way that is
inadequate or unsatisfactory when it comes to justice, because it brings someone to, or leaves
someone with a life of insufficient dignity, but is also the least of the unjust acts available. On
the other, we are given reason to weaken our normative claims whenever they outstrip the
7 I use recent neo-Aristotelian work to support a somewhat similar methodology for thinking about dignity in 
Chapter 5.
8 The interpretation I eventually develop in Ch.6 may appear to violate this criterion; in fact it does not do so, 
because the norms that extend beyond the current capacity of individuals to live by them do not generate 
deontic burdens: people's 'obligations' still do not outstrip what can reasonably be expected of them.
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possibilities that actual, contemporary situations afford. This threatens either to re-introduce
aggregative reasoning – because the considerations which justify the 'tragic' option will be
aggregative – thereby violating a key desideratum, or to introduce a distance between our
evaluations  of  the  justice  of  events  and our  judgements  about  what  people  ought  to  do,
justice-wise. The difficulties thrown up by this tension will be a principal topic of Chapter 6,
where I  argue  for  a  resolution  by locating my Nussbaum-style  sufficientarian  account  of
global justice as an ideal theory, aimed at guiding our practical imaginations and our general
evaluative responses to events, rather than our moment-to-moment decisions.
These complications aside, engaging in one or the other of the two methods above will result
in a list of capabilities that are valuable, and a judgement about just how much of each
capability is necessary in each life for a person to be suitably enabled to flourish.9 These lists,
in congruence with the fact that they originate in reflection about human life itself, are
supposed to be universal, applying to all human10 lives in the contemporary world, across
boundaries of nationality, ethnicity, cultural identity, gender, and so on. This raises important
meta-level questions about justification, which I begin to address later in this Chapter (§2.2
onwards). The compelling core of Nussbaum's view remains, however. As she argues, justice
requires11 that every human being have that bundle of capabilities and functionings, suitably
distributed over their lives, that constitutes a life of dignity.
§1.2 Why Capability?
9 See Appendix A for an example list, from Nussbaum 2006a, 76-8.
10 Precisely what is involved in these kinds of references to 'humanity' is a central topic of Ch.5.
11 Put this way, it will appear that I am proposing a supposedly complete account of social justice. However, 
this is not a necessary consequence (and I shall suggest later – in Ch.6 – that it is not very plausible). The 
claim, rather, is really just that this is part of what justice requires. Nussbaum usually inserts similar caveats 
(e.g. at 2000a, 75; 2006a, 274).
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As  the  preceding  section  has  exemplified,  capability theorists maintain that  facts  about
people's capabilities are essential to evaluation of the justice of individual situations and of
polities. Thus far, however, I have not given a characterisation of exactly why it is plausible
to hold that capabilities are so important, as it is functionings that might more naturally be
seen as components of human well-being12.  To see  this,  note  firstly  that  capabilities  are
always capabilities for something: for some functioning. What is more, capability advocates
do not hold that just any functioning will be of importance here. It is hardly important, prima
facie, to enable people to efficiently count all the blades of grass in a field13 – and this appears
to  be because  that  functioning would  be of  no value  to  its  potential  bearers.  This  might
suggest that the value of a capability is at best derivative of the value of the functioning with
reference  to  which  it  is  defined.  However,  capability  advocates  (or,  at  least,  Sen  and
Nussbaum)  are  committed  to  resisting  this  thought,  and  arguing  instead  for  a  more
independent good-making role for capabilities. In this section, then, I turn to consider the
justification for this focus on capability. I do this in two subsections. In §1.2.1, I examine the
justifications  that  Nussbaum has  considered  for  a  focus  on  capability,  together  with  the
question of how exclusive this focus is within her own work. Then, in §1.2.2, I build on this
discussion to  sketch a model  capability theory that  I  hold to  be well-supported by some
Nussbaum-style  justifications,  and which will  inform my arguments  concerning the often
more abstract or higher-order topics that form the subject-matter of most of the rest of the
Thesis. In this subsection I also provide a brief defence of the strictness of my definition of
capability.
12 See e.g. Arneson 2010, for one argument that functionings are of great importance. As I have already noted, 
capability theorists typically integrate considerations about well-being very thoroughly into their views 
about justice.
13 The example is, famously, used by John Rawls (1999, 379); cf. Foot 2002, 107).
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Before I move on to that, however, it is worth re-emphasising some of the points I made in
the last Chapter. There, I presented four desiderata for an account of global justice, of which
the first three are of importance here. Firstly, I claimed that accounts of justice need to be
sensitive to choice and other agential etiological factors – this will be of obvious importance
in  what  follows,  since  the  very concept  of  a  capability  implicates  choice,  on  my strong
definition.  Secondly,  I  noted  that  theories  need  to  be  able  to  tailor  their  evaluations  of
individuals to those individuals' circumstances to a high degree – this desideratum will be in
play insofar as different ways of understanding the capabilities focus might affect the amount,
and kind, of detailed information that is identified as salient. Thirdly,  I held that theories
should place value on intrinsic goods as far as possible, in order to render as clear as possible
the value of justice for the individual humans that it affects.
§1.2.1 'Why Capability?' in Nussbaum
In this subsection, then,  I shall concentrate on Nussbaum's work, and the role of different
justifications within that, in order to provide a relatively complete picture of one way of
thinking about the importance of capabilities in comparison  to functionings. There are two
major kinds of argument for this conclusion. The first places the connection that well-being is
supposed to have to politically-relevant conceptions of justice in the foreground. The second
emphasises the essential role of practical reasoning and choice in human well-being itself. As
well as the difference between these two kinds of argument, there is a difference in what is
being argued for: sometimes it seems that Nussbaum in particular holds that only capability is
relevant to social justice and well-being; sometimes it seems that capabilities are only one
vital ingredient in complete conceptions of such. I will expand on this later in the subsection,
but it is important to note from the outset that all that is actually necessary for capability
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theory to meet the third desideratum is that capabilities be essential to adequate thought about
the human good; it is not necessary that nothing else be too. What is more, if, as I claim, the
proper role of a capability approach involves providing characterisations of both the justice-
relevant capabilities and  other justice-relevant goods (other functionings), the fact that the
capabilities aren't of exclusive significance is even less threatening.
One instance of the first kind of answer to 'Why Capability?' would trade on the fact that the
capability approach aims to provide an account that links well-being with values such as
justice, freedom, and equality. This has potential benefits in both directions: by explaining
how well-being relates to judgements about the correct form of political arrangements it
should make it less mysterious how politics relates to ethics, but, equally, linking conceptions
of freedom and equality to well-being, such that being made more free or equal always
clearly contributes to one's good, helps to clarify  how it is that those things are valuable.
Consider  'freedom': 'negative' conceptions of freedom, as the absence of coercion, have
frequently been considered to be the most plausible analyses of everyday concepts named
'freedom', but this common-sense  plausibility is marred by the obscurity of any grounds to
think that purely negative freedom could be of intrinsic value. What we need is an analysis of
something that can genuinely be called 'freedom', but which also exhibits a strong, clear, and
ideally intrinsic, normative pull. The approach that capability theory proposes, which
preserves most importantly the common-sense judgement that freedom, as a distinctive value,
involves opportunities to act rather than (or, at least, as well as) exercises of agency14, has a
good chance of satisfying the former criterion15. So long as the link to well-being is plausible,
14 See Taylor 1991, 143-4, for a general distinction between 'opportunity' and 'exercise' concepts of liberty. 
Whether capability-theoretic freedom can really be regarded as exclusively an opportunity concept is 
debatable, but it is not important for my purposes to address this here; it is at least clear that any capability 
approach worthy of the name will involve opportunity-side considerations to some extent.
15 It is, of course, impossible to do justice to the disputes surrounding the analysis of concepts like freedom 
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it will satisfy the latter too. Turning to equality, it seems implausible that any kind of equality
that is mandated by justice could be independent of the choices that agents make in their
lives. One ubiquitous objection, associated most prominently with 'luck egalitarian' views, to
the Thesis that justice requires us to equalise the amount of good that people experience over
their lives16 is that individuals should not be responsible for the irresponsible actions of
others. For example, if someone who has had  available  a  genuine  opportunity  for  post-
secondary education wastes this, there may not be any injustice involved in their not having
that opportunity again at a later stage of their life, even if the lack of such education would
normally be an injustice.17 This kind of intuition supports opportunity-involving conceptions
of equality, too: surely justice does not require us to continually allocate resources to people
who, despite having sufficient opportunities in the past, have consistently chosen18 to waste
them, and have not thus attained equal functioning with others? From this perspective, then,
the fact that a capability-centric approach takes as relevant values opportunities, rather than
just choice-insensitive outcomes, counts in its favour for the purposes at hand.19
and equality, as they relate to the concept of capability, here. See e.g. Cohen 1993, and Sen 1993, for some 
important arguments in this area.
16 As should already be clear, the capability-theoretic view of justice does not advocate a straightforward 
equalisation of goods in any case, but it does involve equal attainment of a threshold level of good, which 
could be susceptible to similar objections.
17 There is room for considerable nuance here: for many capabilities, perhaps including the opportunity for 
rewarding higher education, I would probably hold that people should have this opportunity at multiple 
points in their lives, even if they have previously chosen not to function. But it is clear that this only 
complicates the picture, rather than changing its deeper structure: it remains the case that at various points in
space and time no injustice results when someone chooses not to function well, whereas a failure to function
with any other etiology would constitute an injustice.
18 This sort of claim need not (and should not!) operate with a simplistic conception of the requisite conditions
for ethically-relevant (luck-excluding) choice. As I flesh out a little below, the references to 'choice' in this 
section – and, arguably, throughout Nussbaum's work too – should be taken as potentially including a very 
wide range of constraints on the sorts of choice that are genuinely of significance here. Cf. fn.30 below.
19 Nussbaum, at least, does not explicitly present full arguments of this form. However, it is clear that 
Nussbaum holds that the capabilities approach is designed to be linked to conceptions of political justice, 
and (at least) of equality (e.g. at 2006a, 75-6) although she does not put emphasis on it as an analysis of 
freedom in the way that Sen does (cf. 1993, esp. 33-5). It is also clear that, quite generally, she does not see 
our extant judgements about social justice or equality as inert in the generation of a normative theory that 
relates to them (cf. e.g. 2006a, 171-179).
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A second instance of this politics-centric kind of answer, which is emphasised in Nussbaum's
more recent work (1999, 40-7; 2000a, 65-105; 2000b, 129-30; 2006a), justifies the
concentration on capabilities as necessary for the relevant normative theory to fall under an
'overlapping consensus', in the sense proposed by Rawls in his Political Liberalism. I cannot
explain Nussbaum's use of this Rawlsian context in detail here. However, her reasoning is
straightforward enough not to require much background information. Nussbaum gives several
rationales for a capabilities focus that amount to appeals to its necessity for consensus to be
possible. The first appeals to particular cases in which it is clear that people whose normative
perspectives Nussbaum thinks 'reasonable' –  and which must therefore be accommodated
within the 'overlapping consensus' – would wish to forgo functioning themselves, but might
nevertheless support bringing themselves and others to the point of choice about whether to
do so or not. The principal example here20 is of religious fasting: the ascetic, for example,
wishes to fast, thereby depriving themselves of the functioning of nutrition; but they need not
oppose themselves or others being given the effective choice of fasting or not (Nussbaum
2000a, 87; cf. 2006a, 79-80). The second, rather than appealing to particular cases, argues
that the kind of general independence from particular 'comprehensive' conceptions of the
good that political liberalism requires is violated if we require people to function in particular
ways (Nussbaum 2000a, 87, 95-6).
The second kind of justification for the focus on the capabilities, that which aims to do work
within the conception of the human good itself, also comes in two forms. I'll deal with these
quite briefly now, since there is considerable overlap with the argument I endorse below. One
form, which is most central in Nussbaum's early work, stresses the central, 'architectonic' role
20 The example also occurs at Sen 1993, 40.
28
of individual practical reason in the good life. Nussbaum claims that practical reason –  the
ability to assess and select individual actions and ways of living among plausible alternatives
–  is such an important element in the human good that it infuses all the rest. Even
functionings such as eating and drinking seem less than fully human if they occur in the total
absence of reflection and deliberation (1987, 44-50; 2000a, 82, 85 and 92). The other form
argues that many particular activities could not even minimally be regarded as valuable
human functionings in the absence of reflection, deliberation, and effective choice. Among
the examples given here are love, which is not genuinely present unless it originates in the
self, rather than being imposed from outside; and play, which is not present if activity is
coerced (2000a, 88).
Now that the grounds which Nussbaum gives for concentration on the capabilities have been
sketched, the remainder of this section will be taken up with an assessment of their
coherence. Firstly, it is worth noting that she seems to hold that some justifications of the first
– political – kinds will be necessary for a defence of any rigid focus on capability rather than
functioning. This is because it  is  clear  that she believes,  as  an  ethical  matter,  that some
functioning of at least some kinds is necessary for a  genuinely good  human life. Very
plausibly,  capabilities themselves are not enough to  ensure  flourishing. This shows that
Nussbaum does not think that one can rely exclusively on appeals to this second kind of
grounding for the capabilities-focus, if that focus is to be exclusive: if the relevant conception
of the human good requires even some actual functioning, it will not be sufficient, to ensure a
minimally good life, to merely guarantee the capabilities21. The existence of the second kind
21 Unless, that is, the actual functionings that are required are necessary prerequisites of more complex and 
difficult-to-instantiate capabilities. For example, nutritional functioning throughout childhood would 
obviously be a necessary prerequisite for a productive and autonomous role in the adult workforce. I take it 
for granted, however, that not all of the functionings that are plausibly required for a flourishing life are 
going to be components of complex capabilities in this way. 
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of well-being-based argumentation is probably not enough to prevent this problem, because it
is not plausible, at least prima facie, that very many of the individual functionings must (by
definition) flow from capability in the way that play or love must. Plausibly, the sort of
functionings that seem absolutely necessary for human dignity or human life itself will tend
to be of a very simple sort – such as the consumption of adequate food and water, or enough
of (e.g.) the social bases of self-respect22 to ward off crippling mental disorders – and it is just
such functionings that are least likely to display the requisite  conceptual dependence on
practical-rational choice.
Secondly, there are reasons to doubt that Nussbaum's explicit endorsement of the capabilities-
only view (e.g. at 2000a, 87) is consistently upheld. The key example here is  what  she
sometimes calls 'dignity', which seems to stand in for a large bundle of functionings centred
on the development  and  maintenance of flourishing relationships with others. Firstly,
Nussbaum claims that the failure to have dignity in relationships will damage other
capabilities, and thus that mandating dignity may be justified on these instrumental grounds
(2000a, 91-5)23. However, she also holds that coercive promotion of dignity functionings is
warranted regardless of such means-end reasons: 
Suppose a state were to say “We give you the option of being treated with dignity. 
Here is a penny. If you give it back to us, we will treat you respectfully, but...you may 
keep the penny, and we will humiliate you.” This would be a bizarre and unfortunate 
nation, hardly compatible, it seems, with basic justice. We want political principles 
that offer respect to all citizens, and, in this one instance, the principles should give 
them no choice in the matter. (2006a, 171-2).
The existence of this exception suggests that the ultimate rationale for the focus on capability
is of a flexible, non-absolutist sort. Importantly, this is a flexibility that Nussbaum is much
more reticent to countenance in the case of direct trade-offs between distinct capabilities
22 See Rawls 1999, 54.
23 See also 2000b, 128-32; where these points are made again in response to Arneson.
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themselves (2000a, 81); there, she holds that losses to one capability cannot be
straightforwardly made up by gains to another. The elasticity of the normative conception that
must lie behind such reasoning seems ill-suited to representation in terms of the kind of
deontological, individual autonomy-based rationale that Nussbaum appropriates from Rawls.
If a substantial amount of  justificatory work were being done by the general injunction
against forcing people to act in ways contrary to their 'reasonable' comprehensive conceptions
of the good, we would expect to see a clean, absolute prohibition on the direct promotion of
functioning in cases where a 'reasonable' conception of the good is plausibly at stake. This is
especially clear given that Nussbaum misrepresents the situation in the quote above by
focusing on government actions; the interventions which governments should take to prevent
violations of dignity in non-governmental contexts such as family life are also, for the
capability theorist, to the point24. It is  far less clear that the exemption for 'dignity' can be
squared with the Rawlsian prohibition on promoting comprehensive conceptions when the
interventions in question might involve (e.g.) shutting down a ubiquitous network of private
members clubs where gendered humiliation is practised for money, etc. If Nussbaum thinks
that 'reasonable' conceptions of the good  are not at risk of contravention in such 'dignity'
cases, we should expect to see argument to that effect.
However, an argument for a general capabilities focus which works within the conception of
well-being, or which  appeals to links to conceptions of freedom, justice, or equality, has
much better prospects to support  the necessary flexibility. Cases of choice-incompatible
functioning may be justified on the grounds that the value for well-being of practical-rational
planning and choice-making is reduced or absent for  exceptional cases like that of dignity
24 I stress this in elaborating on Nussbaum's general rejection of public/private distinctions below (§1.3)
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(perhaps because e.g. a choice to degradingly submit to the dominance of others is destructive
of practical reason itself). Alternately, perhaps the cogency of the  capability-theoretic
conceptions of freedom or equality will not be significantly damaged by relaxing the
prohibition on the promotion of functioning in these limited cases.
Taken together, these points show that it is obscure what essential work the appeal to
violations of people's moral autonomy in forcing them to function actually does. On the one
hand, it does not seem plausible that considerations of well-being alone can justify an
exclusive restriction to the promotion of capability; this might suggest that some Rawls-style
liberal rationalisation must fill the gap. On the other, Nussbaum appears not, in fact, to think
that such an exclusive restriction is appropriate. Ultimately, then, most of the normative work
here seems to be being done by conceptions of well-being, rather than by restrictions
originating in thoroughly independent political thought. Given that in early versions of her
approach this was the only justification given, this also suggests that not much of substance in
her account has changed with respect to  this issue, despite the large superficial change that
has resulted from her endorsement of Rawlsian political liberalism25.
§1.2.2 Justifying the Capability Account
As I made clear in the previous Chapter (§4), the primary notion of capability that is intended
to do work in the version of the capability approach that I want to defend is extremely strict,
in one respect. This is because someone only counts as having a fully-fledged capability, on
this view, if they are in a state such that a properly-constituted (uncoerced, etc.) act of their
will cannot fail to make a difference, in determining whether or not they instantiate a valuable
25 This does not become fully explicit until 2000a, but Nussbaum's constructive engagement with Rawlsian 
liberalism begins with her 1997 and (especially) 1998.
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functioning. If they choose to function, they will do so; if they do not so choose, they will
not. This is a much more rigorous and precise specification than that which generally plays a
role in Nussbaum's work (or that of Sen). It is,  correspondingly,  also a state that will be
comparatively rare. On the other hand, as the previous section suggests, I am very sceptical
that capability – on even a much weaker construal than my own – could provide anything like
a  complete basis for an account of justice, or (even more clearly) an account of the human
good. Firstly, as critics such as Arneson have repeatedly stressed, sometimes (at least) justice
requires that people function, rather than just having capability, and in some further cases it is
obscure why capability is of great value, over and above the value of its related functioning.26
Secondly, there is a potential tension between the strictness of a conception of capability, and
the tightness of the focus upon capability so conceived. The more strictly capability is defined
– the harder it is to possess, relative to its functioning, and thus the 'further away' it is from its
functioning27 – the more difficult  it  will  become to justify an exclusive or near-exclusive
focus on it. Thus, if a fairly strict conception of capability is warranted, as I shall argue is the
case, only a relatively loose focus on capabilities as components of the good life or of the
life-relative-to-which-justice-has-been-done (what I am calling 'dignity') will be warranted in
turn.
As things stand, I have given some reason to hold that we should not pursue an exclusive
focus on capability, and I have been working with a fairly strict biconditional definition for
26 It may well even be that there are cases where causing people to have effective opportunities to function 
rather than causing them to function is actually a very bad thing, rather than just being of negligible value. 
This will be the case to the extent that giving people a choice about doing things always leaves open the 
possibility that they won't do them; less obviously, it might also be the case that some things that are of 
value in even adult lives are best when they aren't planned, deliberated about, and chosen from a broad 
space of open alternatives. But I won't pursue this thought further here.
27 As is often the case, this notion of distance can be identified with some function that determines a closeness 
ordering of possible worlds, but I won't attempt to give one here; I think that the intuitive idea will suffice.
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capability  itself.  This  opens  the  way  for  a  defence  of  capability,  strictly  conceived,  as
something that is of intrinsic value in human lives, and something that, in many instances,
human lives need to contain in order for justice to be done with respect to them. In what
follows, I will pursue both ends (the defence of the strict definition, and the answering of the
'why  capability?'  question)  simultaneously.  To  begin  with,  schematically,  the  case  for
capability as a distinctive component of good lives, and one with which justice should be
particularly concerned, is as follows. Capability is essential because it guarantees that people
are able  to actively choose the good, in  those cases where the good is  not exhausted by
choice-involving functionings directly28. The thought is then – again, schematically – that a
chosen good is, eo ipso, better than an unchosen good.29
However,  'choice'  is  hardly a  transparent  concept  here,  and must  be unpacked in several
ways30. One way appeals to the diverse array of variants of a functioning that (plausibly, at
least) can only arise when the creativity of agents with open possibilities is in play. This is
probably part of what Nussbaum has in mind when she talks about the value of being e.g.
able to choose what and how to eat, over and above the nutritional or gustatory value of what
is actually consumed. Functionings that can be instantiated in more or less  creative ways –
which  is,  arguably,  most  of  them  –  are,  then,  particularly  apt  for  a  capability-theoretic
28 As Nussbaum says (see above), there are probably some good functionings that constitutively involve 
practical rationality, and the permanent possibility of effective choice, to such an extent that anyone who 
instantiates them must possess capability in even my very strict sense. Clearly, for these cases no additional 
argument for the value of capability is required, over and above an argument for the value of the 
functioning.
29 A different, more theory-laden way of putting this would be to note that the virtuous choose the good, 
whenever the good is apt for choice; virtue is at least usually a species of autonomy. Anyone who is 
heteronomously pushed into instantiating a justice-related functioning will thereby be prevented from living 
the life of virtue; at least in many cases, this will be deeply unjust. Cf. Kymlicka 1988, 183, on the necessity
of a life 'lived from the inside'. See also the next paragraph.
30 Arguably, there might be as many qualitatively distinct but similarly good-making features of the processes 
that generate a functioning as there are distinct valuable functionings to be generated (maybe more, indeed).
'Choice' would then merely be a theoretical place-holder term for this otherwise-undistinctive mass of 
features. I am particularist enough not to be worried if this turns out to be the case. Cf. Ch.4, §2.1.
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treatment.  Alternatively,  it  can  be  valuable  to  plan certain  activities  with  the  veracious
awareness that one's plans will make a difference to how things go. Similarly,  deliberation
about whether or how to go about something, alone or with others, can be a valuable process,
and can be more valuable, again, when it will be effective in changing the course of events.
Finally31, and most importantly, these processes are generally, if not necessarily, involved in
coming  to  recognise  the  value  of  functionings  for  oneself.  It  is  often  only  through
deliberation,  discussion,  creative  exploration,  and so  on,  that  the  true  value  of  activities,
relationships,  etc.,  becomes  clear.  This  is  especially  important  within  the  context  of  the
Aristotelian tradition that will become increasingly prominent as this Thesis progresses, since
it is almost a commonplace within that tradition that the virtuous – those who lead good lives
– do not merely do the right thing (neutrally described), they do it for the right reason; this
requires that a person can respond appropriately to the right features of things in functioning,
and agential etiology is clearly important for this to occur. But even apart from a commitment
to Aristotelian thinking, it seems as plausible as anything – ethically speaking – that doing
something in recognition of its value, and (thus) because of that value, is generally better than
doing it incidentally.
This  provides  a  solid  motivation  for  some  degree  of  focus  on  capability  as  well  as
functioning, but I should still spell out why it is particularly relevant to the more rigorous
definition of capability that I have proposed. Each of the aspects of agential involvement in
31 The etiology of a functioning can also make a difference in ways that do not obviously have to do with 
agentive capacities. For example, it might be better to instantiate some (or all!) functionings when they are 
performed against a background of social equality, respect, etc. Or, perhaps, it might be best if they occur in 
the context of widespread societal consensus, perhaps as a result of democratic deliberation. Sen 
distinguishes between 'process' and 'opportunity' aspects of freedom, somewhat along the same lines (e.g. at 
2009, 228-31). I won't, however, explore these etiological factors further, since – however important they 
might be to a truly comprehensive overview of the components of a good or dignified life – they are less 
distinctive of the capability approach, and that is my target view.
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functioning  that  I  have  highlighted  are  connected,  in  more  or  less  direct  ways,  to  the
possession of effective choice. The virtue of the strict definition, then, is that it guarantees
that effective choice will be present in a way that will actually make a difference to the way
the chooser's life goes. For contrast, consider a slightly weaker variant of the strict definition.
This would drop the biconditional clause, thus: if an individual has the capability Cf, they will
instantiate functioning f if they choose to do so; not, that is,  only if they choose to do so.
Here, the capable agent does have an effective choice, but it is left open that their choice may
not make any difference to the way things go for them, since it may be that they would have
instantiated the functioning regardless32. 
I  do  not  want  to  suggest  that  a  person  who  has  the  weak  capability  for  some valuable
functioning is in a bad situation – they do have a genuine opportunity to realise something
that will make their life go well. However, some of the features of the agentive capacities that
make capability so significant are not necessarily fully present in this case. Take Sen's classic
malaria example33 – he holds that someone who has a public health protection from malaria
thereby gains a valuable capability. On the weaker definition, this is plausible – they do gain
an effective choice to be malaria-free (and malaria-freedom is a very valuable functioning).
Nevertheless, on the stronger definition, this is not a complete capability, since the choice to
be malaria-free can make no difference; in the counterfactual case where the choice is not
made,  the  agent  instantiates  the  functioning  regardless.  However,  consider  the  valuable
processes involved in choice, outlined above, at this point. Firstly, is it plausible that the (ex
hypothesi)  capable  individuals  would  gain  a  valuable  sort  of  creativity  from  malaria
protection?  No.  People  might collectively  plan  an  anti-malaria  policy,  and  engage  in
32 Compare Vallentyne 2005, esp. 363-6, on the distinction between 'control' and 'effective' freedoms, and his 
argument for the only partial importance of the former.
33 Sen 1993, 54-5. Cf. Cohen 1993, 33.
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deliberation to  that  end,  but  this  could only be an extremely limited process,  since once
effective  protection  was in  place,  there  would  no  longer  be any need to  engage in  such
activity.  Deliberation  and planning would become pointless  for  at  least  almost  all  of  the
individuals  involved  –  apart,  that  is,  from  the  technical  (i.e.  medical;  environmental)
professionals who would be implicated by the continuing process of securing the capability
through time34. It appears, then, that the distinctive agential processes that pick out capability
as ethically significant are not significantly present in this sort of case35. They are only likely
to  be  fully present  where  strong capability  is  realised.  This  gives  us  excellent  reason to
conclude that it is only if we include some elements of strong capability into our approach
that we can really remain true to the distinctive motivations for the capability approach per
se.
To conclude,  what  does  the view of  the life  of dignity look like,  once this  is  taken into
account? What does justice require that every human life contain? My answer is that lives
must contain many different functionings – some of them (like adequate nutrition, adequate
health, and the social bases of self-respect) must be constantly present, while others (like
fulfilling employment and leisure time) are temporary, and must be distributed appropriately
across life. In many cases, it may also be of some value for people to have relatively weak
forms of capability for these functionings, even where strong capability is impossible. But
human  lives,  in  order  for  the  value  of  practical  rationality,  creativity  and  collective
deliberation to be adequately represented in them, also need, at certain relatively rare points,
and with reference to certain functionings only, to contain capability in the strictest sense.
34 Clearly, any creativity involved for these people will constitute an aspect of their valuable labour, not an 
aspect of their malaria-freedom itself.
35 Arguably, what this suggests is that protection from malaria is not plausibly a valuable capability after all – 
having the opportunity to be malaria-free isn't significantly more valuable than just (securely) being so. 
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People need many things to flourish; one of them is for their agency to make a real and
positive difference to the world.
§1.3 The Bounds of Justice
Conceptions  of  justice  can  helpfully  be  distinguished  from one  another  in  terms  of  the
thought that each involves substantive outer and inner bounds. The outer bound concerns the
maximal set of patients of justice – those with reference to whom justice should make claims;
the inner bound concerns the relative size of the 'private' and 'public' spheres – the regions of
human relations which form the proper ambit of the norms of justice. In this section, I set the
stage for the discussion of universalism and the proper role of theories of global justice in the
Thesis by briefly summarising, and then noting some important problems with, Nussbaum's
central claims about the location of these bounds.
Nussbaum's approach to the former question is relatively easy to summarise:  Nussbaum's
theory has always had a global scope, and rests on a cosmopolitan perspective, at least to the
extent that it applies to all human beings as individuals, regardless of nationality. She notes
that it does not follow from this that any implementation of the approach must occur at the
level  to  which  it  most  fundamentally  applies  (2000a,  101-105;  2006a,  306-324),  but
consistently demonstrates a willingness to advocate pragmatic interference with nation-state
practice to  protect capabilities entitlements,  at  least  where the most serious injustices are
involved. I do not disagree significantly with this aspect of Nussbaum's thinking. I accept
both  the  fundamental  cosmopolitan  answer  to  the  question  about  application,  and  the
recognition  that  this  has  no  immediate  consequences  of  itself  for  what  justice  would
prescribe. Rather than constituting (i.e.) a directly applicable decision procedure for NGO,
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global-governance, or nation-state policy-making, the capabilities approach provides a more-
or-less  general  ethical  orientation,  which  Nussbaum  sometimes  (e.g.  at  2000a,  102-6)
compares  to  that  contained  within  the  necessarily-vague  promulgations  of  constitutional
statute36.  My  only  significant  argument  in  the  vicinity  is  that,  until  the  ethical  role  of
humanity is completely clear, the justification for a universalist cosmopolitanism will not be
clear either. Nussbaum's adoption of a Rawlsian 'political-liberal' ban on the involvement of
'comprehensive' or 'metaphysical' doctrines would preclude the kind of Aristotelian story of
which she was once a proponent37; clearly, there is no consensus that the nature of the human
species generates norms of itself38! It is not clear what could take its place: if the suggestion is
that it simply follows from contemporary global political culture that all and only individual
humans are patients of justice, this will – at best – simply beg the question, since (however
contingently) all of the participants in that culture are human.
There are two important potentially problematic aspects of Nussbaum's thinking about the
domain  of  justice  and  its  practical  role.  Firstly,  some  of  her  language  links  capability-
theoretic  justice  too  cavalierly  with  the  purview  of  state  institutions.  This  limits  the
applicability of the capability approach, as well as building in dubious statist assumptions
without proper argument. Secondly, her commitment to Rawlsian public reason threatens to
implicate  a  public/private  contrast  which  would  be  inconsistent  with  her  feminist
commitments.  Reflecting  on  her  attempts  to  avoid  such implications  helps  to  clarify the
extent and nature of her liberal  assumptions about justice,  and demonstrates the need for
36 It is also reasonable to suppose that Nussbaum agrees with this thought since it is close to Rawls' view of 
the status of principles of justice. See esp. Rawls 1997, 766-68.
37 See Chapter 5, §1.2 for a brief account of Nussbaum's original Aristotelianism about humanity, and Chapter 
5 more generally for my appropriation of Aristotelian ideas in giving a similar story.
38 'Of itself' is important here – many proponents of 'human rights' rest their case on the (putatively complete) 
overlap between personhood and humanity, for example – and in this account personhood is doing the 
normative work, not humanity itself.
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alternative claims at certain points. In the first two subsequent subsections, I focus on these
different questions about the inner bound. In the third, I take a broader view, evaluating the
liberal bent of Nussbaum's feminism, and arguing that, so long as negative-libertarian values
are not privileged over others,  and once the role of individualism has been clarified,  her
liberalism – if it is such – is acceptable.
§1.3.1 The Inner Bound: the Role of the State
The first problem concerns the relation between the requirements that capability theory is
supposed to generate, and the proper domain of state – or other large-scale institutional –
action. This is a salient issue for my purposes because Nussbaum thinks of the standard of
capability-theoretic justice as generating prescriptions primarily for governmental or other
macroscopic institutional  action:  typical  wording, from  Women and Human Development,
speaks of 'the structure of social and political institutions' (2000a, 75) as the normative target
of the capabilities approach39. In this section, I shall argue that this is problematic, firstly
because it implies that state and other macroscopic institutions must have a large amount of
power over very many domains of life, which is both dubious and unnecessary, and secondly
because it would limit the conception of dignity to elements which large-scale, powerful, and
typically coercive institutions can actively support.
The first  aspect of this problem concerns the coercive and intrusive (distinctively  power-
laden) tendencies of state action. Nussbaum exposes herself to attack on these grounds in
much of her work. Most explicitly,  she says that 'the central  capabilities always supply a
39 This is not unambiguous across Nussbaum's corpus as a whole; in 'Aristotelian Social Democracy' (1990a), 
by contrast, she begins by setting herself 'the task of political arrangement' (208-9), which seems neutral 
between institution-focussed and more basically relational strategies, although she soon glosses this as a 
question about 'the job of government' (214).
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compelling interest for purposes of government action' (2000a, 280). This may not entail that
failures of dignity will always require actual government action – the government could have
a prerogative that it (contingently) need not make use of, because it happens that the relevant
needs  are  already met  –  but  it  does  put  the  emphasis  strongly  on  state-based  solutions.
Several thinkers have criticised this aspect of Nussbaum's work, usually with reference to a
sub-set of her central  capabilities for which it  seems especially likely that state  action is
unlikely to be appropriate. Eric Nelson (2008, esp. 98-103)40, Henry Richardson (2000, 314-
15), and Thom Brooks (2014, 6-7) all raise versions of this criticism. The point is clearest in
Brooks41: 
Consider the capability to bodily integrity. For Nussbaum, this capability includes  
‘having opportunities for sexual satisfaction’. What would it mean for a community to
secure the capability of its members to have such opportunities? The community  
cannot require any fellow citizen to love you, nor desire sexual satisfaction with you. 
Neither may the community enforce existing couples to desire sexual satisfaction with
their partners. Either scenario would be highly intrusive and unacceptable. Moreover, 
it is far from clear how a community might act through public policy to ensure the 
capabilities  threshold  is  reached.  Would  we  expect  to  find  government-funded  
matchmaking websites or speed dating clubs? (6-7)
One option, in response to criticism of this kind, would be to abandon the claim that the
capability  for  sexual  satisfaction  is  an  aspect  of  dignity.  Consider  also,  against  this
background,  what  the  state  might  have  to  do  to  ensure  that  individuals  can  '[enter]  into
meaningful  relationships  of mutual  recognition with other  workers',  or  '[be]  able  to  have
attachments  to  things  and  people  outside  ourselves'42.  Thus,  there  are  likely  to  be  many
40 Nelson's primary concern is actually with neutrality, and whether the role of the state in Nussbaum is 
compatible with the neutralist (Rawlsian) liberalism she endorses. I agree that she can be attacked on those 
grounds, but I do not ultimately endorse neutrality anyway, so I need not press this point here.
41 An important aspect of Richardson's and Brooks' criticisms concerns whether the state could coherently 
promote only capability in many instances, because there is no real gap in practice between functioning and 
capability in some cases, because the functionings in question are intrinsically other-involving. The 
capability for sexual satisfaction is like this; Richardson also suggests that various political rights are too 
(2000, 319-26). For example, a person cannot be capable of living in mutual respect with others unless 
others actively respect them (which is the relevant functioning).
42 See Appendix A.
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capabilities for which similar difficulties arise, at least once the massively power-involving
nature of governmental involvement is made clear, so the same is likely to go for many of the
most intimate capabilities on Nussbaum's list. However, a capability approach limited in this
way to  'bread  and  butter'  capabilities  (Nelson  2008,  102)  will  clearly  fail  to  satisfy  the
motivations  which,  I  have  noted,  gave  rise  to  it.  In  Nussbaum's  conception,  at  least,  the
capability approach is supposed to be motivated by the thought that justice requires everyone
to have an equal basis for a minimally good life. If 'minimally good life' here merely referred
to (e.g.) the failure to starve to death, this revision would be compatible with that. Clearly,
however,  this is not what any capability theorist has had in mind – what we want is not
merely for people to be enabled to continue to (just barely) live; what we want is for them to
be enabled to flourish (at least, in some substantial sense). 
What  is  more,  it  is  not  really  clear  from  the  outset  why  a  restrictive  emphasis  on
governmental action should be warranted. If the motivation for the capability approach is to
enable people to live with one another in a way compatible with their human dignity, it is far
from obvious  that  the  government  always  need  be  implicated  even  as  a  safety  net.  An
alternative option is  to begin by thinking more holistically about how people need to be
relating to one another (including through the institutions that affect them) in order for their
dignity to be secure. On this approach, government action only needs to be implicated when
A) it is actually needed, and B) when it is genuinely the best relational means available. For
cases like the capability for sexual satisfaction, at least, these conditions will rarely be met43,
but this does not necessitate a watering-down of our conception of dignity.
43 I say rarely, not never: sexual/relationship education policy should probably play a role here, as well as the 
prohibition of genital mutilation that is Nussbaum's focus (2000a, 94).
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The second aspect of the problem, then, concerns whether governmental action will always
(or even usually) be the best means of securing capability, if I am correct that, fundamentally,
the motivation for the capabilities approach runs broader than the governmental sphere44. One
lacuna that arises is Nussbaum's approach concerns a lack of attention to non-governmental
action  aimed  at  (most  obviously)  the  removal  of  societal  (but  not  paradigmatically
institutional)  barriers  to  equal  capability,  such  as  sexism  and  racism.  These  structural
injustices  affect  capability  both  on a  broad scale  –  because  they generate  inequalities  of
treatment across most of the capabilities on the list – and on the narrower scale – because
they intrinsically violate certain capabilities, such as the capability to 'be treated as a dignified
being whose worth is  equal to  that  of others'45.  The clear  relevance of non-governmental
action,  e.g.  that  occurring  within  social  movements  such  as  feminism,  suggests  that  this
lacuna is  also  motivated  by Nussbaum's  emphasis  on  the  institutional  sphere.  As  I  have
already noted, her claim may not be that the entirety of capability-theoretic normative thought
is restricted to what falls within paradigmatically institutional (usually, state-level) frames. If
not, however, it is unclear why Nussbaum never discusses how capability-theoretic justice
could govern the actions of 'private' individuals and groups, by – for example – motivating
campaigns  against  sexist  or  racist  advertising,  or  anti-bystander  initiatives  to  reduce  the
incidence of microagressions. After all, these largely non-institutional forms of praxis have
often been more prominent in action for the effective promotion of social justice over recent
decades than legal or regulatory changes. 
In conclusion, there appear to be good reasons not to adopt a restrictive emphasis on the
44 Of course, it will often be the case, empirically speaking, that legal guarantees and mandates for state action 
are the only way to reliably ensure that the capability threshold is attained by all. If so, state action will 
usually be required. But this would still not follow from the basic reasoning that motivates the capability 
approach itself.
45 Again, see Appendix A.
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space  of  (especially  governmental)  institutions  when  thinking  about  the  practical  and
evaluative  targets  of  the  capability  approach.  In  what  follows,  I  shall  operate  on  the
understanding that – in principle – any way in which individuals relate to one another might
be a target for change, with state action providing only one of the means to ensure the equal
dignity of all.
§1.3.2 The Inner Bound: the Personal as Political
The  second of  the  problematic  regions  of  Nussbaum's  thinking  about  the  domain  of  the
political concerns her response to an important line of feminist and other radical critique,
which corresponds loosely to the slogan 'the personal is political!' Generally speaking, this
critique generates suspicion of attempts to restrict the space of the political to traditionally
'public' institutions and the spaces they affect, arguing instead that justice and other political
norms must be applied unrestrictedly across society. Many feminist thinkers have noted ways
in which the traditional liberal presumption that certain regions of relational life are beyond
politics, and cannot be evaluated or interacted with on the basis of justice-involving critique,
has  functioned  to  protect  the  unequal  standing  of  powerful  or  otherwise  privileged
individuals. I cannot provide an expansive overview of this work here. However, Jenny Saul
provides a nice encapsulation of the orientation: 
Many feminists...maintain that there is much more to power relations between the  
sexes than the presence or absence of laws against sex discrimination. In particular, 
they  argue  for  the  significance  of  matters  traditionally  considered  private  and  
personal,  rather  than  political  –  the  structure  of  families,  sexual  relationships,  
appearance-related concerns, or the words we use. (2003, 3).46
Nussbaum  has  attempted  to  accommodate  this  species  of  anti-privacy  move  within  the
46 Cf. esp. Benhabib 1993; Jaggar 1991; Young 2009; as well as many of the essays within the Saul volume 
itself, for several useful variations on the theme.
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confines of political liberalism, relying on the work of Okin (1989) in doing so (e.g. at 1999a,
66-7). She argues that social institutions such as the family must be regarded as parts of the
Rawlsian basic structure – the 'public' side of the public/private divide (2000, 241-297, esp.
252-283). However, even if this were sufficient to assuage Okin-style doubts about privacy,
Nussbaum's acceptance of a Rawlsian framing – with its constitutive constraints on the sorts
of claim that can be made within the 'political' domain – generates  of itself a public/private
contrast.  This is necessarily the case, because there must be some non-empty set of 'non-
political'  normative  considerations,  and  parts  of  life  to  which  they  pertain,  if  political
liberalism is not to amount to a ban on most47 ethical disagreement tout court48. For example,
she has explicitly claimed, following Rawls, that 'churches and universities' (2000a, 272-3)
are not part of the basic structure, and so are not fully subject to the general requirements of
justice. The explicit  reason she gives is that these entities 'have a life outside the state...;
[while] families do not'. The test is, then, whether or not an aspect of human interrelation 'is a
social and legal construct in a... fundamental and thoroughgoing way' (2000a, 275). 
However, it is unclear both why churches and universities are not recognised as social, if not
legal constructs, and why this is a relevant criterion at all. In the absence of a strict restriction
of capability-theoretic attention to the domain of direct state action, which I have already
argued would be untenable, there is no obvious reason why the existence of a 'life outside the
state' should have this deep significance. Perhaps, if the rectification of injustice were always
47 It is necessary to say 'most', because the later Rawls eventually concedes the existence of a plurality of 
'reasonable' liberal conceptions of justice, in addition to his own conception involving the two principles: by
Rawls 1997, the public reason methodology is described as generating a 'family of liberal political 
conceptions of justice' (e.g. 767, and throughout). Thus, there is some reasonable disagreement even within 
the political domain of basic justice.
48 This criticism will only apply to 'consensus'-based versions of political (or 'justificatory' (Gaus 1999)) 
liberalism. 'Convergence' models, such as those of Gaus (2012) and Vallier (2011) would not have this 
implication, even if they were extended to cover a more inclusive conception of the political domain.
45
a matter of state action (especially coercive state action), it would make sense to restrict the
application of justice-concepts solely to areas of life with which the state was already deeply
involved (if that is not, in any case, an all-encompassing set). But I have argued that injustice
does  not  always  consist  in,  and is  not  always  best  rectified  by,  state  action.  A plausible
alternative explanation is that Nussbaum's real reason for adopting a restriction to the 'basic
structure'  is  a  classically liberal  concern with negative freedom, reflecting  her  evaluative
rejection of a world in which religion- or education-involving choices are constrained by
(even non-state?) others in the name of justice. It is compatible with everything I have and
will  say for this to be a sound evaluative judgement within the capability approach. But,
again, there is no need to invoke a principled public/private boundary in order to do so; if a
certain action – even one motivated by concern for a core capability – would significantly49
violate  a  dignity-involving capability (which  at  least  some non-state  interventions  within
academic or  'religious'  life  plausibly would),  that  is  sufficient  to  regard it  as  unjust.  The
appeal to the 'basic structure' in bounding the polis is at best a theoretical third wheel, and at
worst an illegitimate means of smuggling in negative-libertarian values without argument.
Once  the  anti-privacy  motivation  is  on  the  table,  there  is  no  reason  to  preserve  any
public/private  distinction in  principle;  instead,  the contours of political  critique of human
relations are justified in directly political terms50. We are always justified in deep hermeneutic
suspicion (Ricoeur 1970,  32)51 of proposals to rigidly cordon off areas of human life on
grounds of privacy, given the effectively anti-egalitarian history of such proposals. It may be
49 Enough, that is, to bring or leave someone below the relevant threshold.
50 I am assuming throughout that, since justice is an ethical concept, there is at least a sense in which politics is
continuous with ethics. When my discussion turns to meta-level matters, I often refer to ethics as my 
subject-matter; the 'ethics' I have in mind throughout includes the concept of justice, and is, to that extent at 
least, also political. It may well be the case, as a result, that 'politics-first' modes of political philosophy such
as political realism are beyond the dialectical scope of this Thesis.
51 Cf. Leiter 2004, which provides a fairly expansive development of the concept.
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that there are some aspects of our lives together which are genuinely private, in the sense that
they rarely (or never) affect human dignity, and so will be of negligible (or no) relevance to
considerations of justice. But, if so, this is a normative thesis in its own right, and the reasons
for hermetic encapsulation of such parts of life can be expressed within the space of political
(justice-related) norms using existing concepts. For example, rather than stipulating that the
bedroom, or child-rearing, or academic mentorship, or comedic speech (or speech  per se)
exist  beyond the properly political  realm,  one can simply argue concretely that  (e.g.)  the
putatively valuable capability (that is, freedom) to engage in sexist joke-making is precluded
by (e.g.) public expressions of rejection, non-state direct action, and/or state coercion52. But
this argument must be made, clearly, and on the merits, rather than surreptitiously relying on
the liberal assumption of privacy that has done so much to protect injustice in the past.
For this reason, as well as those surveyed in the previous subsection, in the remainder of the
Thesis, I shall operate (pace much of the liberal tradition) with the presumption that the polis
– the domain to which norms of justice apply53 – has no inner bound. This will be important
52 Clearly, the additional claim – about vocal rejection or other non-state action – will have to be made in 
many cases, since I do not closely link the rectification of injustice or preservation of justice to state action 
alone. Many political actions which might offend against the putative value of (some conception of) privacy,
then, would not do so apart from the deployment of state coercion.
53 There is a risk of straw-manning the (e.g.) liberal opponent here – i.e. the Rawlsian strands in Nussbaum – 
by overstating the extent to which principles of justice do not extend to elements of relationship outwith the 
basic structure. Rawls' late position is that although principles of justice do not apply fully and directly to 
the 'internal life' of non-basic institutions (e.g. at 1997, 789), they do constrain the form of such institutions 
from the outside, guaranteeing most pressingly an effective capacity to exit the institution (789-90). The 
upshot of this, Rawls claims, is that 'the spheres of the political and the public, of the nonpublic and the 
private, fall out from the content and application of the conception of justice and its principles. If the so-
called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such thing' (1997, 791). It 
is not the case, then, that Rawlsian justice incorporates a private sphere whose boundaries are not 
determined by the conception of justice (and other political values). Rather, liberal justice is supposed to be 
self-limiting, restricting its central principles to a sub-set of relationships on grounds of freedom-promotion,
or non-applicability, or both; the general liberal rationale suggests the former, some of Rawls' comments, 
e.g. about non-political conceptions of justice within the family (ibid.), suggest the latter. I do not think it 
obvious that a vague sufficientarian conception such as that which I am developing here would have to 
incorporate such theory-internal restrictions, even if it were proposed as a complete theory of justice; the 
additional flexibility of the capability approach should help to avoid non-applicability worries, at least.
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in what follows insofar as I eventually endorse – in Chapter 6 – a fundamentally relational
Aristotelian conception of justice which represents traditionally 'public' (governmental, civil-
societal, etc.) modes of interrelation as comprising only part of the polis.
§1.3.3 Liberalism?: Individualism and the Privileging of Choice
The two strands that I have discussed, taken together, motivate a turn away from some of
Nussbaum's restrictive emphases in developing her capability approach. In Chapter 6, I will
make use of both elements in articulating a somewhat different interpretation of the proper
role of capability theory in guiding political practice. However, another controversial aspect
of Nussbaum's work on the political role of the capabilities needs to be discussed; here, too,
my project will need a solid basis for further development. This aspect concerns the liberal
nature of Nussbaum's proposals. I discuss two forms that Nussbaum's liberalism takes within
her deployment of the capability approach, and arrive, after clarifications, at the conclusion
that both her reformed individualism and her incorporation of the value of free choice are
sustainable in principle.
Firstly,  I  need  to  consider  the  difficult  issue  of  whether  or  not  the  liberal  nature  of
Nussbaum's political framework builds in a problematic metaphysics of the individual self,
assuming that  it  does (or should,  and therefore can)  stand apart  from, and be in rational
control of, every element of its interactions with others. However, there are related areas of
recent  dispute  with  which  I  am not  concerned.  Firstly,  I  am not  interested  here  in  any
accusation  that  liberalism  builds  in  a  suspect  picture  of  the  self  as  'unencumbered'  by
(irrevocable) 'constitutive ends' (Sandel 1984, 86), or that it deprives people of the security of
socially given (and thus involuntary) roles (MacIntyre 2007, esp. 241-256). Apart from the
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question of whether such attacks were ever well-targeted against Rawls (cf. Bell 2012; Rawls
2005, 22-8), it  is not clear that Nussbaum would be vulnerable to them in any minimally
plausible form. Her account does not imply that people are or should be detached from others
(Nussbaum 1999a, 59-62). It probably does imply that we cannot give significant weight to
all those conceptions of social roles, projects, or relationships of which it is true that a person
'could not understand [themselves] without it' (Sandel 1984, 86), but this is for good reason,
since many such conceptions are incompatible with dignity, for the person in question or for
those they interact with. It is also likely that a plausible moral epistemology would violate
any such restriction in another way, by requiring that people be able to be at least minimally
critical about any element of their lives, even (e.g.) relationships of motherhood (Nussbaum
1999a, 71-8; Kymlicka 1988, 190) or a sense of religious calling. However, it is hard to see
how any plausible  and  widely-applicable  ethical  perspective  could  fail  to  violate  such  a
restriction. What is more, a Nussbaum-style capability approach, because it explicitly takes a
stand on (at least some) questions about the good, rather than hiding beneath a veneer of
superficial  neutrality,  is  well-placed  to  take  the  bite  out  of  many  such  communitarian
criticisms.  In  particular,  it  is  possible  within the  capability approach to  address  concerns
about damage to relational or communal goods at face value; if it is genuinely the case that a
justice-relevant good is at stake – and my approach has been extremely permissive about
what could count as a justice-relevant good – the capability approach should be able to take
note of this fact. Secondly, I am also not concerned with criticisms of the idea that individuals
are the fundamental locus of politically-relevant goods, such as the good of dignity, at least
once that idea is distinguished from the claim that individuals cannot be benefited or harmed
in virtue of their relation to groups (Nussbaum 1999a, 62-3). 
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Instead,  I  am interested  in  whether  Nussbaum has  a  plausible  enough social  ontology to
accommodate the strong role that group membership and interrelation plays, both in the good
of  individuals  and  in  ethical  epistemology54.  My  primary  worry  is  that  she  has  never
discussed the role that membership in oppressed social groups can play in precluding dignity
for a person in adequate detail. Her  oeuvre does include helpful materials for this purpose.
For example, her influential paper on objectification and pornography contains discussion of
the  effects  of  objectification  on  women  as  women rather  than  merely as  (non-gendered)
individuals (1999b, 213-240). What is more, she has consistently emphasised the relevance of
culturally-ingrained norms (e.g. of gender) to whether or not an individual can function55.
However, a satisfactory framework for global justice requires explicit acknowledgement that
these  sorts  of  thing  are  linked:  that  membership  in  a  socially-salient  group  can  eo  ipso
damage  dignity,  and  thus  that  the  status  of  such  groups  is  of  substantial  relevance  to
capability-theoretic justice.
Since  Nussbaum  has  not  provided  such  an  account  within  her  capability  approach,  the
question is then whether one can be incorporated which will not conflict with her liberal
outlook. In particular, it may seem that the liberal commitment to taking the individual as the
central concern of political norms is likely to prevent recognition of these important social
factors.  However,  as  Charles  Mills  has  recently  argued  (2012),  in  a  survey  of  various
attempted justifications for a divergence of radical critical philosophy from liberalism, it is
not obviously essential to liberalism to build in a problematic concentration on the individual
(methodological individualism), beyond the locus-of-value claim that I have already accepted
('normative individualism'). In particular, a view which accepts that individuals are the locus
54 Insights from feminist social epistemology are central in the next Chapter.
55 The relevance of gender norms concerning 'modesty' to acquittals for rape in India is noted at (2000a, 30), 
for example. There are many other instances in her corpus of work.
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of political value, and accords a significant role for individual freedom of choice, does not
have  to  suppose  that  individuals  have  a  significant  degree  of  control  over  their  group
memberships, the constitution of the groups of which they are members (i.e. whether they are
oppressed or otherwise hierarchically positioned), or the effects that their group memberships
have  on  their  well-being.  We  need  an  account  of  group  social  ontology and  the  group-
individual relation which will not presuppose that individuals have this implausible degree of
control. Chapter 2 of Ann Cudd's 2006 work, Analysing Oppression (29-54), presents a view
of the group-individual relation which satisfies this desideratum56. I need not discuss most of
the details of her account here – since for current purposes all that is required is a way of
making sense of  the irreducible  contribution of social  groups to  justice-relevant  states of
affairs – but the upshot can be seen in the following definition:
A social group is a collection of persons who share (or would share under similar  
circumstances) a set of social constraints on action. (44)
As Cudd makes clear (42), 'constraints' are facts which 'frame' or 'guide' action; they can be
incentives as well as (e.g.) threats or preventions. Examples of such social constraints include
racial  stereotypes  and  their  attitudinal  consequences  (43),  and  facts  about  differential
likelihoods for significant consequences, such as the increased likelihood of sexual assault
when walking alone (42)57. Importantly, on this account many groups – including many of
those with the largest actual-world effects on dignity – are 'non-voluntary', in the sense that
they 'are formed not by the intentions of the individuals in them... but by the actions, beliefs,
and attitudes of others, both in the group and out, that constrain their lives in patterned and
56 My endorsement here is solely of Cudd's analysis of the supervenience of social groups on the individuals 
that they comprise, and her basic thought that damage accrues solely to individuals, even when it accrues in 
virtue of group membership, and where the group is explanatorily irreducible to individuals and their non-
relational properties. I do not need to (and do not) accept her analysis of oppression itself, or the rational 
choice psychology she draws upon in giving her individual-level explanations, or many of the other details 
and applications of her account.
57 Cudd does not specifically mention implicit biases or their effects, but these would readily fit within her 
account.
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socially significant ways' (44). What is more, as well as its being the case that the group's
existence, constitution, and particular membership, are not subject to individual volition, it is
also  possible  for  individuals  to  be  dramatically  mistaken about  which  groups  they  are
members of and/or the nature of those groups (45). This account is suitable to my purposes,
because it  recognises  the  limits  of  individual  choice  in  securing dignity while  remaining
compatible with the normative individualism that, as Mills argues, lies at the heart of the
liberal tradition.
The  second  aspect  of  Nussbaum's  liberalism  which  requires  clarification  and  evaluation
concerns the role of liberty itself in her approach. I have already noted some ways in which
freedom functions as a value within the capability approach, including within the justification
for a focus on capability itself. What is more, several traditional liberties are included on the
list itself – freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience58; this makes
these freedoms 'central and nonnegotiable' (2006a, 80), at least without tragic costs. However,
one might be suspicious, given Nussbaum's more recent placement of the capability approach
within the Rawlsian tradition of liberalism, with its lexical prioritising of liberty over e.g. re-
distributional change (Rawls 1999, 214-220), that she builds in an implausibly strong role for
freedom of choice. Nussbaum has explicitly and repeatedly disavowed the idea that 'negative'
or 'neoliberal' freedom is of intrinsic or all-purpose importance (e.g. 2003, 43-6; 2006a, 216-
17). Nevertheless, there are two areas of remaining concern.
Firstly, the Rawlsian framework builds in a large role for choice through the methodological
restriction to elements which can be part of an 'overlapping consensus' between 'reasonable'
58 See Appendix A.
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ethical conceptions. This is potentially an incorporation of space for choice of vast scope,
depending on how many,  and which,  conceptions are  judged 'reasonable',  and how much
overlap there then turns out to be amongst them. I suspect – although I cannot substantiate
this  here  –  that  a  view  such  as  Nussbaum's  could  not  possibly  be  the  subject  of  such
consensus, without an unusually restrictive interpretation of 'reasonable'. If this is right, her
acceptance of Rawlsian assumptions would mandate a space for choice that could not be
interfered with on grounds of justice of a width that would be implausible by her own lights;
she would have to give up much of what she wants from a theory of global justice as a
result59. Since I cannot substantiate this here – both because of space constraints and because
it is in part a difficult empirical (sociological) question – I shall leave this concern to one side,
although the alternative I'll present through the rest of the Thesis will not be vulnerable to this
type of problem, because I drop the Rawlsian requirement entirely.
Secondly, Nussbaum appeals to a presumption against paternalistic interference (esp. 2000,
51-5),  and plainly regards  this  as a  powerful  principle  against  which normative accounts
should be judged.  This is problematic not as a normative judgement per se – although I am
suspicious  of  whether  Mill's  'harm principle',  or  other  ideas  which  rely  on  a  distinction
between self- and other-affecting conduct, can make much substantive difference in practice.
Rather,  it  is  problematic  because  it  appears  to  be  espoused  as  a  judgement  outside  the
capability approach itself, which will then set limits on what forms that approach could take.
This is potentially very damaging to the approach, because it clearly needs to make large
numbers of judgements about individuals' goods in order to be practically workable60; if all
such judgements have to coincide with the self-conceptions of individuals at all times, most
59 Nelson 2008 is particularly trenchant on this point.
60 See also the brief discussion in the next Chapter (§2.1.1), for a little more on the alleged wrongs of 
paternalism.
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such political action will become unjustifiable. As a result, it had better not be the case that
paternalistic  interference with freedom of choice is  ruled out  in  principle  on Nussbaum's
view.
Fortunately, the most that can be generated by the capability approach she proposes, at its
most basic level, is the conclusion that since various freedoms (whether incorporated via a
restriction  to  capability-promotion  over  functioning-promotion,  via  a  more  pluralistic
conception of each valuable capability/functioning, or otherwise) are entitlements of dignity,
violating them in the name of dignity itself will be – at best –  tragic. Nussbaum's approach
does not give us reason to privilege freedom of choice in general, or even core freedoms such
as  freedom  of  speech  or  conscience,  over  other  capabilities.  This  puts  accusations  of
paternalism in  a  new light.  Firstly,  some forms  of  paternalistic  interference  may not  be
problematic at all – as Nussbaum appears to acknowledge (2000a, 53). Others might violate
dignity, but be (tragically) necessary to secure the most dignity possible. Finally, some actions
might be made wrong by being paternalistic which would otherwise be acceptable, because
the  paternalism  in  these  case  precludes  dignity  while  not  simultaneously
preserving/promoting it to a greater degree. Only in the final set of cases will anti-paternalist
considerations  have  the  sort  of  immediate  deontic  consequences  that  liberals  have  often
proposed, but which threaten to severely restrict the scope for political action.
With these clarifications in place, it appears that the sort of liberalism involved in Nussbaum's
overall approach is largely benign. However, I have noted several areas where a better basic
account is needed, especially concerning the scope of the polis, the domain of justice as such.
These modifications will have effects at various points in the Thesis, but especially in Chapter
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6, where I draw my claims about justice together, and illuminate the resultant whole.
§2. Constructivism or Realism?
§2.1 Introduction
As I have presented it, any capability theory will require a theory of the good (or goods) to
fill out its content. Firstly, it needs an account of which functionings are goods – as without
such it will not be capable of identifying the capabilities associated with those functionings as
things  with which  justice  is  concerned61.  Secondly,  it  needs  to  be able  to  claim that  the
capabilities themselves are goods, as otherwise capability theory will be vulnerable to one of
the same criticisms that it generally appeals to in motivating itself as an approach – it, like
resourcist  theories,  will  be focusing  on mere  means,  rather  than on something that  is  of
ultimate significance for people's lives.
But in addition, this theory of the good must be objective, in the sense of being epistemically
secure in the face of persistent disagreement, because it needs to be capable of critiquing
contemporary social realities and people's ideas about them. If the normative premises used in
critique have no better epistemic standing than those being criticised, such critique will fail to
be rationally cogent. The central issue with which I shall be concerned in this second part of
the Chapter is that of the correct sense in which the claims about the human good at the
61 Here, as elsewhere, I presuppose a certain conception of the role of capability theory. Some may claim that 
capability theory may be justified as an essential part of a theory of justice without involving any theory of 
the good. For example, Robeyns (2003; cf. also 2005) claims that we can select a list of relevant capabilities
as an input into a theory of justice without presupposing that they are goods in any deep sense. In her view, 
the fact that there are consistent inequalities of capability and/or functioning (which we cannot suppose are 
ultimately down to unconditioned choices) of itself justifies policy to eliminate them; this argument does not
rely on the claim that the things that are unequally distributed are goods. I cannot argue against this 
adequately here, but I think it is highly dubious to suppose that the mere fact of different treatment could be 
of normative import if no-one could be said to be harmed by it. This does not require that the harm be direct;
perhaps the harm accrues e.g. through a violation of respect or substantive inequality? But then respectful 
relation to others, or valuable equality with others, would be figuring as an element of the good.
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centre of capability theory  are objective.  This comes against a backdrop of disagreement
between  two  (very)  broad  groups  of  thinkers  in  the  meta-ethical  literature.  One  group,
'constructivists',  identifies  the  objectivity  that  (i.e.)  capability  theory  might  attain  as
consisting  in  agreement,  under  procedurally idealised conditions62.  To call  an idealisation
'procedural' here is to claim that it does not introduce substantive normative content into the
standards  which  constrain  the  idealised  situation,  such  that  this  methodology  becomes
immediately circular (even in part). This requirement is necessary because even the strongest
anti-constructivists  may be able  to  agree that  for  some group of agents objectivity could
consist in agreement: so long as relativism is false, the set of agents who know the facts will
trivially agree in their beliefs63, and their beliefs will trivially be true ex hypothesi. The second
group, 'realists', identifies objectivity as consisting in a relationship to a set of facts that exist
independently of any merely procedurally constrained agreement between human agents. A
second relevant – if less well-explored – dichotomy among conceptions of objectivity, which
differentiates two possible camps of realist  views, lies between perspectives according to
which objectivity can be 'culture-laden',  and those according to which it cannot. 'Culture-
laden'  perspectives  are  those  that  do  not  begin  by including the  positions  of  all  existing
agents64, identifying the substantive constraints on ethical epistemology in a way which is
incompatible  with  some extant  enculturated  viewpoints,  and  thus  beginning  instead  with
62 Because I am only interested in approaches that are compatible with universalism here, I will not be 
discussing versions of constructivism which are overwhelmingly likely to generate non-universalist 
conclusions when applied to questions of justice at the global level. Thus, the 'Humean Constructivism' of 
Street (2010 and 2012), and Velleman (2013) will not be under detailed consideration here, although 
Enoch's argument (Ch.4, §1.5) still applies to these versions.
63 This is important: the McDowellian version of culture-laden realism that I endorse in Chapter 4 is 
surprisingly close to constructivism in some respects, and (as I shall show there) its refusal to endorse any 
form of proceduralism is one thing that preserves the difference.
64 Here, and throughout the Thesis, I assume that normative epistemology/methodology must resemble the 
method of reflective equilibrium at least to some extent: such methodology must begin with existing 
responses, and build from there. If there are methodologies that genuinely radically differ from this (which I
doubt), my central distinction in epistemology between constructivists and culture-laden realists will not 
capture them, and they will be outside the scope of my argument. Compare Setiya 2010, 215-18.
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some  non-maximal  set  of  perspectives  that  may,  if  appropriately  developed,  admit  of
objectivity. This distinction will be of central importance in Chapter 3 and 4, and so I shall
leave a more detailed account of it until then (beginning in Chapter 3 §2).
Issues about objectivity have especial importance for capability theories because these (as a
kind) give a certain significance to the individual will and individual choice. Insofar as they
can  genuinely  be  described  as  justifying  a  concentration  on  capabilities  as  well  as
functionings, they must include an account of the importance of choice and its underlying
agential processes that does not entirely reduce to the importance of the things chosen: if they
do not do this, it will not be clear why we should not just promote functionings themselves,
without placing importance on capability. It may seem, then, that a perspective on objectivity
which puts the substantively-unconstrained will front and centre, as constructivists' focus on
what  people  can/do/will  agree upon evidently must  do,  will  be more congruent  with the
impetus of capability theory as a whole. Whether or not this rationale is ultimately convincing
(and my position will be that it is not), it provides some motive to examine whether realism is
even compatible with the capability approach.
This issue is also of significance because if constructivist or non-culture-laden realist views
of objectivity are correct, this will have (potentially very radical) consequences for the way
that we must engage in normative thought,  and (in particular),  for the attempt, typical of
Nussbaum's capability approach, to draw substantive conclusions about the way the world
should be in the absence of any obvious consensus. Constructivists take objectivity to be a
function  of  agreement  among  all  competent  agents,  where  the  relevant  conception  of
competence cannot – at least directly – bring in substantive normative content.  However,
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there is very little agreement about – for example – whether the capability to achieve sexual
satisfaction  is  of  universal  value,  unless  the  relevant  set  of  judges  is  substantively
constrained65. They are, then, not merely committed to the view that we do not know whether
a  person  who  judges  something  like  this  to  be  the  case  is  objectively  correct;  they  are
committed to saying that she is not objectively correct (at least, not yet). This problematic is
particularly pressing because many proponents of constructivism in the arena of political
philosophy advocate radical actual-world versions of it, involving proposals of deliberative
democracy that are in most cases very distant from the contemporary status quo66. Advocating
such methodologies threatens to put on hold all prescriptions and actions that are not aimed at
bringing such a deliberative-democratic situation into being, because until such a procedure is
realised  we  can  have  no  objective  guidance  as  to  what  to  do.67 Other  versions  of
constructivism settle  for  a  merely  hypothetical consensus,  usually  including  a  very large
amount of procedural idealisation, which might reduce the extent to which there is a conflict
in practice between advocates of tradition-laden realism and these opponents68. This division
among  constructivist  positions  complicates  matters  because  one  preliminary  reason  to
embrace culture-laden realism – the threat of a paralyzing sceptical aporia – is not obviously
65 Tamir 1996 provides a classic and vivid example of such dissensus.
66 Both the Habermasian and (more arguably) late-Rawlsian wings of contemporary contractarian thought are 
examples here. Gaus' (2012) more explicitly actual-world-based development of the public reason tradition 
is an even clearer example. Similarly, this is one motivation behind the turn to deliberative democracy: the 
thought is often not merely that such democracy will make for a good society, but that the relative presence 
of democratic consensus would constitute the worth of a social order.
67 That this is the case is perhaps responsible for the dominance of the rhetoric of democratic authority and 
distinctively political equality in much of today's radical egalitarian discourse, although few take this line 
quite as strongly and explicitly as Elizabeth Anderson, who appeals to democratic equality alone in (at least 
some of) her work on the capabilities, e.g. her 2003. I suggest that the potentially paralysing aporia of 
actual-consensus constructivism may be bypassed by presenting prescriptions as justified by pro-democratic
considerations alone (if such justifications are successful), or disguised by such presentation (if they are 
not).
68 The classic recent example is Michael Smith (1994). Rawls' own approach in A Theory of Justice (1999), if 
not in his later work, is also of this strongly hypothetical kind, although parts of what I say immediately 
below – about the difficulties in assessing the consequences of strongly idealised theories do not apply to his
view, because at least some of its negative consequences – in terms of what it precludes people from saying 
about justice – are comparatively clear. Compare §2.5 in the next Chapter here. 
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relevant to these constructivisms. This is because when constructivists endorse criteria for the
constitution  of  objectivity  that  are  wildly  counterfactual,  it  becomes  very  hard  to  assess
whether or not they will conflict in practice with culture-laden realism in the way that actual-
consensus views must do.  Regardless,  I  would not have space to argue meticulously that
particular hypothetical-constructivist approaches would have this paralytic effect here. 
However, the arguments that I will give – which make up most of the next Chapter – will be a
mixture  between direct  reflection on how we should  respond to situations  of  substantive
disagreement,  and  meta-level  argumentation69 about  the  underlying  basis  for  different
methodological approaches. This cocktail is intended to remove much of the motivation for
any constructivist  approach  in  this  area,  and  in  this  way,  more  forcefully  motivate  the
alternative I offer. The following two chapters will continue this admixture of first-order and
meta-level critique, although first-order considerations will be prevalent in Chapter 3, and
meta-level ones dominant in Chapter 4. To clarify,  the thought will  ultimately be that no
constructivist  view is  more promising than the culture-laden realist  alternative I  begin to
present  in  Chapter  4,  for  a  number  of  reasons set  out  in  the  next  two Chapters.  Firstly,
relatively  simplistic  proceduralist  constructivisms  are  very  likely  to  be  extensionally
inadequate,  because  they  face  a  general  'problem  of  adaption'.  This  argument  is  made
throughout Chapter 3, §1, with reference to H.E. Baber's sophisticated form of preferentism.
The  problem  with  more  complicated,  and  more  clearly  value-laden,  actual-process
69 I generally present the disputes at issue here as resting, at least in large part, on a disagreement about 
objectivity itself, rather than just on less radical disagreement about how many (and which) people we ought
to count as peers of our epistemic community – as those whose judgements can be expected to possess such 
objectivity, such that they count as evidence for us, or more broadly as those whose testimonial relationship 
to us is otherwise constitutive of our objectivity. Even if one accepts that not all culturally-located points of 
view on normative issues need to be given epistemic weight – that is, even if one is open to a culture-laden 
methodology – it will still be an open question which points of view have such epistemic standing and 
which do not. Disputes of this latter kind, then, cannot be fully resolved by meta-level argument, and I do 
not provide any detailed thoughts about this in the Thesis, although my conclusion (in Ch.4) is that thought 
about this first-order matter should link peerage to virtue.
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constructivist methodologies is that they cannot make proper sense of the feedback between
theses  about  methodology and  those  expressing  evaluations/prescriptions  without  ad  hoc
gerrymandering or extensional inadequacy. This argument is made primarily in Chapter 3,
§§2.3-4, but, as with the other criticisms made, its most basic form is given by David Enoch's
'Why  Idealise?'  challenge.  Because  of  the  vastly  different  implementations  which  are
compatible  with  the  basic  strategy of  hypothetical-process  constructivism,  it  is  relatively
difficult to identify an ideally general flaw. In the absence of that, in Chapter 3 §2.5, I discuss
an extremely influential example – Rawls' 'political liberal' constructivism –  in some depth,
and give reasons to think that it, in particular, does not provide a promising option for my
purposes. Finally, in Chapter 4 §§1.4-5, I endorse Enoch's fully general, and deep problem for
constructivist views, as I am construing them here, and use this diagnosis to finally clarify the
ultimate difference between constructivism and the culture-laden realism that I prefer.
The structure of the rest of this section will be as follows. In §2.2, I provide an overall sketch
of  Nussbaum's  position  on  normative  methodology  and  the  justification  of  capability
approaches. In  §2.3, I outline the problems for Nussbaum in this area. In  §2.4 and  §2.5, I
sharpen this  critique using two strands of  criticism taken from a paper  by Alison Jaggar
(2006) as paradigms. Finally,  in  §2.6, I arrive at  an overall assessment of the respects in
which Nussbaum's view is implausible, incomplete, or incoherent here, and point the way to a
solution, a more detailed construction of which will be the topic of Chapters 3 and 4.
§2.2 Nussbaum's Methodology
§2.2.1 The Early Approach: Human Nature and Evaluation
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Nussbaum's early work70 on the capabilities usually involves the exegesis, adaptation, and
promotion  of  ideas  from  Aristotle,  and  her  approach  to  normative  methodology  is  no
exception.  In  this  subsection  I  shall  describe  her  early  view  about  how  the  capabilities
approach can be justified (as always) for a global context. The core resource here is her 'Non-
Relative Virtues' (1993), but it will be necessary to place this paper in a broader context.
I'll begin, then, by reconstructing the  central argument of 'Non-Relative Virtues'. Officially,
Nussbaum's target in this text is cultural relativism, the view that normative perspectives, and
in particular conceptions of the good, can only ever have validity relative to some cultural
context. However, in arguing against that view, she provides the most detailed (on the meta-
level at least) account of a justification for capability theory in her early work. She begins
with the claim that, for Aristotle:
[Some particular account of the human good] is supposed to be objective in the
sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from
local traditions or practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie
beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact
recognised in local traditions. (243)
This is a clearly realist and universalist conception. She next introduces the notion of 'spheres'
within human experience – a 'sphere' being an area of an experienced life that can be seen in
all lives that can count as 'human'. Then she offers the concept of a 'thin' virtue, this being
“whatever being stably disposed to act appropriately in [a given sphere] consists in”. Each
cultural grouping will have (probably numerous) different 'thick' conceptions of virtue, which
fill out this formula with substantive content. These will compete with one another, and only
one can be correct (245).
70 Nussbaum (2006b) presents a time line of her work, divided into four stages. Roughly, the first phase is 
between 1987, when her first work on the capabilities approach appears, and 1997, when she begins to 
introduce specifically Rawlsian 'political liberal' ideas into her work. (1316). When I refer to her early work,
this is the period I have in mind; the other three phases all count as 'late'.
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Given the universality of the 'spheres', it then looks like we can isolate an equally universal
cross-cultural debate about the virtues that takes each single sphere as its subject, even if the
participants in this debate have no idea that there are other participants who disagree with
them, and even if the thick conceptions that the participants endorse are radically divergent.
This position is made available by externalism about the semantic values  of certain terms,
which Nussbaum endorses here, claiming, indeed, that Arisotle was an externalist too (247).
Because “[t]he reference of the virtue term in each case is fixed by the sphere of experience”
(247) that appears in its 'thin' definition, there will be one correct answer to the question of
what each virtue consists in. Notably, this looks rather like the way that science is (often, on
realist models) supposed to proceed71. Thus,
We can understand progress in ethics, like progress in science, to be progress in
finding the correct fuller conception of a virtue, isolated by its thin or nominal
definition. (248)
How would this function as a grounding for capability theory?  The immediate problem is
that, although this may be quite all right as an account of virtue –  of how people ought to
behave –  what we are looking for is an account of the human good, and a view of global
justice that  can  cohere with that. However, one of the 'spheres' that Nussbaum thinks is
universal, a part of every human experience, is 'justice', cashed out as 'the distribution of
limited resources' (246). Presumably then, the idea is that some particular capability theory
will be (at least a significant part of) the correct account of this particular virtue. Whether or
not this methodology will  support a given view of the capabilities will ultimately rest on
which conception of justice 'wins' empirically here; Nussbaum's contention (or, as now seems
appropriate, hypothesis) is obviously that a capability-theoretic view like hers will result.
71 Cf. for example Boyd 1988.
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Unfortunately, there is a problem lurking. What justifies the selection of 'spheres' that
Nussbaum makes (largely following Aristotle)? Secondarily, what meta-level status do those
judgements –  judgements about which spheres of human life are relevantly essential to
humanity – have? In this way, Nussbaum's project in this paper looks as though it just pushes
back the question about the justification of the capabilities to a lower level. This is the level
of essentialism about the human: of reflection on what is essential to human life. The core of
Nussbaum's view is the claim that in thinking about the human good – that is, in addressing
the kind of questions that are necessary to give content to capability theory – we are engaged
in reflection on what it is to be human at all72.  Prima facie, this might be a thoroughly
scientific, indeed potentially a reductionist, conception on a metaphysical level. After all, the
best (perhaps the only) way to discover the characteristic or essential features of the species
homo sapiens is to engage in biology, perhaps aided by the social sciences. The link to
evolutionary selection that biology's relevance provides might even provide the resources for
a reduction of morality to that-which-would-be-selected-for-in-the-relevant-environment, or
something of that kind.
Fortunately however, Nussbaum makes explicit that this is not what she intends. Rather, the
link to reflection about humanity itself is supposed to work in both directions: as well as
revealing that we can think about ethics in terms of what makes a life fully human, it reveals
that reflection on what makes a life fully human is itself ethical. The account of what it is to
function humanly is provided by an 'ethical investigation of a certain sort' (1987, 2). It is a
matter of deciding 'which functions...are so important, so central, that their absence will mean
the absence of a human being or a human life' (1995, 94)73.
72 This looks like a paradigmatic instance of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which I examine in detail in Chapter 
5.
73 Although she notes that, strictly, what makes a being human is a matter of what they could do (and be), if 
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This is an attractive way of justifying the capabilities, at least in the abstract. It begins with a
conception of the human good, moves from that to an image of justice, and is capable of
making sense of why, when we turn to justice itself, we should be interested in people's well-
being again: it would be a strange kind of justice that was an essential part of the good life,
but  did not  clearly make its  bearers  better  off!  Not  only does this  provide a  method for
thinking about normative issues, then, it provides a method that is well placed to justify a
capability approach. In addition, this appears to be a realist methodology, and – because of
its explicitly ethical basis – plausibly a culture-laden one, in the sense I gave above.
Worryingly for my project, though, even here there are signs that this realism is less than full-
fledged. For example, the point of this method is to argue against cultural relativism. It does
so on the basis that there are universal features of human lives. But, officially at least (see
§2.3.3 below), these features are not external to human tradition per se - “there is no 'innocent
eye', no way of seeing the world that is entirely neutral and free of cultural shaping” (260). As
a result “[t]here is no Archimedean point here, no pure access to unsullied 'nature' – even,
here, human nature – as it is, in and of itself” (265). To claim that there are universal features
of human lives can only then be to claim that human lives  as experienced have universal
features. This is not constructivism, exactly – it does not hold that the facts about what human
beings are (if they are, universally, anything at all) are constructed from subjective states of
individuals. But it does come quite close; in particular, it suggests that were something not to
form a part of an enculturated individual's self-conception, it could not be a potential part of
their  lives,  something  that  they  should pursue.  This  is  a  clear  violation  of  culture-laden
only the conditions were right, and not, as this sentence suggests, what they actually do do. (Nussbaum 
1987, 20) Compare my view in Chapter 5, §1.2, on this point.
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realism, if not of realism simpliciter.
§2.2.2 The Late Approach: Informed Desire and Substantive Good
The most important alteration in Nussbaum's work on the capabilities has come from her
explicit acceptance of a Rawlsian 'political liberal' conception of the basis for political norms.
In §1.3 above, I provided some reasons to move away from a political-liberal framework for a
capability approach. Insofar as Nussbaum's view implicates such ideas, then – and (a fortiori)
insofar as she may be committed to some level of constructivism as a result of them – it will
be unsatisfactory. However, there is more to say, even if this 'political liberalism' is ignored74.
This  is  made  easier  by  the  fact  that  Nussbaum's  (2000a)  work  Women  and  Human
Development contains significant discussion of methodology, most of which makes little or
no  reference  to  'political  liberalism'.  Most  importantly,  the  role  that  she  gives  there  to
'procedural' methodologies is a step away from the clearer realism of her earlier work, and a
step  towards  constructivism.  It  is  this  apparent  combination  of  realist  and  constructivist
elements in Nussbaum's recent work that is of particular significance for understanding the
problems her methodology highlights.
The discussion in  Women and Human Development is centred around a distinction between
'procedural' and 'substantive' methodologies75. Essentially, the difference is that 'procedural'
74 Notably, some have accused Nussbaum, quite reasonably, of just endorsing 'political-liberal' ideas without 
really making the changes to her theory that these would require. Most obviously, if you want to ensure that 
your prescriptions will be compatible with all 'reasonable' conceptions present in the global polis, surely the 
best way to do this is to follow some largely constructivist method, building only from premises that you 
know are universally endorsed. Without being too cynical, I cannot help but suspect that the reason that 
Nussbaum doesn't do this is that she knows that the output of such a process would not be friendly to her 
capability theory's ambitions, if it managed to generate a positive result at all (which I also doubt). Compare
the discussion of Jaggar's critiques below.
75 I discuss this further in §1 of the next Chapter. Given that I go over the application of procedural and 
substantive methodologies to the topic of adaptive preferences there, I shall not include it in my exposition 
here, although it is in that context that the distinctions and arguments discussed in this section are made.
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methodology aims to provide a way of thinking about normative issues that builds in as little
substantive content  as  possible;  the purest  procedural  model  would  build  in  none.  These
methods usually aim towards a disinterested and impartial viewpoint that is able to take on
board as many different contributions as possible. 'Substantive' methodologies, by contrast,
insist that we must begin with a significant amount of normative content already in place, and
then work from there to discover answers to the rest of the questions that arise. As a result,
substantive approaches will be characterised by a relatively direct focus on discussion about
normative subject-matters (such as the nature of the human good), because once conclusions
about the good are established these have a double significance: they will inform our future
methodology76, as well as being important in their own right77.
Paradigmatically, procedural approaches work by stipulating some form of relevant data; the
two most relevant being intuitions about the good, and preferences78, and then proceed by
aggregating that data to arrive at the correct result. So, the policy that most people prefer or
think good is the one that we should say  is good, for example79. The relationship between
proceduralism and constructivism should be clear: it will not make much sense to be a pure
proceduralist,  at  least,  unless  one  is  a  constructivist.  At  least  prima  facie,  it  is  only  if
objectivity in beliefs about the good is a construction from (e.g.) preferences that the correct
epistemic method would involve the aggregation of (e.g.) preferences alone. As one allows
76 See especially §2.4.2 of the next Chapter.
77 Cf. also Nussbaum 2001a, 68-71.
78 Nussbaum tends to talk about desire as much as preferences; I take it that preference is relative desire, such 
that to prefer x to y is to desire x more than y, and such that if there were only one conceivable option, it 
would make no sense to say that a person prefers it, although it would still make sense to say that they 
desire it. This doesn't appear to be how Nussbaum uses the word, however; cf. 2000, pp. 119-121.
79 There is a potential difference between this (meta-level) attribution of epistemic significance to preferences, 
and the first-order significance that preferentists such as H.E. Baber – for which see §1.2 of the next Chapter
– propose. As I say in fn.1 of the next Chapter, one could be a first-order preferentist without believing that 
a preference-based proceduralism was correct, although it would make little sense to do so. Nussbaum's 
discussion in Women and Human Development doesn't distinguish between these two levels, which makes 
things more difficult for me throughout.
66
more and more substantive content to enter into one's methodology, constructivism becomes
less and less obviously appropriate.
Nussbaum, however, doesn't focus on such pure proceduralism, for two good reasons. Firstly,
pure  proceduralism isn't  well-motivated unless  we assume constructivism,  and Nussbaum
generally seems unwilling to do that. We have certain beliefs about how people ought to be
treated that are very basic, and we are not willing to give these up; on the other hand, if we
came to think that objectivity necessitated that we put these beliefs to one side, we would be
willing  to  do  so.  For  example,  feminists  (at  least)  can  agree  that  women  should,
fundamentally, be treated equally with men. If we are faced with someone (or perhaps many
people) who (explicitly or implicitly) deny this, and would prefer women to be treated worse
than men, we will  not want to include their  preferences as evidence that we (objectively
speaking)  ought  to  treat  women unequally.  If  it  is  necessarily the case that  the objective
standpoint  is  a  construction  from  preferences,  however,  we  will  have to  include  these
preferences too (and just hope that they will be outweighed in the final analysis).80 If this is
right, all feminists should hope that constructivism (at least of a preference-based kind) is
false.   Secondly,  very few serious people, upon inspection,  really  are pure proceduralists.
Relevantly, Nussbaum discusses two broadly proceduralist models (those of John Harsanyi
and Richard Brandt) and identifies a number of respects in which they fail to be relevantly
'pure' (122-135).
It  is  against  this  background that  Nussbaum sets  out  her  preferred account  of  normative
methodology, and, thereby, of the justification for a capability approach that will result. This
80 See (Nussbaum 2000a, 117-9), where she makes much the same point in introducing 'subjective welfarism', 
as a kind of procedural approach.
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methodology has two strands: the informed desire approach, a weak form of proceduralism;
and the substantive good approach, which (unsurprisingly) is strongly substantive. To begin
with, the latter is quite straightforward, and much of it should already be familiar from the
motivation for capability theory I provided in Chapter 1. We begin with the strongest beliefs
or  immediate  judgements  that  we  have  about  the  good  life  and  global  justice,  bringing
together a conception of human dignity, treating each person as an end with an individual
good, and working up to a list of fundamental entitlements of justice, without which people
will not live lives of adequate dignity. The methodology here is, essentially, wide reflective
equilibrium – the movement towards an ever-more coherent set of normative beliefs, and one
that is consistent with an ever-better  set of relevant empirical data. Included in this is an
interpersonal,  cross-cultural  element,  through which a wider set of ways of living can be
understood and evaluated. (2000a, 70-110). 
On the one hand, this may seem to be a sufficient method on its own. In addition to the
scepticism towards procedural alternatives that I have already mentioned, Nussbaum adds
other claims that indicate the superiority of this sort of explicitly substance-laden approach.
She says that '[a]ny procedural approach that we can accept will be so laden with normative
values that it collapses, in effect, into a substantive good approach' (119). Also, she believes
that '[o]ur intuitions about the central capabilities are at least as secure as our intuitions about
what constitutes a good procedure' (150). These claims obviously tell against the tenability of
a procedural alternative that would fail to securely and explicitly build in the values that her
capability theory represents.
On the other hand, Nussbaum presents three reasons to add a procedural justification to the
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substantive good method, and these seem to be what motivates her to incorporate such an
approach, despite her worries. Firstly, there are epistemic reasons. We may well neglect to
properly consider alternative ways of life if we fail to cast our net wide. Additionally, she
holds  that  wide-ranging  independent  agreement  with  the  results  of  the  substantive  good
approach constitutes evidence for its truth. (151). She claims that 'we would not conclude
that....items on the list were central human goods unless we heard women saying so, when
questioned in a [suitably value-laden] procedure' (160). Secondly, any prescriptions we make
for the global  polis will have to be stable: it cannot be the case that significant numbers of
people would inevitably revolt or be deeply unhappy in the world we recommend. In part, she
holds this thesis for Rawlsian reasons, according to which a political order is not justified
unless  people  actively  accept  it,  rather  than  it's  being  a  mere  modus  vivendi (152-3).
However, this element does not seem essential – after all, a world filled with chaotic, if not
violent insurrection, or with hatred and mistrust for central institutions, would hardly be a
good one, and this alone justifies  some kind of stability requirement81. Finally, we have a
normative reason to give weight to people's desires. She says that 'desire is an intelligent part
of the human being that deserves respect in itself in any procedure of justification we would
design' (154).
As a result, Nussbaum proposes that the substantive good approach be supplemented by a
more strictly proceduralist method that involves consulting 'informed desires'. The idea here
is  that  we  examine  what  desires  people  in  general  have  in  procedurally-idealised
81 If we refuse to accept 'political liberalism', and endorse the radical transformation of existing perspectives, 
we can say that there would be stability, but only in virtue of the fact that people's desires had 
comprehensively changed. The only real impact that a stability requirement would then have would be the 
requirement that we not endorse anything that significant numbers of people are innately predisposed to 
reject. I suspect that, empirically, this would be a near-negligible category, but see §2.3.3 below on this 
point.
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circumstances. The informed desire methodology yields a result when the following occurs: 
[P]eople  from a  wide  variety  of  backgrounds,  coming  together  in  conditions
conducive  to  reflective  criticism of  tradition,  and  free  from intimidation  and
hierarchy...agree  that  [some  conception]  is  a  good  one,  one  that  they  would
choose...When people are respected as equals, and free from intimidation, and
able to learn about the world, and secure against desperation, their judgements
about the core of a political conception are likely to be more reliable. (151-2).
Nussbaum believes that the results of a properly-conducted informed desire proceduralism
such as this will converge over time with the result of the substantive good method. When
this occurs, the justification for the capability approach will be even more robust than the
substantive good view alone, and its objective soundness will be clear. (155-66).
§2.3 Sketch of the Problem
§2.3.1 Unclarities, Inconsistencies, and Lacunae
Now that Nussbaum's conception of the justification for her capability theory is in view, I can
begin to criticise it.  To a large extent, the motivation for my project here is quite simple.
Nussbaum's account of the background to her capability theory is incomplete, inconsistent, or
unclear in a number of dimensions, and these are worth remedying for their own sake. This
motivation operates apart from any more pressing problems – e.g. with the practical ability to
offer  good  prescriptions  –  that  her  theory  may  possess.  This  motive  directs  particular
attention to the meta-level aspects of Nussbaum's theory; this is an area where I perceive a
need for substantial revision, and my aim is to provide such revision, largely in the next three
chapters. It should be sufficient to motivate an investigation of this kind to note that we have
to have  some meta-level view,  and therefore that  a  complete specification of a capability
theory will have to include meta-level theses as well as first-order ones.
I  have  operated,  and  will  continue  to  operate  throughout  the  Thesis,  with  a  quite  broad
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interpretation  of  what  is  included  in  the  meta-level.  It  certainly  goes  beyond  the  core
questions  contained  within  the  dominant  post-Moore  line  of  meta-ethical  inquiry,  which
focuses  on  debates  between  various  species  of  cognitivism/non-cognitivism,  realism/anti-
realism, and naturalism/non-naturalism. Indeed, I shall not have a great deal to say about
those general topics here, although as I have said, a truly comprehensive capability approach
would have to do so. Instead, the meta-level theses that I shall be most concerned with have
to do with differing images of normative practice, in a much looser sense than is generally
standard in contemporary meta-ethics. Central issues with which I shall be concerned include
the interconnected questions of how we can think about objectivity; how we should respond
to diversity of normative attitudes; and what kinds of methods we should use in thinking
about the good life and justice.  With this in mind, in the rest of this subsection (§§2.3.2-
2.3.3), I shall proceed to bring out two problems within Nussbaum's account that appear to
ultimately have their source in her approach to meta-level questions. Firstly, I identify some
points at which she advocates deference to procedures like local specification without any
clear rationale in terms of the substantive good approach. Secondly, I describe an area of
tension  within  Nussbaum's  work  which  has  to  do  with  the  need  for  methodological
convergence that she posits.82
§2.3.2  Plural  and  Local  Specification:  Bounded  Constructivism?  Or  An
Acknowledgement of Epistemic Limits?
Nussbaum's work on the capabilities approach is characterised by an occasional tendency to
leave aside the detailed answering of questions to which the approach gives rise. Of course, a
82 A third issue concerns the possibility that the absence of convergence between the two methods would give 
rise to the same sceptical aporia that constructivism faces almost immediately. I won't develop this here, 
however. See §2.3 in the next Chapter for further development of the point, applied to constructivist 
approaches generally.
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certain reticence to seek a complete set of answers to all such questions is understandable for
a number of reasons. Firstly, no one thinker could hope to deal comprehensively with every
normative issue that her approach throws up in her lifetime, let alone in single articles or
books. Secondly, there are many questions for which answers cannot be given because we do
not have adequate evidence. We just do not know exactly how the global  polis should be
ordered, to take a significant example, because our understanding of economics, sociology,
political science, etc., is obviously far from adequate. Giving answers to normative questions
at the global level, at the level of precision that we might one day hope to achieve 83, will then
not  be  possible  today.  Alternately,  we may know that  we will  never be  in  a  position  to
justifiably include the answers to  certain questions in our theory, because the evidence that
would be required to justify those answers is bound to particular, fine-grained contexts in a
way that prevents us from accessing it in advance84.
However, Nussbaum's typical response, when faced with a large number of issues for which
such exculpations might be available, is instead to appeal to what she calls 'plural'  and/or
'local' specification85 (1990a, 235-8). Plural specification occurs whenever space is left for
individuals to choose ways of living that are not specifically endorsed by the conception of
the good that the theorist offers, but which remain within bounds set by that image. Local
specification allows for a diversity of good ways of living that are linked to the context in
which the relevant individual finds herself, but which are similarly restricted by the general,
universal image of the good. The difference between the two seems just to be that the latter
83 Disregarding of course the fact that as our knowledge of the way things are grows, they change, ensuring 
that fully adequate knowledge is likely to remain a tantalizing prospect.
84 This being what is involved in Nussbaum's (relatively modest) particularism. See her 2001b, 290-317, esp. 
298-306. Cf. §1.4 in the next Chapter.
85 Her use of this terminology seems to have lapsed in more recent work, but the same idea seems to be at 
work in her later work too.
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involves  reference  to  contexts86 in  which  many individuals  will  find  themselves
(paradigmatically, cultural settings, and perhaps extending to things like disabilities), whereas
the first leaves open a space for specific paths that might be unique to an individual. Both
these theoretical devices function to restrict the degree of normative prescription that can take
place in advance of individuals' and (perhaps) groups' choices, and so, to the extent that they
can justifiably be employed, they will excuse the thinker from providing a complete theory in
the same way as the two reasons I gave in the previous paragraph. But what kind of rationale
is at work here?
There are several options. On the one hand, Nussbaum's use of these ideas could just be an
application  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  reasons  I  noted  above;  she  might  merely be
acknowledging the limits of what she can be expected to do given constraints of time and
available evidence. This would be well justified for a wide variety of cases, and would be
compatible with a culture-laden realism of the kind I propose later. On the other hand, it
might be motivated by a tacit,  if  partial,  acceptance of some meta-level thesis that would
contradict the realism that she elsewhere seems to accept.
This possibility is made more plausible by some of Nussbaum's language when talking about
plural and local specification, and by the role that this kind of indeterminacy is supposed to
play in making it more likely that the procedural and substantive methods will  converge.
Most critical here is Nussbaum's use of limited specification as a means to argue that her
capability theory is not paternalistic; that it does not force people to live in a certain way for
their own good. She is particularly concerned that her view not seem like “one that simply
86 Bear in mind that 'contexts', as I'm thinking of them here, include facts about the constitution of individuals 
(e.g. disability status or personal history) as well as of their (e.g. social) environment. 
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tells distant people what wisdom requires”. Instead, we should always seek to “imagine a
possible transition from the current ways to some specification of the vague conception [of
the capabilities] that fits that history and those circumstances”. (1990a, 236-7). Given the
level of particularity this would require, it is not surprising that limited (in this case, local)
specification is recommended. Quite plausibly, such tailoring of prescriptions to particularity
would often be warranted by a robustly realist view. But it seems that the only rationale for
local  specification  that  could  guarantee non-paternalism,  and  refuse  to  ever engage  in
prescription  that  is  not  rooted  in  the  addressees’  conceptions  of  the  good,  would  be
constructivist87. Surely, no realist can rule out that some people's norms might be too far from
the  truth  to  get  to  it  without  radical  transformation?  If  so,  realists  cannot  rule  out  the
possibility that paternalistic interference might be warranted, unless they happen to already
know that paternalism is always wrong88. Nussbaum's lack of a clear account of precisely
when and why paternalism constitutes an objection to a claim about someone's good may
well  be  rooted  in  her  unclarity  about  basic  meta-level  issues,  and  this  warrants  an
investigation into those issues directly.
§2.3.3 What explains the Convergence?
A  third  issue  concerns  why we  should  expect  convergence  between  substantive  and
procedural  methods  over  time.  This  is  not  a  trivial  or  obvious  hypothesis,  and if  true  it
requires some explanation. The most straightforward explanation concerns human nature. If
humans have a universal nature that causes them to desire certain things regardless of cultural
87 Paternalism, after all, is the bypassing of an individual's will for their own good – a view like Nussbaum's 
can only fail to be paternalistic to some extent if it always concurs with what people will, or would will, for 
themselves. Compare the introduction to the next Chapter.
88 Again, it is hard to distinguish first-order and meta-level species of constructivism/proceduralism here. 
Arguably, a person could technically be a culture-laden realist and yet still hold that all claims that cannot be
procedurally derived from a persons perspective will be illegitimate, on the first order ground that this 
constitutes an impermissible paternalism.
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setting,  this  would  provide  one  of  the  ingredients  necessary  for  convergence  to  occur.
Nussbaum seems to espouse such a view. For example, she claims that:
the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent independent
of  culture,  powerfully  though culture  shapes  it  at  every stage...[some desires]
seem to be relatively permanent features of our makeup as humans, which culture
can blunt, but cannot altogether remove. (2000a, 155).
If we combine this with the strong epistemic role that human desire is supposed to play, this
suggests that what is most fundamentally at work here is a non-culture-laden realism. The
explanation for why people come to converge in their moral views over time might be that all
humans, regardless of cultural location, will, when in the relevant environment, come under
the causal influence of the mind-independent good, and will come to desire the right things as
a result. As well as explaining why human desire, regardless of enculturation, will be good
evidence,  this  account  will  explain  why  the  substantive  and  procedural  methods  would
converge89.  If Nussbaum's substantive reflection provides her with access to certain truths
about the good, and the consultation of others desires will tend to do the same in virtue of
their natural orientation, the outputs of the two processes would converge over time.
However, as will become clear in the next Chapter, we have good reasons to seek a culture-
laden realism. Insofar as the interpretation I have given here is correct, and insofar as that
restricts Nussbaum to non-culture-laden forms of realism, it will conflict with the position I
put forward later. Resisting Nussbaum's view will involve denying that desire can have the
intrinsically evidential role that she ultimately seems to advocate, and holding that we should
not  expect  desire-based proceduralist  methodology to be  particularly accurate.  This  is  of
wider significance, insofar as the prospects of a universalistic capability approach will depend
89 Compare Sturgeon 2006; Enoch 2011, Ch.7. Arguably, the sort of empirical, explanatory considerations that 
are brought in by notions of convergence are likely to militate against culture-laden realism, at least when 
read as requiring explanations to be given in scientific terms: as we shall see in the following chapters (esp. 
Ch.5), to make sense of a plausible Aristotelian culture-laden realism we need to deploy autonomously 
ethical concepts on every level of our explanations.
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on whether it can justify divergences from local (including individual) beliefs and desires.
What is more, in the next Chapter I shall give several reasons for scepticism about ability of
constructivisms to sustain themselves when faced with certain kinds of epistemic difficulty.
§2.4 Jaggar's Critique
§2.4.1 Jaggar's Epistemic Critique
So far, I have outlined Nussbaum's views on normative methodology and the justification of
her capability approach, and provided a variety of reasons to be skeptical that this is, in the
end,  a  coherent  and  plausible  account.  In  this  final  section,  I  turn  to  one  of  the  most
comprehensive criticisms of Nussbaum in this area, Alison Jaggar's 2006 paper “Reasoning
about  Well-Being:  Nussbaum's  Methods  of  Justifying  the  Capabilities”.  Her  critique  is
essential here because it incorporates and continues in spirit a number of others that came
before, especially those of Okin (2003) and Ackerly (2000); and because it raises in a quite
general way a number of distinct criticisms of Nussbaum, some of which I find compelling,
and some of which are not cogent, but are mistaken in a way that points towards clarifications
and revisions of Nussbaum's meta-level approach.
Many of Jaggar's criticisms are of a broadly epistemic kind: they aim to identify features of
Nussbaum's way of thinking about justification that make it unlikely that it  will  result  in
objectivity. In this sub-section, I will describe Jaggar's criticisms that seem to be of this broad
kind. Through both this section and the next, I will not assess the cogency of the criticisms I
survey, leaving this task until §2.5 below.
Firstly, Jaggar argues that Nussbaum's claim that there is a good chance that a procedural
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informed desire approach would, in fact, result in backing for the capabilities approach is
unsupported, at least on the evidence she provides. She notes that Nussbaum has had very
few direct and reasonably comprehensive conversations with people outside of academic or
NGO circles  (perhaps  only two!)  who come from non-Western  backgrounds.  Also,  when
large-scale  conversations  such  as  conferences  have  been  organised,  they  tend  to  include
mainly Westerners, and there is little evidence that existing inequalities in power have been
compensated for. Finally, the limited evidence of other's views that Nussbaum provides is
almost always filtered through her interpretations, and it is plausible that others might not
interpret  what  has  been  said  as  supporting  the  capabilities  approach  over  alternative
proposals. (313-5).
Secondly, many of these same criticisms, especially those that trade on a general concern
about  the  non-inclusion  of  all  perspectives,  also  apply to  the  substantive-good approach.
Given that this is her primary approach, relative to which the proceduralist method is merely
a supplement, and given that it is something like the substantive good approach that I want to
defend, it is this to which I give most attention.
Consider the following two quotes:
Establishing that a set of intuitions or preferences is in balance shows only that
the set is internally coherent. Unless the individual or group creating the set has
considered all available intuitions, it remains possible that anomalous intuitions
may have been excluded or  that  other  equilibria,  expressing alternative  moral
perspectives,  may  exist.  Since  the  reflective  equilibrium  approach  offers  no
guidelines for preferring one of these possible alternative equilibria to the others,
it does not dispel the specters of subjectivism, if the coherent set of intuitions is
held by an individual, or of relativism, if the set is held by a community...In order
to address such concerns, Nussbaum must explain why the intuitions of those who
accept the values on her list of capabilities are more reliable than the intuitions of
those who do not. (315-6).
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Not only does [this approach] provide no safeguard against philosophers selecting
only intuitions that are in agreement with their own, while dismissing dissenting
views; it explicitly recommends that philosophers should select only intuitions
with which they agree. Thus rather than providing independent confirmation of
the political conception of the capabilities, it simply begs the question...Insofar as
the...substantive-good approach lacks both a requirement that philosophers check
their  own  intuitions  against  those  of  non-arbitrarily  selected  others  and  a
procedure  to  ensure  that  this  checking  is  done  fairly,  it  is  unable  to  assure
philosophers that they are not projecting their own ideas on to other people and
simply rationalizing their own pre-existing values. (317).
There are a number of epistemic criticisms here, many of which seem compelling. Firstly,
Jaggar notes that an individual, or restricted group method of reflective equilibrium does not
seem satisfactory, because there may be more than one coherent, stable position, and it will be
difficult  to  rule  this  out  without  unrestricted  discussion.  Secondly,  if  there  are  multiple
equilibria, reflective equilibrium per se offers no reason to select one over another90. Thirdly,
any justification that this method provides for a normative conception cannot be independent.
And finally, if the process is very individualistic, there will be nothing in place to prevent
misinterpretation of others and the invalid appropriation of their responses as evidence for
theses they do not support.
§2.4.2 Jaggar's Normative Critique
In addition to the above epistemic criticisms, Jaggar also argues that Nussbaum's substantive
good approach is  normatively problematic: that it  treats  people unjustly.  As before,  I will
quote the key passages, and draw out the criticisms afterwards:
The  non-platonist  substantive-good  approach  is  problematic  in  several
overlapping respects. It runs the risk of exclusiveness because it fails to mandate
that everyone should participate in developing the list of capabilities; instead, an
unidentified  'we'  draw  on  the  ideas  of  other  vaguely  identified  'people.'  In
addition, it is explicitly non-egalitarian: some people, the same unidentified 'we,'
assume  the  authority  to  decide  whether  or  not  those  people’s  desires  are
90 It is not clear why the absence of a procedure that guarantees the establishment of a single correct result 
should lead to subjectivism or relativism, however, and Jaggar does not expand on this here. Even a cursory 
glance at the history of epistemology should indicate that such guaranteed certainty is at least extremely 
rare, if not completely absent.
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'informed' or 'corrupt' or 'mistaken.' Indeed, even when the desires of the others
are accepted as informed, they are given only limited weight. Nussbaum writes
that the 'informed desires'  of other people play 'a large role in finding a good
substantive list,' but the role she assigns to them is primarily that of assisting in
discovering  the capabilities; their role in  justifying  them is merely 'limited and
ancillary'. (318)
If  the  desires  of  members  of  an  oppressed  group  are  incompatible  with  the
capabilities, the non-platonist substantive good approach recommends dismissing
them as “adaptive preferences” without taking seriously the possibility that “our”
own preferences might be corrupt or mistaken. (319)
In  addition,  the  approach  asserts  that  people  whose  desires  are  judged  to  be
deformed (shown by their failure to endorse “our” values) are not yet ready for
proceduralism, moral epistemology’s version of liberal democracy. Only if they
agree with “our” intuitions, are they allowed moral self-government. A picture
emerges of morally enlightened philosophers, equipped with prior insight into the
universal values, roving across the moral resources of the global South in search
of whatever will enhance “our” theories. If this reading is correct, then the non-
platonist  substantive-good approach is  not  only an illiberal  approach to  moral
justification; in many global contexts, its use by Western philosophers is likely
also to be neocolonial. (320)
Firstly, Jaggar notes that the substantive good approach runs the risk of being 'exclusivist',
and that 'we' (that is, members of a group that includes Nussbaum and is centred around her
own normative views)  make decisions about  which perspectives  are  worthy of  inclusion.
Second, other people are used as sources of information about ways of living and differing
evaluations of ways of living; what these people think is not a justificatory input though (at
least, not just per se). Third, Nussbaum is willing to claim that other people's preferences are
unsound, but does not place her own in play in the same way. Fourth, Nussbaum disrespects
the self-government of those who she treats as incompetent, and this is illiberal. Finally, this
disrespect smacks of colonialism, because as a matter of fact, many of those whose views or
preferences will  be thus treated as corrupt or mistaken will  be from developing countries
where there is a history of colonisation, and Nussbaum is a white American. Jaggar's earlier
reference to 'oppressed groups' suggests that this colonialism claim is really only a special
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case of a broader accusation, and the substantive good method will be problematic whenever
the intuitions of someone from an oppressed group are said to be unreliable, in contrast to
those of someone of a different background.91
§2.5 What is Required in Response?
So,  what  impact  do  these  criticisms  have,  and what  changes  should  Nussbaum make  in
response  to  them?  The  epistemic  critique  has  some  cogency.  If  we  take  the  procedural
approach seriously, as Jaggar prefers, she seems right that we have few epistemic reasons not
to include a broader range of participants than Nussbaum's engagement with others typically
has, and to use those participants' contributions in a less thickly-interpreted way. Some of
these criticisms are well-taken in relation to the substantive good method too – there too, we
should be careful not to misinterpret the contributions of others, and we have good reason to
increase the diversity of interlocutors if we  can.  Ultimately, though, most of the criticisms
here raise further questions, at least if what is at work in the substantive good approach is a
culture-laden realism. Jaggar's argument seems to require that  every point of view be given
equal  evidential  weight,  but  for  culture-laden  realists,  views  that  originate  from  some
processes of enculturation may be just plain unreliable. Responses that were the result of such
enculturation would not bear even an approximate relationship to the truth. Far from making
the  process  more  reliably objective,  then,  they would  be  likely to  at  best  make  it  more
confused  than  it  needs  to  be,  and  at  worst  lead  to  entirely false  conclusions.  Reflective
equilibrium is  a  path-dependent  method:  where  you end up depends on where you start.
Contra constructivism, it is vital to restrict the responses that are given epistemic significance
to those that seem to have a good chance of being accurate. As realists, we should also be
91 Notably, much of what Jaggar says relies on the concept of 'assuming authority'. I return to this in the next 
Chapter, §1.3.
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sceptical of the possibility of multiple equilibria: reflective equilibrium is supposed to lead us
to the truth, and, unless relativism is true, the truth will not be plural. I shall return to these
issues in more depth in the next Chapter (§2), but this provides some motivation to articulate
a culture-laden realist account, as I begin to do there.
In comparison, it is even more clear that the normative critique draws on a constructivist
metaethic. The core of the normative critique is the idea that we treat people unjustly if we do
not take all of their responses as evidence. The most plausible explanation for the idea that all
responses must be treated equally, regardless of the cultural background that shapes them, is
the idea that  all  responses  are fundamentally equal.  Although non-culture-laden forms of
realism  might  endorse  that92,  this  idea  is  most  likely  to  be  a  result  of  an  assumed
constructivist meta-level theory. If the target of such criticisms is a culture-laden realism, they
will not amount to arguments so much as blank rejections. Culture-laden realisms hold that
some  cultural  positions  may  just  be  irreparably  corrupt,  and  may  not  contain  sufficient
resources for constructive rational argument to a good end93. For these perspectives, then, the
idea that every point of view must, for the sake of justice, be represented on its own terms is
entirely unmotivated. I shall say more about this in the next Chapter (§2.1), where I argue
more  thoroughly  that  normative  critiques  such  as  those  of  Jaggar  are  largely  question-
begging, flowing from an assumed constructivism that fails to engage with the possibility of
culture-laden realism, and that they cannot properly account for the practical necessity of
epistemological 'fixed points', such as the fundamental equality of women, and the badness of
adaptive preferences.
92 Although, if they do, this will most likely be because they do not take responses to ever be of epistemic 
significance as such.
93 Compare especially the discussion of reasons externalism in Ch.4 §2.2 on this point.
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Although I shall not be returning to consider Nussbaum's meta-level approach in detail again,
my reasoning for my ultimate conclusion regarding it is not yet in sight – much of that takes
place in the next chapter. However, from what I have said so far, it ought to be possible to
make out at least vaguely what my conclusion must be. I conclude that Nussbaum's approach
is torn, when faced with the problems I have set out, and especially in the light of criticisms
like Jaggar's. One horn of this putative dilemma is a culture-laden form of realism. I shall
show  that  this  approach  has  good  prospects  for  filling  in  the  gaps  in  her  theory,  and
responding to constructivistic criticisms. However, it does not (pace Nussbaum's optimism
about the prospects for overlapping consensus) build in the thought that people regardless of
cultural position will tend to desire the good, and does not leave room for the Rawlsian model
of political justification that she now prefers. The other horn preserves those elements of her
view, but forces her – in the face of Jaggar's  critique – to abandon the substantive good
method and leave the capability approach at the mercy of a proceduralism whose results are
necessarily far out of sight, and which is unlikely to be able to coherently sustain its own
egalitarian motivations. My belief is that the correct response to this dilemma is plain: we
should choose culture-laden realism. Hopefully, the argument of the next chapter will make
that belief compelling.
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Chapter 3: 
Justification, Objectivity, and the Human Good
In  this  Chapter,  following on from my conclusions in Chapter 2, my primary aim is  to
account in more detail for the division between ways of looking at objectivity that I have
identified, and to give reasons to favour one over the other. In large part, I shall continue to
operate with the broad distinction between 'culture-laden  realist' and 'constructivist'
conceptions of objectivity that I have used up to this point. However, what will also come to
the forefront is a connected dispute about the proper role of preferences in our normative
thought. These questions are related in that some views attempt to justify normative claims
with reference to preferences alone – these view are forms of preferentism. Capability theory
has traditionally opposed strict preferentism on the grounds that preferences are often
adaptive. The basic connection between preferentism and constructivism can be put simply:
since preferences are subjective states of the individual will, a view that refers to those alone
may well be able to claim a constructivistic kind of objectivity just per se. If a view of the
human good is a construction from preferences, and preferences are elements of the
subjective will, some sort of constructivist objectivity about that view of the good will
trivially be  available1. Preferentists, therefore, would  have a powerful incentive to be
constructivists. If preferentism is implausible as a justification for capability theory, meta-
level constructivism about the justification for capability theory will be weakened also,
simply because it will be harder to see how the  capability approach could be objectively
1 This is a relatively modest claim. It leaves it open that one could be a preferentist and yet a realist. One 
could (prima facie) think that there is a real, mind-independent good for humankind, but that it is exhausted 
by the satisfaction of preferences. 
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justified on a constructivist account.
In §1, then, I discuss a number of issues that bear on this question. I begin (in §1.1) by
quickly introducing the phenomenon of adaptive preferences, the recognition of which
typically informs much of the motivation  for a capability approach, in its usual global
context. I also  throw  initial doubt on whether a preferentist solution to the problem of
adaptive preferences is possible. Next, in §1.2, I describe a recent preferentist account, by
H.E. Baber, that aims both to solve this problem, and to provide a justification for capability
theory along the way. I then argue against this account. 
In §2, I assess in greater detail, and with reference to a greater number of sources, the
constructivist critiques of the realism-based meta-level conception and methodology that I
propose, and begin the process of responding to them by identifying significant problems
with the actual-process constructivism that these critiques seem intended to point towards. In
§2.1, I begin with a somewhat generalised version of the normative critique of Jaggar – some
elements  of  which  I  will  already have  identified  in  Baber's  preferentist  work  –  which  I
identify as a worry about the assumption of authority over others. I identify two forms that
this worry could take. The first (§2.1.1) concerns significant first-order normative disputes
that I cannot fully deal with here, although I say a little in response. The second (§2.1.2) goes
deeper, identifying an issue that,  if  cogent, would necessitate a turn towards deliberative-
democratic constructivism. However, I argue that this critique rests on a conflation between
authority and expertise. In §2.2, I turn to the epistemic critique, identifying its heart as the
idea that methods like Nussbaum's introduce standpoint-based biases. §2.2.1 examines the
claim that the individualism of the substantive good method is at fault,  reaching a mixed
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conclusion.  In  §2.2.2  I  turn  to  the  more  specific  question  of  how  to  accommodate
marginalised groups within the substantive good method, arguing that a reasonable response
here  makes  better  sense  within  a  realist  framework.  Next,  in  §2.3,  I  point  out  that
constructivism, including the kind that Jaggar seems to propose, is potentially self-effacing,
and thus internally unstable. In §2.4, I follow this by outlining the widely-accepted thesis of
epistemological 'naturalism', and claim, once again, that this cannot be made sense of unless a
realist  meta-level  conception  is  at  work  in  the  background  The  section,  along  with  the
primarily negative part of the Thesis, concludes in §2.5, where I focus on Rawls' 'political
constructivism', and argue that it, as an influential example of a hypothetical constructivist
approach,  is  similarly  unpromising  for  my  purposes.  Finally,  in  §3,  I  discuss  more
constructively some ways in which epistemological ideas friendly to the form of realism I
shall  endorse  have  been deployed in  practical  feminist  work.  Once the ground has been
cleared and the motivations established for a culture-laden realism, I can begin to explicate a
suitable view. This provides the task of the next Chapter.
§1. Adaption: Realism or Constructivism?
§1.1 Adaptive preferences
Perhaps the most important motivation for a culture-laden realist2 conception of objectivity, in
relation to the capability approach, results from the phenomenon of  adaptive preferences.
This phenomenon, which was brought to prominence by John Elster (1983), and elaborated in
relation  to  her  capability  approach  in  Nussbaum  (2000a,  esp.136-45),  occurs  when
individuals in circumstances of deprivation or oppression come to endorse, desire, or prefer
2  In general, I have been emphasising a distinction between realism simpliciter and constructivism. However,
it is important to note that at least some of my arguments in this section relate to culture-laden realism 
specifically, and may not be relevant to realisms that do not share that view's essential feature.
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things  that  they  otherwise  would  not.  People's  affective  sensibilities  –  their  persistent
tendencies to respond emotionally to worldly stimuli – and their beliefs have been shown to
systematically 'adapt' to the environments in which they find themselves, conceiving of them
as 'normal' or even 'natural' parts of life. When such adaption is present, individuals often do
not have any desire for change – it is not a realistic possibility in their minds, and even if it is
presented to them as a matter of immediacy, they will often refuse it. Important instances of
this phenomenon include the lowered demands for education, food, and medical care that are
observed in disadvantaged groups, relative to their advantaged peers. Even within relatively
localised contexts, such as between regions of India, women tend to exhibit less desire for
additional education, food, and medical care than men, despite the fact that in objective terms
they  get  less  of  each.  (2000a,  139).  On  any  reasonably  egalitarian  view,  this  looks
problematic – not only are the disadvantaged deprived of the basic goods to which they have
an  equal  right,  the  environment  of  disadvantage  even  leads  to  an  acquiescence  in  this
inequality. In addition, this topic has importance quite apart from any concern with equality
(as a component of the human good or otherwise). Adaption causes people not to seek their
good, and causes others to be unconcerned with their lack of attainment of it. For anyone who
cares about the quality of people's lives at all, it must then be a significant issue.
For example, consider the case of Jayamma, as recounted by Nussbaum  in  Women and
Human Development (2000a, 17-21, 64, 106-113, and 140). Jayamma was (circa 2000) a
woman in her mid-60's from Kerala (in the south of India). For around 45 years, she worked
as a brick-carrier for a brick kiln. She carried 500-700 bricks per day, 20 bricks at a time,
stacked and balanced on a plank on her head, holding them using the strength of her neck
alone. She never earned more than 5 rupees a day for this work. Because she worked in a
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'cottage industry', there was no protection from a labour union. As a rule, men begin working
at the kiln doing this form of labour, but they soon progress to other jobs (e.g. moulding the
bricks) that require far less physical exertion but earn twice as much. No woman is ever
promoted to these better jobs, and they are not allowed to learn the additional skills that
would be required in any case. Jayamma has never had any opportunities for formal
education, and there are few other labour opportunities available. While Jayamma's husband
was alive, almost all of his wages went on tobacco, alcohol and extra food for him, while she
had to support herself and their children. Despite all of these injustices, however, Jayamma is
and has been “very acquiescent in a discriminatory wage structure and a discriminatory
system of family income sharing. When women were paid less for heavier work...and denied
chances for promotion, Jayamma didn't complain or protest. She knew that this was how
things were and would be.” (113).
Recognising this as a phenomenon also raises questions about what the causes of adaption
might be, and what features of an individual's environment may be implicated in the process.
In particular, it  seems as though it is not merely the fact of lasting deprivation itself that
results in problematic adaption – not, for example, the persistent lack of food on the part of
one sociological group relative to another alone. Rather, many cases involve people adapting
to features of the surrounding cultural milieu in ways that look just as problematic. It is not
solely the fact that women are observed to consume less food, as a statistical generalisation,
that gives rise to a lack of desire for adequate nutrition on the part of other women, but also
the presence of ideological elements that directly discourage such desire. People's affective
sensibilities are obviously affected by enculturation, and if the surrounding culture and wider
society contain ideas that lead to a lack of desire for substantive equality, this is adaption no
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less than in the non-cultural case3.
The question that arises here is whether or not constructivist views, restricted as they are to
the space of existing desires and preferences themselves, can acknowledge those elements of
people's  affective  sensibilities  that  are  problematic  as problematic,  and  include  some
plausible explanation of why that particular set of responses is so. Doing this while remaining
within the space of existing people's responses will be difficult, in two ways.
Firstly,  the  justification  for  realism  arising  from  adaptive  preferences  can  flow  from
considerations of simplicity.  Even if it  is possible to fully account for adaptivity within a
constructivist theory – weeding out affective responses that are flawed without appeal to a
mind-independent standard –  it is clear that realist conceptions will be simpler. Incorporating
all the ways that affective responses can be problematically adaptive, from the involvement of
an existing inequality that lowers expectations, to the presence of an oppressive ideology,
would require an extremely complex constructivist procedure. The constructivist, given that
she must identify the perspective of normative objectivity with a perspective rooted in each
individual's existing affective sensibility4, will need to manufacture a procedure for sorting
existing preferences that eliminates those that are problematically adaptive without smuggling
in normative claims from outside. They cannot do the latter, of course, because substantive
claims originating outside of the affective sensibilities of the relevant existing subjects are
illegitimate for constructivism. Realism, by contrast,  can account for adaptive preferences
3 If, that is, there actually are any cases where no moulding of people's dispositions by enculturating 
processes is involved, which seems doubtful.
4 Strictly speaking, it is possible that some (e.g.) Kantian versions of constructivism would disavow this 
requirement, since the subjective base from which construction is supposed to take place is not relevantly 
affective, on these views. If such views can genuinely keep affective elements at arms length (which I 
doubt), they would not be vulnerable to the argument at this point. On the other hand, of course, there is no 
prima facie reason why such views would be concerned with preferences at all.
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straightforwardly and (probably, depending on the content of the realism) quite simply. If a
preference  results  from the  wrong kind of  background,  whether  that  be a  background of
material  inequality  or  of  inegalitarian  or  otherwise  false  ideology,  it  can  be  rejected  as
unresponsive to the normative facts5. Of course, it is important to note that the considerable
theoretical  advantages  of  realism  here  will  likely  not  mean  that  the  real-world  task  of
evaluating the normative admissibility of preferences will  be remotely easy in itself.  Just
because realism assures us that, were we to know fully the content of the correct theory of the
good, we could straightforwardly generate a procedure for assessing preferences, this does
not eliminate the major source of practical difficulty, which lies in deciding on the precise
content of the good itself.  However,  this  could not be a  greater problem (indeed, I  shall
suggest, it is a lesser one) for realism than constructivism – if the constructivist is to identify
the same set of preferences as problematic that the realist does, they will have to make claims
about procedures that are functionally identical to those that the realist makes about content.
Any indeterminacy or uncertainty in the latter will (at least  prima facie) be reflected in the
former. 
Secondly, it is doubtful whether constructivist views can motivate the rejection of all and only
those preferences that are problematically adaptive at all, regardless of whether they can do
so  simply.  Nussbaum has  claimed  that  an  adequate  answer  to  this  problem  requires  an
account of the human good that does not automatically take as evidence the existing beliefs
and desires of contemporary humans, even those that have been put through some procedure
of idealisation (2000a, 148-9). The problem here is not merely that no proceduralist account
5 Of course, it is only within the context of some particular realist normative view that we can say what the 
'wrong kind' of background is here. My point is merely that any realism will have some resources available 
to do this. A further advantage of this approach is that it dispenses with any fraudulent veneer of neutrality 
that might accompany alternative theories.
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seems  to  have  been  offered  that  could  do  this  job.  That  might,  if  defeasibly,  justify  a
prediction that no account will be forthcoming. Rather, the principal problem is that reasons
have to be found for why each procedural rule is included, and the pure proceduralist cannot,
in  giving such reasons,  refer  to  substantive  normative content,  e.g.  'without  this  rule  my
procedure  will  generate  repugnant  moral  views'6.  Given this,  it  is  not  clear  what  a  pure
constructivist  can  say,  particularly  about  cases  of  adaption  that  involve  the  cultural
background.  The  particular  problem  here  is  that  all  beliefs/desires  that  are  relevant  to
normative judgement take place against some background of enculturation, so the challenge is
to  specify  what  it  is  about  particular  kinds  of  enculturation  that  is  problematic  without
referring at any point to the content of the belief/desire itself.
Taken together, these two considerations are sufficient to motivate a realist version of
objectivity for capability theory. Without a theory whose normative standards can stand
outside of people's existing beliefs and desires7, it looks as though adequately responding to
the problems raised by the phenomenon of adaptive preferences will be (at  least) highly
complicated on a theoretical level, and may even be impossible. In the next section, I shall
examine one recent preferentist account, that of H.E. Baber, which explicitly aims to avoid an
appeal to a conception of the human good that stands outside of existing desires in the way I
have urged is necessary.
6 See, however, §§2.2-3 below. If a constructivist concedes the necessity of  'fixed points', they can reject 
preferences on the ground that they contradict them. The question, as I say there, is how any constructivist 
could justify such fixity.
7 Arguably, this is what it all comes down to. Two broader connections are notable here. Firstly, 
constructivism has a revealing relationship to anti-realism, construed (as elsewhere) as a refusal to 
countenance any concept of objectivity that would transcend our subjectivity (e.g. our possible or actual 
evidence, beliefs, desires, or our phenomenology generally). Cf. Miller (2003), which cashes out a 
requirement for realism in terms of whether or not the facts it postulates are 'constitutively independent of 
human opinion' (6), and Dummett (1991) for a detailed exposition of the idea. Secondly, constructivism in 
the normative domain is voluntaristic: the truth is dependent on states of the will. This raises a connnection 
with the Euthyphro problem, the classic statement of which is obviously Plato (1997, 1-16).
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§1.2 Baber's Trans-world Preferentism
As I have said, Baber's account is a form of preferentism: it holds that all preferences, and
only preferences, are the correct ingredients in a theory of the human good. Her 2010 paper,
'Worlds, Capabilities, and Well-being' describes a preferentist view, and argues that it has the
resources to solve the problem of adaptive preferences and justify a capability theory. Given
that this is a fairly comprehensive attempt to ground a normative theory, there would be much
to say about it. However, I shall not be concerned with issues concerning Baber's account of
the foundations of capability theory8 that don't  relate to the cogency of a  constructivist
approach to adaptivity.
Baber's preferentism is distinguished by its inclusion of possible preferences, as well as actual
ones, when making an assessment of an individual's good. Specifically, preferences that a
subject could easily have had – that is, those that beings relevantly similar to them have, in
close possible worlds – also count as benefiting the actual-world subject if they are satisfied.
This (arguably) counts as a capability theory because one way of understanding what a
capability is appeals to that which could easily happen but won't, or could easily have
happened but didn't. On this account, it benefits a person to open up a broad space of possible
functionings that 'centres' on their actual preferences, even though they may not (actually)
prefer the possible states of affairs that are thus enabled. Classic capability-creating policies
do not merely impact what happens in the actual world, e.g. by enabling an agent A0 to
choose to do things she otherwise couldn't. They also impact a range of possible worlds, by
8 For example, her definition of capability differs from the one I gave in Chapter 1. On her definition, having 
the capability to Φ is not conceptually related to the capacity to effectively choose to Φ, rather it is a 
function of how metaphysically close one is to a world at which one Φ's, regardless of whether one's choices
are what distinguishes that world from our own. (Baber 2010, p.381.)
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making it the case that in those possible worlds possible versions of A0 (A1, A2, A3...An )
satisfy preferences that A0 may or may not have, but could easily have had. For a set of
possible worlds, which are centred on subjects A0-An, such that each version of A0 lives in a
unique world, a given world will be closer to the actual world to the degree that the
'psychology and circumstances' of the relevant subject An resembles that of A0. (379-380) 
This enables definitions of three key  concepts for Baber: relevance, fruitfulness, and
capability. A possible preference is relevant to the well-being of A0 to the extent that the
world in which that preference occurs is close to A0's world; that is, to the extent that the
value of 'n' for that particular individual An is relatively low. The satisfaction of a preference
held by a close possible version of A0, such as A1, makes A0, substantially better off, whereas
for high values of n, the difference made may be negligible. Capability is constituted by a
relatively small distance between the world of A0  and the world in which a given  state of
affairs occurs. A0 only counts as having capability relative to a state of affairs (i.e. the
instantiation of a 'doing' or 'being' functioning) if the world at which that state of affairs
occurs is  metaphysically close. Finally, states of affairs are more fruitful if they are
compatible with the satisfaction of lots of other actual and possible relevant preferences.
Finally, then, it is possible to see how this theory evaluates a given state of affairs in terms of
its contribution to an individual's well-being. Having capabilities but not functioning is
valuable, on this view, just to the extent that the capability is achieved: to the extent that the
individual could function; to the extent that the capability is relevant, such that some close
version of the individual prefers it; and to the extent that the capability is fruitful, such that
having it is compatible with a wide range of other capabilities. (379-83)
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This amounts to a grounding for a capability-involving theory of well-being in preferentist
terms. Baber also claims that it has the resources to account for adaptive preferences. It can
do this in two ways. Firstly, some preferences that people have may be fruitless, and if that is
so, satisfying them may be of neutral or negative value overall9. Baber's example here is the
preference of someone who wishes to have a healthy limb amputated (386). Secondly, it may
be the case that people would have preferences for some things if only their circumstances
were slightly different, and her account allows this fact to have normative weight. It appears
that this theory will generate the right verdict about a large number of the cases that we think
problematically adaptive, and will do this without building in (covertly or otherwise) any
objective, preference-external theory of the good.
As yet, I have not  argued that trans-world preferentism does not have good prospects for
doing the work that we require for (e.g.) the formation of a conception of dignity.  The best
way to begin to do this, to bring out the substantive differences between Baber's view and my
own, is to consider the positive case she gives for her theory, relative to non-preferentist
proposals. Unfortunately, she does not offer a great deal in the way of explicit argument.
However, she does make three comments that imply criticisms of the realist approach that I
prefer. The first criticism can be seen in this passage10:
Of course, it is a matter of empirical conjecture whether the preference for better 
working conditions, higher pay and control over her earnings is a nearby preference 
for Jayamma or other poor women. It could be that they are so beaten down that their 
desire for a better life is remote. Nussbaum’s stories about the response of poor 
women in developing countries to improved prospects however suggest otherwise. 
When the poor Indian women whose stories she tells see the benefits of joining 
9 It should be noted that standard preferentism can also designate preferences as deformed 'on net' in this way;
the only difference here is that trans-world preferentism factors in the possible effects of relevant possible 
preferences as well as actual effects of actual ones.
10 I quote all three of the critical passages at length because I think they get remarkably close to the heart of 
the issues that I have been considering, and in the light of that, I don't want to run the risk of misinterpreting
a key opponent via a paraphrase.
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women’s co-ops and taking advantage of microcredit schemes they jump at the chance
to participate—no elaborate therapeutic intervention or extensive personality 
remodeling is required. Their preferences for improved conditions are nearby and that 
is why we think it is worthwhile to improve the conditions of their lives. Mutatis 
mutandis, when the preference for “improved”  conditions is not nearby, when it
would take aggressive therapy, propaganda and extensive character remodeling to elicit or 
manufacture them, we question the value of life-improvement programs: we are 
skeptical about projects intended to reform preferences by advertisers, missionaries 
and political ideologues. (388-9)
The criticism present in this passage seems to be very similar to  the normative strand in
Jaggar's criticism (as discussed in the last Chapter). Those who believe that sometimes people
are just radically wrong about what would be good for them are compared to 'missionaries'
and 'political ideologues'. Again, it is hard to see what the criticism here really is – we may
condemn missionaries or advertisers, but generally if we do so it is on the grounds that their
beliefs about the good of their proselytical targets are false, not on the grounds that
proselytism is somehow bad in itself. But if that is the content of the criticism, it is blankly
question-begging –  it assumes precisely what is at issue: the truth of some (preferentist)
claims about the good, and the falsity of some (non-preferentist) others. The same goes for
'political ideologues', except that this has connotations of dogmatism. This, however, would
be an epistemic accusation, not a normative one, in the sense I have described; the claim
would be that the 'ideologue' is insufficiently open to the possibility that she is wrong.11
In the second instance, Baber presents an example:
I have come into some money—not much, but enough to pay for either breast
augmentation or a course in electronics technology at my local community
college. Each alternative opens a range of career options for me. Breast
augmentation opens possibilities for working as a stripper, waitressing at Hooters
and sex work; the electronics course opens a very different range of career
options. Personally, I prefer a career in electronics and regard stripping,
waitressing and whoring as bad, awful and gruesome alternatives, so I’m better
off with the electronics course. But that’s just me. There is nothing inherently
11 A third possibility is that Baber is trading on concerns about alienation or paternalism here. See §2.1.1 
below. Thanks to Kirk Surgener and Sarah-Louise Johnson (respectively) for emphasising these as possible 
motivations.
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better in being a technician (or a philosopher) than in being a stripper: de
gustibus. The current account accommodates that intuition. (386-7)12
With the second from last sentence, we arrive at the heart of the matter. There are two points
to make here. 
Firstly, this is clearly a substantive claim, and a contestable one. If Baber's argument relies on
the positive thesis that all ways of life, preferences aside, are equal in value, this removes it
from the merely procedural kind of theorising that I oppose, and which coheres with
constructivism. One of the principal attractions of such an approach is supposed to be that it
remains neutral  in  principle between particular normative claims, providing a procedure
within which people can resolve their differences on allegedly equal terms. If we have to
begin with the idea that all ways of living are on a par (an idea that, on the face of it,
vanishingly few accept), all perspectives will not be treated equally.
Secondly, is Baber's  claim here really intuitive? Surely not –  and a turn back towards our
starting point in the problem of adaptive preferences should show us this. We begin, when
looking at a typical case of adaption, with the thought that the preferences that we consider to
be adaptive –  such as (potentially) the preference for breast augmentation over education –
are bad preferences to have. The most straightforward way of explicating that response is
precisely as a belief that they will not make the person better off. Baber's aim here then seems
to be to explain away this response, rather than to explain it by setting it in a wider context.
12 There is a rhetorical turn in Baber's writing here. Presumably, she focuses on the case of stripping and breast
augmentation because she expects us to be 'liberal', 'pro-sex' feminists who wouldn't dream of regarding as 
problematic women's choices to do these things. Whether her audience matches her expectations on this 
count is, however, beside the point. Her theory, as is clear from the first paragraph quoted above, entails just
as equally that e.g. preferences not to eat properly in order to feed one's gluttonous and domineering 
husband are also just fine, so long as the psychology of the individual who has them is set up in the right 
way; so long, perhaps, as the person in question has been sufficiently 'beaten down'. It is far less likely that 
people will find that intuitive.
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On her account, what is really at work when we recognise adaption is an implicit empirical
hypothesis about the preferences that a person would have if only circumstances were
different (if she is to remain true to her doctrine that all preferences are inherently equally
good, she cannot say 'if circumstances were better'...13). We hypothesise that in most slight
permutations of the person and her situation, she would prefer nutrition for herself over the
indulgence of her husband. As she then points out, this is compatible with its not being the
case that the original preference is bad simpliciter – it just happens to be outweighed in trans-
world comparison. So, we are supposed to discard our initial intuition of the badness of the
preference, in favour of this theory-motivated alternative. Even so, it remains the case that we
did initially think that the preference was bad simpliciter, and so the idea that we would find it
intuitive in its own right that all preferences are inherently equal is implausible on its face14.
Baber's third argument is contained here:
Arguably, ceteris paribus, we should prefer an account of well-being that is
monistic and subjectivist to an irreducibly pluralistic objective list theory like
Nussbaum’s. Unified theories are to be preferred to piecemeal explanations, and
objective accounts of well-being that purport to ground the requisites for the good
life in the structure of Being or essential human nature seem suspiciously
obscurantist. (379)
Firstly, it is not clear why it would be better, ceteris paribus, to have a subjectivist theory than
an objectivist one; if anything, it seems to be the other way round.15 Secondly, although the
13 There is a further criticism that would flow from this point, and which would damage the prospects for 
trans-world preferentism to recognise almost any cases of adaption, although this is less germane to my 
purposes in this Chapter. On the face of it, the preferences of all close versions of subject A count equally, if 
they are equally fruitful. Baber gets the result she wants vis-a-vis adaptive preferences by arguing that there 
will be close possible versions of most agents that would prefer things we think unproblematic. However, 
she cannot conclude (without metaphysical argument) that there would not be an equally large number of 
equally close possible people whose preferences are more problematic than those of the actual person. If so, 
she will not be able to condemn adaption without abandoning preferentism after all. I thank Sam Shearn for 
inspiring this line of argument.
14 This part of my argument is likely to generalise to most other forms of proceduralism.
15 If it is just as easy for us to justify an objective theory as a subjective one, as the ceteris paribus condition 
implies, it must be preferable to be able to claim mind-independent objectivity for it, rather than mere 
justification from our/my particular perspective. Probably, Baber has in mind alleged metaethical difficulties
with normative objectivity here.
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account  I shall eventually propose (in Chapter 5) does have to do with 'essential human
nature', I hope it is  not  obscure. Finally, although it may be that monism and unity are
theoretical virtues ceteris paribus, I think that there are sufficient reasons to think that all
things are not equal here – that Baber's view will very likely not provide us with the resources
that we need after all. 
That is because Baber, from what she says against the non-preferentist, must think that there
are substantive differences between the set of preferences that she acknowledges are
problematically adaptive, and those which she expects her opponent to find problematic. A
residual substantive dispute remains, even if Baber succeeds in accounting for some
preferences' adaptive badness, over whether or not this exhausts the category of 'adaptive
preferences' entirely. Ultimately, there is not one 'problem of adaptive preferences' that
different people are trying to solve in different ways. There are potentially as many distinct
'problems of adaptive preferences' as there are preferences that a person might think
problematically adaptive. For the preferentist to stand on a level playing field with her
opponent, she must first isolate some specific set of preferences whose badness must be
explained. Plainly, Baber and myself (and, probably, Baber and Nussbaum) disagree about the
content of that set. As a result, the meta-level dispute about methods of theoretical accounting
will collapse into a first-order dispute about what is good, and what is bad. Anti-preferentists
can be quite content with this state of affairs, because they want to stop there – with the idea
that some preferences are bad, and others good. The satisfaction of some preferences will
make their bearers better off; the satisfaction of others will be of significant disvalue, or
neither valuable or disvaluable. While  we remain at this substantive level of disagreement,
the non-preferentist seems to have the upper hand: all they have to do is identify some set of
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preferences that are bad, and try to see what connects them together to build a more general
image of the bad  life. They do not, as the preferentist does, have the additional  task of
explaining away our  initial sense that some preferences are normatively irrelevant or
positively perverse.
Overall, then, we seem to have a number of reasons, with respect to the phenomenon of
adaptive preferences, to pursue a realist account. It does not appear that even a highly
sophisticated preferentism like Baber's will be able to explain the badness of all the
preferences that are problematic. The most likely explanation for this is that Baber doesn't
actually think that the phenomenon of adaption is nearly as wide-ranging as non-preferentists
(and, perhaps, disinterested others) likely will do. Given this, it is best to pursue a realism-
congruent theory, on which the explanation of the badness of adaptive preferences is simple
and direct: adaption occurs in those cases where people do not know the good, as a result of
their social environment and the enculturation to which it has given rise.16
§2. Arguing about Constructivism
I have suggested that realism provides the most straightforward, and perhaps the only,
theoretical response to the problem of adaptive preferences. We need a way of thinking about
normative subject-matters that makes the good independent of the space of existing human
subjective states, rather than requiring that a conception of the good be built exclusively
within it. I have also suggested that some of the criticisms of this realist conception (at this
16 From the McDowellian Aristotelian point of view that I develop in the next Chapter, the only person whose 
preferences will not exhibit adaption at all will be the virtuous person. Her preferences will not be adaptive 
because they will be the result of a process of habituation, within a cultural setting, that is individuated 
exactly by its conduciveness to human flourishing. From this perspective, the phenomenon of adaptive 
preferences is entirely unsurprising – people have bad preferences because they have no exposure to the 
good. The next Chapter fills out the meta-level story here.
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high level of generality) are unconvincing. In this section, I shall evaluate these criticisms
more closely, and argue either that they are not cogent, or that they can be effectively
accommodated by some realisms. As a result, in this section I aim both to further motivate a
realist foundation for capability theory, and to make some progress towards the identification
of what kind of realism is appropriate.
Before I continue, a reminder may be necessary. I began, in the previous Chapter, with
Nussbaum's model of capability theory. Having noted a number of problems with it, I opted
to provisionally endorse the substantive good model, construed as a form of culture-laden
realism. Having already adopted Jaggar's criticism of the substantive good model as the
paradigm case, I continue in this section by concentrating on constructivist criticisms that
have a (broadly) feminist origin17. Feminist epistemologies are still not entirely mainstream18,
and as a result, the critiques of my chosen meta-level conception may not be the most
common ones that would be appealed to. However, this narrowness of focus is defensible for
a number of reasons. Firstly, it is of course impossible in a project of this size to consider
every criticism. Secondly, criticisms from within the feminist tradition are especially relevant
to capability theory because the capability approach is, arguably at least, unusually consonant
with feminist concerns. Examples would include the emphasis on effective rather than merely
formal  (i.e.  legal) equality, the willingness to pay close attention to human diversity and
difference, and (to some extent at least) the rejection of public/private distinctions. Finally,
the form of culture-laden realism I shall propose has some interesting features that an
introduction via feminist-constructivist criticism will highlight (see especially §3 below). The
17 As should become clear, 'feminist' epistemology here is not narrowly concerned with issues arising from 
gender inequality, but equally with race, class, and other structural inequalities. If this is regarded as 
obscurantist, readers can substitute 'critical-theoretical' for 'feminist' at most points.
18 Or, as many of the contributors to the Antony and Witt (2002) volume say, 'malestream'.
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two most important of these are scepticism about (or even total erasure of): A) the dichotomy
between reason and emotion19, and B) the idea that knowledge about the normative (and,
potentially at least, knowledge per se) involves the elimination of contingent particularity
from the believer's standpoint20.
§2.1 Privileging one's own Perspective – Authority
The core of Jaggar's normative criticism in her 2006 paper concerns an alleged assumption of
authority on the part of a normative theorist (in that instance, Nussbaum). I won't repeat
myself too much by quoting examples (see §2.4.2 in the last Chapter), but perhaps the
clearest is the following: “A central theme of my discussion has been concern about the
philosopher’s moral authority. With respect to each methodological approach, I have argued
either that it assigns undue authority to the philosopher or that the philosopher, in this case
Nussbaum, assumes undue authority in using it.” (Jaggar 2006, 320). In this section, I identify
two worries that this criticism may well trade upon, and respond to each in turn (although my
response to the first worry is necessarily brief).
§2.1.1 Paternalism and Alienation
As I noted  in my previous discussion of Jaggar's critique, one of her central normative
criticisms is that Nussbaum's substantive good methodology violates individuals' 'moral self-
government' (Jaggar 2006, 320) by failing to give their preferences intrinsic normative or
epistemic weight. If Jaggar's point was just to note that preferences are not given such
intrinsic weight by the (culture-laden realist) substantive good conception, this would not be
19 See §2.1 in the next Chapter for the claims about this which I endorse.
20 Cf. Jaggar 2000a (235-40); it is clear from the definition of culture-laden realism itself that this is a 
consequence, but the next Chapter provides the background for this thought.
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an argument  but an instance of begging the question: not giving such subjective states
inherent weight is precisely what distinguishes culture-laden realism from its rivals. However,
Jaggar also invokes the idea of self-government. I take it that this – as well as her references
to the substantive good method as 'illiberal' (320) – marks a concern that using this method
will be morally wrong21. There are two commonly-used moral concepts that might plausibly
be in play here.
Firstly, Jaggar might be concerned that using the substantive good methodology will involve
paternalism – it will claim to know the good of individuals better than they do themselves,
and make prescriptions concerning them accordingly. Secondly, she may be concerned that
there is a threat of alienation looming here22. The substantive good conception refuses to take
people's existing self-conceptions and normative perspectives as read, most obviously
because those may be problematically adaptive. In engaging some people in discussion, or
developing actions or systems of policy that might affect them, the substantive good method
will not be able to begin by engaging them on their own terms. The political change that the
substantive good methodology would recommend –  which would necessarily include a
change in people's perspectives –  will then cause some people to be alienated from
themselves, or from aspects of themselves23. Both of these concepts are potential problems
for a substantive-good-based capability approach, in part for reasons Jaggar notes.
Substantive good approaches cannot rule out the possibility that individuals' perspectives will
21 If this is right, Jaggar's normative criticism seems to contradict some elements of her epistemic criticism. 
She relies here on the normative cogency of certain moral claims. However, her claim elsewhere seems to 
be that the substantive good method she opposes is guilty of the same thing – relying on certain moral theses
in thinking about the future path of normative methodology. See §2.3 below for a generalised account of this
threat.
22 The quotation from Axel Honneth which Jaggar uses in her (1999, 318) also seems to involve a claim that 
alienation is a serious wrong, which may support my interpretation here.
23 Compare the discussion of alienation in the context of Williams' argument for his reasons internalism in the 
next Chapter (§2.2.2)
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be judged to be defective (i.e. adaptive). That being so, others might have better knowledge
about an individual or group's good than that individual or group themselves do. Similarly,
the correct course of political change might then involve alienation. If alienation is a very
serious harm, or if paternalism is extremely disrespectful, these will represent powerful
objections to the substantive good methodology24.
I have limited space to argue about first-order normative questions here, and I certainly
cannot adequately defend the view that concerns about paternalism and/or alienation are not
cogent. In lieu of that, I shall restrict myself to two points. Firstly, although I have certainly
not shown that alienation or paternalism do not pose problems for a substantive-good-based
capability approach to justice, Jaggar has not shown that they are problematic either; she
seems to simply assume it. Secondly, is it really so implausible, prima facie, that individuals
or even groups can be so corrupt that they would be better off undergoing paternalistic
interference, or alienating social change? Examples such as the de-Nazification of Germany,
or of intervention into self-destructive religious cults, suggest otherwise.
§2.1.2 Methodological Exclusion; Authority and Expertise
The second worry that seems to be present in Jaggar's normative critique concerns the
exclusion of some people from the methodology that, in application, is supposed to govern
their lives. This differs from the first worry in that it does not seem to involve a claim that
using the method will make people's lives worse or violate rights to independence or negative
liberty. Rather, the thought is that failing to include every perspective as an equal influence in
24  I say 'very serious' and 'extremely' because even if these things are bad- or wrong- makers to some extent, 
this would not automatically show that the method that involves them is indefensible. It may well be the 
case that any reasonable course of action in the contemporary world will involve some bads/wrongs. Cf. 
Ch.6, esp. §§2-3
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a methodology is problematic independently of such harms or rights-violations. 
Jaggar's claims here are powerful, if they are on target. The substantive-good methodology
does involve treating some perspectives, or elements thereof, differently from others.
Engaging in substantive thought about the good, we begin with plausible theses about the
good, modifying them as a result of engagement with the experiences of epistemic peers. But
who counts as an epistemic peer is itself affected by whether, and why, they accept or reject
enough of these theses; if they don't accept some of these theses, their perspective will be
adaptive, and to that extent they will not be an epistemic peer. As a result, the account of the
good (and, relatedly, of justice) that is the result of substantive-good methodology is likely to
apply to people who have not had an equal influence on its formulation. Jaggar holds that this
methodology is elitist, in that it privileges theorists over everyone else (2006, 318-9), and
prestigious, assertive, and domineering25 theorists over other theorists (317-8), and probably
neocolonial, in that it is likely to privilege 'Westerners' over global others (319). Elsewhere,
she juxtaposes the conceptions of moral justification she opposes, described as 'covertly elitist
and authoritarian', against reformed conceptions that would be 'transparent and democratic'
(2000b, 241). As I noted above, what seems to unite these elements of Jaggar's normative
critique is the idea that using methodologies like the substantive-good conception implicitly
privileges the user, setting them up in a position of authority over others that those others
have not accepted, and likely would not accept. If this is a correct description of what such
realist conceptions involve, it seems clear that they should be rejected.
However, this criticism seems to elide a very important distinction, and I shall argue that it is
25 These being, typically, male-gendered traits. See Code 1991.
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only because of this elision that the features of substantive-good methods that Jaggar
identifies look normatively problematic. The distinction that Jaggar's discussion elides is
between expertise, which is a concept that realism needs to make use of, and authority, which
realists need not say anything about, at least at the level of epistemic methodology. The
agents who are, relative to some particular topic, better situated to possess knowledge about
the good are claimed to be experts. Someone could be an expert for some ethical/political
subject-matter because of (e.g.) the possession of certain skills, or a large amount of pre-
existing relevant knowledge. Some of these skills, such as the ability to understand the gender
significance of some particular action or policy, may be easier to acquire in some cultural
contexts rather than others26. Likewise, some pieces of knowledge, such as knowledge of the
ways in which gender or race are not normatively-relevant categories, may have an existing
currency in some cultural contexts (i.e. feminist and race-conscious ones) that will make them
easier to attain. Possessing such skills, or such knowledge, however, is not to be identified
with the possession of authority over others.
This distinction is a fundamental marker of the difference between realisms and
constructivisms. If one is a realist, one does not think that moral prescriptions are commands
that have their force in virtue of a relationship of authority between commander and
commanded. The voluntarism that makes rightness or wrongness a function of someone's will
is a distinctively constructivist thesis.27 Sometimes people know things that others don't due
26 It is important to note that talk of 'culture' need not suppose that there are internally homogeneous, 
unchanging, and uncontested cultures to which individuals either wholly and exclusively do, or wholly and 
exclusively don't, belong. To talk of 'culture' in the broad sense that I intend is just to talk of ideas that are 
present within human societies, and then of the patterns of enculturation that development and ongoing life 
in such socieities involves. I see no barrier to accepting the view of culture that is briefly proposed in Jaggar
1999 (314-9), or the sophisticated model that is elaborated in Anne Phillips' Multiculturalism Without 
Culture (2007).
27 See fn.7 above. Most of my negative claims about constructivism in this Chapter can profitably be 
compared to the excellent discussion of Gaus' (2011) constructivistic view in Enoch 2013.
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to a difference in circumstances that includes, potentially, a difference in cultural location (a
difference in the enculturation that has formed them thus far). But these differences are not
relevant to the force that prescriptions have; any force that they have derives solely from their
relationship to the truth, not from the status of the prescriber.28
If we bear this in mind, the authority-based criticism of realism that I have sketched is either
mistargeted or question-begging. Jaggar finds the substantive good method problematic
because she thinks that the person pursuing it claims the authority to decide which intuitions
are good evidence and which are deformed. To the extent that these references to authority
rather than expertise are ineliminable, the relevant criticisms –  concerning elitism, or
concerning neocolonialism –  will be mistargeted. Suppose, however, that we can replace
every reference to authority with a reference to expertise. In this case, Jaggar's criticisms may,
at least largely, be on target. But, to the extent that these are not epistemic criticisms, which
would work within realism by urging that we cannot safely treat cultural location as being of
epistemic significance, they will be question-begging. All of the claims that the constructivist
would be attributing are central theses of culture-laden realism; bringing them out does
nothing to damage it unless there is some sound prior argument that the concept of moral
expertise is normatively problematic. Jaggar provides no explicit argumentation here; she just
seems to think it obvious. Where constructivist criticism takes this form, it does not amount
to a critical engagement with realism so much as a failure to take it seriously at all.
§2.2 Privileging one's own Perspective – Bias
28 As well as the sources I note elsewhere, Jaggar 1998 explicitly endorses the Habermasian political 
constructivist tradition, defining moral justification in terms of actual (rather than hypothetical) consensual 
agreement under idealised conditions (see esp. 8). This is clearly a voluntaristic conception of objectivity.
105
I have argued that Jaggar's normative critique is not very convincing as it stands. In this
section, I move on to discuss her epistemic critique, noting a number of points at which it
seems to mandate alterations in the substantive good methodology (at least as practised by
Nussbaum). However, I shall argue that these warranted reforms do not amount to a
transformation from culture-laden realism to constructivism; indeed, I shall suggest that it is
only within the framework of realism that some of them make sense. The section is divided
into halves; in §2.2.1 I discuss the general concern that Jaggar raises about the reliability of
the substantive good method, while §2.2.2 addresses a specific issue about the epistemic
contributions of marginalised groups. In the first part, I shall argue that in general, Jaggar's
arguments fail to justify a move away from culture-laden realism; in the second I concede
that, while Nussbaum's specific  approach is lacking in relevant respects, realism is a more
promising approach to issues of marginalisation than constructivism in general.
§2.2.1 Individualism and Epistemic Path-dependence
Jaggar's central complaints about the substantive good method concern the extent to which
the method's starting point in the user's own, individual, normative perspective might bias its
future course. If this claim is sound, all of the judgements that the followers of the method
arrive at will be suspect, because (as Jaggar also notes) the substantive good conception is a
path-dependent method – where you end up depends on where you began. This is guaranteed
to be the case, because this method is a form of (wide, interpersonal) reflective equilibrium:
every change that occurs is the result of an alignment of old elements with new ones, or
dissonant elements with one another. Path-dependent methods, if they are to be epistemically
sound, will need to ensure that the starting points are as good as possible. One way to achieve
this is might be to widen the starting point to include as many theses as possible.
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It is against this background that Jaggar's epistemic criticisms have their force. Jaggar
suggests that, in various ways, Nussbaum's substantive good conception fails to be as sound
as it might be, by failing to be as inclusive as it might be. Instead, Nussbaum's methodology
makes it likely –  given some of the insights of feminist epistemology –  that important
normative truths will be overlooked. Jaggar mentions a number of mechanisms by which this
could occur, including systemic hermeneutic inaccuracy (2006, 319)29; marginalisation as a
result of linguistic difference (1998, 12-3), or pre-existing social hierarchy that gives some
agents relative prestige (2006, 317; 1998, 10); and, above all, individual theorist- centred
methodology (2006, 320). My aim here is not to fully specify an epistemology for capability
theory, so I shall not go into these topics at length. Instead, in the next section, I shall focus
on perhaps the most important specific issue that Jaggar raises – the question of the extent to
which substantive-good methodology might reinforce the marginalisation of certain groups.
Before I turn to consider that, however, there are two very general points that Jaggar makes
that again bring fundamental meta-level differences between constructivism and realism to
the fore. The first comes as part of her claim that the substantive-good method is
'monological' (317-8) in a Habermasian sense. As a result, it cannot constitute 'independent'
justification: in every case where new content is introduced into the method, its introduction
is shaped by pre-existing items of content, and so no confirmation from outside for existing
content can ever  truly be independent30. This claim is question-begging, however, in its
insistence that the (flexible and changing) resources of a not-all-inclusive perspective could
29 See also Fricker 2006, for a compelling development of this concept.
30 Jaggar's invocation of this idea is strange. As I note later (§2.4), she, like many feminist epistemologists, 
accepts a Quinean post-positivist model of epistemological naturalism. Against that background, surely 
Jaggar's demand for independence here presupposes the theory/observation dichotomy, which Quineans 
must reject?
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not be sufficient for justification. Jaggar, likely because of her discourse-ethical affiliations,
presupposes that objectivity requires a model of dialogue –  no one 'person'31 can achieve
justification on their own. It is not clear why anyone who is not already a Habermasian
constructivist has any reason to accept this. The second general point concerns Jaggar's claim
that the substantive-good methodology is suspect because there could be 'multiple equilibria'
–  multiple coherent, but differing, normative systems. As she says, this cannot be ruled out
unless we have considered all possible responses (2006, 315)32. Arguably, given that the
central mark of realism33 is the view that objectivity is not a function of subjective evidence
alone, any realist must hold that the choice between two apparently maximally-coherent and
equally complete conceptual systems will always be illusory – one will always be closer to
reality, and therefore superior, even if we do not at present have the resources to identify
which. If Jaggar is denying this, her argument is, again, question-begging.
§2.2.2 Marginalised Voices
Apart from this general claim that substantive-good methodology is not epistemically sound,
Jaggar raises an important specific issue, concerning the treatment of marginalised
perspectives. Take the case of stigmatised and socially dominated minorities, such as (in most
societies and my own) women, ethnic minorities, and minorities of gender and sexuality.
Jaggar's claim is that theorists, who are in the contemporary world likely to be from dominant
sociological categories, are not likely to share much cultural background with disadvantaged
31 I am extending Jaggar's speech metaphor here – of course, the users of a given instantiation of the 
substantive-good method will not be a single person literally. Separate people here represent putatively 
separate forms of enculturation (or 'traditions', or bildung).
32 Strictly speaking, it seems that we could not infallibly rule out the possibility of other equilibria even if we 
had considered all possible responses: equilibrium is not merely a function of the set of inputs, but of the 
path that is taken – that is, of the order that the inputs are considered.
33 According, that is, to the Dummettian view that I am working with in the Thesis. See Miller 2010; compare 
Wright 1992.
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others. Culture-laden realism could  then provide a license to dominate those others, by
creating a category of cultural settings that do not conduce to understanding of the good, and
placing them within it34.
This could occur, but as Jaggar recognises (2006, 310-11), no method can guarantee success
or render abuse impossible. It will be necessary to put in place epistemic practices to help
prevent such abuses, and many of those that Jaggar recommends, including most importantly
the practice of deference to the testimony of well-placed members of such groups35 on
questions that relate to ways of life of which they have experience36, look like good
candidates. In this way, much of the detail of Jaggar's suggestions can be incorporated into a
reformed substantive-good methodology. What no culture-laden realist can accept, on the
other hand, is the idea that the acceptance of people as epistemic peers has no limits: that we
should be unboundedly inclusive. Jaggar's arguments may suggest that Nussbaum's use of the
substantive-good methodology, at least, is not inclusive enough –  she does not seem to be
committed in practice to engaging with a wide range of diverse perspectives. But widening
34 Technically, it looks quite unlikely that a user of the substantive-good method would be justified in doing 
this, even within that methods own terms: in most cases, the overlap between conceptions of the good and 
sociological categories like these is relatively loose. The rejection of capabilities approaches, for example, 
doesn't seem very likely to supervene on gender categories like 'woman', or broad racial categories like 
'Black American'. The sociological categories relative to which this sort of consideration is more likely to be
relevant are cultural or (especially) religious categories membership of which is constituted by attachment 
to certain norms. (It remains an open question whether there are any such categories.)
35 A second issue, which Jaggar discusses in much more detail in her 1998 (esp. 11-4), concerns whether there 
even are members of marginalised (including cultural) groupings who are well-placed to articulate what is 
of value and what is of disvalue in their particular ways of life. If a group has traditionally been subject to 
domination from others, there may not be any view of the good that is theirs, but which is not contaminated 
by such domination. Jaggar concludes that it might be necessary to allow such groups to retreat into 
exclusive spaces ('subaltern counterpublics'), so that they might develop and endorse such a view. Only then
will it be possible for others to engage with them on equal terms. Again, both this possibility and Jaggar's 
consequent prescription appear to be entirely compatible with realism.
36 Jaggar references Lugones and Spelman 1983, and Thomas 1992-3, in this regard. See also Mohanty 1991. 
At least most of the recommendations contained therein seem to be compatible with realism, as part of an 
epistemically improved (because more inclusive and with less potential for hermeneutic injustice) 
methodology, but I can't engage further with the details here. Wylie 2003 provides a pre-eminent statement 
of standpoint theory, the generalised epistemological framework within which these sorts of claims fit.
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the range of considered perspectives and imposing no bounds at all upon that range are very
different things, and Jaggar has not done enough to require the latter response.
In addition to the extent to which realist methodology can create barriers to such abuse, the
tables can be turned on the constructivist here. Where it seems as though we have reason to
defer to the self-descriptions of groups over the descriptions of others, for example, culture-
laden realism's paradigm of expertise can make sense of why this should be so in a way that
constructivism's paradigm of authority cannot. After all, culture-laden realists already accept
that knowledge about normative subject-matters is only accessible by those who have been
enculturated in some particular way (probably, in actuality, some very broad set of ways).37
However, it is not necessary to think, even though objectivity is available to us today, that
total objectivity38 can in practice be obtained by some single individual. It should go without
saying that I, as a white British male, am not going to be able within a lifetime to incorporate
all the normative insights about the plural human good that may be embedded in traditions I
have little or no immersion in. A fortiori, I do not possess such insights here and now, and of
course no other individual will either39. From a constructivist point of view, however, where
authority is the central concept, and authority is equally distributed across humankind, it is
mysterious why anyone should be deferred to. If we begin from the position that all
preferences/normative beliefs/etc. have equal weight, what could the rationale for deference
to others in specific circumstances be? Why should the preferences of those with greater
familiarity with a way of life be accorded greater significance, if all have equal authority to
37 See the next Chapter for an exegesis of McDowell's culture-laden realist claims in this area.
38 I have not, as yet, given any account of what I take objectivity to be (apart from gesturing towards some 
form of culture-laden realism. To the extent that I have space to provide an adequate account, this will come
later in this Chapter (§2.4-3.2).
39 Robeyns 2005 uses this uncontentious fact as a basis to criticise the construction of lists of capabilities. It is 
not clear, however, why the fact that a method is fallible, when followed by any given individual, should 
lead us to give it up.
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decide for all, and there is no mind-independent matter of fact to which some might have
better access?40 Realism gives a much better general explanation of the concrete grounds for
testimonial deference than appears to be available to the constructivist.
§2.3 Constructivism as Self-Effacing
I have suggested that although culture-laden realism can (and should) incorporate many of
Jaggar's suggestions, the ultimate end-point of her critique seems to be the idea that, contrary
to Nussbaum's methodology, no perspective may be excluded from normative discourse on
substantive grounds. Jaggar endorses the idea that our methodology should be morally-laden
(2006, 310-15; 2000b, 235-40) – insofar as it should not allow some voices to dominate over
others, for example through threats of violence – but rejects Nussbaum's thesis that this moral
content should inform not only the way that discussion takes place, but also what it is
reasonable to discuss. In this section, I argue that constructivism is self-effacing41 in a number
of ways, and that these threaten to render incoherent Jaggar's position here.
To see how this might be so, it may be helpful to turn back to consider Nussbaum's own view,
as explicated in the previous Chapter. A central thesis of hers is that the capability approach is
justified because it is ethically plausible – it is something that seems true increasingly as we
progress towards wide, interpersonal  reflective equilibrium: as we take in more and more
information,  and the insights of more and more others. On the other hand, however, she
40 Of course, we could imagine a constructivism that didn't begin from the view that all (e.g.) preferences have
equal weight; a kind of culture-laden constructivism (cf. the discussion of LeBar's view in the next Chapter 
on this point). But again, in the absence of a belief in some mind-independent truth to which some set of 
people has easier or unique access, why would we decide to begin by treating one preference or belief 
differently from another? My discussion here is very quick, but this argument is parallel to that of David 
Enoch, which I discuss in the next Chapter; see there for a more adequate treatment.
41 The use of a self-effacingness objection here follows Claassen 2011. The contemporary locus classicus of 
this sort of self-effacingness critique is probably Parfit 1984, Part 1.
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concedes that we have reason to leave the substance of the view quite vague, not merely for
pragmatic reasons (so as not to alienate potential allies), but also for normative reasons,
which she associates with Rawls. There are a number of positions that distinguish capability
theory from its competitors. All capability theorists as such accept that there are some
constraints on a theory of justice – that it emphasise capabilities as well as functionings, that
it be pluralist about the good, that it tailor its prescriptions to the actual circumstances of
individuals, etc. This sets up a distinction between general or structural claims, about which
capability theorists agree, and issue as prescriptions for the global polis, and specific items of
content, about which there is little agreement, and about which Nussbaum does not issue
prescriptions. If such theorists then endorse a constructivist view of value, according to which
the facts about goodness/rightness are determined by what people (usually, as a group) think
or want, this presents a challenge. Why hold that the general structure of the correct theory of
justice is evident, when its specific content requires a deliberative process (actual or ideal) to
be decided upon?42
To flesh this out, consider an opponent of the capability approach's response to it. One of the
lines of argument they might use, exemplified by Jaggar's critique, would trade on the extent
to which capability theories might involve a disrespectful disregard for the thoughts and
feelings of (many, at least) of the very people that they are designed to help. Perhaps such an
opponent would begin by disputing some detail of the specific capability approach under
attack – if Nussbaum is the target, perhaps her description of the capabilities list. But, if what
they are really concerned with is a failure to engage with the worldviews of others, it will
make little sense to stop there. After all, most capability theorists, even those who most
42 This line of argument is similar to a criticism of capability theory by Richard Arneson (2010, 112-8). Cf. 
Claassen 2011, 497-8.
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emphasise public deliberation and democratic input, do not actually show that the capability-
based theories of justice that they propose are congruent with the existing beliefs and
affective responses of impoverished (or, indeed, other) people. Some of them, some of the
time, make moves in this direction (e.g. Nussbaum 2000a, 148-161)43. This notwithstanding,
it remains the case that the primary motivations that they give for capability theory stem from
normative claims made in abstraction from survey-taking or the implementation of
deliberative-democratic procedures. When Sen, for example, criticises resourcist models for
failing to pay sufficient attention to the specific needs of each individual, or welfarist ones for
failing to respect the importance of choice and agency, comprehensive consultation of
people's actual beliefs and desires is nowhere to be seen. This line of argument amounts to a
dilemma for advocates of the capability approach – either endorse some constructivist view,
and defend all of the distinctive claims of capability theory on that basis (which is likely to be
extremely difficult to do given the diversity of normative perspectives in the world), or
endorse realism, accepting that not all normative claims (at least) require a grounding in the
existing desires of human agents as such.
However, this is not merely a problem for those who half-heartedly endorse constructivism.
Even avowed constructivists such as Jaggar face contradictions of this kind. Firstly, Jaggar's
constructivism itself can hardly be construed as theoretically neutral –  after all, Nussbaum
disagrees with her about it. If it is not neutral, then surely people should have their say about
it, and this opens up the prospect of constructivism collapsing into self-contradiction, for
people might well not come to agree that constructivism is the correct meta-level view after
all! Secondly, apart from the prospect that constructivism per se might be rejected, we require
43 Cf. Jaggar (2006, 311-5).
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a more specific method –  some version of constructivism –  if we are to actually engage in
thought about the good or justice.44 Does Jaggar have particularly good reasons to think that
her preferred version of constructivism is uniquely accepted by a wide range of epistemic
agents? If so, she does not offer them. Finally, it should be noted that some of these
methodological factors within constructivism are, or implicate, controversial normative
claims. Jaggar holds that the ideal speech situation involves a level playing field between men
and women, for example. Is there widespread agreement across the world that women ought
to have an equal say on normative questions with men45? Even if there is, history tells us that
this is a sadly contingent and fragile state of affairs. And if not, constructivism seems to have
to come to an end at some point, just presupposing answers to questions that could be, or
actually are, still controversial. If it does this, how is it fundamentally different from culture-
laden realism?
My argument here has recent parallels in feminist-epistemological work. For example, Daniel
Hicks has recently argued that Helen Longino's conception of objectivity (intended primarily
for the practice of science) is unable to distinguish between substantively feminist and anti-
feminist  perspectives.  What  is  more,  her  account  of  objectivity  requires  that  enough
'alternative viewpoints'  be 'actively cultivated'  for it  to be the case that all  widely-shared
44 See Antony 2008, esp. 574-6. Compare also Claassen 2011, esp. 495.
45 Jaggar has said: “Feminists are certainly unwilling to concede that the subordination of women may ever be 
morally justified and this core claim has a status something like that of an analytic statement in the feminist 
“web of belief.” Apart from this minimal moral conviction, however, feminism’s views about the processes, 
methods, and conclusions of good moral thinking are sufficiently varied, contested, and negotiable that each
can provide a useful check on the others.” (2000a, 465). This suggests that Jaggar's objection to Nussbaum –
that her view is exclusionary because it allows items of substantive content to have an impact on which 
perspectives are taken as evidence – is somewhat disingenuous. This makes it appear that the only 
difference between Jaggar and Nussbaum in this respect is that Jaggar's substantive requirement is relatively
vague, and so does not introduce quite so much normative content. If so, Jaggar cannot coherently object 
that it is an immediate, fatal flaw that “Nussbaum's test for determining whether or not a desire is informed 
seems to be precisely whether or not it can be interpreted as a desire for one of the items on her list” (2006, 
316). At most, she could claim that the capabilities list, unlike her even vaguer commitment to work against 
'the subordination of women', is not sufficiently justified that it is reasonable to use it as a practical test for 
epistemic peerage.
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beliefs  within a  community are  subject  to  the critical  scrutiny that  she thinks objectivity
requires. As Hicks points out, this plausibly means that feminists would be committed to not
only  including  but  actively  cultivating  substantively  anti-feminist  viewpoints,  up  to  and
including  neo-Nazis.  Hicks  then  argues  that  the  only  way  to  avoid  this  criticism  is  to
mandate, for participants, a liberal-style explicit commitment to the principle of epistemic
inclusion  itself,  which  would  exclude  (e.g.)  most  Nazis,  but  would  also  exclude  many
communitarian and non-liberal thinkers including (as it happens) Jaggar herself (2011). In
this way, the use of (allegedly) feminist values of inclusion and anti-marginalisation to shape
the course of ongoing inquiry can function to undermine those very values46.
A second important example comes from Kristen Intemann (2010, esp. 789-93). There she
posits a division between 'standpoint' and 'empiricist' feminist epistemologies47, and argues
that  the  primary  difference  between  them concerns  their  conception  of,  and  attitude  to,
diversity.  Briefly,  the former view the epistemically valuable sort  of diversity in terms of
differences in position within social hierarchies, while the latter identify differences between
people's values and interests as being of relevance.48 Intemann then argues that the approach
to diversity of the 'empiricist' camp is untenable because: 
On the feminist empiricist account, the content of values and interests is irrelevant to 
46 Hicks' argument is significantly different to mine, and I note it only as an emblem of the wider problem for 
proceduralistic approaches to methodology. Firstly, it is targeted at a much more liberal version of feminist 
epistemic theory than Jaggar's own. And, secondly, its target is a view of scientific objectivity, which brings 
in some different issues to the ethical/political objectivity that is my concern.
47 This distinction is potentially quite misleading, and Jaggar is a good example of this. She is a standpoint 
theorist (Jaggar 2004), but is also extremely friendly to the appropriation of Quinean 'naturalist' ideas that 
are distinctive of feminist empiricism (e.g. in Jaggar 2000b).
48 Jaggar's account muddies the waters between these two kinds of exclusion: standpoint exclusion and 
valuational exclusion. In her critique of Nussbaum, the most objectionable implications are consequences of
her attack on valuational exclusion; however, she also discusses narrower standpoint-based difficulties, and 
is more usually identified as a standpoint theorist (e.g. Jaggar 2004). My account actively denies the 
distinction: unless standpoints are individuated in such a way as to preclude them from representing 
evaluative perspectives, many standpoints will do so (if only accidentally). If so, the criticisms I have been 
making will apply to proceduralist versions of standpoint epistemology just as much as explicitly 
evaluationally-inclusive approaches.
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the purported epistemic benefit they provide in contributing to diversity. That is, all 
values and interests are equally beneficial in contributing toward a diverse community
that will be likely to identify when the value judgments of others are operating as  
background assumptions. This is worrisome, as it suggests that the ideal scientific  
community is one where all values and interests are represented, including those that 
are potentially problematic. For example, do we need to include members of the Flat 
Earth  Society  in  research  in  astronomy?  Do  we  need  to  ensure  there  are  
representatives of chemical companies in research on environmental toxins? Should 
the interests and values of tobacco companies be represented in cancer research?
(791-2)
Further feminist scholars have endorsed similar restrictions on the practice of inclusion of
value-laden perspectives in ethical enquiry49. The conclusion of all these arguments tends in a
single  direction  – against  the  pure  procedural  principles  which  characterise  constructivist
meta-level  positions,  and  towards  the  explicit  and  clear  incorporation  of  substantive
judgements into ethical methodology.
§2.4 Making Sense of Epistemological 'Naturalism'50
Most of my claims in this Chapter thus far have been negative, arguing that constructivist
framings are implausible. In this section and the next, I shall begin to concentrate on the
positive  case  for  a  culture-laden  realist  understanding  of  methodology.  This  section  is
concerned with  some theoretical  ideas  which  have  informed much,  if  not  most,  feminist
epistemology over the last two decades. Discussing them will have two benefits. Firstly, it
will give a final recapitulation of my claim that constructivism does not adequately explain
the  epistemic  methodology  that  is  necessary  for  (e.g.)  answering  questions  about  the
constituents of human dignity, while culture-laden realism does. Secondly, it will provide a
49 Cf., for instance, Haslanger (2000, 46): “what is important is not whether a particular account 'marginalises' 
some individuals, but whether its doing so is in conflict with the feminist values that motivate the inquiry.” 
And cf. Benhabib (2006, 286): “all demands cannot be said to be valid because they are articulated by 
groups with a history of marginalisation or oppression. Oppression and marginalisation are no guarantee of 
progressive or just politics.”
50 'Naturalism' requires scare quotes here (if not everywhere!) because, as Anderson (2011) notes, although 
feminist epistemologists often follow Quine in many ways, they do not (pace his attempts to the contrary) 
aim to produce a psychologistic, non-normative reduction for epistemology. Cf. Code 1996, and see Held 
2002 for critique in this vicinity.
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basis for the more thoroughly metaethical claims of the next Chapter, much of which will
presuppose an understanding of 'epistemological naturalism' and its role in feminist thought.
As I have said, the core concept in question is called 'epistemological naturalism' by most of
those  in  the  feminist-epistemological  literature;  I  shall  occasionally  also  refer  to  it  as
'Neurathian', for Otto von Neurath and his eponymous boat (1944, 47). The function of this
concept  is  to  register  the  way  in  which  epistemological  subjects  and  processes  can  be
examined empirically, and the results of this examination can feed back into the epistemic
practices themselves. Thus, for example, learning that a particular method excludes women
by bringing to salience features of women's appearance or behaviour, which will then cause
testimony to be dismissed because those features are associated with negative implicit biases,
can  function  to  discredit  the  method  epistemically.  Quite  generally,  epistemological
naturalism involves a feedback loop between existing empirical methods and the judgements
that  rationalise  them,  and  the  new  judgements  that  may  be  generated  if  parts  of  the
methodology (i.e. theory-construction and observation) are deployed in critical reflection on
other  parts  (i.e.  the  broader  practice  of  knowledge-creation,  in  which  gender  (and  other
social) norms are often observed to be operative). This kind of empirically-based critique is
necessarily holistic, because its Quinean practitioners reject the idea that there are any deep,
principled  divisions  within  background  theorising  about  the  world  which  preclude  some
content from bearing on the interpretation of the empirical observations which methods (and
the broader belief-generating practices within which they sit) produce. Not only is there no
deep epistemic distinction between theory and observation – because all observations depend
on existing judgements to be incorporated as empirically meaningful;  there is also no in-
principle reason why one region of the existing 'web of belief' (/'theory') can be made use of
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in such incorporation, while another cannot. Thus, Quine and his followers conclude that,
strictly speaking, the background theory is only ever confirmed or disconfirmed as a whole;
individual  observations  can  only  be  thought  to  justify  individual  beliefs  if  an  enormous
amount of (in-principle alterable) background content is taken for granted.
A vital and extremely relevant strand within epistemological naturalism then concerns the
positive role that feminist values themselves can play in improving epistemic practices. The
general thought is that values such as the equality of investigators can, because they form part
of the existing background 'theory', motivate and guide empirical investigations which will
reveal biases and other unreliabilities in operative methodology, and thereby have epistemic
benefits. Louise Antony, in inaugurating the tradition of 'empiricist feminism', identified what
she called  'the bias  paradox'  here  (2008,  554-6).  The core  thought  here  is  that,  although
feminist values are used to expose (e.g.) gendered biases operative in existing practice, there
is also a sense in which they constitute biases themselves; like all elements of the background
theory (in principle, at least), they shape ongoing inquiry, while being themselves substantive
claims, and thereby (in some sense, at least) revisable. The general response from feminists
must involve an argument that the egalitarian 'biases' are better, epistemically speaking, than
the gendered biases which they are used to critique. Different feminists have given different
versions of this critique; some are more consonant with my endorsement of culture-laden
realism than others.
Antony's own response, however, is congenial to my general claims about methodology and
the meta-level  frameworks which best make sense of it.  Her  main claim is  that  'the real
problem with the ruling-class [androcentric, racist, etc.] worldview is not that it is biased; it's
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that it  is false' (574)51.  With reference to examples such as the design of experiments on
language development which could (or could not) include both boys and girls, or people of
different races, she argues that the assumptions which lead to sexist conclusions are reliably
implausible (empirically speaking) when considered in the clear light of day,  and usually
reflect dubious essentialisations and/or naturalisations of categories which our best empirical
(sociological,  anthropological,  etc.)  theory tells  us to be socially constructed (576). Thus,
Antony's defence of the use of feminist values in guiding inquiry is that, when we use these
values, we arrive at a more generally coherent, more complete, or more empirically adequate
theory, than we would do if we instead incorporated other values. For Antony, this is just to
say that these values are likely to be part of the true theory of reality.
As I have noted, Antony's positive resolution of the 'bias paradox' is broadly realistic. Her
paper  also  contains  useful  thoughts  about  the  deficiencies  of  a  constructivist-sounding
alternative. As she says there: 
Naturalized epistemology tells us that there is no presuppositionless position from  
which to assess epistemic practice, that we must take some knowledge for granted... a 
genuinely open mind, far from leading us closer to the truth, would lead to epistemic 
chaos. (571-2).
The problem is that – as Quinean empirical holism suggests – if no substantive presumptions
are  made,  epistemology  becomes  impossible;  there  are  too  many  ways  to  interpret  the
observations which are made, and so no conclusion can be securely justified (2008, 571-3).
So, it seems that any constructivist approach that seeks to evade the need for a total aporia
will need to concede the importance of certain (probably not universally accepted) values, at
least in order to orient the direction of future inquiry. However, constructivism requires an
explanation of the role that such orienting ideas  would play. Notably, realism has such an
51 Cf. also Langton 1993.
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explanation –  we make use of these value-laden beliefs  because they are places where we
have particularly good evidence, places where we may be confident that we are relatively
close to the truth, such that taking contrary testimony seriously as something with epistemic
weight could not fail to worsen our epistemic position, making the resulting judgements less
objective,  rather  than  more  so (Antony 2008,  556).  It  is  not  clear  what  parallel  move a
constructivist  can make, however,  other than simply insisting that  these orienting ideas –
rather than all the possible alternatives – are constitutive ingredients of objectivity52.
My negative  case  against  constructivism in  the  context  of  epistemological  naturalism is
substantially complete. However, before I conclude, it will be illuminating to consider one
other means of defence for the presence of feminist 'biases' in epistemology: that of Elizabeth
Anderson. Her interpretation, unlike Antony's, is not especially coherent with culture-laden
realism, and it will be helpful to make clear why I reject it.
Anderson, in arguing that feminist  values can play some role in methodology53,  does not
appear to want to claim that this is because those values are good in their own right. Rather,
she argues that  some  values are needed to bridge the gap between theory and observation
(1995a, 27-32), and then that  'our values, interests, and aims, some of which have moral and
political import' (37) do this by shaping the course of enquiry in a variety of (she argues)
thoroughly legitimate ways (37-55). However, she never actually specifies what 'our' values,
interests, and aims are, which are supposed to do this work54. In her other prominent paper on
52 Of course, people can stipulatively use terms like 'objectivity' as they like. But if constructivists are merely 
stipulating that objectivity requires feminist values, they are conceding that they have nothing rational to say
to anyone who disagrees – they will be doomed to talking past one another. Cf. Douglas 2004, on the many 
meanings of 'objectivity'.
53 Her paper is aimed at scientific methodology, and it is not clear to what extent it is intended to generalise, so
my rejection of her proposals for the ethical/political case may not apply to her actual target in the paper.
54 Intemann 2005 provides a good critique of this content-neutral aspect of Anderson's proposals.
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the topic, 'Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defence', her defence again turns
on  considerations  distinctive  of  naturalised  epistemology:  the  idea  that  some  epistemic
'processes  are  such  that,  once  we  reflect  on  how  they  work  or  what  they  do,  we  lose
confidence in the beliefs to which they give rise', because they are revealed to be unreliable
(1995b,  55).  Like  Antony,  she  is  happy  to  talk  of  truth  in  explicating  this  notion  of
reliability/unreliability. However, some of her language is revealing:
Feminist studies of sexism in theories explore the prospects for alternative scientific 
theories that meet criteria of empirical adequacy while seeking to serve women’s  
interests and to promote universal equality. (1995b, 58)
Here, the epistemic aspect of the defence of the involvement of feminist values is merely
negative; some values are needed, and feminist ones are as good as any, since they meet
criteria of empirical adequacy. However, there is no attempt to link the ethical/political aims
of feminism with the epistemic role of these values more positively; there is no attempt to
claim that feminist values actually do any  better, epistemically speaking, than alternatives.
The epistemic role and the ethical/political  one are still  functionally separate.  It  does not
appear to be the case, on Anderson's view, that feminist values are more keyed in to the real
world  than  other  values.  This  is  unsurprising,  since  all  she  urges,  when  generating  an
ethical/political  component  to  fill  the  epistemic  gap,  is  an  apparently  content-neutral
'reflective  endorsement  test'  (1995b,  52-3).  This  would  not  be  a  very robust  defence  of
feminist epistemology, even for the scientific case, because it is far from obvious how a view
like hers  can  respond on epistemic  terms  to  (e.g.)  anti-egalitarian values,  so long as  the
relevant individuals have reflectively endorsed them (which is hardly a high bar). It would
have even worse prospects  for  the case of ethical  epistemology,  amounting to  a  form of
proceduralism that disavows any claim to the better standing of the values which orient the
inquiry. Such a proceduralism would be especially clearly vulnerable to the criticisms I've
made throughout the Chapter. Thus, I hold that a realism-congruent view like Antony's has
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much better prospects for making sense of the good standing of feminist values within the
framework of epistemological naturalism.
To conclude this section, it will be helpful to bring the discussion back to the bigger picture.
The dispute within feminist epistemology has tended to be between those who see the
impulse of feminism as being towards an epistemology that is traditional in its fundamental
premises, but more aware of ways that social inequalities might distort people's beliefs, and
those who want more radical change, fundamentally altering (or even rejecting) the ideas of
knowledge,  reason, truth, and reality themselves. Although I have resisted one radical
revision – meta-normative constructivism – this does not imply that the realism I endorse is
not consonant with many of the more revisionary theses that feminist epistemology includes.
As I have shown, culture-laden realism is actually conceptually well-equipped to incorporate
many feminist insights. I  conclude that feminist work should have a major impact on our
conception of moral objectivity, and the normative methodologies within which it functions,
but that there is no compelling case to abandon realism. Indeed, the upshot of feminist
epistemology in some ways supports the kind of culture-laden realism that Nussbaum's
substantive good methodology implicates, rather than undermining it as Jaggar has claimed.
To end this sub-section on a conciliatory note, it seems that this conclusion may not actually
be too distant from Jaggar's overall view. For example, her survey paper 'Ethics Naturalised:
Feminism's Contribution to Moral Epistemology' (2000a), spends a great deal of time
outlining the feminist theses that I am urging55 are in harmony with culture-laden realism, and
just a fragment of two pages making claims against 'objectivist realism' (463-4). This
55 To be more explicit, here I have in mind the emphasis on socially marginalised voices (subject to case-by-
case ethical evaluation!), the recognition that social location can more broadly affect objectivity, and the 
recognition that affective response is not irrelevant to epistemic standing. Some of these have already been 
discussed; some will be discussed either in §3 below, or in the next Chapter.
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suggests that, in the end, there is more scope for agreement here than might be apparent.
§2.5 Rawls' 'Political Constructivism'
Throughout this Chapter, I have given several reasons to suspect that (some form of) culture-
laden realism has better  prospects than constructivism for playing the crucial  background
roles that are my focus in the thesis. The preliminary barrier to constructivist success involves
the problem of adaptive preferences: how can a constructivist prevent preferences that have
(prima facie) been warped by the unjust circumstances of their  formation from distorting
moral epistemology? I have argued that even very technically sophisticated preferentist forms
of constructivism – such as that of Baber – do not promise a satisfactory resolution of this
problem, and so are likely to be unreliable as bases for epistemology. Despite this, it would be
too quick to conclude that constructivism as such has poor prospects: many proposed forms
of constructivism have not (at least explicitly) been preference-based, and some aim to face
the  problem  of  adaption  head  on,  excluding  or  transforming  the  adaptive  elements  of
subjectivity  through  idealisation  or  a  constrained  real-world  dialogical  process.  In  this
section, I fill in the lacuna in my argument that this leaves. Firstly, I clarify the scope of the
criticisms I make of constructivism in the thesis, and how they may be taken to demotivate it
as  a  plausible  source  for  a  capability  approach.  Secondly,  I  provide  some  argument
specifically  against  Rawls'  political  constructivism,  with  the  aim  of  illustrating  some
significant challenges that such a view would have to overcome, and thereby demotivating a
further possible way of providing a constructivist background for a universalist56 capability
56 One obvious challenge I shall not make involves the fact that – as Rawls himself (1999b) recognises – it is 
even more difficult to see how the idea of a mutually acceptable conception of justice could be established 
at the global level than it is at more local levels. This throws great doubt on the prospects for a genuinely 
universalistic 'political liberal' constructivism. However, my arguments will aim at the plausibility of 
Rawlsian constructivism as a method of justification for any realistic political space, rather than only this 
narrower issue.
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approach.
Constructivism takes many forms. The most basic pick out some subjective category, and
provide a completely content-neutral way of aggregating or otherwise integrating the various
items within that category to produce prescriptions; preferentisms such as that of Baber fall
within  this  type.  They  are  precluded  (by  stipulation)  from  incorporating  into  their
constructive procedure any test or constraint which does not flow straightforwardly either
from the individual subjective elements alone, or from (prima facie) neutral sources such as
logic57.  For  example,  Baber's  test  of  'fruitfulness'  satisfies  this  requirement,  because  it  is
simply  a  measure  of  the  compatibility  of  the  satisfaction  of  one  preference  with  the
satisfaction of numerous others. Constructivisms of this type are straightforwardly vulnerable
to the problem of adaptive preferences (or analogues to it), and I take my argument so far to
be sufficient to demotivate them as such. 
Alternatively, a constructivist can attempt to design a procedure such that the (prima facie)
adaptive elements will be prevented from having an influence on the result, by incorporating
constraints which do not flow simply from the subjective basis alone. Two prominent ways of
doing this exist. The first involves an actualised dialogical procedure, which may build in
value-laden constraints, such as a constraint on gendered power inequality, but which allows
the discursive process which (eventually)  generates prescriptions to flow relatively freely.
57 See Enoch 2006, Velleman 2009, and Enoch 2011b  for an exemplary exchange concerning whether a 
(purportedly normatively significant) constructivism such as Velleman's can be regarded as flowing from a 
neutral subjective base (in that case, what is common between all instances of human agency). Rawls' 
strategy is similar to that of Velleman, except that its means of response to arguments such as these would 
necessarily be weaker: Rawls does not (even more implausibly) pretend that his norm of impartiality is 
constitutive of agency in the polis per se, only that it is implicated by normal ('reasonable') agency in 
modern liberal polities. I do not need to consider views such as Velleman's, because – as I have noted in 
Ch.2 (fn.62) above – they overwhelmingly tend towards relativism, and thus would be incapable of 
supporting a capability theory of global justice.
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The combination of limited value-ladenness and inclusive flexibility is supposed to generate
an expectation that adaptive elements, even if they are introduced throughout the process, will
'come out in the wash', so to speak; they will not ultimately be able to have a detrimental
impact  on  the  eventual  conclusions.  It  appears  that  Jaggar's  own preferred  epistemology
would be of this type, and many, if not most, proposals for deliberative democracy are also
likely to fit this bill. The problems I have identified for such views stem from the choice of
values to be incorporated into the procedure, and the necessary weakness of the grounds for
any particular incorporation, given that all such values are far from being the subject of an
unconstrained consensus,  and given that  no realist  rationale  can be offered  which would
bypass the need for such unanimity. In the previous two sub-sections, I have introduced this
issue, but the deepest form of it can be located in the work of David Enoch, discussed in the
next Chapter (especially §§1.4-5). This deep and unresolved problem suggests that realism is
ultimately better  placed to provide the background for an epistemology,  even if  it  draws
extensively  on  resources  developed  by  actual-process  constructivists  in  doing  so.  The
existence of this serious problem for such constructivisms – which realism, by contrast, can
avoid – suggests that they, too, can be considered poorly motivated for my purposes here.
The second strategy involves building a hypothetical procedure which aims to idealise away
the  problematic  (/adaptive)  elements  directly,  by  drawing  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  on
exogenous values to justify their exclusion from a reflective process (rather than an actual-
world dialogical one). Because this approach may not need to incorporate feedback over time
between the outputs of its procedure and the influences on the procedure itself, the meta-level
concern about making sense of epistemological naturalism is less obviously pressing for it58.
58 The concern does not really go away, however, as my discussion below will reveal: the question of why it is 
legitimate to privilege the value of political impartiality, and the liberalism-friendly perspectives of those 
who strongly endorse it, is still a significant one.
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The  most  prominent  example  of  a  theory  like  this  is  Rawls'  political  constructivism.  I
proceed, then, in the rest of this section, by discussing Rawls' account in a little more detail,
making clear where some of its weaknesses lie, and, thereby, throwing direct doubt on at least
one of the main opponents to the species of claim that I prefer. The specifics, at least, of this
critique  of  Rawls  are  unlikely  to  generalise  to  all  hypothetical-process  non-preferentist
versions of constructivism  per se.  However, the weakness of this paradigmatic attempt to
ground moral (or,  in  this  case,  political)  epistemology without  appeal  to realism helps  to
demotivate constructivism, and thereby motivate the alternative I shall offer. I shall begin
with a brief exegesis of the core ideas of Rawls' method (circa Political Liberalism), and an
explanation of the way in which these are constructivist. Then, I shall make clear that the
methodology  which  Rawls  proposes  is  extremely  demanding,  both  in  that  it  builds  in
constraints that many contemporary individuals do not, on the face of it, accept, and in that
even if those constraints are accepted in principle, it privileges them over the particular values
that people espouse to an extraordinary extent. This makes it very difficult to see why many
individuals would find Rawlsian argument compelling; if this is correct, Rawls' methodology
must  fail,  on its  own ambitious  constructivist  terms,  to  provide justifications  suitable  for
guiding action in the polis59. Finally, I shall note that a method such as Rawls' also necessarily
invokes a public/private contrast that is likely to restrict the content of (i.e.) conceptions of
dignity,  to the detriment of those whose unjust treatment disproportionately occurs in the
'private' sphere60.
59 To make it explicit: the point will not be that it is a failure of any justification per se that it will not be 
compelling to its audience, but that it is a failure of any constructivist justification to be so, because 
constructivist objectivity is premised on the availability of agreement without prior substantive 
transformation.
60 I mentioned this point in my discussion of the public/private issue in the previous Chapter (§1.3.2), but I 
have not substantiated it at greater length until now.
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I shall begin, as I've said, with an outline of how Rawls' constructivism is supposed to work,
focussing only on its most central ideas. The core of Rawls' methodology for thinking about
the proper form of justice remained much the same from the original publication of A Theory
of Justice in 1973 until his death; the differences concern the justification that Rawls offers
for choosing this methodology, which evolved from relative ambiguity in his early work to a
much more clearly constructivist  approach.  The central  idea  is  that  objective judgements
about justice can be attained through reasoning about the proper basic form of society which
has been purified of biasing, partial influences by a process of abstraction. Individuals are to
imagine  that  they  are  designing  principles  both  for  constitutional  design,  and  for  the
distribution of goods in society, but from the 'original position', which is distinguished from
the  actual  world  by  a  'veil  of  ignorance',  which  keeps  from  individuals  any  particular
knowledge which, it is argued, might improperly influence them. The agents in the original
position  are  conceived  of  as  otherwise  –  apart  from  the  effects  of  the  veil  itself  –
representative of the psychology of 'normal' human reasoners61. In his late works, this method
of hypothetical reasoning against a background of abstraction is justified as necessary for the
achievement of objectivity, constructivistically construed.
Rawls' overarching constructivist conception of objectivity, as it figures in his late works, can
be seen in the following:
Political  convictions...are  objective...if  reasonable  and  rational  persons,  who  are  
sufficiently  intelligent  and  conscientious  in  exercising  their  powers  of  practical  
reason, and whose reasoning exhibits none of the familiar defects of reasoning, would 
eventually endose those convictions...provided that these persons know the relevant 
facts  and  have  sufficiently  surveyed  the  grounds  that  bear  on  the  matter  under  
conditions favourable to due reflection.
This is then simplified:
61 This core methodology is described and redescribed in almost all of Rawls' major works, but a relatively 
quick exegesis is given in his 2001, 10-26.
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To say that a political conviction is objective is to say that there are reasons, specified 
by  a  reasonable  and  mutually  recognisable  political  conception...  sufficient  to  
convince all reasonable persons that it is reasonable. (Rawls 2005, 119)
The specifics of Rawlsian methodology – the assembly of a 'veil of ignorance', etc. – are then
to  be  viewed as  a  model  of  what  it  would  take  for  a  conception  to  be  'reasonable'  and
'mutually recognisable', via an interpretation of the impartiality that 'reasonableness' itself is
thought  to  entail.  As  Leif  Wenar  has  convincingly  argued  (1995,  36-8),  the  concept  of
reasonableness that does the vast majority of the actual work throughout Rawls' late theory
ultimately boils down to a set of features of the persons he stipulates as 'reasonable'. Two of
the  most  significant  and  controversial  among  these  –  some,  like  the  possession  of  'the
intellectual powers of judgement, thought, and inference' (Rawls 2005, 81), pose relatively
little difficulty – are discussed in the next two paragraphs.
Firstly, 'reasonable' persons recognise 'the burdens of judgement', which, as well as including
an uncontroversial admission of general human fallibility, require people to explain a wide
range62 of existing disagreement about politically-relevant questions in terms of that mere
fallibility, rather than in terms of specific, attributable epistemic failures. If disagreement is
explained  in  this  way,  a  gap  is  opened  for  the  justification  of  an  attitude  of  principled
toleration towards the opponent: the situation is symmetrical, because you are as fallible as
your opponent, and so you have no special justification to incorporate your belief into the
political  structures  which  govern  you  both  (2005,  54-8).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the
disagreement  of  the  other  were  attributable  to  'prejudice...bias,  self-  [or]  group-interest,
blindness  [or]  willfulness'  (58)  on  their  part,  the  way  would  be  open  to  appeal  to  that
62 It remains entirely obscure exactly what Rawls intends for this range to include and exclude. He appears to 
be content with appealing to the sense of his audience (if such a sense exists) that most of the major 
accepted systems of belief can be endorsed by some without this being explicable by those who disagree 
other than in terms of fallibility. As he says soon after (60, fn.14) 'a reasonable doctrine is one that can be 
affirmed in a reasonable way' [my italics], rather than one which always, or even usually, is affirmed in that 
way.
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diagnosis in justifying (i.e.) a policy which took greater heed of your perspective than theirs.
The problem here – apart from the fact that it is obviously a matter of considerable general
dispute whether or not many popular doctrines (think of theist/atheist controversies...)  can
genuinely  be  believed  without  particular  epistemic  failure  –  is  that  this  criterion  for
reasonableness is highly exclusionary. Wenar points out, in particular, that religions typically
attribute the failure of other- or non-religionists to accept the truth as they see it to such things
as 'wordly temptation, demonic possession, divine predestination,' etc. (1995, 41-8). Catholic
orthodoxy, in particular, holds that 'those religious truths which are by their nature accessible
to human reason can be known by all men with ease, with solid certitude, and with no trace of
error, even in the present state of the human race' (44). It does not appear to be only religious
perspectives  which  are  likely  to  refuse  to  accept  such  a  stringent  and  broad-ranging
requirement of agnosticism about one's  opponents'  epistemic credentials,  however.  As my
discussion of feminist epistemology in this Chapter demonstrates, there is great contemporary
demand for explanations of disagreement about a wide range of politically-relevant questions
which could hardly be satisfied with a nod towards the fact that 'the evidence...is conflicting
and  complex,  and thus  hard  to  assess  and evaluate',  or  that  'there  are  different  kinds  of
normative consideration of different force on both sides... and it is difficult to make an overall
assessment' (2005, 56-7). Instead, if anything, many individuals are especially likely to make
assertions  of  bias  about  the  large-scale  politically-relevant  controversies  that  are  Rawls'
concern. Such people too, then, will be excluded from the category of the 'reasonable'.
Secondly, Rawls requires that included individuals possess a 'reasonable moral psychology'.
The  controversial  element  here  is  the  claim  that  reasonable  people  possess  certain
'conception-dependent  desires',  in  particular  the  desire  to  live  up  to  Rawls'  'idea  of
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citizenship'. If someone possesses such a desire, they will be motivated to act in accordance
with the conception, no matter how much the conception may have evolved, just so long as it
has evolved compatibly with its internal logic (Rawls 2005, 82-6)63. This may be necessary
for Rawls to include because of the potentially radical nature of the revisions which might be
required of an individual's practical identity, and which would – on this theory – be expected
to flow solely from the intellectual recognition that some hypothetical process had delivered
that result. Unlike actual-process discursive views, which can realistically postulate change
across the full range of psychological categories which might play a role in ethical thought
and  action,  hypothetical  methods  can  offer  only  narrow  intellectual  change  based  upon
logical reasoning. It is only if a distinctly Kantian theory about moral psychology is true (at
least  of 'reasonable'  agents),  then,  that Rawls'  methodology could be expected to  reliably
issue in  altered  political  praxis.  As Wenar  notes,  this  is  a  deeply controversial  area.  For
Rawls' stipulation to be effective, the full range of Humean theories of moral psychology,
according to which reason is the slave of the passions, must be false. Likewise, those who
agree  with  Hobbes  that  humans  are  primarily  self-regarding,  and  those  who  agree  with
Bentham that we are driven solely (or even just overwhelmingly, on occasion) by pleasure
and pain, are likewise required to be wrong. (Wenar 1995, 48-51). This second aspect of
reasonableness,  too,  then,  is  highly problematic  as  a  requirement  for  inclusion  in  Rawls'
process.
Rawls' political liberalism is a constructivist approach of the third kind. The subjective basis
63 The extremity of this is clearest in his fn.31 (2005, 82), where Rawls makes explicit that his claim is that the
desiderative power of a conception-dependent desire depends entirely on the logical power of the 
conception 'to which it is attached'. If a desire is attached to a principle with enormous logical power – one 
which could, consistently, generate almost any conclusion, given the right assumptions (e.g. about the form 
of society) – that desire will overwhelm absolutely any other, so long as the conception in question is 
granted lexical priority by the agent concerned. This is an extraordinarily strong Kantian thesis.
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– the politically-relevant psychology of typical contemporary human agents – is to be purged
of  bad  (including,  at  least  potentially,  adaptive)  elements  by  a  method  of  hypothetical
judgement  whose  guiding  principles  are  determined  by  a  conception  –  in  this  case,  of
'reasonableness' – which is not drawn from that subjective basis alone. Instead, Rawls claims
to have located the demands of reasonableness, rather vaguely, in 'the public political culture
of a democratic society', including 'the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the
public  traditions of  their  interpretation...including historic  texts  and documents  which are
common  knowledge'  (2005,  13-14).  Although  Rawls  repeatedly  postulates  that  the  core
values  of  political  liberalism  are  compatible  with  the  actual  perspectives  of  most
contemporary agents – the fact that he never substantiates this with the requisite sociological
evidence  notwithstanding  –  he  makes  clear  that  he  does  not  think  that  just  any way of
drawing out a methodology for building consensus would do. His choice of methodology is
explicitly based upon substantive beliefs about the right way to build such a consensus, which
are  not  themselves  presented  as  being  uncontroversially  present  in  contemporary  society
(Rawls  2005,  134-44).  It  remains  obscure  whether,  and  how,  these  meta-methodological
values are supposed to be objectively justified. This lacuna would provide an entrance point
for general anti-constructivist argument of the kind given by Enoch, and discussed in the next
Chapter:  what,  apart  from  realist  considerations,  could  justify  the  selection  of  meta-
methodological  principles,  given that these stand outside the space of construction itself?
However, I'll supplement this general avenue for critique with more specific criticisms in the
remainder of this subsection.
In line with this general method, a Rawlsian constructivist account of 'dignity' – as I have
been deploying the term – would justify the putative elements of that conception in terms of
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their being subject to an 'overlapping consensus', between all of the subjects of justice whose
lives  the  conception  is  to  regulate64,  with  this  being  evidenced  by  their  having  been
successfully subjected to a process of idealisation designed to ensure Rawls' distinctive kind
of impartiality. For something to count as an element of 'dignity', it would have to be shown
that  representatives  in  the  original  position  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  choose  to
incorporate it, presumably on the grounds that it is necessary65 for the attainment of social
justice, as those representatives would (consensually) conceive of it. Because this idealisation
draws on values that are not simply part of the subjective base on which the constructive
procedure is  performed – the subjective base does not include an explicit,  overwhelming
injunction against political 'unreasonableness' – the view as a whole cannot be counted as
immediately comparable to preferentism, and might be invulnerable to some of the criticisms
I have made in this Chapter thus far. 
On the other hand, from even the highly condensed accounting I've given, a deep problem can
be identified for  Rawlsian methodology.  It  seems unlikely,  in  reality,  that  conceptions of
impartiality – 'reasonableness' – suitable to do the heavy lifting that Rawls requires would
very widely be given the primacy of normative place that is required for this strategy to work,
even where they are endorsed at all66. If even one of the core elements of 'reasonableness' is
64 This is intentionally ambiguous: the results of the constructive procedure only directly regulate the political 
agency of the 'reasonable', for Rawls. However, in an indirect sense, everyone who is subject to political 
power (that is, absolutely everyone) would be regulated by the conclusions the procedure produces, if (as 
Rawls intends) the 'reasonable' possess at least the bulk of such power.
65 Thom Brooks has provided an argument that a minimum threshold level of a range of classic capabilities 
can, in fact, be justified using Rawlsian considerations alone (Brooks 2015). Nussbaum, in most of her later 
work, also says things which suggest that she thinks this is plausible, although the actual methodology she 
uses is significantly different to Rawls'. See especially Nussbaum 2006a, for explicit consideration of her 
similarities and differences to Rawls.
66 Most of Rawls' discussions on this issue are focussed on the question of whether an effective, stable 
overlapping consensus is possible, rather than whether it is realistic in a more immediate sense. However, 
only the latter question is straightforwardly relevant to the question of methodologies for thinking about 
global justice here and now.
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rejected by, or fails to hold of, an agent, they will not count as capable of such impartiality,
and  Rawls'  methodology  will  not  be  available  to  them.  This  would  not  be  a  deep,
philosophical difficulty – as opposed to a brutely practical one – if it were not for the fact that
political constructivism leaves itself few or no resources to engage with those who are thus
categorised as 'unreasonable'. If – or rather, when – faced with someone who explicitly rejects
the  'political  liberal'  construal  of  the  political  problem,  or  someone  who  more  meekly
wonders whether this way of setting things up does not amount to targeting us at justice so
much as giving up on its possibility, the Rawlsian constructivist appears to be left with little
to  say.  What  Rawls  thinks  his  methodology  does  allow  at  this  point  is  argument  'by
conjecture', in which a 'reasonable' person attempts to argue that a (putatively superficially)
'unreasonable' individual does in fact endorse the values that would enable political liberalism
to have rational purchase on them (1997, 786-7). However, this is little more than fishing for
common  ground  where  none  may  exist,  and  can  only  be  rationally  arbitrary  from  the
constructivist perspective itself (it is not, as Rawls acknowledges (786), a form of 'public
reasoning', the kind that is amenable to objectivity as he conceives it).67 After all, there is no
reason, other than Rawls' frequently asserted but sociologically unsupported  confidence, to
think that practitioners of constructivist methods would know the minds of the 'unreasonable'
better  than they do themselves68.  Apart  from this  thin,  arational form of engagement,  the
Rawlsian can do nothing but ignore such respondents, and hope that they do not turn out to be
so numerous as to upset the feasibility of the project.
67 See also Besch 2013, 64-65, here.
68 The situation is worse for the Rawlsian than it is for practitioners of Marxist, or Freudian, or other 
programmes incorporating ideas like 'false consciousness', which are often accused of the same hubris. At 
least those bodies of thought include diagnoses of why individuals might be systematically deluded about 
(e.g.) their interests, values, or practical commitments. Rawls appears to offer nothing which might play 
such a role.
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As Wenar's paper (1995; cf. Hurd 1995, 819-23; Friedman 2000, esp. 28-32; Besch 2013, 65-
7) suggests, by building such strong restrictions into his conception of 'reasonableness', Rawls
is  essentially  guaranteeing  that  he  can  only  –  without  hypocritically  violating  his  own
constructivist bona fides – preach to his (much-diminished) choir. Ross Poole has pointed out
that  this  circumstance  is  also  paradoxical,  from  Rawls'  own  perspective:  he  needs  his
audience to be sufficiently committed to the political-liberal project to give the outputs of his
idealising methodology precedence, and yet the methodology itself functions by abstracting
away  from  the  extant  sense  of  justice  and/or  other-concern  that  must  underlie  that
commitment (Poole 2005, 63-8). The result is that the methodology is unlikely to be able to
do any real work – those who would already be inclined to take part in Rawls' project may
well be alienated from its prescribed course; those who would not can be given no reason to
participate in the first place.
For them, as Poole says, 
Raws' assumption that a sense of justice already has a cultural existence occupies the 
place that should be filled by an argument why people should be moved by, and give 
priority to, considerations of justice [as he conceives them]. (67)
These  tensions,  once  their  full  depth  is  recognised,  make  the  entire  project  of  political
constructivism presented in  Political  Liberalism and other  late  works  very likely to be a
failure on its own terms. As Heidi Hurd says, Rawls' exclusions comprise not only 'hate-
mongering members of fringe cults', but
libertarians and classical liberals... act consequentialists... egoists, altruists, Catholics, 
Protestants,  hedonists,  perfectionists,  communists,  socialists,  feminists,  
communitarians, and religious fundamentalists, who [all] for one reason or another  
part ways with the fundamental liberal tenets that define Rawls' reasonable person ... 
Once we realise the scope of the audience that Rawls is  not  addressing, one has to  
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wonder what remains of...[his] project. (821-2)
Hurd's focus is on the pragmatic absurdity of a claim to be justifying a form of liberalism,
when one has excluded many, if  not all,  non-liberals (and – for that matter – even many
liberals) from one's argumentative targets, but a more pressing tension for my purposes is
evident on the level of methodology itself. Rawls' exclusions on the first-order level involve
him in something of a performative, dialectical contradiction, but when the focus is instead
on  the  constructivist  nature  of  his  methodology,  he  is  involved  as  well  in  conceptual
contradiction. The nature of his political constructivist project is to draw out ideas that are
supposed to be implicit in the accepted institutions and/or common values of the polis, and
thus  supply constructivistic  objectivity to  norms which can gain commensurately general
allegiance.  But,  if  his  audience  is  this  limited,  the  scope  of  the  norms  that  could  gain
objectivity will not be remotely general; if, instead, he  were to direct his arguments to the
polis tout court, any objectivity they might have could not be construed as constructive, at
least in the way he proposes, because any basis it might have in antecedently endorsed ideas
would  remain  entirely  obscure.  Rawls'  'political  constructivism'  appears  to  be  either  not
political, or not a form of constructivism.
The second major problem that I'll discuss concerns the limiting effects of Rawls' restriction
of  political  constructivism  to  the  'basic  structure'.  As  I  have  previously  noted,  Rawls'
constructivism limits its target to what he calls the 'basic structure' of society. Some move
such as this seems to be necessary for him, in order for his claim to be a constructivist to have
any plausibility: it is only because the range of discourse falling under his account is limited
that he is – even potentially – able to avoid making controversial claims about such a wide
range of things that it  would become entirely unclear how he could still  aspire to ground
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political truth in the existing worldviews of the general public. As this is a private/public
distinction, it necessarily falls under the warranted suspicion I argued in the previous Chapter
(§1.3): it is not clear what principled reason can be given for drawing the line between public
and private in any particular place – even if a reason can be given for drawing it at all – and,
more importantly, private/public distinctions have a notorious history of being used to cover
up injustices by relegating them to the 'private' sphere. There, I noted Okin's classic work on
justice within the family, as an attack on Rawlsian restrictions to the basic structure. Here,
instead, I'll draw out a more recent critique by Andrew Koppelman, which supports the same
conclusion: that restricting the space of thought about justice to the basic structure is likely to
produce extensionally inadequate results, and will do so in a way that reveals a bias against
the concerns of oppressed or marginalised people.
Firstly, Koppelman examines the case of sexual freedom for sexual minorities. He notes that,
since it is not clear that sexual freedom is a prerequisite of the development of the capacities
necessary to engage on equal terms in the democratic process of reasonable disagreement
with others, nor is it necessary for the development of the ability to use deliberative reason in
formulating an individual conception of the good, it is not clear what special grounds there
are for protecting such freedom from a Rawlsian point of view. If one of these 'two moral
powers' were in danger (Rawls 2005, 18-19), political liberalism would prescribe protection,
because the capacity for use of such powers is essential to the fundamental political freedom
and equality that Rawls thinks central to the values underlying it. If one of these fundamental
publicly recognised interests is not at stake, however, the interest of (e.g.) a gay couple to
have the liberty to have sex with one another is on a par with the interest of others in living in
a  society  where  sodomy  is  subject  to  public  sanction.  For  Rawls,  there  is  'a  general
136
presumption  against  imposing  legal  or  other  restrictions  on  conduct  without  sufficient
reason...  But this presumption creates no special priority for any particular liberty'  (2005,
292).  It  is  similarly  difficult  to  see  how  any  special  rights  to  enjoy  specific  forms  of
relationship could have a particular justification under political liberalism, since incorporating
these would be accorded great importance by some general 'comprehensive' worldviews, but
little or no importance, or actively negative importance, by others. (Koppelman 2009, 463-6).
Secondly,  Koppelman  notes  that  in  the  case  of  female  genital  mutilation  (FGM),  too,
Rawlsian  constructivism  has  difficulty  accounting  for  the  injustice  of  the  practice.
Koppelman notes that many practitioners or supporters of FGM do offer (putative, according
to their comprehensive conception of the good) reasons for the practice. It is bound up with
widespread (at  least  in certain locations)  conceptualisations  of hygiene,  womanhood,  and
marriageability.  There  are  clear,  countervailing  reasons,  of  course,  many of  which  could
legitimately be appealed to in making a case for prohibition. However, because the harms that
FGM does, which generate these reasons, do not (at least  prima facie) affect the two moral
powers, they are not relevant to considerations of Rawlsian justice. What is more, because the
power of legislatures, insofar as they do not violate the principles of justice for the 'basic
structure', is unconstrained by Rawlsian constructivism itself, it is even possible that forcible
FGM could legitimately be mandated in a polity. Koppelman considers a number of Rawlsian
counter-arguments to his thesis. Against the complaint that FGM (if performed on children)
constitutes  child  abuse,  he  notes  that  Rawls  has  no  consistent  means  of  justifying  a
conception of 'child abuse' which would go beyond abuses that preclude the development of
the  moral  powers.  As  examples  of  adult  women  who  underwent  FGM,  and  who  have
achieved  clear  excellence  in  the  use  of  their  moral  powers  clearly imply,  however,  it  is
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implausible that FGM will always have this effect. Against the complaint that FGM damages
health, he notes that health is a contested concept between comprehensive conceptions that
Rawls apparently must regard as 'reasonable', including some which regard genital integrity
as irrelevant or even contrary to health, and that no reasonably disputable version of such a
concept may be built in to the constructed account of justice. Most importantly, against the
response that FGM (at least,  as a structural practice) violates gender equality, Koppelman
notes that the only species of gender equality that Rawlsian justice can coherently require is
one wholly concerned with gender-based  political inequality; equality as a citizen. It is far
from clear that practices such as FGM necessarily cause political inequalities of this kind.
(2009, 466-74).
Koppelman then contrasts the strictly Rawlsian response with that of Nussbaum, who, while
she draws extensively on Rawlsian-sounding concepts, and is, as I brought out in the previous
Chapter, officially (if equivocally) a friend to constructivism in practice, does in fact bring in
non-universal value judgements and interpretations of relevant concepts when formulating
her arguments about these matters.  As Koppelman notes, this  may be consistent,  because
Nussbaum settles on a much weaker interpretation of the requirement for compatibility with
'reasonable'  doctrines  than  Rawls  does.  Unlike  Rawls'  formal  and  strict  criteria  for
'reasonableness',  Nussbaum  requires  only  that  claims  about  justice  be  susceptible  to
agreement  between  the  holders  of  many diverse  perspectives;  she  is  not  forced,  as  an
unequivocal  political  constructivist  must  be,  to  accept  all  which  meet  some  determinate
criteria.  (Koppelman 2009, 480-1).  This  suggests  that  an accurate  account  of  the wrongs
involved  here  can  only  be  achieved  by abandoning  the  most  distinctive  idea  of  Rawls'
constructivism.
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Koppelman's  general  point  is  that  the  Rawlsian  restriction  removes  issues  such  as
prohibitions on the freedom of sexual minorities, and the prohibition of gender-based (or –
for that matter – gender-neutral) involuntary genital cutting, from the conceptual sphere of
justice. It does this for different reasons in different cases, but the overarching problem is the
same:  the  restriction  to  the  basic  structure,  and  the  ban  on  'private'  reasons  that  is  its
necessary corollary, deprives the political liberal of the resources needed to articulate what is
unjust about certain cases. Because the language of justice is not only necessary for accuracy,
but  equally  for  practical  political  organising  and  contestation69,  adopting  a  political
constructivist methodology would not only fail many oppressed people on a theoretical level,
it would also be likely to harm their struggles for liberation.
It will be helpful, in closing, to consider explicitly a key argument that Rawls would likely
level  at  someone  who argues  against  the  species  of  idealisation  in  methodology that  he
proposes, as I have here. Perhaps the most forceful argument that Rawls offers for his way of
thinking about the methodology for thought and discourse about justice rests on its intended
role  as  the  basis  for  political  order  and stability.  Rawls  attempts  to  solve  two problems
simultaneously:  the  problem of  securing  social  order  by 'reconciling'  people  to  the  basic
institutions of their society, and the problem of actually justifying those institutions and (over
time)  rationalising  any  changes  to  them  without  substantively  transforming  the  people
concerned. He thinks that performing the first without the second is unpalatable, while the
69 There is a connection here to the more general feminist work that I cite in this Chapter, and elsewhere in the 
thesis. This suggests that there may be many instances in which reasons which have been rendered invisible 
to many by structures of oppression can come to be 'public' and shareable only by transformative 
experiences that (however partially) eliminate that oppression just per se. However, the pursuit of such 
transformation is precluded by restrictions, within the space of discourse about justice, to what can – at a 
time – be publicly shared. See especially the next section for relevant theory.
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second without the first is impossible, since a social order that was not stable could not be
justified.  (2005,  133-57.)  If  what  I  have  argued  in  this  section  is  correct,  however,  this
aspiration is likely to be a vain hope, and, unless individuals can be significantly transformed,
the work of maintaining political stability may have little to do with public justification to one
another.  This  removes  much  of  the  force  of  this  key  Rawlsian  argument:  if  something
probably cannot be done, the failure to do it is unproblematic. 
Instead  of  Rawls'  strict  and  exclusionary  understanding  of  'reasonableness',  there  are  a
number of alternative possibilities for thinking about reconciliation and its relationship to
justification proper. Most of the authors who have taken a similar critical line to that given
here propose a more minimal concept of the 'reasonable' which avoids the entirely amoral
'mere modus vivendi' alternative with which Rawls constantly contrasts it (Wenar 1995, esp.
61-2; Koppelman 2009, 479-82; Klosko 1997, 637-46). In all of these alternative proposals,
additional kinds of controversy are permitted into the space of valid deliberation about the
political, to varying degrees. As some of these thinkers recognise, this is likely to require (if
not  constitute)  an  abandonment  of  Rawls'  constructivist  program,  along  any  number  of
dimensions.  For  Koppelman,  this  departure  from  constructivism  is  necessary  because
additional normative content is required in order to secure commonly-agreed standards of
justice (i.e. the prohibition of FGM), but this will come at the cost of explicitly excluding
some (those who demand FGM) from the relevant deliberative space on transparently first-
order  grounds  (2009,  476-9).  For  Wenar,  it  is  essential  because  the  endorsement  of
constructivism about the political  is itself  an exclusionary threat to stability (1995, 52-7).
Alternatively, for Besch, it is because views about the proper scope of justification cannot,
without brutely begging the question, be given any constructivist rationale: every form of
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constructivism simply assumes some constrained scope. Instead, for this question at least, a
substantive, perfectionist answer must be given (2013, 68-70). The precise details can be left
aside, although all of these lines of argument are consistent with my broader proposals in the
thesis, because my purpose here is merely to demotivate Rawls' way of thinking about the
issue of stability through justification, which is so tightly bound up with the motivation for
his constructivist methodology; I do not need to provide an alternative account of my own.
Many non-Rawlsian political philosophers may continue to reject a mere modus vivendi, and
seek, however partially, to satisfy Rawls' hankering after stability for the right kind of reason,
for example on the grounds that a more satisfying kind of social unity is often possible (e.g.
Koppelman  2009,  481-2).  In  any case,  whether  or  not  this  aspiration  is  a  noble  one  in
principle,  nothing  can  be  gained  by  the  Rawlsian  pretence  that  many  deep  and  lasting
disagreements about normative matters can be hermetically sealed off from questions about
justice by castigating many participants as 'unreasonable', and exhorting the rest to use only
an impoverished and potentially biased set of political concepts. There may be hope for the
actual-world construction of genuine agreement here and there, which might secure at least
local political stability for reasons other than brutally Hobbesian fear of chaos or unreflective
complacency. But this goal is unlikely to be served70 by a rhetoric which pretends that those
who seek different political ends should be opposed because they are fundamentally unco-
operative,  dogmatic,  or malicious; rather,  they should be opposed on the honest,  realism-
friendly ground that they are wrong. 
§3 The Locus of Epistemic Values; Contingent Virtue
70 Compare especially Bohman and Richardson 2009, 265-74, which argues that the true grounds for hope of 
agreement in politics lie in the scope for actual common ground, and not on hypothetical consensus.
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Finally, in ending this Chapter, I want to do a little more to reinforce my claim that culture-
laden realism is far from being an alien presence within feminist epistemology. To that end, in
this section I shall discuss work by Laura Ruetsche and Rebecca Kukla, which utilises ideas,
within a feminist ethical/political epistemology, which are especially congruent with culture-
laden realism, and particularly with the McDowellian view I bring out in the next Chapter.
Before I  do so,  I  shall  also discuss one controversy within feminist  epistemology,  which
concerns the correct location of epistemic values (such as objectively justified belief). This
controversy will be important in what follows, because one answer to this question sits better
than others with the version of culture-laden realism I endorse.
The controversy in question turns on whether or not we should regard individuals or groups71
as the primary objects of epistemological theory. Many feminist epistemologists have argued
that, because of the ubiquitous relevance of social-relational factors to epistemic standing,
and because (on many views, at least) this implies that no individual can be epistemically
self-sufficient, we must regard the community as the level at which epistemic explanations
occur, and as the locus of knowledge itself. I understand this question about the individual-
group relation in epistemology in a parallel way to the understanding I've previously adopted
about that relation within normative political philosophy72. Here, as there, it is open to us to
combine a 'normative individualism' – the view that the basic locus of relevant values is the
individual  –  with  an  anti-reductionist  social  ontology  which  acknowledges  the  many
71 I am ignoring a third category of social-epistemic stances on the individual-group relation, which hold that 
individuals within specific relational settings are the primary base for epistemology (as with the community 
model, this is ambiguous between normative and explanatory interpretations of the relevant 'base' notion). 
Most importantly, I do not discuss Grasswick's own 'individuals-in-communities' account (Grasswick 2004).
I think that Grasswick's (or some other) relational account is likely to be better at doing the explanatory 
work than a strictly community-centred view, but my key argument – that normative and methodological 
individualisms are separable, and only the latter are problematic – will apply to relational views no less than
group-based ones.
72 See §1.3.3 in the previous Chapter.
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(including some constitutive) ways in which social  location affects how individuals stand
with  respect  to  those  values.  Thus,  although  justification  (or  objectivity,  or  knowledge)
depend upon social facts and an individual's social history – that is to say, the community
view  is  correct  that  individuals  are  not  self-sufficient  –  the  justification  itself  (the
epistemically valuable state) is primarily a state of individuals. 
Fortunately, it is not clear that this claim contradicts very much of the community-centric
view.  For  example,  much of  the  discussion of  community-first  views about  the  locus  of
knowledge (e.g. in Grasswick 2013) does not pertain to the questions I am concerned with.
For example, Grasswick identifies the view that “communities can be understood as knowers
in the sense that a communal context is required for knowing. Individuals know only within
communities.”  However,  this  is  not  incompatible  with  the  epistemic  form of  normative
individualism (and  is  clearly  congruent  with  culture-laden  realism as  well).  Her  overall
summary is as follows:
Feminist social epistemologists who argue for a community model of knowers do not 
deny that individuals also know. However, their accounts challenge the possibility of 
understanding individuals as knowers in isolation from their communities, and press 
for a better  understanding of the relative roles of individuals and communities in  
knowing. For example, communal accounts of knowing suggest that the epistemic  
responsibilities of individuals will need to be understood in relation to their communal
memberships,  which  set  limits  on  the  conceptual  resources  and  epistemic  tools  
individuals have available to them. (Grasswick 2013)
On  the  face  of  it  at  least,  this  is  perfectly  compatible  with  normative  individualism in
epistemology:  the complaints  raised against  traditional  epistemology here argue that  it  is
impossible to  adequately explain how knowledge (or justification,  etc.,  mutatis  mutandis)
comes about within the confines of methodological individualism. But, as I argued for the
ethical/political  case,  normative  individualism  need  not  imply  its  more  general
methodological sibling.
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What is more, we have some good reasons to continue to view justification (etc.) as located at
the  individual  level.  Most  importantly,  a  central  evaluative  function  of  justification  is  to
distinguish interlocutors as having epistemic standing relative to one another; it is hard to see
how a view which regards communities as the primary locus of justification will be able to
tell a compelling story about the conferral of such standing. At least, an individually-based
account will be more straightforward. In addition, it is not obvious how to make sense of the
role of epistemic norms (asserting the true, not believing the false, etc.) in guiding individual
action,  if  those  values  apply  to  individuals  only  derivatively.  With  an  individual-based
account, we can more easily make sense of the role of such values. Why should I listen to the
testimony of  an  agent?  Because  I  (an  individual)  am justified  in  believing  that  she  (an
individual) knows something that I do not. Even if, to explicate my justification, and/or her
knowledge, we have to refer to relational or community-implicating facts at every stage, it
remains the case that the justification is mine, and the knowledge is hers. If this is correct, the
ground is clear for a conception of epistemic standing which incorporates extensive reference
to relational factors, but is centred on an individual-level concept: the concept of virtue.
In the remainder of the Chapter, I begin to introduce the notion of virtue I shall be supporting,
with reference to the feminist-epistemological work of Kukla and Ruetsche.  This work is
distinguished  by  its  uptake  of  a  (roughly)  Aristotelian  notion  of  virtue  alongside  an
acceptance of a significant degree of contingency in virtue (so construed). I shall concentrate
on their  joint  paper,  'Contingent  Natures  and Virtuous  Knowers:  Could  Epistemology be
“Gendered”?',  but many of the same points are present in their sole-authored work73. The
73 Cf. Ruetsche 2004; Kukla 2002.
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central claim of the paper is that 'there exist some individuals for whom being gendered74 in
the way that they were had some relevant effect on their contingent history which in turn
altered their second nature75 epistemic capacities.' (Kukla and Ruetsche 2002, 396)76 Later,
they gloss this as the more precise claim that 'a gendered standpoint conditions a second
nature yielding access to results duplicated neither by [purportedly location-neutral epistemic
rationality] nor by other second natures as they are currently constituted'77 (407). Although
theirs is a nicely detailed account, it suffices for my purposes in this section to note a few
general features which demonstrate the compatibility between feminist epistemology and an
Aristotelian development of culture-laden realism. Firstly, they implicate a notion of virtue as
a habituated capacity, with cultural influences playing a role in its development (esp. 413-18).
Secondly, they (unsurprisingly) develop their account so that locations salient to feminism are
included – gender, race, class, etc. Thirdly, they make clear that there may be some second-
natural positions such that no rational process (i.e. of argument) can bring the relevant agent
to a state such that they can access the (e.g. gendered) contingently-inaccessible reasons (410-
12). Finally, they explicitly regard the epistemic benefits of the contingent virtue that they
discuss as involving a relation to objective reality (409-10; cf. especially Kukla 2002, 334-8).
These, taken together, constitute a version of culture-laden realism which is well-placed to
incorporate feminist-epistemological insights; it is also a view which, as will become clearer
in the next Chapter, is extremely close to that which I favour78.
74 It appears that Kukla and Ruetsche would generalise the account to social (including, presumably, more 
generally cultural) locations beyond genderings.
75 I discuss the notion of second nature, as it figures in McDowell, explicitly in Appendix B. At this point, an 
intuitive understanding will suffice.
76 Much of the (uniformly excellent) paper runs through several different interpretations of this idea. I discuss 
only the last.
77 This element is included to avoid 'epistemic separatism', either as the view that gendered reasons are gender-
relative reasons, or as the view that gendered positions (and the reasons to which they give access) are 
permanently beyond the reach of differently-gendered others (Kukla and Ruetsche 2002, 403-5). The first is 
implausibly relativistic, the second is in tension with its own motivations – if gender is socially contingent, 
it should be possible for the perspectives it involves to be shareable.
78 This is not especially surprising, since they explicitly (e.g. 392-3) draw on McDowell's work in developing 
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To sum up the Chapter, there are two key reasons to reject constructivism as a meta-level
frame  for  the  methodology  of  the  capability  approach.  Firstly,  at  least  most  forms  of
constructivism  either  motivate,  or  are  motivated  by,  proceduralisms  –  such  as  Baber's
preferentist  response  to  preference  adaption  –  which  are  all,  so  far  as  we  have  seen,
extensionally  inadequate.  Even  if  such  views  had  meta-level  advantages  (metaphysical
parsimony, simplicity, etc.), their inability to capture which desires are problematic and which
not  is  devastating.  Secondly,  constructivism also has meta-level  disadvantages,  because it
cannot  adequately  make  sense  of  the  epistemological  feedback  between  procedural  and
substantive judgements.  Since an appeal to  such feedback is  the only way to resolve the
problems  of  extensional  inadequacy,  I  conclude  that  constructivism  is  not  a  promising
methodological position. Even in the face of arguments such as Jaggar's, we have reason to
seek a culture-laden form of realism.
it. Cf. also Code 2014, 188-199, and Fricker 2003 (which provides a link between McDowell-type virtue-
centric epistemology and her broader later work on testimonial (2007) and hermeneutical (2006) epistemic 
injustice), for other especially friendly approaches.
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Chapter 4: 
Shapeless Virtue
Throughout much of the previous two chapters, I have issued a series of promissory notes for
an account of objectivity, about the normative topics that capability theories concern, that is
capable of meeting a number of desiderata. It is worth collating these here. Firstly, we need a
concept of objectivity worthy of the name: we need to be able to account for some people
knowing something that others don't,  in virtue of something different about the way they
relate to the parts of the world they have beliefs about. This concept needs to make sense on
the meta-level, and discussion concerning it cannot be conducted in isolation from meta-level
discourse. Specifically, I have given preliminary reasons to doubt that a constructivist meta-
level approach is likely to be plausible here, so we should instead seek some form of realism1.
Secondly, we need to be able to make sense of the specific contours of the concept. If we
believe that objectivity about some fact can depend upon cultural location or social position,
for example, it needs to be clear how this can be the case coherently with a plausible meta-
level framework. I have argued throughout much of the last two chapters that the requisite
concept of objectivity will have features such as this – under the banner of what I've called
'culture-ladenness' – so these must be accommodated. Thirdly, we must be able to claim that,
for some kinds of normative discourse at least (i.e. that involved in the capabilities approach
1 I am not considering non-cognitivist or error-theoretic meta-ethical theses here. This is defensible given that
my main dialectical opponents seem to be committed to there being normative truths. On the other hand, if 
constructivism is compatible with expressivism, say, (see e.g. Lenman 2012), or if expressivists can 'quasi-
realistically' accommodate almost all ordinary phenomena of normative thought and discourse (Blackburn 
1984 and 1993; cf. Dreier 2004 for the now-classic internal threat to this paradigm), or perhaps even if 
morality is thought to be a useful fiction (cf. Joyce 2006; Kalderon 2005), it might be possible to motivate at
least many of the kind of things that constructivistic normative thinkers say coherently with a non-realist 
theory.
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to global justice), the answers for which we claim objectivity hold universally. Even if the
perspective of objectivity about some question is culturally-laden, as I have suggested it will
be,  this  cannot  entail  that  the  claims  it  endorses  are  true  only for  those  who have been
similarly enculturated. Enculturation-dependent objectivity cannot be allowed to collapse into
cultural relativism. Finally, it may help to identify some account of how the target discourse
relates (semantically, metaphysically, epistemically etc.) to other discourses (natural-scientific
discourse, for example)2. This is what is generally referred to within metaethics as the broad
debate about 'naturalism'.
Some of these desiderata will be addressed in later chapters: I will not make any serious
claims about  naturalism,  at  least,  here3.  Others  can  best  be dealt  with  now, however,  by
explicating and defending a  general  view of  metaethics  that  can satisfy them. I  find this
account in the work of John McDowell, and it is his approach that I shall draw out here. Two
large caveats apply, however. Firstly, I am not concerned with pure exegesis – my aim, as I
have  said,  is  to  produce  a  plausible  basis  for  a  capability  approach.  Any  errors  of
interpretation that there may be in the following should not damage this aim significantly4.
Secondly, I do not have space to consider every criticism of McDowell, nor can I adequately
trace the connections between areas of his philosophy, or fully describe many aspects even of
the proposals I do rely on. Setting out on any of these tasks would quickly turn this into a
Thesis about McDowellian metaethics alone, with any hope of contributing to the capability
2 Specifically, this might help because the (perhaps) more straightforward relationship that constructivisms 
might posit between the ethical and non-ethical levels might provide motivation for constructivism. Cf. 
fn.15 in the previous Chapter.
3 I discuss neo-Aristotelian 'naturalism' in Chapter 5. However, the full meta-level interpretation of that 
approach is of little significance for my purposes in this Thesis, and so I cannot devote significant space to 
it, although I concede that a genuinely complete framework of the sort I'm proposing would provide more 
on this score. To that end, Appendix B contains some argument on the topic, which may help to illustrate the
direction of travel I think most plausible.
4 Of course, I do not think that the approach I describe here is correct because McDowell is (for the most 
part) its origin!
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approach  lost.  Rather,  my  objective  is  relatively  modest:  I  believe  that  McDowell's
metaethical approach is independently compelling,  but I also claim that it  is an excellent
complement to a capability approach, and it is this latter belief that I hope to support here. As
such, I shall only engage in general defence of the McDowellian approach I favour when
faced with  problems  so  damaging  that,  if  they were  not  responded to,  would  make  this
metaethics clearly inappropriate as a partner for a capability approach.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 1, sub-sections 1.1 and 1.2 describe
important elements of McDowell's general philosophical output that are especially relevant to
the metaethical claims that are my focus. §§1.3-5 then explain McDowell's central idea: that
moral facts can be understood as  sui generis worldly dispositions. In so doing, I also bring
into greater focus the similarities and differences my view has with constructivism. Section 2
turns to more general meta-level issues, such as moral psychology and epistemology, bringing
out a number of respects in which McDowell's approach may complement a transformation of
the  way we think  about  ethics  on a  more  practical  level,  and reiterating  some points  of
agreement with themes from recent feminist work. §2.1 focuses on moral psychology, noting
two ways in which McDowell's highly flexible approach to these issues brings advantages to
the overall picture. §2.2 briefly engages with the debate about reasons internalism, and argues
that here too a McDowell-inspired approach pays dividends in the context I'm working in.
This section also provides the basis for an important link which I identify between different
kinds of reasons claims and the controversy about ideal and non-ideal theorising in political
philosophy, which I pursue further in Ch.6. Finally, §2.3 grapples with what may be the most
interesting  potential  problem for  this  approach:  in  linking moral  knowledge to  a  (set  of)
cultural position(s), while linking what moral knowledge is about to humanity itself, it may
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render  relativism not  so much  false as  unintelligible.  This  may seem unsatisfactory,  so I
engage in further explanation to assuage worries in this area.
§1 Secondary-Quality Realism
§1.1 The General Picture: Idealism, Realism, Quietism
McDowell's aim, throughout all of his work5, is to show how we can be satisfied, when faced
with an apparently pressing philosophical problem, without having to radically revise the
viewpoints from which we begin. Rather, problems can be shown to be illusory, by clarifying
our practices and discourses to show that no revision is required. This methodological stance
is called quietism. (McDowell 2009e). It is important to recognise that being a quietist about
one region of philosophy (broadly conceived) does not commit one to quietism about all such
regions: in particular, first-order normative discourse still contains problems that will require
substantive,  non-quietist,  solutions.  However,  large  areas  (at  least)  of  contemporary
metaethics  may be  ripe  for  such treatment,  and McDowell's  proposals  for  this  region of
philosophy should be seen in this light.
Within this expansive metaphilosophical framework, McDowell's most relevant theses for my
purposes  are  also  his  most  general.  It  will  be  necessary to  explain  some of  these  broad
interventions to provide a context for the specific, metaethical claims. I shall begin with a
summary of the central  relevant conclusions of  Mind and World; I  do not have space to
recount  the  arguments  for  these  conclusions.  Firstly,  McDowell  claims  that  the  world  is
5 Notice that this formulation does not assert that McDowell is committed to this sort of aim across all of 
'philosophy' (for at least most construals of that subject): he has explicitly disavowed that view (cf. 
McDowell 2009e, 366-7). Those first-order areas of philosophy for which quietism seems most implausible 
– ethical, political, aesthetic, scientific-methodological, first-order epistemic, etc. – are ones in which he has
done little or no work.
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constitutively apt for conceptualisation. The stuff of which the world is composed must be
such that some concept-user can place it within their cognition; the world must be thinkable.
(1994, esp. 24-45)6. Secondly, the concepts that the world is apt for must be  ours, in some
(very weak) sense. At least, it must be the case that there is a rational route between (some of)
the  concepts  that  we now possess,  and the  concepts  within which  the world itself  could
figure. Assuming that all epistemic rationality is in some sense Neurathian, this rational route
will be available just in case our current concepts allow us to know things about reality to any
extent at all; that this is, in fact, the situation that we are in then seems to be a good candidate
for something presupposed by ordinary human cognition and discourse.7 This thesis, which
might  be  considered  a  weak  form of  idealism,  does  not  require  that  any of  our  current
concepts  can  capture  any aspect  of  the world fully.  All  it  requires  is  that  there  be some
possible conceptual community (some group of beings8 that share some concepts), that is
continuous with the contemporary one in the sense that one could move in a Neurathian way
from our worldview to theirs, and whose concepts could do so.9 Thirdly, whenever people
have veridical experience of something, there are concepts at work in that experience (1994,
esp. 3-23 and 46-65). As a corollary, coming to have experience of something will require the
possession of some relevant set of concepts10. The immediate benefit of this idea is that it
6 McDowell's view on this has changed, since Mind and World was published. Originally, he fleshed out the 
idea of the conceptuality of the world in terms of propositionality, with an associated focus on what can 
enter into language and discursive thought. He has since relaxed this thesis, but I can't discuss any impact 
this might have on my argument here. See McDowell 2008a.
7 Along the lines of a Wittgensteinian hinge proposition, perhaps (Wittgenstein 1969), or a constitutive norm 
of thought itself à la Davidson (2001); cf. McDowell 1998g.
8 Technically, one being (a 'God' -type character) would do, but that is enormously implausible given the 
social way that knowledge arises in our species (our only solid reference-point), and, indeed, given the 
physical constraints of the universe.
9 This refers to the roughly Davidsonian argument that McDowell gives in Mind and World. (Cf. also 
McDowell 2009a, 134-151). As far as I can see, this very weak interpretation of the maximal conceptual 
community is all McDowell requires to do his work. However, there is some reason to think that McDowell 
holds a more strongly anthropocentric interpretation (cf. especially Haddock 2008). Even if this is so, it 
should not affect my argument.
10 Note that this doesn't entail that all knowledge requires some specific course of education, or the 
understanding of some theory; some concepts might either A) be innate, or B) be so fundamental to 
engagement with the world that they would be a part of any pattern of agential development whatsoever. 
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coheres  with  the  overwhelmingly  plausible  thesis  that  the  experiences  which  are
epistemologically important for ethics will be so only because they are infused with certain
acquired concepts – clearly people do not recognise the humiliation of others, for example,
using  the  simple  application  of  visual  attention  alone.  Rather,  the  deployment  of  some
conception of social standing (inter alia) will be necessary in order to be able to register the
salience of those features present within (e.g.) the visual field that are criteria for humiliation.
An important pattern is visible here (and elsewhere in McDowell's work). He aims to show
how the essential involvement of human capacities in our epistemological practice does not
preclude its being about a reality that those capacities do not create. He aims to reconcile very
weak (arguably, even trivial) versions of realism and idealism11. In doing so, the problems
that (putatively) more substantial realisms or idealisms concerned themselves with should no
longer  seem pressing:  we already have everything we need12.  As I  shall  show, this  same
impulse is at work in McDowell's metaethical work; that this broader background is available
helps to make that specific intervention more compelling.
A second aspect of McDowell's general work that is particularly important here also concerns
an attack on a certain kind of theoretical sealing-off of the human mind from the rest of the
world.  As I  have noted,  McDowell's  view involves a kind of very modest idealism quite
generally,  which  erodes  the  presupposition  that  the  concepts  that  are  at  work  in  human
worldviews must form a markedly different kind to the facts that those worldviews are about,
such that we could thoroughly separate out internal mentality from worldly materials. But
11 Haddock 2008 puts it this way, although he sees this resolution as in tension with a similarly weak (or 
trivial) thesis of naturalism, that he also identifies in McDowell. I cannot respond to this here.
12 Compare Naomi Scheman's allegedly Wittgensteinian invocation of 'real needs' in attacking 'metaphysical' 
realism in her (2001). The turn back to real needs is congruent with quietism, but her rejection of 
unconstructed reality is nothing if not a substantial, revisionary thesis. Cf. McDowell 1998a, esp. 260-2.
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there is also a more specific commitment, to a variety of mental content externalism13: in this
case, the view that the psychological states involved in virtue (epistemic, ethical, etc.) cannot
be individuated using 'inside the head'  ('internal')  resources alone.  This view is  explicitly
developed for the epistemology of non-ethical perception14; put simply, McDowell holds that
someone who sees (e.g.) a bent straw in a glass, and someone who sees a straight straw that
they consequently judge  to  be  bent  because  the  glass  contains  some water,  do  not  have
identical experiences of the world15, even if the only way for a third party to tell that this is so
is to look to the broader environment outside their heads. (1998b; 1998c; 2011, 36-53). As
McDowell puts it, there is no epistemic 'highest common factor' (1998b, 385-394) between
illusory (or hallucinatory,  or – perhaps – otherwise misleading) experiences and veridical
ones, because veridical experiences are genuinely world-involving in a way that the others
are not. As will become clear, this is an extremely useful epistemological feature, since it
allows us to make sense of the evidential difference between a virtuous response to a situation
and a non-virtuous one, and also forces us to grapple with the virtuous condition in all its
contingent complexity, while still thinking of it as a unity. Even better, it does so in a way that
does not require us to give any strictly independent motivation for the judgement that there is
a difference between one experience and the other – we presuppose things about the state of
the world and our relation to it in describing the experience as veridical, but we might also
have to rely on that very experience in justifying these more general claims about the world.
This  is  an  excellent  fit  for  culture-laden  realism:  our  methodology  must  incorporate
substantive  ethical  content  with  the  thought  that  this  is  truth,  using  this  to  exclude  (as
13 It may be arguable whether McDowellian disjunctivism really does involve mental content externalism, but 
I'll ignore this exegetical question here, in line with my general strategy in this Chapter.
14 As well as in giving a gloss on the Wittgensteinian notion of 'criteria' as it figures in e.g. the debate about 
knowledge of other minds. The classic source for both is McDowell 1998b.
15 Putting it this way assumes that the water itself is not independently visible to the latter agent at the time the
mistake is made.
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epistemic peers) the positions from which that content is inaccessible; this epistemological
circularity is well-justified on realist grounds (and is unavoidable in any case). Just as – quite
generally – we need to deploy all our substantively-laden thought about the world in order to
separate epistemically-weighty perceptions  from mere appearances,  so we need to deploy
substantive  ethical  thought  in  order  to  pick  out  the  objectivity-involving  deliverances  of
virtue. What enables the state of virtue to be visible as a unity, on this view, will be exercises
of practical reason itself.
§1.2 The General Picture: Rules and Rails
The second of the more general areas that it is important to describe concerns McDowell's
response to the rule-following considerations that arise from the work of Wittgenstein. As
before,  I  cannot  go  into  detail  concerning  the  motivations  for  this  debate,  bring  out  the
nuances of McDowell's response, or consider criticisms. The rule-following considerations
are a connected set of issues, largely dealt with in the philosophy of language, that have to do
with the nature of rules. Rules are essentially normative, and they can be extremely complex
(perhaps, in the case of some e.g. mathematical rules, infinitely so). On the other hand, rules
can be followed by a human agent, and this sort of internalisation brings in a psychological
component: necessarily, people who have internalised a rule are disposed to respond to events
in accordance with that rule. The problem is that the latter considerations can seem to be in
tension with the former. For one thing, the normativity of rules ensures that there are always,
in  principle,  further  cases  to  which  they could  apply (even where  the  rule  itself  doesn't
contain the concept of infinity); there is always something that would constitute 'going on in
the same way'. What is more, it always has to be possible to make sense of the idea that one
could go wrong – if one could not go wrong, it is not clear that one can get things right, and
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then the rule would no longer be normative. However, what dispositions hold of a particular
person is a determinate matter of fact that can seem to have nothing inherently to do with the
nature of the rules that they follow. This gives rise to several problems. For one, how could
anyone know that a person understood a rule, when all  that they could observe were the
products of an individual disposition that the rule would inherently transcend (Kripke 1982,
22-37; McDowell 1998a, 226-8)? Alternately, how can rules be normative, if they can be
entirely captured in the finite psychological dispositions that people can observe? (McDowell
1998a, 246-9).
McDowell's response is that we can dissolve any apparent problems that may arise here so
long as we reject an assumption that is at work in the motivation for the problematic. Sceptics
about rules, such as Kripke, assume that we have to be capable of characterising the personal
dispositions that command of a rule involves independently of the content of the rule itself.
The thought is that if people are latching on to a pattern in learning to follow a rule, this
pattern must be discernible to those that do not have a grasp of the rule already. There must
be a pattern in the world that the rule relies upon, and that people then internalise. Rules are
thought of as something like 'rails', on this picture. They are already there to be followed, and
rule-following individuals attach themselves like railway carriages. This image allows us to
make sense of how people can follow rules, but it does so at a fatal cost (McDowell 1998d,
203-212). On the one hand, if following a rule is attaching to externally-characterisable rails,
one  cannot  go  wrong  once  one  has  done  so,  and  this  prevents  rules  being  genuinely
normative16. If it is the case that we can see the rail stretching out before we attach to it, there
16 According to McDowell, this was an indirect consequence of Crispin Wright's community-involving view. 
(McDowell 1998a, 232-236). Wright appears to have largely come round to the conclusion that a package of
views like McDowell's is ultimately the only way to secure empiricism in the face of the rule-following 
considerations (although he retains significant worries about it as a general philosophical approach) (Wright 
2007).
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is no longer any sense to be made of our being right in going on in one way rather than
another, since staying 'on track' will require no evaluable acts of normative (logical, semantic,
epistemic, ethical...) judgement. On the other, perhaps the right result (if the 'rails' picture is
mandatory) is to say that rules can't really be said to exist – there are no determinate and yet
normative things for rules to be17.
McDowell rejects the picture of rules as rails, and endorses the view that the worldly patterns
and personal dispositions-to-respond that rule-following involves cannot be identified without
using the content of the rule itself.  McDowell's response is not a denial that there is any
psychological disposition that holds of a person who knows how to follow a rule. There will
be such a disposition. It is just that  which disposition it is cannot be picked out by anyone
who does not already understand the rule.  Understanding the rule,  and understanding the
behaviour that internalising the rule produces, are co-dependent. A consequence of this view,
which McDowell thinks people find unsettling, is that there is nothing that a person's rule-
following consists in apart from the internalisation of some extremely specific, irreducible
pattern. That a person is genuinely following a rule is, then, a highly fragile and contingent
circumstance; their 'going on in the same way' is not something that can be guaranteed or
known  about  without  sharing  an  element  of  their  personal  constitution,  their  'whirl  of
organism'. (McDowell 1998d, 206-9). As with the elements of Mind and World summarised
above, this relatively general part of McDowell's work will be of great importance for the
account of his metaethics that follows.
§1.3 Worldly Facts; Human Responses
17 This is Kripke's 'sceptical solution'. See (Kripke 1982; McDowell 1998a).
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These  general  issues  aside,  I  can  return  to  the  main  focus  of  this  Chapter  –  describing
McDowellian metaethics, and clarifying how it can do background work in capability theory.
In  the  remainder  of  Part  1,  I  describe  the  core  idea  of  McDowellian  metaethics,  as  I
understand it: the idea that both moral facts and the states constitutive of objectivity can be
characterised as sui generis dispositions.
The insight that we can use the concept of a worldly disposition to flesh out a conception of
moral reality is not unique to McDowell. Other proponents of the idea include David Lewis,
Mark Johnston, and Michael Smith (Johnston, Lewis, and Smith 1989), and David Wiggins
(1987)18. However, McDowell's view is different, in some of the specific claims it makes, and
in the connections those claims have to other parts of his philosophy. For McDowell, the
function  of  the  dispositional  model  is  twofold.  Firstly,  understanding  moral  facts  as
dispositional helps us to understand how they can have certain properties which have been
thought of as 'queer', without giving up on realism concerning them. Secondly, by exploiting
a series of analogies that the dispositional model opens up, a number of 'companions in guilt'
arguments are made available. These arguments show just how much of the world as we
know it is unavailable to the moral anti-realist; just how impoverished such a perspective
would have to be, if it were consistent. I'll go through this account briefly now, before noting
a potential problem and describing a way of avoiding it.
Many of the major threads of metaethics in the late C20 th can be seen as beginning with J.L.
Mackie's  1977  book,  Ethics:  Inventing  Right  and  Wrong.  There,  Mackie  raises  several
18 Enoch 2005 includes Peter Railton and Bernard Williams as varieties of dispositionalist, too. Some of these 
thinkers are closer to McDowell than others, in various ways. See for example Smith 1989, 107; Johnston 
1989, 147-8; as well as much of Wiggins 1987, for some not dissimilar thoughts. None of these views has 
all the benefits that McDowell's does, however, because none of them is as consistent in their anti-
reductionism.
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potential problems for the realist conception of ethics that may seem to be implicit in ordinary
practice. The most important feature of these is that they function in the way they do because
of the categoricity of ethical demands, as well as their motivational force. One problem is that
ethical facts  would have to have motivational force A) independently of a wide range of
contingent features of individuals19 and B) despite being mind-independent real existences
(Mackie  1977,  40-2).  Alternately,  if  moral  properties  are  independent  of  humanity,  it  is
unclear how we can come to know about them: the usual epistemic accounts do not seem
appropriate, and traditional responses refer to a special faculty of intuition that seems obscure
to many (38-40). It is problems of this kind that dispositionalism responds to. 
It  does  this  by  substituting  a  somewhat  different  conception  of  moral  facts  and  their
independence from human subjectivity for the one that  Mackie has in mind.  Rather  than
thinking of such facts as generally inert, sitting in the cold of the physical world quite apart
from anything human, we can think of them as precisely the kind of thing that is hooked in to
human subjectivity.  They can be seen as dispositions to elicit  responses from agents who
interact with them (McDowell 1998e). If these responses include actions, this could solve the
problem of motivational efficacy. Similarly, if they include the formation of beliefs, this could
solve the problem of epistemic access. Things are not quite as simple as this, however. There
are a number of further features of these dispositions, which are required in order to respect
one or another property of ordinary ethical thought and practice. Firstly, the dispositions have
to  be  dispositions  to  cause  responses  in  virtuous agents;  those  who  get  things  right.
19 This is required because of categoricity. If the motivational force of a moral property depended on an 
individual's contingent desires, for example, any individual that did not happen to have such a desire would 
no longer be subject to prescriptions generated on the basis of instantiations of the property. Mackie 
commits to motivational internalism here. As I shall describe below (§2.1), McDowell is also a motivational
internalist (of a sort), and this prevents him from responding to Mackie in the way that some others have. 
Compare, for example, the classic response of Brink (1989, 37-56).
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Otherwise,  it  would  be  unclear  why there  isn't  a  consensus  about  ethical  questions  –  if
everyone who came into contact with a particular situation was caused to have exactly the
same response to it, general agreement would be the result (cf. Wright 1988, 5-11). Secondly,
we have to be able to make sense of the idea that moral facts merit (or even require) certain
responses from people, rather than merely causing them. (McDowell 1998e, 143-5 (esp. fn.
42)). Thirdly, if a single moral fact is to be capable of generating actions (so as to solve the
motivation problem), and beliefs (so as to solve the epistemic one), it is clear that there will
have to be some sort of unity at the psychological level between beliefs and action in this
case. I discuss this third feature at greater length below (§2.1). Respecting the second feature,
I take it to be clear that any plausible account of the phenomenology of virtue and its proper
placement in social practices will have to accommodate this sense of meriting/requiring, but I
do not think I need to say more about exactly how this can be done here. Finally, the first
feature is accommodated straightforwardly, by introducing the restriction to the responses of
the virtuous directly into the theory, in a way that will become clearer through the rest of this
section.
Once the general concept of a subjectivity-involving worldly disposition is available, it  is
possible to link ethical facts (so construed) to a more-or-less wide variety of other facts that
are subject to the same treatment. The thought is that dispositional treatments are available
for those facts that have traditionally been thought of as secondary qualities. Examples that
McDowell discusses include redness (134-5), funnyness (157-161), and fearfulness (143-6).
As  I  have  said,  once  analogies  with  properties  such  as  these  have  been  established,
companions in guilt arguments can be formulated to show A) that moral properties are not
'queer' after all – rather, they are eminently ordinary, and/or B) that a very wide range of
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people  (including,  perhaps,  many  moral  anti-realists)  are  committed  to  the  existence  of
properties that will stand or fall with those implicated by ethics. Given that my aim is not to
fully justify this metaethical approach, but just to demonstrate its congruence with capability-
theoretic concerns, I do not need to go into any more detail here.
However, one problem which looms at this point turns out to be of more significance for my
purposes. This problem concerns the primary/secondary distinction – how sharp a dichotomy
it is, and what really marks the difference. One of the ways that McDowell introduces the
primary/secondary  division  that  he  wants  to  make  use  of  is  in  terms  of  intelligibility
independent  of  subjective  response:  this  is  what  primary qualities  possess  that  secondary
qualities do not (1998, 133-4e).  As Tim Thornton has pointed out, however, this way of
making the contrast begins to make less sense when we bear the rest of McDowell's thought –
especially the theses of Mind and World – in mind. In general, McDowell resists the idea that
there are parts of the world that could lie beyond the possible scope of our concepts (for some
maximal Davidsonian 'our', at least); this is what I referred to above as his 'idealism'. As a
corollary, the world is not some alien place inherently beyond our ken, it is rather the kind of
place that we do, or could come to, have experiential or experience-implicating knowledge
of. (Thornton 2004, 65-99). This makes it less clear that the difference between primary and
secondary qualities can be cashed out in this way: perhaps  every empirical property can be
seen as a disposition to give rise to some sort of experience in some sort of epistemic agent20.
20  This may seem to straightforwardly vitiate a commitment to realism, as the view that facts are not – in 
general – the kind of things that agents are capable of recognising whenever they obtain. McDowell appears
to be committed to such a thesis (e.g. 1998f, 315). However, the appearances are deceiving here. We can 
make the idea that there is, for each fact, some agent whose psychology it could affect in an evidence-
constituting way coherent with this Dummettian conception of realism if we recognise that a person can, on 
an occasion, 'have a knowledge of conditions that they are not, in general, capable of recognising whenever 
they obtain'. Here, as elsewhere, the way to dissolve a philosophical puzzle lies in avoiding a reductive 
insistence that the shape of a norm must be independently codifiable; in this case, the idea is that someone 
can have direct knowledge of some worldly fact not because they possessed an independent epistemological
decision procedure that guaranteed them that access, but simply in virtue of the irreducible way in which 
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On the other hand, another element of McDowell's construal of the difference is not subject to
this problem. This is the emphasis on the specificity of the responses that secondary qualities
involve. Secondary qualities like colours or moral facts differ from primary qualities in that
the agential capacities they recruit are not essential to experience of the world in general21 –
the emotional capacities that, as I shall suggest below (§2.1), are involved in moral cognition
would be a good example of this. This specificity might also be reflected in the (possible) fact
that there could be other concept-using beings22, unlike us in many ways, who would find
ethical normativity entirely unintelligible and would be forever cut off from ethical reality,
but who would be perfectly capable of engaging with the discourse of (e.g.) physics.23
The picture that we have arrived at is fairly simple, at least at this schematic level. The core
thought is that there are ethical facts, and (complete) objectivity consists in the apprehension
of  all  such facts.24 However,  these  facts  cannot  be  apprehended,  or  even comprehended,
without the possession of ethical concepts, which is a matter of inculcation with thoroughly
human (as  it  happens,  thoroughly cultural)  dispositions.  As in  the case of  rule-following
generally, we can deploy the notion of a disposition in two places. Firstly, the ethical facts can
be thought of as (world-side) dispositions to produce certain responses in suitably-constituted
subjects. Secondly, the subjects whose responses these are will instantiate a psychological
they relate to the world at this particular juncture. (Cf. McDowell 1998f).
21 A different way of capturing this might be to recognise that secondary qualities have a distinctively narrow 
cosmological role, in the sense elucidated by Crispin Wright (1992).
22 An interesting question to consider is whether this idea of divisions between kinds of being might profitably
make use of the neo-Aristotelian naturalist species concepts that I discuss in the next Chapter. However, I 
won't discuss this further.
23  I do not ultimately want to take a stand on whether Thornton's criticism is cogent here or not, and my 
argument does not rely on it. Using the specificity-based conception of secondary qualities, however, will 
both avoid this criticism if it is cogent, and may clarify other interesting connections here, like the 
possibility noted in fn.21 above.
24 As I have noted before, it is obviously extremely unlikely that any individual will possess complete 
objectivity, but this does not matter for my purposes; all I require is that the broad first-order framework of 
universalist capability theory be objectively justified for (at least) me. Because this framework is fairly 
vague, it only implicates some small subset of all the specific ethical matters of fact that there are; thus, 
complete objectivity about it will not require complete objectivity tout court.
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disposition – precisely the disposition to respond in that  particular way to that  particular
worldly fact. Both these dispositions – the 'fact' disposition and the 'virtue' disposition – will
presumably supervene on other facts (psychological, social,  biological, physical, etc.),  but
which  facts  those  are  is  not  something  that  could  be  fully  specified  in  advance  of  the
possession of the 'agent' disposition itself25. It is this agent-side disposition that McDowell
calls 'virtue'. In this way, the concept of virtue is brought into conceptual connection with
ethical objectivity, conceived in a fairly traditional realist frame.
§1.4 Sui-Genereity and Circularity
What  I  have  just  stressed  is  the  sense  in  which  ethical  practice,  and the  specific  set  of
capacities and concepts it involves, are sui generis – they stand on their own, irreducible to
anything else. In particular, we cannot expect to ever be able to simply say what the good is –
or which actions are right – without relying on an irreducible expertise. Rather, these things
can  only  be  shown immanently  from within  the  developed  virtuous  sensibility26.  In  this
section, I turn to address a common accusation against views like this: that they are viciously
circular, trivial, or vacuous, which prevents them from doing any philosophical work at all. 
One classic  way of bringing out this  sense of  vacuity27 is  Crispin Wright's  in  his  'Moral
Values,  Projection,  and  Secondary  Qualities'.  Wright  notes  that  dispositional  accounts  of
properties involve 'basic equations'. For example, consider this basic equation, for 'red':
25 Of course, it is also possible that complete possession of the 'agent-side' disposition will require previous (or
current) awareness of the world-side fact too; so this sentence will likely be equally true, mutatis mutandis, 
for the 'fact' disposition. That is to say, perhaps one cannot know what virtue looks like (psychologically 
speaking) until one knows how the virtuous would respond to which facts; perhaps the advent of recognition
of the features and the responses is strictly contemporaneous with recognition of the psychological state.
26 I discuss the relation of this thought to McDowell's particularism in §2.1 below.
27  There are others: D'Arms and Jacobsen argue that the concept of the moral sentiments is theoretically 
circular in McDowell (2000, 729-32); Smith claims that accounts such as his cannot provide interesting 
analyses (1993, 247).
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x is red iff for any [subject] S: if S knows which object x is, and knowingly observes
it in  plain  view  in  normal  perceptual  conditions;  and  is  fully  attentive  to  this  
observation;  and  is  perceptually  normal  and  is  prey  to  no  other  cognitive  
d[y]sfunction; and is free of doubt about the satisfaction of any of these conditions – 
then if S forms a belief about x's colour, that belief will be that x is red.
(Wright 1988, 15).
This statement is plausibly true (or in the vicinity of a truth) and illuminates the secondary-
quality nature of redness. Wright suggests that this sort of statement constitutes a paradigm
case for dispositional accounts of secondary qualities.
However, compare the following (simplified) basic equation for 'good', which is consonant
with the McDowellian line of thought I'm pursuing:
x is good iff for any S: if S is virtuous and S is fully aware of x's features, S will  
believe that x is good.
Like the first statement, this is plausibly true. However, Wright argues that there is a major
difference between this sort of claim and the one concerning 'red'. Here, unlike there, it is not
likely to be the case that we can independently specify the conditions that the subject needs to
be in such that their beliefs are guaranteed truth. Both statements fit the form:
x is F iff for any S: if S operates under conditions C then (if S forms a germane belief 
then S will believe that x is F)
For the case of redness, but not for the case of goodness, it is plausible that we can give a
substantive account of the conditions C independently of particular judgements about  the
actual distribution of F: we can say what normal vision is like – and perhaps also what normal
visual conditions are – without depending on our substantive judgements about which objects
have which colours. Even given such an independent interpretation of the C-conditions for
colour,  it  remains  plausible  that  the  biconditional  will  be  true.  Wright  thinks  that  this  is
because the extensions of colour terms, but not those of ethical terms, just are determined by
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the normal reactions of colour perceivers. He concludes that 
here is where the analogy between moral and secondary qualities most fundamentally 
breaks down: proper pedigree for visual appraisals of colour is a matter of meeting 
conditions whose satisfaction in a particular case does not directly depend on what the
extension of colour predicates is; proper pedigree for moral judgements, by contrast, 
is a matter of meeting conditions the satisfaction of some of which is, irreducibly, a 
moral question. (1988, 23-4)
However,  this  does  not  have  to  have  the  significance  that  Wright  imputes  –  that  ethical
qualities are not really secondary-quality dispositions after all.  What it  does entail  is  that
ethical dispositionalism cannot be a reductive enterprise, and the basic equations it endorses
cannot be regarded as giving ethics a grounding in a thoroughly non-ethical reality. Instead,
the  truth  of  these  basic  equations  will  be  a  trivial  consequence  of  the  tightly  circular
interaction between a conception of virtue and an ethical worldview28.
As a result, it  is clear that McDowell's approach cannot possibly provide certain kinds of
substantial theoretical resources that others potentially could. For example, the truth of the
basic equations of ethics could not be used to elucidate, for a genuine outsider 29, what is
involved in ethical perception (ethical language, etc.). While a colourblind individual might
come to gain a better appreciation of colour facts by learning the truth of the basic equations
for the relevant colours, it is not plausible that a putative amoralist could learn anything about
ethical truth by coming to understand its relation to virtue, since virtue itself will be just as
much of a mystery to them. In other ways, too, the McDowellian perspective must leave
28 Compare, especially, the discussion of accusations of relativism in connection to response-dependence 
theories (e.g. that of Horgan and Timmons 1996) in LeBar 2005 (198-204). The greater clarity of the 
circularity in McDowell's version of response-dependence, compared to that of LeBar, would make this sort 
of counterargument even more effective for a view like mine. I cannot discuss the details here, however.
29 Clearly, someone is not an outsider in this radical sense if they merely lack the precise enculturated location 
necessary to appreciate some particular ethical fact, or deploy correctly some particular ethical concept 
(which may be the same thing); rather, they would have to be genuinely outside the space of ethical 
concepts entirely. Clearly, there are not many genuine ethical outsiders in the actual world.
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many  of  the  elements  of  the  metaethical  story  vague  (and  so  –   one  might  suspect  –
incomplete). This sort of incompleteness might give ammunition to (e.g.) reductive naturalists
(perhaps of a proceduralist bent). However, this is not a deep consequence of this sort of
perspective.  What  the  perspective  implies  is  not,  strictly,  that  there  is  almost  nothing
substantive to be said about (e.g.) moral psychology, but that saying more substantive things
will  necessarily involve deploying ethical conceptions which are substantive in their  own
right, and thus that the claims, and the fine-grained methodology, that such putatively meta-
level enquiries involve will be strictly coeval with the enquiry of traditional first-order ethics.
The thought is not that metaethics  per se must always be empty,  but just  that meta-level
inquiry, if it is to be substantive, cannot be regarded as separate from ethical inquiry30.
What is not clear, however, is whether the inability of this account to play such independent
theoretical roles is genuinely problematic. Firstly, McDowell's general quietist approach will
clearly preclude some such contributions – otherwise it would be hard to make sense of what
the  quietist  opposes.  There  is  a  strong  potential  for  a  kind  of  grand  metaphilosophical
question-begging in making accusations of triviality of this kind. McDowell's quietist stance
– where it is in play – involves the claim that no non-trivial, constructive philosophical truths
are available to be discovered31; of course, every claim he does make in such domains will
then be insubstantial.  In using such triviality as a  criticism,  an opponent presupposes the
falsity of quietism; accusations of theoretical shallowness are appropriate only if something
30 There is a second potential barrier to substantive abstract theorising in McDowell, which this response 
neglects. The extent to which epistemological particularism is true will be the extent to which generalities 
about meta-ethical matters – which kinds of consideration can count as evidence, for example – will not be 
reliable. However, as I note in §2.1 below, McDowellian particularism does not entail skepticism about all 
ethical generalities – McDowell is not committed to a strong form of epistemological particularism – so 
there might be some genuinely informative theory about (e.g.) the nature of virtue after all. All McDowell is
committed to is the claim that we do not strictly need there to be any such theory for it to be possible for us 
to (virtuously) go on in the same way.
31 Traditionally, quietists have taken the view that this is because the supposed questions that constitute the 
domain are incoherent or in some way confused. I do not need to commit to this here, however.
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deeper is  available (1998a, 241-2).  Secondly,  it  is not clear that being trivial,  circular,  or
theoretically vacuous in the respect that McDowell's view is results in his view being totally
uninformative, or (especially) practically useless. For a start, surely the realisation that there
is nothing substantial to be said about a putative question is a pragmatic gain – it would allow
us  to  divert  time  and  energy to  other  questions.  Apart  from that,  perhaps  the  apparent
candidates for non-trivial truth – which turn out to be confused or otherwise implausible –
have had pernicious effects on other, more substantial,  areas of our discourse that quietist
therapy can then remedy. The impetus towards weak practical responses to injustice that I
have previously argued proceduralism supports would be one example.
To end this subsection, I'd like to note a respect in which this apparent weakness – the way
that linking virtue and objectivity so closely makes most metaethical truths insubstantial –
may actually be a benefit. As I have stressed in the last Chapter, it is necessary to incorporate
a reciprocal justificatory link between correct methodology and correct conclusions – this
being what was frequently referred to as 'epistemological naturalism'. What I want to note in
closing this section is the extent to which the McDowellian emphasis on the theoretical co-
dependence of feature and response makes sense of this32. For McDowell, there is a clear
rationale for us to alter our concrete methods of going about ethical discourse and practice
when we come to see that following a previous method has not lead to success: it is only by
following the right method – becoming virtuous, perhaps in a community of virtue33 – that we
32  Cf. James 2007, 312 on this point.
33 This way of putting it brings to the fore the normative individualism built in to McDowell's approach. 
However, as I've already stressed, there does not seem to be any reason to think that this precludes a social 
epistemology in any substantial way. The social environment would need to be incorporated into the 
conception of individual virtue, such that no-one can be fully virtuous on their own, although the virtue in 
such a case presumably remains theirs, rather than belonging to some mysteriously free-floating communal 
entity. Cf. Ch.3 §3.
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could  possibly come  to  act  well  with  true  reliability.  As  David  Enoch  has  suggested34,
reductive dispositionalists or constructivists do not have this rationale, because they cannot
invoke truth without invoking methodology first, and what is in dispute here is substantive
truth, with methodological consequences following depending on which particular judgement
is reached. Non-dispositional ('robust') realists like Enoch himself can make sense of altering
methods or other 'agent-side' elements in the name of truth, but it is not clear for them why
good practice – virtue – is so deeply important for getting ethics right: for them it is a mere
means  to  an  end of  which  it  is  constitutively independent.  Likewise,  robust  realism has
problems explaining the epistemic and motivational connection between facts and (epistemic
and practical) agency, given this complete metaphysical independence. It is only a view that
posits a constitutive but mutual relationship between ethical virtue and ethical reality that can
be entirely satisfying here; and this is what McDowell's approach – perhaps uniquely – does.
§1.5 Constructivism Redux?
Hopefully, the basic form of the secondary-quality analogy, and the dispositionalism that it
makes use of, are now clear. In this section I will discuss one potential challenge to my use of
McDowell, which involves a claim that McDowell's theory is a form of constructivism after
all  –  given  that  I  have  previously  argued  that  capability  theory  is  not  well  suited  to  a
constructivist development, this would be fatal for my project if true. I shall argue, on the
contrary, that the McDowellian perspective dissolves the Euthyphro contrast that drives the
idea that we must choose between constructivism and a dubiously non-anthropocentric ethical
realism. In doing so, it makes sense of the epistemological feedback loop between conception
of expertise and conception of fact in a straightforward and satisfying way. Two applications
34 See the next subsection, where I bring this critique out more fully.
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of the Euthyphro contrast will be discussed here. Firstly, I shall note some close similarities
between the view I'm endorsing and the avowedly 'Aristotelian Constructivist' approach of
Mark LeBar, the critical issue about which appears to turn on a question about some kind of
priority. Secondly, I shall bring my view into the frame set by David Enoch in his devastating
criticism of  the  idealisations  which  any remotely  plausible  constructivism must  involve;
doing so makes the power of a McDowell-style realism particularly clear.
LeBar's metaethical stance has, on the face of it, remarkable similarities with McDowell's, as
I've been describing it here. The core of his view is given in this passage:
The  goodness  of (say) a cold beer is not anything one recognizes and responds to.  
Instead, one recognizes and responds to its natural properties (these, of course, are not
constructed), and to the extent that, in virtue of its natural properties, it contributes to 
one’s living well, only in that way does it have value... the goodness of a good life is 
in turn crucially dependent on the exercise of practical rationality in the right way 
(that is, practical wisdom, or phronesis). This is true both because such lives require 
the direction of practical wisdom and because only successful practical rationality can
determine which lives are genuinely good. On the other hand, the criterion for success
in practical rationality — practical wisdom — just is the construction of a good life. 
Neither eudaimonia nor practical wisdom can be specified without essential reference 
to the other. (2008, 13-14)
This shares two important features with the view I'm developing here. Firstly, various goods
are proposed to depend upon the integration of certain things into a life of virtue ('practical
wisdom').35 Secondly, and more importantly, LeBar also holds that the conception of the good
and the conception of virtue are circularly interdependent.36 However, LeBar seems to think
35 The version of this claim I advocate will become clearer in the next Chapter (esp. §3.2).
36 One potential difference between LeBar's view and the one I've been developing is that LeBar holds that the
connections he identifies are connections between properties rather than concepts; de re identities between 
the properties picked out as ethically salient by virtue and those that actually have such salience, rather than 
connections de dicto/de se. He has argued elsewhere (2005), that the tendency to rely on an a priori and 
necessary connection has damaged the case for response-dependence theories. See also Wedgwood 1997 
and Miščević 1998 for similar claims. I accept (tentatively) that it is better to see the connections as 
operating at the level of properties rather than concepts. However, as LeBar points out, recognition of the 
identity between the properties could and should transform the concepts over time (2005, 181-3). Because 
McDowell's version of the response-dependence claim does not entail any positive first-order theses, as I 
acknowledged in the previous subsection, it would probably be fairly easy for people to reform their 
thinking to align with it, as I would recommend. 
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that accepting these claims amounts to being a constructivist. Some of the things LeBar has
said suggest that the difference here is merely terminological: 
The conception of welfare at work here is constructivist in that there is no “prior and 
independent order of objects and relations” providing a criterion for the principles  
governing what constitutes well-being, no “standpoint external to the parties’ own  
perspective” from which principles of welfare may be specified. (2004, 204)
If all that is required to be a constructivist is to think that there is no  prior and  external
standpoint  from  which  ethical  truths  can  be  understood,  then  McDowell  is  clearly  a
constructivist. But there are two other senses of constructivism which should be considered
here.  Firstly,  constructivism can be construed as  the positive thesis  that  'the parties'  own
perspective' is prior to the truths they endorse, rather than the other way around. Secondly,
constructivism can be viewed as the metaethical counterpart to first-order proceduralism – the
view that  there  is  some formulable  procedure  that  is  sufficient  for  ethical  epistemology,
including (e.g.)  the epistemology of claims about  human dignity.  Viewing the constraints
placed by practical wisdom as irreducible to any independent procedure or independently-
identifiable  perspective,  as LeBar explicitly does,  would clearly rule  out  both  conceptual
priority  –  or  'priority  in  the  order  of  understanding'  (McDowell  1998o,  157),  and  the
epistemological priority – the privileging of a methodology even in the face of its apparent
extensional failures – which typifies proceduralism. It appears, then, that if there is any major
meta-level  difference  between  the  strongly  anti-priority  view  of  McDowell  and  LeBar's
'Aristotelian Constructivism', it will have to lie in a thesis about some other form of priority,
which LeBar does not mention37.  Otherwise, LeBar's claim that his  view is constructivist
appears to rest entirely on the fact that it fails to endorse the traditional 'realist' answer to the
Euthyphro  question.  It  is  unclear  why constructivism should  be  identified  with  the  mere
rejection of the 'robust' realist horn of the dilemma, rather than with the positive espousal of
37 Perhaps LeBar has some distinct form of metaphysical priority in mind, of the sort which has recently 
become fashionable? (See, for example, Schaffer 2009). It is unclear.
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the anti-realist one. In the rest of this section, I shall suggest that the McDowellian view, as I
understand it, is distinct from both constructivism and traditional forms of realism precisely
because it dissolves the Euthyphro question itself.
On my understanding, what is truly distinctive about McDowell's view is the way that his
general anti-reductionist (§§1.2-4) and realist/idealist perspective (§1.1) allows him to justify
a principled refusal to assign priority to either agent-side or world-side features in metaethics.
I need to say more, though, about how this refusal works. It will be helpful, in doing this, to
present anti-priority realism against the background of David Enoch's attack on idealisation in
the  context  of  subjectivity-based  theories.  To  begin  with,  Enoch  has  pointed  out  that
response-dependent or dispositionalist theories are very often closely related to constructivist
views; indeed, he has suggested that most contemporary constructivists are dispositionalists,
of  some  broad  kind  (2009,  21,  fn.14).  This  makes  some  sense,  because  all  metaethical
approaches have to have a world-involving component at some point – they all have to make
claims about what ethical properties are, however those are construed – and dispositions look
apt to do the job that constructivisms would implicate. Consider: according to constructivism
as I have described it, the core of the view is that subjective responses, constrained solely by
some procedure (as opposed to directly by substantial ideas about content), give rise to the
moral facts38. A disposition-based account of moral facts is then immediately available: they
are dispositions to cause responses in agents whenever those agents' psychology passes some
procedural  test.  Enoch  provides  an  argument  against  views  like  this  that  trades  on  the
procedural nature of the ideal agent that they involve. He questions whether they can provide
38 Street 2010 (364-6) objects to this sort of characterisation that it is better to view constructivisms as holding 
that normative truths arise from a particular sort of perspective, rather than from the application of a 
procedure. However, I don't think this makes any difference to my argument here or throughout the Thesis: 
constructivists have to provide a plausible account of the boundaries of this perspective, and this seems to 
play precisely the same role as a procedure in whittling down the candidates for truth.
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any rationale for idealising – for restricting the set of subjective responses that are valid –
consistently with the motivations with which they begin.
It  is  important  to  note  immediately that  Enoch does  not,  actually,  view his  argument  as
applicable to McDowell (or to David Wiggins' similar thesis). This is because he recognises
that  there  is,  on  McDowell's  account,  no  conceptual  priority,  and  not  necessarily  any
metaphysical dependence, between the level of moral concepts/properties, and the non-moral
levels on which that level supervenes39. He also notes that 'no-priority' views are invulnerable
to the concerns he raises in a later paper, and this time he specifically acknowledges that an
accusation of 'constructivism' would be illegitimate because constructivists take a stand on
the Euthyphro contrast: they hold that normative truth depends on correct human response,
and not the other way around (2009, 21, fn.16). As I put it  above, for constructivists  the
responses 'give rise to' the moral facts; this is not a claim that McDowellian metaethics needs
to make. On the other hand, it will be helpful in explicating McDowell's position to go into
more detail on why, exactly, it is not vulnerable to the sorts of concern that Enoch raises.
Enoch's  argument,  in  summary,  is  that  metaethical  approaches  which  tie  truth  to  the
subjective responses of agents are forced to engage in some idealisation in order to prevent
their  theories  giving  wildly  implausible  results.  Thus,  rather  than  my  responses  now
determining the ethical truth (or some part  thereof), it  would be the response of an ideal
version of me – someone with full information about the non-normative facts, for instance; or
someone who is not motivated by partiality (procedurally construed)40. The problem for these
idealising  projects  is  that  there  is  no  clear  rationale  within  their  starting-points  for  such
39 He claims that the argument could be modified so as to apply to 'no-priority' views too, but gives no 
indication of how this could be done. (Enoch 2005, 765, fn.18)
40 Compare my commentary on Baber's response to the problem of adaptive preferences in Chapter 3 (§1.2).
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idealisation: it rapidly begins to look ad hoc. To put it slightly polemically, it looks as though
the proponents of these views realise that the place they begin is utterly inhospitable to any
decent ethical perspective, and desperately aim to cover up this fact by splashing some stolen
paint on the walls. The most immediate problem is that people who hold that there is no truth
apart from subjective response cannot claim that some responses are better than others in
virtue of  tracking this  independent  truth  (Enoch 2005,  761-5).  In  addition  to  that,  which
Enoch  calls  the  'natural'  answer,  there  are  a  number  of  other  possibilities  for  defending
idealisation here. Enoch goes through these in turn, and shows that they cannot be made to
work for the thinkers he targets; I don't need to follow the rest of his discussion here.
It is worth reflecting again on why, exactly, this challenge cannot work against McDowell.
One of Enoch's claims provides a good clue. He says that “[a]s even the geography of their
texts  shows,  idealizers  start  off  with  actual  responses,  then  patching [sic]  up  extensional
inadequacies by idealizing.” (2005, 769). But, for McDowell's case at least, this would not be
a charitable claim. As it happens, McDowell never actually does the sort of work in which
this tendency might be observable – he would likely regard it as too first-order: a matter for
constructive engagement rather than quietist therapy. But there is a good reason for that, quite
independent of his metaphilosophical stance: from his perspective, such projects make very
little sense. Ethics is sui generis, and the only way to say anything about it is to do it; nothing
can be said from outside.  It  seems more fair,  then,  to see McDowell as holding that the
primary, orienting concept of ethical/political epistemology should be that of the person who
gets things right (otherwise known as the virtuous person)41. This concept, in contrast to those
41 Cf. Zangwill 2003, which argues against many dispositionalist views on the grounds that they radically 
distort moral phenomenology and practice. He notes that this argument doesn't apply to normatively-laden 
accounts of the relevant dispositions – such as McDowell's – but argues that such accounts are vacuous. 
Hopefully I say enough in this Chapter to draw the sting of this criticism. Kawall 2004 provides an 
extensive response to Zangwill here, although it too does not apply to norm-laden accounts.
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of the half-hearted idealisers that are Enoch's main targets, is a concept of a correct-agent,
rather  than  of  an  agent  who  is  arbitrarily  stipulated  to  be  correct,  or  a  metaphysically
independent  correctness  that  just  happens  to  be  realised  by  an  agent42.  The  concept  of
correctness plays an essential role in the individuation of the psychological form in question.
As  a  result,  the  concept  of  moral  correctness  should  be  understood  relationally,  with  a
constitutive connection to  agential  capacities;  likewise,  the concept  of  the virtuous agent
should be understood as constitutively linked to an idea of getting things right. The idealising
projects  that Enoch criticises begin,  as he says,  with an idea of subjective responses and
underlying  psychological  capacities  that  does  not  necessarily implicate  any  concept  of
correctness  at  all.  For  McDowell,  however,  understanding  the  relevant  psychological
capacities as the basis of ethics, and understanding one norm-involving shape that human
psychology can take – the shape of the virtuous agent – go together from the very start.43 The
link to McDowell's take on the rule-following considerations should be clear: here, as there,
the  way  out  of  the  fly-bottle  is  shown  by  refusing  a  theoretical  demand  to  take  up  a
perspective independent  of  that  which is  to  be explained.  Behaviour  governed by ethical
rules, as with linguistic ones, cannot be accurately thought about from outside the form of life
in which those rules figure.
42 This is similar to the 'justificatory practices' rationale that Enoch rejects when offered on behalf of his 
targets. McDowell's account of our implicit justificatory practices is, at the very least, much closer to the 
sort of account that Enoch argues for, however, which suggests that McDowell could use this rationale for 
idealisation where others could not. Cf. Enoch 2005, 777-8, especially fn.38.
43 A second line of response to arguments like Enoch's would note that the connection between beginning on a 
process of discursive thought about an area, and beginning to have in view a normative end-point that can 
be identified with the possession of some more-or-less specific set of agential capacities, may be fully 
general, in line with the sort of considerations that I mentioned in connection with Thornton above. Thus, it 
is not merely ethical engagement that presupposes a constitutive link between making contact with the 
world, and approximating some sort of epistemic agent, it is all worldly engagement per se. If Enoch's 
arguments were to tell against that, it looks like they would prove far too much: they would amount to an 
attack on McDowell-style idealism/realism syntheses themselves. In line with my earlier reticence about 
Thornton's suggestion, however, I don't want to commit to this sort of reply.
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§2 Virtue as a Shapeless Unity
I concluded the last section with a recognition of the thoroughgoing anti-reductive approach
that McDowell takes to the individuation of the perspective with which objectivity and right
relationship to ethical reality are associated: the perspective of virtue. Before I move on to
consider other central elements of McDowellian metaethics in some detail, I need to place
what I've said in the context of a helpful piece of terminology. One way of expressing the
thoroughly  sui  generis nature  of  ethical  terms,  concepts,  properties,  and  anything  which
involves them, is to say that such elements of the world are shapeless44, when viewed from
anywhere outside of ethics itself.
Since I'll occasionally deploy this terminology throughout the rest of the Thesis, it is worth
dwelling on it  briefly,  to clarify what I do – and do not – mean by it.  This is especially
important because most of the work that has been done on this concept, and its proper role in
metaethics (if it  is thought to have one), has taken it to have a different, and often more
radical45,  significance.  For  example,  Pekka  Väyrynen  has  recently  argued  (2014)  that
shapelessness does not entail anything particularly special about ethical terms, concepts, or
properties  per se,  apart  from the untenability of non-revisionary forms of  reductionism46,
because the kinds  of  reductive  theoretical  move which  proponents  of  shapelessness  have
argued are impossible seem to be impossible in very many non-ethical cases too. Väyrynen
44 The term originates from Blackburn 1981, 167. 
45 Roberts 2011, for example, argues that the shapelessness thesis about evaluative concepts, in conjunction 
with the view that thick concepts are irreducible to thin ones (which I am not taking a stand on in this 
thesis), entails a very radical form of particularism; one far more radical than any of McDowell's own work 
would suggest. Cf. the very weak version of particularism described in the next subsection.
46 Strictly speaking, the shapelessness of ordinary/pre-theoretical ethical concepts is compatible with 
revisionary reductionisms like that of Railton (e.g. 1986), as Väyrynen notes (18, fn.32). This is because 
revisionists can, in principle, simply revise the concept until it becomes identical with some pre-existing 
independent concept. Clearly, doing this would violate the motivations behind this entire Thesis: if we allow
metaethicists to revise ethical concepts without regard to extensional adequacy, in principle any first-order 
ethical view (i.e. about justice) could end up being true!
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thus  argues  that  the  failure  of  such  reductionist  programmes  does  not  support  many
significant  positive  metaethical  proposals  (11-19).  I  can  accept  this  argument  without
difficulty, because as a quietist I am unconcerned with justifying the more constructive or
revisionary theories that Väyrynen notes are unsupported by the fact of shapelessness (cf. 19-
21).  To  give  another  example,  Gerald  Lang  has  argued47 that  considerations  about
shapelessness  do  not  effectively support  objectivism about  ethics  over  non-cognitivist  or
error-theoretic rivals, because these views need not suppose that shapelessness is false (2001,
202-4).48 This is similarly irrelevant to my concerns here,  because I am not concerned to
argue against proposals which do not deploy a notion of ethical truth (cf. fn.1 above). For my
purposes in this Chapter, and in the wider Thesis, I do not need to endorse a version of the
shapelessness hypothesis which extends beyond the generalised anti-reductionism on which
I've focussed to this point.
§2.1 Particularism, Cognition, and Affect
As McDowell says, rather than it being the case that we should grasp virtue in terms of a
conceptually-external relation to a conception of right action – understanding the shape of
virtue 'from the outside in' – we can only really understand what it is to be virtuous by being
(however partially) virtuous, and thereby grasping it 'from the inside out' (1998h, 50)49. In this
47 Alex Miller has endorsed the view that McDowell's argument against non-cognitivism is mistargeted on 
similar grounds (2003, 244-56).
48 The clarification of shapelessness as a moderate thesis with exclusively negative (anti-reductive) 
entailments should be viewed as of a piece with the tentative concession, made in fn.36 above, that the 
postulated links between the perspective of virtue and the perspective of objectivity can be viewed as de re, 
concerning properties rather than concepts. As before, this is perfectly sufficient for McDowellian 
metaethics to play the supporting role in the capability approach that I have urged is needed.
49 The requirement that the state of virtue be a fully unified and comprehensive one – which is necessary in 
order for virtue to play the multiple theoretical roles that it does in a view like McDowell's – potentially has 
significant consequences for ethical practice. As Daniel Jacobson (2005) has noted, views which place such 
strong idealising constraints on what can count as an instance of virtue make it unlike most ordinary skills in
most ways, and ensure that individuals will only extremely rarely possess it. In fact, Jacobson is so amazed 
by the difficulty of achieving the sort of skill of virtue that the McDowellian way of thinking involves that 
he expresses doubt that virtue – so conceived – is so much as possible for human beings. It remains unclear 
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section, I shall explore some of the aspects of this orienting idea, dealing at once with the
conjuncture  of  affective  and  cognitive  elements  that  virtue  involves,  and  the  conceptual
particularism which McDowell defends in relation to it. Thus, the subsection engages in two
tasks, both of which are linked to McDowell's general anti-reductionist position. Firstly, I
note that McDowell's view involves conceptualising virtue as an irreducible combination of
cognitive  and  affective  psychological  elements.  This  has  the  major  advantage  of
incorporating  motivation-relevant  elements,  reason-sensitive elements,  and states  (such as
emotional reactions) which intuitively have a role in good ethical thought  and action,  all
within  one unified state50 which  is  individuated with  reference  to  a  norm of  correctness.
Secondly, I bring out McDowell's particularism, as the claim that exceptionless principles (or
even hedged principles51) are not required for ethical thought or practice to be governed by
reason.
McDowell's view of virtue is sentimentalist, in the sense that he thinks of virtue as involving
a shaping of affective capacities, including those that, like the psychological states that are
conventionally labelled 'desires', involve tendencies toward action. However, he also thinks of
the virtuous agent as being disposed towards the formation of appropriate beliefs, and as – at
any  given  time  –  possessing  many  such  beliefs.  This  may  seem  to  be  a  problematic
to me exactly why he thinks this; clearly full virtue is going to be an extraordinarily rare achievement, 
perhaps it is even the case that it has never once been realised in the history of our species. But so long as it 
is not impossible, it still makes sense to place it as a regulative ideal whose interconnections provide a 
framework within which less idealised ethical thinking can take place. Cf. Ch.6, §3. Cf. also Stichter 2007.
50 One of McDowell's most distinctive contributions to Aristotelian moral psychology is his 'silencing' thesis: 
the view that the virtuous person does not face a dilemma between conflicting reasons, but (at the moment 
of decision/judgement) experiences all reasons but one to be 'silenced'. This thesis is problematic, and I do 
not rely on it here. See (1998h, 67-72); (1998i, 90-94); and (1998j, 46-9) for McDowell's development of 
the concept; Christensen 2009 and Stark 2001 for critique.
51 Cf. Lance and Little 2006, 2007a and 2007b; Väyrynen 2007. There is now an enormous and enormously 
complicated literature on particularism, but, if I am right, almost all of it is irrelevant to my Thesis, because 
the essential part is the denial of 'subsumptivism' alone, and that is weak enough to be compatible with 
almost all more general versions of both particularism and its negation ('generalism').
176
combination of claims, because it violates a central tenet of the 'Humean' theory of moral
psychology, which is that desires (/desiderative states more generally) and beliefs (/cognitive
states more generally) are metaphysically 'distinct existences' and can always be pulled apart
from one another52 (Smith 1994, 117-119). McDowell does not need to claim, against this
'Humean' theory, that there are no person-level states like 'belief' and 'desire' that hermetically
isolate cognitive/representational and affective/motivational elements of mind exclusively. He
does not even need to claim that such states play no role in the psychology of ethics. All that
is required is that the psychology of virtue does not (distinctively) involve the possession of
such  isolated  elements,  but  rather  a  unified  person-level  disposition53.  This  disposition
happens to have functional similarities with both general 'Humean' types, but is irreducible to
any sum of tokens of those types. Thus, although it is true that the virtuous have ethical
beliefs (and in many cases it may also make sense to attribute distinctive desires to them too),
there  is  no  reason to  expect  such beliefs  to  conform to  a  psychological  model  that  was
generated independently of ethics54.
Take a particular judgement, the judgement that S is suffering unjustly, and that this suffering
can readily be alleviated by resources at hand. On McDowell's view, the virtuous agent who
comes to form such a judgement will thereby be motivated to alleviate the suffering, without
our needing to postulate an independently intelligible55 desire to do so on their part (1998i,
84-5; cf. Also 1998h, 53-4). For the virtuous, perception that a person is suffering in such
52 This, in turn, is central to the 'Humean theory of motivation'; As David McNaughton puts it: 'The 
combination of belief and desire is required to motivate [an] agent to act. Desires without beliefs are blind; 
beliefs without desires are inert' (1988, 21).
53 Smith concedes (119) that it might be (rationally) a requirement for virtue that an agent have both cognitive 
and desiderative states, so whether or not he can agree with this sentence will depend on what is involved in 
the disposition's being 'unified'.
54 This is McDowell's 'anti-psychologism about psychology'; cf. fn.80 below.
55 That the desire must be independently intelligible is an entailment of the Humean theory: how can X and Y 
be postulated as distinct existences if Y is not even intelligible apart from the understanding of X?
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circumstances is  sufficient  to  explain (and, not coincidentally,  justify)  their  motivation to
alleviate it56. We do not need to (and, plausibly, cannot) identify two independent states that
the virtuous agent happens to have, but which can in principle be possessed separately by
non-virtuous agents. It is this feature which violates the Humean theory. For the Humean, in
this case there must be A) a cognitive state involving the recognition of the suffering (or, for
example, recognising that it would be right to relieve suffering in this case), and B) a separate
desiderative state involving the motivation to alleviate suffering (or, perhaps, to do what is
right). 
Smith's  'Humean'  attack  on  McDowell's  view  ultimately57 involves  the  claim  that  it  is
implausible  that  any  unified  motivationally-relevant  belief-state  could  exist,  because  it
requires that there be beliefs such that (e.g.) an individual can have them at one time, when
their desiderative constitution is virtuous, but must be thought to 'lose' them whenever they
fail to be adequately disposed to act well (1994, 122-4). On the face of it,  this is a good
objection; it does seem outlandish to think that people's abilities to entertain propositional
contents (and so form beliefs about them) can depend in this strict way on whether or not they
have certain motivations. However, this interpretation reflects an uncharitable understanding
of the McDowellian view. Margaret Little provides a nice account of how this is so (1997, 72-
56 This anti-Humean aspect of McDowell's ethical psychology coheres very well with the particularism 
described below. One reason to be sceptical of the Humean postulation of independent desires is that it is 
unclear that there are any independently describable desires of the non-virtuous that can exactly match the 
patterns of motivation that the virtuous have (1998i, 84-5). The affective/motivational responses of the 
virtuous may be uncodifiable, just as the content of ethics itself is.
57 There is a preliminary attack involving the claim that there is a contradiction in the very idea that a unitary 
state could be both belief- and desire-like. Smith claims that cognitive and desiderative states have different 
'directions of fit'; different dispositional profiles. On Smith's favoured dispositional theory of desires, a 
desire is simply a disposition to be motivated towards certain actions in certain circumstances. This would 
not work if the existence of the desire depended on not recognising that its content (what it is a desire for) 
obtains – if so, no-one could desire things that are not the case. However, part of the dispositional profile of 
a belief is a tendency to vanish when presented with evidence that its content does not obtain. (1994, 113-6).
Smith wants to argue that this involves a contradiction. However, this argument is invalid because the anti-
Humean does not have to believe that the functional dispositions are all directed at the same contents. In the 
end, Smith appears to concede this (118). Cf. Little 1997, 70-71.
178
6).  It  is  not charitable  to  view the anti-Humean as holding that  the understanding of the
virtuous is reducible to belief in coarse-grained propositions58 like 'x is suffering unjustly, and
I can help', but then supposing that whether or not such a proposition is cognitively available
to an agent depends upon their  concurrent motivations. Rather, they simply deny that the
cognitive availability (or not) of such propositions is sufficient to capture virtuous cognition59.
Little urges a comparison between virtuous perception and the phenomenon of 'gestalt shifts',
here. If a person who has previously been able to see the image of Marilyn Monroe in a
'Magic Eye' painting later fails to be able to do so, it would not make sense to say that they
ceased to judge (or believe) that the image was there, but it would make equally little sense to
insist that no cognitive change had occurred60 (73). Unless the Humean can provide a unified
account of cognition which refers solely to coarse-grained propositional content, arguments
like Smith's are not cogent.
The most important advantage of the anti-Humean view is that it  is extremely flexible in
principle – any element of human psychology could, if it became plausible, be implicated as
part of virtue61. In particular, this allows affective change (or difference) to have an intrinsic
role in epistemic improvement (or superiority)62. As McDowell puts it: 'one might ask why a
58 Little's formulation may be too strong at times. She holds that McDowell-type views think of the cognition 
of the virtuous as (distinctively) not susceptible to capture in propositional terms at all. This seems 
unwarranted – all that is required is that it not be susceptible to complete capture using only those coarse-
grained contents that are, intuitively, cognitively accessible by most agents most of the time.
59 Compare, here, the disjunctivist claim that the content of experience differs between veridical and non-
veridical cases. See §1.1 above.
60 Cf. Wittgenstein 2001, Part II, §xi.
61 There are two other important advantages. Firstly, as (e.g.) Schroeder 2005 notes, 'Humean' theories of 
motivation may provide support for Humean theories of reasons, which are species of proceduralism, with 
all its attendant tendencies towards extensional inadequacy (i.e. revisionism). McDowell-style anti-
psychologism avoids such threats. A second threat that psychologism generates is a pressure towards non-
cognitivism. The 'Moral Problem' of Smith (1994) can be resolved by denying cognitivism (12), and an 
assertion of the Humean account is part of its constituent inconsistent triad.
62 Cf. McDowell 2009b, 50-1, which is especially clear about the ineradicable role of affective development in
the formation of virtue. For McDowell's Aristotle, 'the content of the intellectual state [which is united by 
cognizance of the good] is formed by moulding the orektikon [the desiderative part of the soul]' (51). Cf. 
also Nussbaum 1986, 307-17, esp.307-9; Nussbaum 1990b, 75-82.
179
training of the feelings (as long as the notion of feeling is comprehensive enough) cannot be
the  cultivation  of  an  ability...to  spot...the  fitnesses  of  things'  (1998e,  147)63.  After  I've
described McDowell's second major contribution to moral psychology,  I'll  return to place
these benefits in the wider context of feminist moral epistemology.
The second area of moral psychology where McDowell has made a relevant contribution
concerns ethical particularism. The core of McDowell's version of particularism is the denial
of a thesis that has since (e.g. Audi 2008) been called 'subsumptivism'64. This is the thesis
that, in order for an ethical judgement to be genuinely governed by reason, it must involve the
subsumption of a particular case under a general ethical law. For example, the judgement that
a  policy  is  unjust  because  it  violates  dignity  (by,  say,  precluding  the  capability  for
reproductive health65) will only be fully governed by reason if 'dignity' and 'the capability for
reproductive health', and the bundle of attributions of ethical valence denoted by 'unjust', can
all be spelled out in a way that avoids reference to the particularities of the situation that the
judgement is about. The primary interest of such a thesis, for my purposes at least, is that if it
is  true  there  must  necessarily  be  something  wrong,  epistemically  speaking66,  with  any
63 As Jeremy Randell-Koons notes in his 2003, his arguments against response-dependence theories – which 
argue that they lead to a problematic relativism, and which take aim especially at those with an affective 
component – cannot be straightforwardly aimed at McDowell, because his view is non-reductive. He does 
suggest that because there is no readily-identifiable moral emotion (or set thereof), it is difficult to see how 
to arrive at an account of the affect-laden response implicated by the 'basic equation' for ethical goodness 
(see §1.4 above). However, this is not particularly convincing, because we can moralise the relevant 
emotions – rather than speaking of anger, we can speak of 'justified anger', and so on. This will make the 
relevant components of the theory circular (if it wasn't that already), but, as elsewhere, it isn't clear why 
quietists should be very concerned about that. Compare D'Arms and Jacobson 2000, 729-32 on this point. 
Cf. also fn.27 above.
64 On my proposal, the denial of subsumptivism is compatible with there being, metaphysically speaking, 
many worldly features that always have the same ethical import no matter the context in which they occur. 
More radical particularisms, such as that of Jonathan Dancy (2004, inter alia) have denied that there are any
such features.
65 Again, see Appendix A.
66 Possibly, a subsumptivist could hold that non-subsuming judgements are acceptable because they have 
heuristic value in everyday cases, even though they are necessarily imperfect. (Likewise the anti-
subsumptivist could agree that, even where a judgement involving subsumption is actually incorrect 
(because there happens to be no such law), making judgements with reference to laws might have heuristic 
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judgement that does not have this structure. This would be unfortunate, because the lack of
such a structure is, arguably at least, typical of most of the judgements that feminists and
(especially) Aristotle-inspired philosophers have identified as being essential to good ethical
practice. In particular, it may threaten the epistemological stance I've defended, on which a
person  may  be  (relevantly)  virtuous  and  (relevantly)  possess  objectivity  in  making  a
judgement even when there is no more general (more abstract, more 'independent') law that
they are relying on in doing so. I have advertised this sort of flexibility as an advantage! So,
the claim that McDowell defends is this: the concepts deployed in the judgements of the
virtuous need not be susceptible to capture in statements of universal law67. Virtue can be a
kind of rationality even if subsumptivism is not true of it.
At the most basic level,  these sort  of claims should be read simply as reiterations of the
message  that  McDowell  identifies  as  flowing from the  rule-following considerations:  we
cannot  understand  either  the  worldly  extension  generated  by  a  rule,  or  the  personal
disposition associated with a grasp of its intension, without understanding the rule itself from
the inside. So, if there is no procedure for correct ethical judgement which could be given and
understood independently of virtue (if the relevant rules are not rails), it follows that there is
no need for ethical generalities; agents already have to be engaging creatively with the world
for ethics to exist (as a sui generis domain) at all (1998h, 57-65). The result is that the truth
about ethics need not be  codifiable; it need not be susceptible to being written down, such
that the rules expressed in such writing are understandable (and, so, applicable) by anyone
other than the virtuous themselves. In turn, this means that subsumptivism must be false, as a
value.) Although subsumptivism, as I understand it, is a claim about ethical concepts and their role in 
judgement (as is, therefore, its denial) it has epistemic consequences; if a judgement is not conceptually 
well-formed, it can hardly be the bearer of truth or justification.
67 Cf. Nussbaum 1990b, 66-75
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universal  thesis  about  the  nature  of  ethical  judgement:  there  may  be  some  knowledge-
involving, reason-governed judgements which do not involve the subsumption of a particular
case under a law that outstrips it in generality. (66-9). This message is technically compatible
with  the  truth  about  ethics  being  extraordinarily  simple,  along  the  lines  of  total  act
utilitarianism,  for  example68.  On  one  hand,  if  virtue  really  were  that  simple  or  easy  to
instantiate, emphasising its  sui genereity would have relatively little point; it would be very
hard to make a practical mistake on the basis of a reductionist proposal in such a world,
because  the  truth  could  be  communicated  very  easily.  However,  it  becomes  far  more
important to emphasise the truth in particularism when – as seems to be the case – the truth of
ethics is enormously complicated, and the epistemic (and, connectedly, practical) value of
simple, abstract ethical theorising is relatively low.
The largest benefit of both of these elements – particularism and the anti-Humean proposal,
apart from their flexibility,  is that they provide nice links to central feminist work on moral
psychology. I'll highlight two, as described by Jaggar (1989), and Little (1995) respectively.
Firstly,  Jaggar  (amongst  other  feminists)  has  identified  numerous  ways  in  which  the
devaluation of emotional responses have served to disadvantage women as contributors to
ethical  thought  and  debate,  given  the  conventional  association  of  femininity  with  the
dominance of emotion over (supposedly dispassionate) reason (Jaggar 1989, 163-5). In turn,
the illusion of dispassionate reason occludes the possibilities for social change by disparaging
the 'outlaw emotions' that might otherwise draw attention to serious injustices such as sexual
harassment; encouraging the identification and articulation of outlaw emotions will then be
an  effective  way to  increase  knowledge  of  such  problems  (165-9).  Secondly,  as  well  as
68 Cf. McKeever and Ridge 2005, 88-89, on the implications of 'anti-transcendental particularism'.
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adding detail to many of Jaggar's emphases (1995, 117-121), Little supplies reason to think
that affect-laden awareness, especially that paradigmatic of care, is especially reliable as a
path to ethical knowledge. Caring about a person as an individual focuses critical attention on
them, noting complex similarities and differences between their situation and those that the
carer has previously encountered, and being more willing to relax general assumptions that
have been operative.  Little argues that an impersonal,  dispassionate investigation of their
situation is unlikely to be as epistemically reliable (122-5)69. As well as providing support for
the  McDowellian  approach  I've  outlined,  these  links  help  to  illuminate  further  the  deep
congruence  between  that  approach  and  the  sort  of  epistemological  orientation  that  even
strong critics of Nussbaum's justification for her capability theory favour.
I conclude that McDowell's version of particularism is compatible with even very simple and
general principles being true, so long as they are judged so from the perspective of virtue, and
not pretended to have a source independent of it. If there is a sound ethical argument for the
existence of a generality, that can be accommodated. Such arguments communicate existing
ethical understanding, which –  although it cannot be reduced to any independent law – may
be expressible using nomological language. Here, as well as with regard to the question of the
cognitive/desiderative  make-up  of  ethical  psychology,  McDowell's  view  turns  out  to  be
precisely as flexible as we require.
§2.2 Reasons Internalism as a form of Proceduralism
In  this  section  I  turn  to  a  possible  argument  against  the  McDowellian  approach.  The
universalism to which I am committed involves the claim that a wide range of agents (all
69 Cf. Khader 2011, which reapplies these ideas to the topic of a just, accurate approach to the identification of 
needs in global development practice.
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humans, in fact) have certain practical reasons (the reasons of global justice), without giving
any argument  to the effect  that  this  universal  scope follows from anything about  purely-
descriptive  human  psychology.  The  tradition  of  'reasons  internalism',  represented  most
importantly by Bernard Williams, opposes this sort of proposal. This is of especial relevance
to  my argument  because  the  kinds  of  consideration  that  are  given in  support  of  reasons
internalism  also  appear  to  favour  a  proceduralist  approach  to  ethical  epistemology,  of
precisely the kind I've rejected since Chapter 2. However, rather than explicitly discussing the
possible ways in which internalist intuitions might motivate proceduralism, my strategy here
will be to remove the threat by giving an argument for a reasons externalist stance. In this
section, then, I explicate a McDowell-inspired response to reasons internalism, and bring out
some respects in which it  coheres  with claims I  make elsewhere,  especially the claim of
feminist  social  epistemology  that  differently-situated  individuals  may  need  to  rely  on
transformative engagement with others to inform them about the right thing for them to do.
Reasons internalism70 (following Setiya 2012) is the view that
The fact that p is a reason for A to Φ only if A is capable of being moved to Φ by the 
belief that p. (4)
There  are  potentially  many  different  reasons  for  a  McDowell-type  metaethicist  to  be
suspicious of internalism. But the one I'll concentrate on and aim to preserve in the rest of this
subsection can be called the 'eudaimonic motivation'. The basic thought here is that there is a
strong connection between the good for someone and what they have reason to do71. Some
70 It is important to note that this model of internalism, which is inspired by Bernard Williams' founding paper 
'Internal and External Reasons' (2012), differs significantly from certain others. In particular, as Setiya notes
(2012, 14-15), it differs from Michael Smith's comparably influential interpretation (in his 1995 and 
elsewhere). Cf. also McDowell 2006. On a view like Smith's, the theses about reasons I eventually endorse 
in this section might be internalistic after all. I can't explore this in detail here.
71 Arguably, this corresponds to thinking of reasons in the way Setiya identifies in this passage: “Finally, 
normative or 'good' reasons might be thought of as grounds on which it would be good to act: good things to
have among one’ s reasons for acting; reasons that conform to relevant norms.” (11).
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possible reductive views, such as the vaguely Humean assimilation of goodness-for to what
satisfies desires, can preserve this connection. A development from a constructivist reading of
Kant, according to which there are universal and purely formal constraints on the human will
that determine both what reasons there are and what the good is, might also do so72. But, if
I've been correct in concluding that no such procedural/reductive proposal can be made to
work, these will not be satisfying ways of maintaining the thought. The natural alternative,
given  the  Aristotelian  resonance  of  most  of  my  claims  so  far,  would  be  a  view  which
associates what individuals have reason to do with the deliverances of the perspective of
virtue – which connects  to  the good in being essential  both to  its  recognition  and to  its
realisation  in  a  life.  The  problem,  simply,  for  reasons  internalism,  is  then  that  people
frequently do not seem to be in a position to be motivated by the facts about their good; virtue
is  relatively  remote  from  them,  and  so,  if  internalism  were  true,  the  attractions  of  the
eudaimonic motivation would be lost.
It is worth noting explicitly that my argument at this point, in defending a sort of reasons
externalism, is not dissimilar to what I've said against other varieties of proceduralism earlier
in  the  Thesis73.  The  thought  is  that  just  as  there  are  structural  similarities  between
proceduralism about well-being (i.e. preferentism), and proceduralism about ethical-epistemic
justification (i.e. the constructivism that Jaggar implicates), there are similar links between
the latter (justificatory) proceduralism and a sort of proceduralism about reasons. In other
72 I am not concerned with realist interpretations of Kant here; these may well be immune to (many of) the 
criticisms I've raised of proceduralist approaches. See e.g. Langton (2007) for one defence of the realist 
reading.
73 I could potentially put this more strongly: if a generally-applicable buck-passing view is true (about the 
good, about the right, or whatever), then forms of reasons internalism will actually be equivalent to forms of
proceduralism about the areas for which we should pass the buck (well-being, right action, etc.). So, for 
example, if the simple Humean theory of reasons were correct, and all reasons were entirely grounded in 
desires, and we should pass the buck when thinking about well-being, it would follow that things will only 
be good for a person to the extent that they desire them – which is a classic, if wildly implausible, form of 
proceduralism about well-being. See Scanlon 1998, chapters 2 and 3, for the canonical buck-passing story.
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words,  the  necessity  of  incorporating  a  species  of  externalism in  ethical  epistemology –
through recognising  that  virtue  cannot  be  individuated  without  consideration  of  external-
world relations – is mirrored in the necessity of incorporating a form of externalism into our
theory of reasons. Recognition of these necessities requires rejecting the relevant varieties of
proceduralism. The lesson is much the same throughout: no adequate normative approach – to
well-being or the human good, to right action, to methodology, or to reasons – can be picked
out  using  internalistic  (or,  which  may  be  the  same  thing,  reductively  'psychologistic')
materials alone.
However,  the most straightforward proposal about reasons that we can generate from the
McDowellian position is fatally flawed. The eudaimonic motivation points us to the thought
that the reasons a person has are generated by goods intrinsic to the situation in which she
acts virtuously. However, this has implausible implications for most of the quotidian, non-
ideal cases with which we should be concerned. This is because,  prima facie, the reasons
someone has if they are 'well-informed and well-disposed' will differ from those they will
have if they are massively ignorant, lacking in an essential skill, or suffering from a deep-
seated vice or irrationality (Williams 1995b, 189-91). A different way of putting this is to say
that the straightforward proposal – which would say that the reasons someone has in a case
are those they would be motivated by if they were virtuous – commits the conditional fallacy.
Although it is true that a subject S would have reason to act virtuously if she were virtuous, it
does not follow that S has reason to act virtuously given that she is not  virtuous. This may
appear to have the extremely unpalatable consequence of precluding the satisfaction of the
eudaimonic motivation.
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I  think  that  the  solution  to  this  –  avoiding the  conditional  fallacy while  maintaining  the
eudaimonic  motivation  –  is  to  identify  a  division  between  two  largely-separate  sorts  of
reason. Rather than try to transplant the reasons of the virtuous into the lives of the non-
virtuous, we should accept that, although – because of the connection between virtue and the
human good – all humans have reason in a broad and holistic sense to act virtuously, there is
a different, equally important sense of 'reason' on which non-virtuous people usually have
reason to act apart from virtue74. What a person has reason to do in a way that relates to the
immediate context of deliberation may differ from what they have reason to do in general, in
virtue of their good; if the situation is dire enough, the best someone can do is act badly.
According to this model:
S has 'D-reason' to Ф in C iff S* would want S to Ф in C (where S* is S's closest fully 
virtuous counterpart).75 
and also
S has 'V-reason' to Ф in C iff S* would Ф in C.
The 'D-reason' formulation is inspired by the 'advice model' approach pioneered by Michael
Smith (1995) and taken up by many others in the years since76. This two-part account does
not commit the conditional fallacy, since the D-reasons that someone has are not proposed to
74 At this point, and throughout this section, I am talking about reasons as overall, all-things-considered 
reasons, rather than pro tanto or otherwise partial considerations. This helps to highlight the difficulties that 
I deal with here, but much of what I say would apply (mutatis mutandis) to e.g. pro tanto reasons too.
75 Robert Johnson argues that advice models like this fail to preserve the motivations for reasons internalism, 
precisely because they posit a connection to the desires of S' idealised counterpart about S's actions, which 
are not first-personal desires to act at all. Thus, the advice-theoretic connection cannot guarantee that S's 
reasons will be capable of explaining her actions. (1997, 621-5). Of course, this is not a problem for me, 
because I am not committed to internalism. (As a result, it is likely that my proposal will not be able to 
incorporate all its alleged benefits.)
76 Cf. Kawall 2014 (136-40), and the proposals discussed therein, for an alternative way of including both a 
virtuous-advice element and a direct virtue-replication element in thinking about different parts of practical 
rationality. Cf. also Svensson 2010, which poses important questions about the connection between virtue 
and right action, to which Kawall's view responds (2014, 140). My view is immune to Svensson's main 
argument, because the distinctions I've drawn generate two conceptions of 'right action' ('D-rightness' and 
'V-rightness'), and these can be used to accommodate his worries. Unfortunately, I do not have space to 
examine the details here.
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be identical to their V-reasons, except in the exceptional case where they are virtuous77.
V-reasons, as the eudaimonic motivation suggests, are reasons to act well; to realise the goods
of virtue in one's own life. Contrastingly, D-reasons can be better understood as reasons to do
the best I can78; these will, indeed, be identical to the reasons that my virtuous counterpart
would want me to act on, since my virtuous counterpart would take my non-ideal constitution
and circumstances (the things which prevent me from achieving my full good) into account.
However, everyone has the reasons of virtue, regardless of the difficulties that their non-ideal
situation throws up. In this way, a variant of Smith's 'advice model' can be made compatible
with the Eudaimonic motivation, and thus with the idea that everybody has reason to live a
good life, in some holistic sense, regardless of how distant from virtue they might be.
One option here is to build all motivational inadequacies into the set of barriers to virtue that
generates the gap between V- and D-reasons. This would mean that no-one ever has D-reason
to do something that they are not inclined to do because of their vicious motivations, and
would immediately make the relevant conception of D-reasons internalistic in Setiya's sense.
This does not seem plausible, however. To see this, it is necessary to look a little more deeply
at McDowell's specific rationales for disagreeing with Williams' original (2012) version of
internalism. This can be seen best in the following passage:
[T]o believe an external reason statement [on McDowell's construal] is... to believe 
that if the agent deliberated correctly, he would be motivated... in the direction in  
which the reason points. But there is no implication, as in Williams’ argument, that 
there must be a deliberative or rational procedure that would lead anyone from not  
77 Thus, the situation of virtue can be characterised – in addition to the characteristic features I've already 
noted – as that situation in which D-reasons and V-reasons are identical.
78 In Ch.6, I bring out a further connection here between the Eudaimonic motivation for an independent, 
largely non-action-guiding conception of V-reasons, and the controversy within political and social theory 
about the relevance of ideal-theoretic norms to non-ideal circumstances, which I discuss there in relation to 
the work of Lisa Tessman. See Ch.6 §3.
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being so motivated to being so motivated. On the contrary, the transition to being so 
motivated is a transition  to  deliberating correctly, not one effected  by  deliberating  
correctly;  effecting  the  transition  may need  some non-rational  alteration  such as  
conversion. (McDowell 1998k, 106-7)
McDowell's  point  here  partly  has  to  do  with  the  recognition  of  a  distinction  between
procedural  rationality  (conformity  to  the  canons  of  logical  inference,  for  example)  and
substantive correctness in practical reasoning (which involves the application of standards
which are irreducible to any independent procedure). This is essentially a restatement of the
anti-reductionist stance which has been my emphasis throughout this Chapter. If becoming
virtuous (which everyone has reason to be) involves internalising irreducible rules, there will
be no independently-specifiable set of patterns against which candidates could be compared
which would provide an adequate test for the status of a consideration as a genuine reason.
And, if virtue involves the formation of affective capacities, then the affective constitution of
the virtuous will  be equally shapeless79.  It  is  thus implausible  that  there are  any 'neutral'
psychological states – individuated apart from the deployment of ethical concepts – which
would be of essential ethical relevance as generators of reasons (even once narrowed down
by  procedural  constraints).80 However,  it  may  seem  that  the  erection  of  the  distinction
between D- and V-reasons does enough work to alleviate any worries here. This would leave
it open for us to place all failures of motivational (e.g. affective) adequacy into the set of
barriers  that  generates  a  gap  between  D-  and  V-reasons.  Thus,  in  every  case  where  an
individual (in a given context of deliberation) had a motivational inadequacy (was viciously
selfish, say, in failing to care properly about the needs of others), this would ensure that the
individual did not have D-reason to do the virtuous (e.g. non-selfish) thing.
79 Another passage from 'Might There be External Reasons?' is similarly illuminating: 'from certain starting-
points there [may be] no [procedurally] rational route...that would take someone to being as if he had been 
properly brought up. (Being properly brought up is not itself a [procedurally] rational route into being that 
way.)' (1998k, 102).
80 In this way, the rejection of (for example) the restrictive Humean conception of desires as reason-giving 
states is founded in McDowell's general 'anti-psychologism about psychology'; cf. 1998f (331). 
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This  is  not  so,  however.  McDowell's  response  also  includes  the  thought  that  Williams'
conclusion 'depends crucially on the premise that a transition to a correct view of the reasons
for  acting  that  apply  to  an  agent...must  be  capable  of  being  effected,  for  the  agent,  by
reasoning' (111). The motivation for the division between D- and V- reasons is not that there
is some special privilege that motivation-preserving ('procedurally rational') reasoning has,
which we should preserve by restricting D-reasons in line with it. Rather, the motivation for
the distinction is to avoid conditional fallacies by ensuring that we do not assume that there
are no genuine barriers to virtuous action in the relevant agent's context of deliberation. This
would only amount to an incorporation of the internalist's fetish for procedural rationality if
all of the motivational inadequacies which make virtue impossible (in the relevant context)
were unalterable tout court, rather than merely unalterable by coming to understand a piece of
procedurally rational  argument81.  As McDowell implies,  this  is  implausible:  sometimes,  a
person can be brought to recognise the salience of a consideration by  altering their (e.g.)
affective constitution in a way that (ex hypothesi) cannot fail to be procedurally arational.
Given this, the difference between the McDowell-inspired approach to reasons I've sketched
here and Setiya's 'reasons internalism' does not merely lie in the postulation of V-reasons –
almost all of which are likely to be 'external', at least relative to some agents – but also in that
many D-reasons will fail to fit within the internalistic mould as well.
This suggests a connection to some of the central points of the previous Chapter. There (§3) I
noted that there are good reasons, flowing from work in feminist social epistemology, to think
that ethical objectivity is likely to require transformative engagement with others, particularly
81 Cf. esp. McDowell 2009b.
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in highly non-ideal circumstances. For example, against a background of serious epistemic
injustice it is especially likely to be necessary to listen sympathetically to the vivid narratives
of  those  in  other  social/cultural  locations,  in  order  to  enable  emotional  engagement  to
overflow the  barriers  to  understanding  that  unjust  marginalisation  has  erected.  There  are
likely to be cases of this type in which the affective-dispositional distance between agents is
not so great as to preclude better action per se, but is great enough that communication of the
grounds for better action will not be able to draw on affective similarity to a sufficient extent
to  count  as  procedurally  rational.  Dealing  adequately  with  this  sort  of  case  will  require
externalism about D-reasons, in addition to that about V-reasons.
§2.2.1 Excursus: On the Barriers to Virtue
I have just argued that the set of barriers to virtue82 – that which causes D-reasons to diverge
from the reasons of virtue proper – does not include all inadequate motivational dispositions.
In this subsection, I shall give some examples of the sort of thing that probably  should  be
included, and note some further connections to feminist epistemological ideas along the way.
Of course, I do not pretend that this is a comprehensive list, only an indicative one.
Firstly,  some individuals may lack skills  that would be required to act well  in a context.
Familiarly,  for  example,  someone  might  lack  the  ability  to  recognise  the  contours  of  a
relatively alien cultural practice, with the result that they are not capable of treating people
respectfully within that practice. Because such skills take significant amounts of time and
82 What I say about the distance between D- and V- reasons in non-ideal circumstances does not entail that 
one's conception of virtue and its constituent goods never has any direct effect on what people should do 
when virtue itself is unavailable to them. It is at least likely that reflection on the goods of the virtuous life 
should inform one's general sense of one's own life – regretting and expressing regret about some things, for
example, and imaginatively discussing with others how our situations or ourselves could become more 
amenable to fully virtuous agency. See Ch.6, §3 on this point.
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effort to develop, the lack of them may render virtue impossible within the immediate context
of deliberation and action. Secondly, there are persistent psychological flaws such as phobias,
delusions, and biases. Especially when opaque to introspection, or immune to interruption by
conscious effort, these are likely to function as barriers to virtuous agency which cannot be
(fully) overcome either by individual reasoning or by transformative engagement by others
within the deliberative moment. Finally, there are traditional vices, such as selfishness, greed,
envy, and resentment. If these are sufficiently well-established, neither procedurally-rational
argument nor proselytical intervention may be adequate to disrupt them, and enable action
from virtue instead.
These examples help to illustrate the category of barriers to virtue that I think important for
clarifying an acceptable theory of reasons, and preserving both the eudaimonic motivation
and the demand for guidance in non-ideal contexts. I shall now show how they shed light on
the broader theoretical context as well. Building on my discussion in the previous Chapter
(§3), there is a dilemma for virtue-centred feminist epistemologies between treating virtue as
a socially dependent trait, in the sense that no-one can be virtuous unless their social context
is constructed such as to enable excellent action, and treating virtue as a fully  social trait,
with its locus at some level higher than the individual agent. These reflections on reasons and
the barriers to virtue shed more light on these alternative options, in a way that I believe
ultimately favours the former. 
Firstly, take the absence of skill. In some cases, it might be possible for the social context to
'compensate' for this by providing information (relevant to the pursuit of the good) which the
skill would have made available if properly developed. On the individual-centred approach,
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the fact that  the information is  provided need not be a  sign that  virtue is  realised in the
situation, because although the individual may do what they should have done83, they did not
do it from virtue. On the group-based approach, it is less obvious that there is anything bad
about this case. Here, which approach seems better justified will depend on whether it is truly
the skill that is necessary for excellent action, or only the information that the skill is needed
to impart. If the latter, the group-based approach seems perfectly accurate. But if the original
description was correct, and the skill itself is a constituent of good action, the individual-
centred  viewpoint  is  superior.  Secondly,  take  a  standard  implicit  racist  bias.  Here,  other
individuals may be able to overrule biased decisions, or alter the context of deliberation by,
for example, anonymising candidates for a position. In this case it seems clearer that, even if
the alterations prevent seriously harmful action by the agent, virtue is still not present, and the
agent does not truly act well; clearly, this favours the individual-centred approach. The final
sort of case, on the other hand, seems inconclusive, because – given that we are ruling out the
possibility of affectively transformative interventions – the social context is unlikely to be
able to compensate for serious vice in a way that might even appear to maintain virtue at the
group level. Neither approach to the issue of location would argue that virtue is present in this
sort of case, then.
The  differences  between  these  approaches  to  virtue  are  significant  in  two  ways.  Firstly,
because the  move up to the social  level might  have weakened the case for the division
between D- and V-reasons, by making room for argument that excellent agency is not out of
reach after all, so long as such agency is located at a level which includes multiple individual
agents. However, I hope I have done enough to suggest that such a move is not very plausible
83 That is, perform the right sort of act, where act-types are individuated independently of their etiology 
(insofar as that is possible).
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– social context is important for the identification (and cultivation) of virtue, but the locus of
virtue is still the individual agent. Secondly, because the usefulness of looking to the social
context illuminates the worth of the virtuous advice model. In many non-ideal cases, there is
an extent to which other individuals can function as (probably partial) proxies for the virtuous
version of the agent,  and thereby help them to act better  than they otherwise might.  The
ultimate advantage of this bifurcated perspective on reasons is that it makes proper sense of
improvements such as these without pretending that they could amount to genuinely good
agency.
§2.2.2 Defending the Divide: Alienation and Blame
If what I've said is correct, then Setiya's 'reasons internalism' is probably false, even when
formulated narrowly about D-reasons. In the remainder of this subsection, I shall return to
consider how this thesis can be defended against Williams' later criticisms84. In so doing, I
shall also provide a more detailed sense of the different roles of D- and V- reasons in ethical
thought and practice.
I've postulated two kinds of reasons: D-reasons, whose function is to enjoin someone to do
the best they can, and V-reasons, whose function is to enjoin people to act well. Technically,
whether or not this model amounts to a denial of Setiya-style internalism turns on whether
there is always a path from the actual situation of S to the situation of S's virtuous counterpart
that is sufficiently85 motivation-preserving. As I've argued, it seems likely – although it is an
84 Of course, there are many other, often more subtle criticisms which would apply to my claims but which I 
do not have space to consider here. I have in mind especially the non-Humean defence of reasons 
internalism given in Markovits 2011, responding to which would require a quite different argument than the 
one I've given here.
85 There is significant room for argument about (e.g.) how long temporally or in number of steps such a path 
can be while remaining consistent with the motivations for internalism, and this 'sufficiently' qualifier stands
in for a solution to this area of dispute. Clearly, I cannot provide such a solution here.
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empirical question whose answer is not entirely obvious – that there are very many V-reasons,
and even some D-reasons, which would be 'external' in this sense. If so, it appears that I am
resolutely opposed to Williams and his many defenders regarding this theoretical point. It is
thus worth reflecting again, in concluding my discussion of this issue, on Williams' original
response to McDowell, only part of which turned on the problem of the conditional fallacy.
Williams' other counterarguments are twofold. The first concerns the prospect of alienation,
the second concerns blameworthiness. 
My discussion of the alienation question will be relatively brief. As I have already said, in
discussing the accusation of alienation that may be an undercurrent in Jaggar's normative
critique of Nussbaum-style methodology (Ch.3 §2.1.1), it is both clear that I have little space
to discuss first-order ethical issues here, and equally clear that the issue of alienation is a
difficult and substantive one; it cannot be taken for granted that alienation is unproblematic,
but it equally cannot be taken for granted that causing alienation will always be unjust (or
impermissible, or inappropriate in other ways). Perhaps some alienation is a price which must
be paid for a more just world; perhaps inducing alienation is sometimes no harm at all. On the
other  hand,  it  may seem more damaging to  raise  the spectre  of  serious alienation in  the
context of claims about reasons. Williams' version of this point (1995b, 191-2), updated for
my purposes, would turn on the idea that if the link between the D-situated individual and her
would-be virtuous counterpart  is  too attenuated,  suggesting that  she ought  (in  any sense,
however distanced from her immediate non-ideal choice situation) to act virtuously amounts
to  suggesting  that  she  become  someone  else.  In  the  most  extreme  case,  this  might  be
suggested to amount to a kind of psychic suicide. However, this argument would involve
reading quite a lot into Williams' text. All Williams really says to suggest a sense of alienation
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is the following:
the fact that [Φing] can be a worthwhile activity surely does not give everyone a  
reason to engage in it... from both an ethical and a psychological point of view, it is 
important that [a reasons claim] should say something special about [its target], and 
not  merely  invoke  in  connection  with  him  some  general  normative  judgement.  
(1995b, 191-2)
There are two elements here. Firstly, Williams implies that there cannot be any reasons which
would hold, not due to anything 'special' about their target, because they are simply universal
in  scope,  being anchored in the good rather than the vagaries of desire86.  Clearly,  this  is
brutely question-begging, and I need not respond to it  seriously.  However,  the claim that
vague truths about general 'worthiness' do not immediately entail a reason for every person is
plausible. Nevertheless, if any particular universalistic account (e.g. of dignity) is compelling
in its own right, this will provide for more than this ambiguous idea of worthiness. I suggest,
then, that we can sensibly pass the buck for a defence against this sort of internalistic attack
to whatever can be said in favour of the idea that some reasons (e.g. of justice) are genuinely
reasons for all  humans,  which I shall  say more about in the next Chapter (and finally in
Chapter 6).
The second issue is more involved, but is also more suggestive of ways to develop the D-/V-
reasons contrast  I've identified.  It  centres on Williams'  claim that  the role  of blame as a
reactive  attitude  (Strawson  1962)  cannot  be  properly  made  sense  of  by  non-internalist
theories of reasons. For Williams, there are three types of cases, all of which involve what he
calls 'focussed blame', which is blame directed at another with reference to something they
ought to have done (or not done); as he notes, just as there is a connection between 'ought'
86 Williams immediately goes on to consider an Aristotelian naturalist basis for linking general considerations 
with individuals, but the version of such a view that I propose in the next Chapter would be unsuitable by 
his lights. It does not (unlike the view he considers (1995b, 192)) involve any claim that humans (qua 
human) are capable of the good life in a way which would entail the presence of the necessary 'internal' 
motivational materials.
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and 'can', there seems to be a connection between 'ought to have' and 'could have'. He also
thinks that 'ought to have done' is connected to 'had reason to, but did not' (1995a, 40-41). In
the first, 'easy' case, an agent is blamed for  Φing, where they had internal reason to not-Φ.
Here, the propriety of blame is supposed to be clear, since blame may bring to the agents'
awareness the considerations which would have lead them not to Φ, had they deliberated
(procedurally) correctly (41). In the second sort of case, an agent is blamed for Φing, but they
did not have an internal reason87 to not-Φ. However, their motivations happen to be such that
the very fact of having been blamed (e.g. by a person who they respect) will transform their
motivational constitution so that they gain an internal reason that they did not have before.
Thus, proleptically, the presence of an internal reason to not-Φ is ensured, and the propriety
of blame is, again, clear. (41-3). In the third sort of case, however, an agent is blamed where
there is no internal reason to not-Φ, and also no prospect of proleptically bringing about such
a reason. In a 'hard' case like this, Williams states that blame is 'inappropriate', because it
would make no sense to blame someone for something which they could not be brought to
recognise was not well-supported by reasons (43).
In responding to Williams88, I should immediately concede that V-reasons should probably be
be disconnected from blame. Williams is probably right that blame is essentially aimed at
influencing those who have done something that they should have not (and thus could have
not, within the relevant deliberative context) done. If a deliberative context is such that the
87 At least, not an 'all-things-considered' internal reason.
88 Miranda Fricker has recently proposed a structurally similar – if significantly improved in detail – account 
of blame (2014). Her most important innovation for my purposes is the suggestion that the induction of 
'remorse', as a self-directed reactive attitude to one's wrongdoing, is the constitutive aim of blaming. (On her
account, blame is essentially a communicative practice). This is consonant with what I shall suggest in 
Chapter 6: that claims about V-reasons are aimed at the different, and somewhat (phenomenologically) 
weaker, attitude of regret. I believe that her account is a good one to capture one practical role of D-reasons,
at least as long as it manages to avoid the first critique below. I suspect, however, that it will be vulnerable 
to the second, fetishism-based critique, and would need to be revised accordingly.
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virtuous action is unavailable to the agent – or (technically) available to them, but such that
they are exculpated from doing it (typically, because it would involve overwhelming costs) –
then they cannot meaningfully be blamed for their failure of virtue. This makes it easy to
meet his challenge of explaining how external reasons are connected to the appropriateness
(or inappropriateness) of blame. This is because the inappropriateness of blame in 'hard' cases
will, on my view, line up with a lack of (D-)reason to Ф, just as it will for Williams. What is
more, the appropriateness of blame in both 'easy' and proleptic cases can be explained in the
same way: in both cases, it is appropriate to blame because blame stands a chance of inducing
someone to recognise the reasons they had to act other than they did. However, building a
positive case for externalism about D-reasons may now seem more difficult. I have resisted
internalism  about  D-reasons  on  the  ground  that  transformative  engagement  can  alter
motivational dispositions in a clearly reason-promoting way, and internalism neglects this.
However, the proleptic mechanism that Williams identifies might seem to do the same job as
such transformative engagement. There are two critical differences, however.
Firstly,  consider  proleptic  advice,  rather  than  proleptic  blame (since  blame  is  backward-
looking, and interventions within the deliberative context must take place before the action
does).  Williams can justify the claim that proleptic advice can be an appropriate kind of
action for a third party (42-3). However, explanations of such appropriateness cannot refer to
the reasons that the advisee has, since, at the time the intervention is mooted, Williams does
not think that such reasons exist. It seems perverse, though, to insist that the justification for
advising someone is not based in their reasons even though it aims to induce recognition of
such. The adviser would be aiming to induce recognition of a reason that the advisee did not
have! An externalist understanding of D-reasons has a simple, and more plausible, story –
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transformative advice aims at inducing recognition of reasons which already exist.
Secondly,  consider  the  nature  of  the  desires  which  secure  the  success  of  proleptic
interventions such as those that Williams relies upon. On the face of it, these desires have to
be unguided by the broader set of reasons, because they are supposed to alter that set from the
outside. Apart from the fact that this would make the process of proleptic transformation less
reliable, it also appears to be fetishistic: it imputes a significant desire for the wrong sort of
thing.  In  order  to  see  this,  it  is  necessary  to  bring  out  the  notion  of  'motivational'  (or
'judgement') internalism, since it is in terms of this concept that debates about fetishism have
been framed. Schematically,  motivational internalism is the view that ethical commitment
(belief/judgement/approval,  etc.)  is  strongly  linked  (in  some  specified  way)  to  practical
motivation. More specifically, some (e.g. Michael Smith) have argued that there is a general
rational connection  between  ethical  commitment  and  motivation.  However,  this  general
proposal  turns  out  to  be  problematic.  Hallvard  Lillehammer  (1997)  provides  a  salutary
reminder of the bad consequences that would result if we were to incorporate such a general
rational requirement for motivational internalism89. Lillehammer notes (194-5) that it seems
perverse to insist that just anyone would be irrational not to be motivated in accordance with
their ethical judgements. For, if someone makes horrific moral judgements, it  seems both
possible and rationally welcome for them to fail to be motivated in accordance with them. As
Lillehammer says (195), having a content-neutral motivation to act in accordance with one's
ethical judgements is a kind of fetishism. Likewise, it is rationally preferable that an agent
not be moved by (e.g.)  general  respect  for  an intervener  to  value things differently (and
thence  to  act  differently),  if  the  intervener  is  not,  in  fact,  relevantly  virtuous.  Having  a
89 Cf. also Johnson 1999, 69.
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content-neutral disposition to be transformed by interventions by others is, thus, equivalently
fetishistic. The solution is to regard the desire90 (on the part of S) as a desire to be transformed
by those in a better epistemic position91; not merely a desire to conform to the expectations of
others. Here, as elsewhere, we have to build substantive presuppositions into the motivational
basis for proleptic transformation, if we are to preserve the possibility that transformation
might be a reliable way to come to act on genuine reasons. Here, as elsewhere, we should not
fetishise any merely procedurally rational process, proleptic or not.
It is important, now that fetishism is in the picture, to make explicit why my account is not
vulnerable  to  Smith's  original  (1994;  cf.  especially  Smith  1996,  180-83)  accusation  of
fetishism against externalism. Smith argues that motivational externalists must appeal to a
merely de dicto desire to do what is right. He thinks that this goes for 'good people' as well as
thoroughly imperfect agents. This seems fetishistic because (at least) the virtuous should be
motivated by (e.g.)  the prospect  of alleviating suffering (de re),  and not the rightness of
alleviating suffering de dicto. However, the foregoing discussion should make clear that this
criticism could not apply to the virtuous themselves, on a McDowellian account, since for
them motivational internalism is  effectively true:  they will  be motivated by their  reasons
directly. In addition, it also does not apply to a non-virtuous target of a D-reason claim, at
least if my argument in the previous paragraph is correct. This is because we need not regard
S as being transformed by S* (or, rather, some proxy for S*) on the basis of a desire to be
respected (simpliciter), or to 'do the right thing' de dicto. Instead, they will be transformed – if
they are transformed in accordance with substantive ethical  reason – on the basis  of  the
90 I am using 'desire' here in a broad, non-Humean sense, according to which desires can have cognitive 
elements. Cf. §2.1 above.
91 Of course, this is not to say that this desire should not (or even could not) have affective elements too – a 
desire for something like respect (or love) is perfectly appropriate, but will only have no whiff of fetishism 
when it is guided by substantive reason.
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thought that92 S*'s intervention will bring them to see things aright. It is true that, before S*'s
intervention, S is incapable of being moved by the ethically-salient features of things  de re
(her genuine D-reasons), but at every stage of the deliberative process she is being moved by
something  with  a  genuine  (de  re)  ethical  significance.  Before  the  transformation,  she  is
capable of being moved by virtuous proleptic advice (de re), and after it she will be capable
of being moved by her D-reasons themselves (de re).  Contra Smith, it is not fetishistic to
desire a genuine improvement in one's (ethically-relevant) epistemic position, even though it
would  be  fetishistic  if  one's  desire  did  not  build  in  a  sensitivity  to  the  way things  are,
epistemically speaking93.
These two advantages help to motivate my division between the two sorts of reason. More
generally, I have argued throughout §2.2 that a more complex account – of the conditions in
which reasons exist – is needed than has generally been provided. In Chapter 6, I shall draw
on this account to argue that the sufficientarian capability approach to global justice should be
interpreted  as  (primarily)  a  theory  about  the  V-reasons  of  justice  that  all  human  beings
possess. This McDowell-inspired account of reasons thus forms another important part of the
framework I am proposing for the capability approach.
§2.3 Anthropocentricity and Universalism
The bulk of the argument of this Chapter is now complete. In this final subsection, I revisit
the anthropocentrism of the approach I've defended. McDowell's secondary-quality realism
takes seriously the thought that ethical facts may be species relative, both in the sense that it
92 Where the motivational basis for the intervention is non-conscious, they will not be motivated by this 
thought, but by a some complex personal disposition whose content is functionally equivalent; I do not think
this makes any significant difference to the argument. Cf. McDowell 2009c, 33-40.
93 Compare McDowell 1998l on the argument of this paragraph.
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is only beings with human-like faculties that are capable of comprehending them, and in the
sense that the kinds of practice that they are facts about may also be uniquely human. In the
next Chapter, I explore one way of making sense of universalism, which develops precisely
that thought: that the modes of relationship that justice regulates, and so the need for justice
itself, are characteristic of our animal species. In this way, it may be a significant advantage
of a framework for an approach to global justice if it can coherently include some restriction
of this kind – this will help to rationalise the central  commitment to human-universalism
about justice that is a standard presupposition of cosmopolitanism94. One possible difficulty
here is that, as I have noted, McDowell's position conjoins two kinds of species-relativity that
could, in principle, come apart: the capacity for knowledge of the norms of a practical domain
might be separable from the capacity to engage in the functionings that are distinctive of the
domain itself.  However, unless there is some particular reason to suppose that these joint
restrictions are not effectively aligned with one another, this does not seem to threaten the
plausibility  of  the  view.  Likewise,  it  appears  the  overall  position,  too,  cannot  be  a
problematic sort of relativism. If a different life-form were discovered that lived in much the
same way as us, having (e.g.) a similar emotional constitution, and a capacity for ethical
debate and practical  co-ordination,  this  element  could  be expanded to include them. The
species-relativity here is (in both respects) of a defeasible, flexible sort, because the thesis of
anthropocentricity was originally motivated precisely by the hypothesis that our faculties are
unique in this way95. For this reason, it could not do real violence to the approach to alter this
assumption, if this became reasonable in its own right.
94 See Chapter 6, §4.1 for more argument in this vein.
95 See, for instance, McDowell 1998n, 118. Elsewhere (1998m, 169-74, esp. 171) McDowell acknowledges 
that parts of human nature (as well as the nature of other possible animals such as his 'rational wolf') play a 
role in enabling the acquisition of reason (and, presumably, thereby all of the many activities which reason 
is required to regulate).
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The role of this Chapter has been to make clear the deep congruence between A) the kind of
epistemology  that  expansive  and  demanding  approaches  to  global  justice  like  capability
theory require and, B) McDowell-style quietistic metaethics. In essence, the attraction of this
combination can now be stated relatively simply.  Any plausible  capability approach (one
which meets the desiderata I gave in the first two Chapters) requires us to make sense of the
integration of substantive values as constraints on methodology, when engaging in inquiry
about (e.g.) the content of dignity. In particular, we must leave open the possibility that, in
making  decisions  about  how  to  formulate  our  ongoing  methodology,  we  must  rely  on
judgements which have been generated by that methodology itself. We are likely to have to
do this even when the judgements are distinctive of particular cultural locations, in a way that
might  seem exclusionary.  As this  Chapter  has  described,  McDowell's  view is  capable  of
making sense of these necessities in a compelling way. Along the way, I have also noted
many other  points  at  which  McDowell's  anti-reductionist  position  can  impart  a  valuable
flexibility to ethical practice, opening up a broad space of possibilities for moral psychology
as well as epistemology. Occasionally, this flexibility has also been shown to help in avoiding
certain first-order errors, e.g. with a restrictive psychologistic theory of reasons. Finally, I
have just begun to bring out the possible connection of this metaethical framework with neo-
Aristotelian naturalism, a view which has great promise for making sense of the universalism
implicit in approaches to global justice. Developing a version of such naturalism which fits
with everything I've argued for thus far then forms the task of the next Chapter.
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Chapter 5: 
A Circle: Humanity, Well-Being, Justice, Virtue
In the last Chapter, I characterised a metaethical position, that of John McDowell, that I hold
is a plausible take on the central questions of metaethics, and that I contend can, as part of a
wider  collection  of  views,  provide  the  framework  for  a  plausible  capability  approach  to
questions about justice (inter alia...). In this Chapter, I address the other main element of that
collection: neo-Aristotelian naturalism. In brief, neo-Aristotelian naturalists believe that the
fact of humanity – the fact that we are the particular kind of animal life that we are – is of
major significance for normative thought, and that Aristotelian ideas are needed to explain
how this is so. This is a position that has undergone a significant revival in recent decades, in
parallel  with  (if  lagging  somewhat  behind)  the  general  revival  in  Aristotelian  normative
theory. However, the interpretation and evaluation of such claims has been fraught, with most
critical  attention from major non-Aristotelian philosophers being dismissive,  where it  has
occurred at all1. Especially troubling for my purposes is an apparent tension between neo-
Aristotelian naturalism and the McDowellian theses I endorsed above. This tension emerges
in  two  places,  one  quite  general,  one  more  specific.  Generally,  there  seems  to  be  an
imcompatibility  between  the  quietism  of  McDowellian  metaethics  and  the  apparently
substantive nature of naturalist metaethical claims2. Specifically, neo-Aristotelian naturalism
seems to threaten the thoroughgoing sui-genereity or conceptual autonomy of normative, and
1 Examples, which I discuss throughout the text below, include FitzPatrick (2000); Lewens (2010, 2011); 
Copp and Sobel (2004), Skorupski (2012).
2 This general issue is of much less significance for my project in this Thesis, but I engage with it a little in 
Appendix B.
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in particular ethical, discourse and practice. My project here, then, is to elucidate and defend
a version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism such that these tensions (and other difficulties) can
be seen to be illusory, thus preserving the benefits of the framework I've been building to this
point.
I begin §1 by reintroducing Nussbaum's version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism. Then I build
from these basic ideas by giving a brief sketch of the role that neo-Aristotelian naturalism
plays in fleshing out and justifying a capability approach to global justice. §2 then describes
the  core thesis  of  neo-Aristotelian naturalism itself,  as  it  figures  in  the  work of  Michael
Thompson, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. After an outline of these proposals, §2.2
describes  an  important  challenge  to  them,  which  centres  on  the  idea  that  they  are
problematically reductive. §2.3 assesses the extent to which such challenges are likely to be
successful, concluding that the threat posed is significant, and warrants a definitive turn away
from reductive  treatments.  §3  is  then  composed  of  the  development  of  a  non-reductive
alternative,  which  coheres  tightly  with  the  McDowellian  metaethical  view  that  was  my
concern in the previous Chapter. Issues covered in the course of this include the ultimate
relationship between the human good and biological humanity (§3.1), and the right (or virtue)
and the good (or well-being) (§3.2).
§1 Introducing neo-Aristotelian Naturalism
§1.1 Naturalism in Nussbaum
The principal  inspiration for  the neo-Aristotelian naturalist  account  of the foundations of
capability theory that I shall offer is, unsurprisingly, the work of Nussbaum. Naturalism crops
up in two major ways in Nussbaum's work. Firstly, as I made clear in Chapter 2 (§2.3.4), the
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conclusions of the clearly constructivistic Rawlsian elements of Nussbaum's approach rely –
if they are to cohere with her substantive good methodology – on a thesis of convergence. It
is difficult to explain this thesis, or even to make it out in detail, unless human nature is such
that  homo sapiens is intrinsically oriented towards the mind-independent good. In this way,
she apparently implicates a non-normative, extra-ethical account of human nature. I do not
have  much to  say about  this  here,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that,  since  the  version of  neo-
Aristotelian  naturalism that  I  propose  below  requires  only  an  ethically-laden  concept  of
human  nature,  my  version  of  the  grounding  for  capability  theory  may  have  fewer
commitments than hers3.
Secondly,  and more importantly,  Nussbaum also makes use of a normative conception of
human nature4. This is explicitly invoked in order to provide a framework within which to fit
theoretical approaches (i.e. the capability approach). Humans have a good, and we arrive at a
conception of this good by reflecting on what is significant about being human. When we do
this, we provide support for a capability approach, in several ways. Firstly, in that we can
form a conception of the virtue of justice (one of the things that makes lives fully human),
which should then be construed according to the capability approach (see her (1993), and
(1995)). Secondly, in that we can form a conception of the general ingredients of the good
life; these will then be the things that people should be enabled to pursue (especially in her
(1992), and most others). Thirdly, in that general reflection on the most distinctively human
3 This is not to say that I think no invariant core of human similarity exists, apart from the ethically-delineated
one that I rely upon here. My reticence to involve such a conception has more metaethical motivations than 
scientific ones – if one claims that a common nature is leading us towards the ethical truth, but this nature is 
not itself dependent on ethical evaluations, there will A) be little or no room for a culture-laden conception 
of objectivity, which I have urged is necessary, and B) be little explanation for why this common nature has 
this truth-conducive effect, when it is entirely unrelated to the truths it supposedly leads us toward.
4 It may be helpful to compare my initial treatment of Nussbaum's invocation of humanity as an element in 
her theory of justice, in Ch.2 §1.1.
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elements of our lives ('practical rationality', and (sometimes) 'sociability') helps to support a
capability approach over alternatives,  including one based solely on functioning. ((1998),
amongst others). In addition to these roles, the conception of humanity also clearly plays
some role in delimiting the space of beings whose goods can make claims of justice, at least
until  her  (2006, 325-407),  where non-human animals  are  incorporated into her  capability
approach.
§1.2 Sketching a neo-Aristotelian Naturalist Capability Theory
Given  this  background,  I  can  begin  to  elaborate  the  actual  content  of  a  neo-Aristotelian
naturalism, suitable to support a capability approach to global justice. The detail of many of
the claims that I make in this section will not be fully clear until later in the Chapter, or in the
next Chapter (esp. §1), but I hope they, and their various interconnections, will be transparent
enough to begin with.
We should start, as Nussbaum does, with a conception of a distinctively human life. This is a
life  characterised  by  a  certain  range  of  functionings.  These  extend  from  classic  'doing'
functionings such as interpersonal communication, to 'being' functionings like having success
in personal projects; from functionings as mundane as having appropriate calorific intake, to
those as sophisticated as the development of an aesthetic sensibility5. As I shall note, many
recent  neo-Aristotelians,  drawing on work by Michael  Thompson,  link  functionings  very
strongly with humanity itself. For Thompson, concepts like 'humanity' – 'life-form concepts' –
are normative or quasi-normative concepts which unify sets of functionings together. What
being human (or,  mutatis  mutandis,  any other  organism) actually  amounts to  is  having a
5 See Appendix A: 'Bodily Health', and 'Senses, Imagination, and Thought'.
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property which sets expectations of functioning, and thereby both plays a role in explanation
when functionings match the expectation, and generates judgements of defect when they do
not (1995; 2004a; 2008). Theoretically, this implicates a limit case – e.g. the perfectly human
being6 – that would instantiate each characteristic functioning fully. Being human simpliciter,
however,  need  not  involve  the  possession  of  most  (or  even  many)  of  the  'normal'
functionings.  Rather,  I  suggest  that  humanity  can  be  identified  (as  a  concrete,  worldly
property rather than a concept) with a disposition whose end is species-typical functioning,
but which may be very easy to frustrate if conditions are not apt7. I will ultimately suggest
that the attribution of this disposition is a fundamentally ethical matter. However, there are
familiar examples of minimal species-typical functionings (e.g., perhaps, a certain range of
genomic  information,  recognisably  human  morphology,  involvement  in  human  relations,
predictably human cognitive function) which will inevitably have to be used as evidence for
the presence of the disposition in  particular  cases.  (It  is  unsurprising that  they would be
evidence for it, since it is, in part, a disposition to produce exactly those features.) As well as
providing evidence of its presence, some of these statistically-normal features (when placed
within a sufficiently complete and coherent framework) can be thought of as providing the
supervenience-base of the disposition.
6 This, like similar concepts I refer to elsewhere, such as 'the virtuous agent', might seem indicative of a 
narrow, perhaps elitist, privileging of one highly-specific kind of person. The connotation is misleading. 
There is, on any plausible view, more than one (indeed probably an extremely large range) of relevantly 
'perfect' lives that are possibilities. Likewise, although there might be only one virtuous course of action in 
some given single situation, there will in reality be many very different ways to live an entirely virtuous life.
And, needless to say, there is no reason whatsoever to think that the perfectly human being (or the virtuous 
agent) would resemble the powerful more than the powerless.
7 This may be an idiosyncratic interpretation – it is generally unclear what kind of worldly thing species-
natures are supposed to be on most neo-Aristotelian accounts. Thompson, for instance, is more interested in 
giving a logical account of species concepts. Foot and Hursthouse do not appear to discuss the issue at all. 
Nussbaum, even in her later work (e.g. 2006, 181-2), in which she drops the concept of 'basic capability', 
seems to think of humanity as a range concept, with actual functioning within the range being necessary for 
human status; Hope 2013 (162-3) provides a compelling criticism of this element.
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Turning back to the explicitly ethical realm, such features can also be equated (in terms of
their  role)  with  Nussbaum's  'basic  capabilities'  (1987,  esp.  25-30)  –  the  minimal  human
capabilities  which,  when present,  generate  demands  for  the  improvement  of  the  life  that
involves them8. Appropriately, the same basic conceptual structure will then apply here as
there, for the purpose of interpersonal comparisons of well-being: being human, just as such,
ensures the applicability of certain judgements about relative goods and the absolute quality
of lives. Specifically, every human is benefited by something to the extent that it brings them
closer to the full attainment of the life-form concept, and harmed to the extent that they are
distanced from it9. And a human has a good – i.e. evaluatively adequate – life to the extent
that it meets enough of the life-form concept.10
With this structure in place, I can turn to consider the place of justice in the lives of humans.
Nussbaum, as I have said, treats justice – in her similar development in Non-Relative Virtues
(1993) – as a good concerned with the proper ordering of the public sphere, and especially
with distribution. This is an option for me here, and if I followed her in this it might imply
little substantive change. However, because of the problems with public/private distinctions
(see  Chapter  2,  §1.3),  and  the  thin  conceptions  of  institutions  and  the  Rawlsian  'basic
8 Note that, strictly speaking, capabilities are functionings, at least according to the definition I gave in Ch.1 
§4 – they are 'being' functionings, consisting in an ability to effectively choose valuable options. Capability 
thus turns out to be a subset of functioning, which makes the theoretical exegesis simpler here. Compare 
MacIntyre 1999, 65 here.
9 At this point, this may sound like an extremely outlandish claim. I hope that, by this Chapter's end, it will 
not seem very radical at all.
10 It is important to remember that here, as always, I am engaged in a Neurathian method. The prospect of 
finding a way of making different sorts of judgement – about humanity simpliciter, about well-being, about 
justice, about virtue – cohere with one another is motivation enough for identifying, in this instance, a 
number of different levels within the species norm; one for human dignity, one for adequate 
exemplification, one for perfect exemplification. At no point is it necessary to to claim that the existence of 
such levels would be plausible in abstraction from the ethical context. For example, judgements about 
'adequately doggish' lives might not make sense in the way that adequately human ('good') lives do, if we 
did not engage in evaluation of the lives of dogs. Or there might be just two levels for some life-form – one 
of minimal exemplification, and one of perfection, with no levels of adequacy in between. But the 
inapplicability of such details in non-human cases doesn't damage the ethical motivation for proposing 
them, or threaten the universality of the basic structure of life-form concepts more generally.
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structure' on which they encourage a focus, I shall use a different concept to do this work.
Rather than treating justice as a virtue dealing with institutional orders, I shall treat it as a
virtue concerned with interpersonal relationships – all of which will, of course, be mediated
by such orders (to varying extents). The complex sociality of human beings is surely one of
our most important traits, and so it should not be surprising that a functioning dealing with
interpersonal connections will be correspondingly central. Complete justice, vis-a-vis a given
individual at a given time, will require all of that individual's relationships to be adequately
good. If we presume that every human being (per se) is disposed to form relationships, of
some appropriate (perhaps very minimal) kind, with every other human being11, given the
right sort of circumstances, it will follow that no human being will be just, and thus that no
human being will be able to live a good human life, unless they are living in a just world – a
world in which relationships are apt to adequately flourish12. It follows from this that every
human is harmed by global injustice,  because many, if not all,  of  their relationships, and
many more of the possible relationships that they are essentially disposed to acquire,  are
damaged by it. It follows in turn that every human being has reasons, of some sort at least, to
promote justice on a global scale.
This provides an entrance point for capability theory proper. For, plausibly enough given the
arguments summarised in Chapter 1, what global justice requires is that everybody be enabled
to live a decent life. Not a perfect life, that is, or a life that should not, in any sense, be better
than it is13, but a life that is not so bad that its condition must damage the relationships it
11 A more thorough defence of this claim is given in Chapter 6.
12 We could, as Nussbaum appears to in her Frontiers of Justice (2006, 325-407), hold that humans have 
minimal default relationships with non-human animals (or some sub-set thereof), as well as with humans. 
This would provide the resources for a critique of injustices against these beings too. Although I do not see 
any deep barrier to the acceptance of this claim, within the framework I set out here and in the following 
chapters, I will not consider it further.
13 By contrast, one way of describing the level of well-being that I am calling the good life is precisely as that 
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involves. Using the term I have deployed throughout, what justice requires, at the minimal
level, is that everyone have dignity, because the lack of a life of dignity cannot fail to damage
all  the  relationships  that  the  individual  is  involved  in.  This  provides  the  rationale  for  a
sufficientarian conception of threshold values of the various functionings and capabilities that
are  constitutive  of  such  a  life.  The  claim,  ultimately,  is  that  no-one  can  have  a  truly
satisfactory life  unless the world is  just  – and the world cannot be just  until  all  humans
possess the threshold value of every valuable capability14.
If this view is defensible, the achievement of the principal purpose of this Thesis would seem
to be at hand. A basis for a capability theory of justice, similar to that of Nussbaum, would be
available that would cohere with a plausible approach to meta-level issues. Justice would be
connected to human well-being, both because bad relationships are a clear detriment to those
who have them, and because the content of justice is partly determined by what people need
to live decent human lives15. And universalism and robust objectivity of judgement would be
assured, at least in principle, as long as neo-Aristotelian naturalism can be made to cohere
with  the  basic  McDowellian  metaethic  I've  presented.  There  are  number  of  challenges
remaining however, which will be dealt with in the remainder of the Thesis. The rest of this
Chapter will involve fleshing out the sketch of a neo-Aristotelian naturalism that I have just
level of functioning such that, although it possibly could be made better, there is no sense in which it should 
be. This marks the point at which relative comparisons of well-being, and claims about how people should 
live differently, start to lose their practical force.
14 This is quite a strong claim – it implies, given that the world has (plausibly) never been adequately just, that 
no human being has ever had a good life. (Although they may have had very good lives in any number of 
particular respects apart from justice, and may have had many good particular relationships inter alia). As 
with many others in this Chapter, this is a significantly less controversial claim than it appears to be. It is a 
commonplace, at least amongst those actively concerned with global justice, that the contemporary world is 
highly unjust. If you add in the view that injustice precludes the possibility of proper relationship, it will 
follow that everyone in the contemporary world is harmed significantly, and it is not a large step from there 
to the view that no-one has a good life: a life about which one cannot say that it should be considerably 
better.
15 This sort of account, then, has good prospects of incorporating attention to the sociality and dependency 
which are MacIntyre's emphases in his 1999 – relation-dependent goods will clearly be relevant to dignity 
when justice itself is conceived of as a relational matter.
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given.  Finally,  in  the  last  Chapter  I  fill  in  this  sketch,  providing  a  more  thorough
understanding of justice in the neo-Aristotelian frame, and then finally drawing the various
threads of the Thesis together, showing how they amount to a strong supporting background
for a capability approach to global justice.
§2 Reductionism?
I have offered an outline of a framework for capability theory. But I have said little about the
neo-Aristotelian naturalism that plays such a central role in it. In this section I remedy that,
offering a description of the core claims of recent Aristotelians in the area, and assessing their
vulnerability to an important sort of challenge, which threatens to derail the entire project.
§2.1 The Core View
To put it  simply,  neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is  the view that what humans  are as
natural, animal beings bears on what is good for them, and on the way they ought to live.
Unlike  the  view  of  Nussbaum  that  I  have  described,  however,  most  neo-Aristotelian
naturalists  do  not  view  the  conception  of  humans  as  animal  beings  as  being  a
straightforwardly ethical conception.  How, then,  does human nature come to have ethical
import, on these views?
§2.1.1 Life-Form and Normativity
The basis for the neo-Aristotelian answers to this question that I shall consider16 has been
16 Probably foremost of the views that I shall not consider here is that of MacIntyre in his Dependent Rational 
Animals (1999). In some ways, his proposal there mirrors the structure of my own cocktail of McDowell 
and Nussbaum. In particular, the role that is played in human good by a conception of reason that is 
nevertheless embedded in, and dependent on, particular communities and worldly circumstances in his 
thesis (see especially 155-62) seems functionally similar to the role of virtue – qua responsiveness to the 
good – in my own. However, some threat of reductionism is still present: it is not clear, as it is with 
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made  explicit  by  Michael  Thompson,  most  comprehensively  in  his  2008  book  Life  and
Action.  Since  both  Foot  and  Hursthouse  rely  on  (an  earlier,  less  detailed,  version  of)
Thompson's  analysis,  and  since  it  is  in  any case  the  best  account  of  the  basic  concepts
underlying neo-Aristotelian naturalism available, I'll  begin by describing this view, before
saying more about how Foot and Hursthouse make theoretical use of it.
Thompson's central claim is that there is no way of characterising a large number of concepts
relating to life and the living without involving an Aristotelian concept of life-form. Attempts
to do so in straightforwardly scientific terms are never satisfactory: one might attempt to do
so using a range of empirical concepts – 'homeostasis', 'reproduction', 'organisation', 'growth
and development', 'adaption', but when the details of such concepts themselves begin to be
filled in, it emerges that they implicitly rely on an idea of typicality or normality that makes
the  analysis  largely  circular.  For  example,  'organisation'  requires  some concept  of  living
functioning to avoid the implication that newly-dead corpses are alive (2008, 36), and 'growth
and development' similarly cannot be reduced to mere thermodynamic  change – it is only
when  changes  of  some  specific  kind  takes  place  that  they  could  count  as  growth,  or
development, and this specific kind seems to be precisely that which characterises the species
in question (43). Thompson insists that this does not amount to the claim that such concepts
McDowell, that the good that ethical inquiry aims toward and partially constitutes is itself ethical. This is 
suggested, at least, by MacInytre's tacit acceptance of the idea that the individual good excludes the goods 
of others, at least in principle. If he did not accept this, there would be no need to argue (as he does e.g. at 
105-110) for the importance of a given (virtuous) action as something that serves the individual's good, 
independently of its rightness – if the human good is thoroughly ethical, the presence of ethical value is 
reason enough for any human, regardless of whether or not they might benefit from a non-ethical point of 
view.
It is also important to note that I do not oppose MacIntyre's view on other (supposedly) McDowellian 
grounds, in particular the ground that concepts like 'belief', 'desire', 'reason', etc. cannot possibly find 
application in non-human animal life at all, because of their essentially linguistic nature. If true this would 
dramatically limit the scope of the analogy between human and animal flourishing that MacIntyre proposes. 
McDowell has moderated his position on these issues (2008b, 234-8), and even if he had not, I would not 
need to go along with them in the relevant details – they are not essential for the metaethical stance I have 
endorsed. See Lovibond 2008, for an overview of the issue.
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are  entirely circular, or involve 'egregious organicist metaphysics', but rather that there is a
certain logically distinctive kind of  thought  that all propositions about the organic involve,
which is encapsulated in concepts of life-form (48). To think, or say, of something that it is
alive is to think of it as instantiating a life-form. Life-form concepts, in turn, are given content
by the various functionings that exemplify the beings that they place together – a conception
of normal developmental paths, of typical behavioural responses to different stimuli, of things
that the exemplary life-form-bearer  does and  is.  'Rabbits eat grass',  'Wolves communicate
using howls', 'Spiders have eight legs', 'Swans pair-bond for life', etc.
There  are  a  few things  that  are  important  to  note  about  these  concepts,  on  Thompson's
development.  Two  of  these  follow  from the  fact  that  they  are  not  names  for  statistical
regularities among phenomena, or collections thereof. We do not produce life-form concepts
by isolating particular functionings, in abstraction from the beings that manifest them17, and
then inventing a life-form concept for each point at which similar functionings frequently
coincide, like the points of overlap on a functioning Venn diagram. Rather, we begin with a
version of a life-form concept, and alter it only when it makes sense to do so according to the
whole concept; new information can make a difference only when it would cohere with the
existing conception. The first consequence is that it  may be the case that a functioning is
characteristic of a life-form even if only a minority of the bearers of that life-form actually
manifest it. The classic18 example is 'having 32 teeth', a functioning apparently characteristic
of human animals, but which is not instantiated by many or most humans at any given time –
since some teeth will never have developed, others may have fallen out, etc. (68). The second
17 It is questionable whether we can even think of something as being a functioning, unless a life-form concept
is involved somehow. Beings and doings are literally the stuff of life. So, arguably, this abstraction couldn't 
even make sense.
18 The origin is Anscombe 1958, 14. Compare (McDowell 1998m, 171), which figures in the argument of the 
next section.
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is  that  the  epistemology  of  life-form  concepts  cannot  be  straightforwardly  empirical  or
scientific – merely noting that lots of animals of kind x instantiate a functioning f does not (of
itself) give a reason to include the functioning in the life-form concept x (68-73). In the end,
the  space  of  life-form  concepts  is  sui  generis relative  to  other  concepts,  including  the
concepts of lawlike empirical patterns that are typical of the sciences.
The most important feature of life-form concepts for my purposes, however, is the fact that
they  produce  standards,  relative  to  which  organisms  can  be  evaluated.  The  simplest
explanation for why this might be so would turn on a claim that life-form concepts are norms
themselves.  Thompson resists  this  conclusion,  saying that  it  is  unilluminating,  at  best,  to
analyse life-form concepts, or their elements, as norms (73-6), but I cannot go into this in
detail19. In any case, it  is relatively unimportant, because even if life-form concepts aren't
normative themselves, they do imply norms:
If, though, we want to apply 'normative' categories to sub-rational nature, and apart 
from any relationship to 'our interests', then the question inevitably arises...: Where 
does  the  standard  come  from?...The  system  of  natural-historical  propositions  
[predications  of  a  life-form]  with  a  given [life-form]...as  subject  supplies  such a  
standard for members of that kind. We may implicitly define a certain very abstract  
category of 'natural defect' with the following...principle of inference: from: “The S is 
F”, and: “This S is not F,” to infer: “This S is defective in that it is not F.” (80).
In this way, the contents of the life-form concept  human have a bearing on evaluations of
individual humans, in the light of functionings – behaviours, relationships, character-traits,
etc. – that they do or do not possess.20
19 It ultimately appears to come down to his claim that life-form judgements are 'transparently “factual” or 
“positive”', and analysing life-form judgements as normative does 'violence' to that (2008, 75). This seems 
like a very thin basis for such a significant claim, especially since if life-form concepts were normative 
themselves this would make it clear why they have normative consequences, rather than merely entailing 
norms for some reason that remains obscure. The dichotomy between the normative and the 'factual' or 
'positive' that Thompson relies on here is obviously questionable, and a plausible metaethical realism like 
McDowell's should dissolve it. But I shall not insist on treating life-form as inherently normative, for 
simplicity's sake.
20 Thompson provides little more in the way of development of a grounding for ethics, although he plainly 
endorses the spirit, if not the letter, of Foot's project in Natural Goodness (2008, 81-2).
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§2.1.2 Foot's Gloss, and Hursthouse's
This sort of account might provide a grounding for ethical evaluations on its own – if the
functioning 'being virtuous' were an element in the human life-form, for example, this would
amount to such a grounding. The two most significant versions of neo-Aristotelian naturalism
to date – of Foot and of Hursthouse – however, have pursued a grounding less directly, by
providing a gloss on a general idea of 'natural goodness', and so influencing the shape of the
human life-form concept. In Thompson's basic schema there is no explicit general concept of
'natural goodness' – there is only failure or success at exemplifying the particular life-form of
one's kind. But Foot insists that such a concept is necessary,  apart from the specific norms
implied by life-forms, because it is not clear why all  the elements of life-form should have
significant normative weight21. The examples she gives are 'The blue-tit has a round blue
patch on its head', and 'The male peacock has a brightly coloured tail', which, she thinks, are
both  genuine  elements  of  their  respective  life-forms22.  However,  only  the  latter  could
reasonably be thought to give rise to evaluations of good or bad in organisms that manifest it,
or fail to. The peacock's tail is essential to attract a mate. But (seemingly), the colour of the
blue-tit's head 'plays no part in [its] life...[But] what counts as “its life” in this context? And
what is “playing a part”?' (2001, 30).
Foot offers an answer to this question, and it is through this answer that the most distinctive –
21 Brewer 2009 also supports the addition of a 'teleological' requirement on evaluation-relevant elements of the
life-form, for similar reasons (200-202). He claims that, without such an addition, it will not be clear why 
not living up to one's life-form is a bad thing. As with Foot's reasoning, this argument does not apply where 
the life-form is itself a subject of ethical evaluation, as it is in my proposal below.
22 There is room for scepticism about this: perhaps, if the round blue patch is the only thing that distinguishes 
blue-tits from otherwise identical organisms, there is no distinctively 'blue-tittish' life-form, and so no bird 
could be judged defective for not instantiating that functioning. This thought would depend, however, on 
there being a system of evaluations – i.e. ethics – already at work in deciding what counts as a life-form and
what does not, and the approach Foot is taking seems to preclude that.
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and, as we shall see, most problematic – part of her approach comes into view:
In plants and non-human animals23 [evaluation-relevant elements of the life-form] all 
have to do, directly or indirectly, with self-maintenance...or with the reproduction of 
the individual... This is 'the life' characteristic of the kind of animal with which the 
[relevant functionings] here have to do. What 'plays a part' in this life is that which is 
causally and teleologically related to it, as putting out roots is related to obtaining  
nourishment, and attracting insects is related to reproduction in plants... The way an 
individual  should  be is  determined  by  what  is  needed  for  development,  self-
maintenance, and reproduction. (31-3).
So, an element of the life-form is relevant to evaluation iff it  contributes to – by being a
means to – the continuation of the life of the individual and its species24. It is not entirely
clear how this restriction works – after all, if having a blue patch on one's head is genuinely
what typifies the life of one's species,  any continuation of that life that does not involve
having a blue-patched head will not be species-typical, and so will not be  good. So I am
skeptical whether this 'teleological' restriction on evaluation can be made to work. We can
either take seriously the idea of life-form-typical functioning, in which case all elements of
the life-form are teleologically related to its continuation, since without them whatever 'life'
would continue would not be exemplary of the kind. Or we can invest in this notion of 'life'
that does not presuppose the elements of the life-form – or, at least, not all of them – in which
case we have abandoned Thompson's conceptual framework entirely. It is not clear what we
might replace it with while staying true to the basic Aristotelian thought: that something's
species determines what is good for it. This is a serious problem for Foot, but I'll leave it
aside, both because my purpose here is not to criticise all other versions of neo-Aristotelian
naturalism, and because there is a more general problem looming, a species of (what I shall
call) anti-reductionist challenge, which I shall introduce in the next sub-section, and return to
consider Foot's vulnerability to it after that.
23 As I shall note in §2.3.1, Foot endorses a (rather ad hoc seeming) exemption from this gloss on natural 
goodness for human beings. This is not of significance for the moment.
24 This opens the way to an account of the human good, and a grounding of virtue in that account, the details 
of which are not important for my purposes at this point. 
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Before I move on to the critiques, however, I need to describe the form that Hursthouse's
grounding of ethical evaluation takes, since it differs somewhat from that of Foot. Similarly,
it begins with a gloss on the ends with which natural goodness is concerned:
[A] good social animal25...is one that is well fitted or endowed with respect to (i) its 
parts, (ii) its operations, (iii) its actions, (iv) its desires and emotions; whether it is  
thus fitted or endowed is determined by whether these four aspects well serve (1) its 
individual survival, (2) the continuance of its species, (3) its characteristic freedom 
from pain and characteristic enjoyment, and (4) the good functioning of its social  
group – in the ways characteristic of the species. (1999, 202).
Unlike Foot's account, however, this account of natural ends is not presented as restricting the
elements of a life-form concept that are relevant to evaluation. Rather, these ends seem to be
a gloss on the natural good of  all living things, directly. Thompson's life-form concepts –
which Hursthouse invokes on the next page (203) – must then play a more minimal role,
perhaps fleshing out the references to 'species' and 'characteristic' functionings. Moving on to
evaluations of human individuals, Hursthouse insists that these four ends are all still apt to
provide an account of the human good (206-16)26, although she claims that rather than the
four aspects that are to be evaluated above, humans have only one – character traits27. Such
character traits can then be assessed according to whether they serve the four ends, conceived
of in such a way as to reflect humanity's  distinctive 'ways of going on'  (238). Doing so,
Hursthouse thinks, will play a role in justifying the development of some character traits – as
virtues – over others.
25 Non-social species are supposed to have a simpler good, involving no reference to group functioning.
26 Notably, however, she argues that each must be reinterpreted in the light of human rational capacities, which
is arguably most characteristic of humanity (217-26). This does not go as far as is necessary towards making
the natural good congruent with plausible ethical conceptions however – why should even modified 
versions of these ends be considered of major intrinsic worth?
27 Her reasoning for this is apparently just that we would not usually call someone a 'good human being' for 
being e.g. healthy. (206-7). This seems a little superficial, but in context it makes sense: Hursthouse, unlike 
myself (and Nussbaum, and, probably, Foot), seems not to be attempting to produce an account of 'good 
human' qua 'human who has a good life' or qua 'good example of humanity', but just qua 'admirable human',
or something similar.
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§2.2 Anti-Reductionist Critique
I have just described two versions of neo-Aristotelian naturalist grounding for ethics (or, at
least, parts thereof). Each, as well as (potentially) the basic neo-Aristotelian concept of life-
form on which they rely, faces a number of serious challenges28. Many of these take a general
anti-reductionist form, and it is one of these that I'll focus on here, as an illustrative example.
Ultimately, I shall suggest that most such problems29 have the same root: it is problematic (to
put  it  mildly)  to  use  a  conception  of  natural  goodness  individuated  apart  from  ethical
concerns in building to ethical conclusions.
The strand of anti-reductionist  argument that I'll  focus on centres on the observation that
reductionist forms of naturalism are apt to rely on a sort of fatalism30. The fatalistic reasoning
might look like this: humans are animals, with animal natures; it follows that there are ways
that they are biologically determined to behave; and so A) since 'ought' implies 'can' (and
'cannot' thus defeats 'ought to'), no-one can say that humans ought to do anything against this
nature, and/or B) if Aristotelian teleology is true, and things ought to behave according to
their kind, humans positively ought to act in accordance with this nature31. Notably, this is a
28 The most important challenge that I'll not address at length is an empirical one. Several commentators have 
suggested that the best contemporary biological science provides no room for the concepts of natural, 
species-specific essences, on which the neo-Aristotelians draw. Important examples include FitzPatrick 
(2000), and Lewens (2010; 2011). It should be clear, however, that none of the thinkers I discuss here rely 
on such biological science – at least not in any straightforward way. The absence of teleology (it is even less
obvious that biology is empirically incompatible with teleology) from contemporary biology does not 
constitute a major threat. Of course, if someone accepts a general 'naturalist' view, on which philosophy 
cannot substantially go beyond the natural sciences, this will be unconvincing. Then, every philosophical 
approach would have to closely relate itself to the natural sciences. But this is not of special significance 
here, since the general McDowellian metaethics I have endorsed would already be untenable were this 
metaphilosophical stance warranted. Cf. the discussion of metaphilosophical naturalism in Appendix B.
29 Cf. for example, the different argument of Andreou 2006, which argues that it is likely to be unclear that 
(prima facie) immoral dispositions are not untypical of humanity, without mistakenly attributing a statistical
epistemology to the Aristotelian naturalists. Her argument could be avoided if ethical concepts were allowed
to do explicit work.
30 Some of the examples adduced in Antony 2000 are especially powerful.
31 Newman 2014, for example, provides an appalling example of this kind of reasoning in the context of 
sexual ethics. He argues (validly) from two Aristotelian naturalist (or very similar) premises to the 
impermissibility of homosexuality, masturbation, and in vitro fertilisation. This abhorrent fatalist attitude is, 
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very strange and (prima facie) implausible thesis as stated. Firstly, it is not clear why anyone
would  expect  it  to  succeed  as  an  argument  –  implicitly,  anyone  who  is  proposing  that
humanity should live one way rather than another almost certainly believes that they can live
that way, and probably has evidence to back this up, in the form of examples of people who
have lived that way. Secondly, the B) conclusion relies on a very strange form of Aristotelian
teleology indeed. One of the ways that it is strange is exegetical: the notion of determination
seems to ignore the distinctions between  final and  efficient  causes, etc., which Aristotelian
naturalists  use;  good action,  for typical  Aristotelians,  is  action with the fulfilment  of our
nature as its  final cause – it is the end for which it is done – but this is perfectly consistent
with our nature not being in any sense its  efficient cause. It is clear how the idea of  final
causation is connected to justification, because both causation and justification are similarly
teleological, and both can have the same end.32 But why would something's  efficient cause
play a role in justifying it, in the way that B) presumes?
It  may be helpful  to  examine an example of Hursthouse's  reasoning in this  context.  The
following passage may seem fatalistic, in the way I have described33:
Could  impersonal  benevolence,  as  a  character  trait  of  human  beings,  foster  
these...ends? The question is, admittedly, wildly speculative, but on the face of it, it  
rather looks as though the species and familal bonding that are part of our biological, 
animal nature, and make us 'partial' to our own species and children, play an essential 
role in sustaining these two ends. (225).
One element here, at least, is the thought that partiality might be a necessary part of human
life; that human life could not be any other way. This may appear problematically fatalistic.
thus, very much a live concern.
32  This distinction also appears to play a significant, if implicit, role in Foot's comments at (30, fn.1). There 
she distinguishes the notion of 'function' from that of Ruth Millikan (among others) – Millikan's is a 
'historical' conception, which I take to be a reference to the fact that function for Millikan is an etiological 
concept, referring simply to the properties that have played a causal role in the evolutionary selection of a 
trait (e.g. Millikan 1993). Cf. McDowell 2009d, esp. 267-75.
33 The context, for clarity, is a discussion of Singer's view that benevolence should be directed equally towards
human and non-human animals, on pain of 'speciesism'.
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However, despite the appearances, it is not so. This is already visible, in the references to
'sustaining ends', rather than living in accordance with nature. But it is immediately clarified
further:
This is not to lapse back into resting content with our nature as we find it, not to deny 
that we could reshape our nature in such a way that we no longer cared particularly 
about our own species or children. Maybe we could. It is to draw attention to the fact 
that, with respect to the continuance of the species and to the good functioning of the 
social group [two ethical ends, for Hursthouse], our natural tendency to bond to other 
human beings and to our children seems to be serving us rather well. (225-6).
This illustrates nicely both the threat of reductionistic fatalism, and one means by which it
can be avoided.
It  may remain obscure how the argument  of the previous two paragraphs relates to anti-
reductionism. To clarify, let me note that the sense in which fatalism is false is also the sense
in which ethical judgement can be effective34. Fatalism is repellent because we know that
there are a wide range of ways that we35 could be; a range that includes but outstrips all of the
ways that humans have been, or have even been  conceived to be. Even if it  is materially
impossible for  homo sapiens to instantiate some functionings, as it is currently constituted,
this is not necessarily significant, because we might be able to transform ourselves such that
this would not be so. Obviously, we are limited by the physical boundaries of the universe,
and what our technology allows us to change within it. And, equally obviously, the fact that
we  can change ourselves to enable us to do something does not establish that we should.36
34 I take it that this thought is a major part of McDowell's argument concerning the 'rational wolf'' example in 
his 'Two Sorts of Naturalism' (1998m, 171-3), especially this: 'Having acquired reason, [the rational wolf] 
can step back from the natural impulse and direct critical scrutiny at it.' (171).
35 Note that this 'we' can be defined first-personally using direct self-reference – 'we' refers to whatever life-
form it is that I am a member of. In principle, this is then compatible with the thought that, given an 
intransigent and ethically worthless conception of humanity, I can form the judgement that I am not human 
(and neither are any of the other individuals who I regard as significantly similar to me). See Thompson 
2004a.
36 Poetically, our limits are something like the starry heavens above, and the moral law within, to paraphrase 
Kant inappropriately (Guyer 1992, 1). The boundary of human possibility and the boundary of technological
possibility (itself necessarily bounded by physical law) only come apart if ethics demands it (as, in many 
cases, it probably will).
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But  humanity  could  remake  itself,  and  arbitrarily  restricting  our  form  (as  opposed  to
restricting it on an ethical basis) to that which we currently have is unjustifiable.
There  is  room  to  generate  a  wide,  and  apparently  disparate  array  of  anti-reductionist
arguments, focussing on quite different aspects of naturalist accounts. There is something that
unites them, however. The uniting thought is that it just isn't plausible that an ethics-neutral
conception of natural goodness could ground ethical claims. In turn this is because the sui
generis nature of ethical reasoning ensures that any non-ethically-specified feature of the
world is of questionable ethical relevance. If we attempt to look at human life as such sub
specie aeternatis, from outside any ethical perspective, we may well find that there is nothing
there. And if we begin from a notion of human nature that constrains us – rather than being a
precondition of everything we could (even conceivably) do – we will neglect the ethically-
evaluable possibilities that we do have. If all this is correct, the project of neo-Aristotelian
naturalism,  if  it  is  reductive – if  it  aims  to  ground ethics  in  something with  which it  is
significantly discontinuous – must fail. As McDowell says:
Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the animal species 
we belong to; it also enables and even obliges us to step back from it, in a way that 
puts its bearing on our practical problems into question. (1998m, 172).
It is only within the pre-existing context of ethical reasoning that a conception of human
nature can be established as relevant to how we should live; it is only if that conception is
itself the product of ethical judgement that this relevance can be guaranteed.
§2.3 Difficulties of Interpretation
So far, I have introduced the basic neo-Aristotelian naturalist framework, and I've given some
reasons  to  be  suspicious  of  its  cogency,  at  least  given  some ways  in  which  it  might  be
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developed. However, I need to do more to concretely link these wrong turns to existing neo-
Aristotelian  approaches  (or,  alternatively,  to  absolve  them  of  such  mistakes).  In  this
subsection,  then,  I  move through each of  the three main thinkers in  turn,  assessing their
vulnerability to these problems, and clarifying, in the course of this discussion, the issues at
stake.
§2.3.1 Foot
Foot's teleological requirement for elements of a life-form to have evaluative relevance, as
noted  in  §2.1.2  above,  informs her  ultimate  account  of  natural  goodness  to  a  significant
extent.  However,  it  is  dubious  why  the  three  ends  she  identifies  –  'development',  'self-
maintenance' and 'reproduction' – should be thought to have ethical relevance for humans. In
fact, Foot appears to admit  that this account of the ends of natural good is not suitable to
ground ethics. Unfortunately, this takes the form of an ad hoc-seeming exception for human
beings. For Foot, '[h]uman good is  sui generis'  (2001, 51). While she thinks that 'lack of
capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being', she also holds that '[t]he bearing and
raising of children is not an ultimate good in human life, because other elements of good such
as the demands of work to be done may give a man or woman reason to renounce family life.'
(42). Although she might attempt to accommodate this within her teleological account by
arguing that such work is also for the sake of the three ends, she does not appear to do so37.
37 Obviously, this violence to the claim that human good stands to human life in just the same way that (non-
human) animal good does to animal life (e.g. 2001, 44). Instead, she weakens the claim to being only that 'a 
common conceptual structure remains' (51). It would fit better with the core aim of neo-Aristotelian 
naturalism to drop the 'development, self-maintenance, and reproduction' gloss entirely, except if it is to be 
understood, as I later advocate, as an explication of what is involved in preserving life-forms, rather than 
something independent to which life-forms are related. But this would conflict with Foot's explicit 
motivation for providing the gloss in the first place: her dissatisfaction with the thought that all elements of 
the life-form, per se, are of normative relevance.
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Instead, Foot eventually arrives at the proposal that the central locus for evaluations of human
beings is the quality of their rational wills (66-7). She then proceeds (66-80) to give a sketch
of an account of various factors that can contribute to the goodness or badness of a person's
will. However, she still maintains that there is a sense of human 'good' that is not identical to
the 'goodness' which is constituted by the quality of the will (92). And, although there is a
connection between the human good and happiness (81-90), and between virtue (which is
connected to the quality of the will) and happiness, this connection is left unclear (94-8). In
the end,  Foot appears to endorse this  disunity,  in  a way that may be of comfort  to  anti-
reductionists: she does not believe that she has provided a method for settling all disputes
about substantial moral questions, but that
in a way, nothing is settled, but everything is left as it was. The account...merely gives
a framework within which disputes are said to take place, and tries to get rid of some 
intruding philosophical theories...that tend to trip us up.' (116).
However,  the  overall  unclarity  of  her  perspective  remains.  Despite  this  non-reductionist-
seeming conclusion, her early claims that the meaning of 'good' is the same in its applications
across the animal world, and that life-form concepts need to be combined with teleology to be
evaluatively relevant, coupled with her failure to clarify that evaluation of humans is a matter
for ethics, justify some continued anti-reductionist suspicion of her proposals.
§2.3.2 Hursthouse
In  one  respect  at  least38,  Hursthouse's  position  is  clearly  less  vulnerable  to  the  anti-
38 It is unclear whether Hursthouse is more or less vulnerable than Foot with respect to the structure of her 
grounding. On the one hand, she relies less on Thompson's pure life-form concepts, which I take to provide 
the best prospect for a truly non-reductive Aristotelian naturalism. On the other, at least her view then only 
has one conception of natural goodness, against which things can be evaluated. If this is a thoroughly ethical
conception, open to revision based on ethical judgement, her view stands a reasonable chance of being non-
reductive, the concerns I mention immediately below notwithstanding. (As it happens, the content of that 
single conception of natural good is, ethically speaking, quite implausible: are individual survival and the 
continuation of the species really of significant intrinsic value? But the reductive/non-reductive distinction 
is about the structure of a grounding, not its specific normative content, so this lack of cogency is not 
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reductionist  critique  than  Foot's.  This  is  because  Hursthouse  explicitly  views  natural-
goodness evaluation as a part of ethics, and her discussion appears also to endorse a kind of
Neurathian  feedback  between  straightforwardly  ethical  judgements  and  'naturalist'  ones
(1999,  207-8).  For  example,  she notes  that  there will  be a  “subtle  interplay between the
possible validation of a given character trait as a virtue [i.e. in terms of its contribution to the
human natural good] and a modification in one's detailed conception of that virtue” (227).
These are precisely the sorts of interconnections that one would expect to see in a fully non-
reductive naturalism. However, there is at least one element in Hursthouse's treatment that
looks problematic.
Both her non-reductionist presentation, and the worrying factor that remains, can be seen in
the following passages:
The pretensions of Aristotelian naturalism are not, in any ordinary understanding of 
the  terms,  either  'scientific'  or  'foundational'.  It  does  not  seek  to  establish  its  
conclusions from 'a neutral point of view'. (193)
This is, plainly, intended to avert the suspicion of reductionism. However, this is supposed to
be coherent with the view that:
Neither side [of an imagined disagreement] believes what they believe about how life 
works on the basis of...observation or statistical analysis. The beliefs are part and pa
rcel of their ethical...outlook, and the...disagreements should surely count as ethical 
disagreements. But they are far from obviously part of an ethical outlook, and far from
being obvious candidates for 'evaluative beliefs'.... I suppose we could classify them 
as 'ethical but non-evaluative beliefs about human nature'... But if we do classify them
thus, the parameters of the contemporary debate about the rationality or objectivity of 
morality shift... the extensions of 'value-laden' and 'from within an ethical outlook' do 
not coincide. (189-90).
It is not clear what work, exactly, the notion of the ethical-but-not-evaluative is supposed to
do here. The thought appears to be that recognising the prima facie factuality of judgements
employing concepts like 'survival' or 'the continuance of the species' tells against their being
relevant for my current concerns.)
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value-laden, in the way that other more obviously ethical concepts seem to be. The claim that
some  only-ethically-accessible  facts  are  nevertheless  not  'value-laden'  is  worrying;  it
suggests,  Hursthouse's  pleas of innocence notwithstanding, that  there is  a significant gulf
between concepts like 'virtue' and 'good', and the concepts she wants to ground them in. I take
it that 'value-ladenness' signifies, for Hursthouse, and Foot39, the involvement of elements of
psychology which had – for much of the 20th Century – been the near-exclusive domain of
non-cognitivists: emotions, pragmatic commitments within social groupings, and so on. The
insistence that ideas of natural good are not 'evaluative' thus suggests that they do not involve
these emotional and social capacities, and do not carry the 'non-rational' and 'non-objective'
taint that those capacities have traditionally40 been supposed to carry41. This is problematic.
Firstly,  because the implication that not being thus 'evaluative'  is  an (epistemically)  good
thing reinforces the (gender-prejudicial and false) idea that emotional responses and social
positions  are  at  best  epistemically  irrelevant,  and  at  worst  essentially  biasing.  Secondly,
because  it  is  hard  to  make  the  view  that  natural  goodness  concepts  are  non-evaluative
consistent  with  the  thesis  that  they  are  part  of  ethics  and  depend  upon  virtue  for  their
recognition. Surely, if the top-level ethical concepts are 'evaluative', and those concepts are in
justificatory contact – through both being parts of ethics – with these simpler, more 'natural'
concepts, the connection between them will have to be content-preserving if it is going to be
justificatory.  If  the  'continuance  of  the  species'  is  going  to  justify  virtuous  action42,  the
39 Foot's discussion in Chapter 1 of Natural Goodness – which is aimed squarely against the non-cognitivist, 
and which she treats as a foundation for the work that follows – would appear to confirm this suspicion in 
her case.
40 As should now be clear, McDowellian metaethics draws the sting from such contrasts, by insisting that 
ethical awareness irreducibly (or 'undisentanglably') involves things from both sides of the dichotomy. 
Ethical awareness just is worldly engagement which involves a particular, sui generis cocktail of human 
capacities. But if Hursthouse's metaethics was similarly oriented, what could 'non-evaluative' mean, other 
than 'non-ethical'?
41 Perhaps not coincidentally, these are often gendered concepts, being 'soft' and 'feminine' rather than 'hard' 
and 'masculine' like the natural sciences. See Code 1991, amongst others, for development of this sort of 
line of thought.
42 Or, for example, if judgements about virtue are going to play a role in forming a conception of the 
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concepts 'continuance of the species' and 'virtuous action' will have to share content. And if
(as I am presuming, based upon the argument of the previous Chapter) the McDowellian
conception of ethical thought as irreducibly cognitive  and affective/motivational is correct,
this will be impossible unless there is 'evaluative' content on both sides.43
The problem, somewhat ironically given the important work that neo-Aristotelians have done
in undermining oppositions between fact and value44, is that Hursthouse, at least, seems to be
relying on that very dichotomy. If, alternatively, there is no strict distinction between fact and
value  –  if  propositions  with  value-laden  content  can  nevertheless  be  factual  –  then  the
motivation for what she says here evaporates. Rather than arguing that facts about health or
disease,  or  natural  goodness or  defect,  are  so  obviously  factual  (but  not 'evaluative')  that
ethics can be factually-based too, the way is open to use the prima facie factuality of these
claims as counterexamples to the distinction – they are clearly factual  and evaluative too!
Once the rigid dichotomy is finally laid to rest, there will be no need to stress differences in
kind between traditionally ethical judgements (about virtue, about justice) and 'natural' ones
(about  humanity  or  health).  And  then  no  suspicion  of  reductionism  will  arise:  ethical
judgement will have no in principle boundaries, it will be evaluative facts all the way down –
from 'virtue' to 'humanity' – and every possible element of an ethical perspective can thus be
placed into Neurathian contact with every other.
'continuance of the species', mutatis mutandis.
43 One way that this might not be so would be if the relationship between the simple, 'natural' concepts – 'the 
continuance of the species', 'characteristic freedom from pain, and characteristic enjoyment', etc. – and the 
ethical ones 'the good life', 'virtue', were merely instrumental. Presumably, one event can be justified relative
to another if it makes that other more likely (and the latter is itself of value) no matter how different those 
events are – one requiring 'evaluative' capacities for its conceptualisation, the other merely requiring 'factual'
ones. But, I take it that neo-Aristotelians are after more than merely an instrumental link between the human
natural good and the good life, virtue, etc. If not, it would be hard to see how their view differs from 
(perhaps two-level) consequentialism. At any rate, an instrumental link would not be sufficient to play the 
required role in a Nussbaum-style capability approach – possessing the capabilities, as an essential element 
of the good, would no longer be related to our identities as human, except perhaps by accident.
44 Hursthouse (108-120) has, indeed, contributed to this project. See esp. Putnam 1993, Walsh 2003.
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§2.3.3 Thompson
Like the others, Thompson is aware of the threat from anti-reductionism:
The objection I...want to take seriously starts from the thought that in employing such 
notions as life and organism and life-form or species we introduce something foreign, 
in particular something 'biological', or crudely empirical, into the elements of ethical 
theory. Any such view, one thinks, must involve either a scientistic dissolution of the 
ethical, tending maybe towards an 'evolutionary ethics', or else the covert substitution 
of an outdated metaphysics for what we know to be empirical. Each path leads to its 
own absurdities.  Together they may be thought to  betray a yearning to view our  
practices 'from outside' or 'from sideways on' in hope perhaps with providing them 
with a foundation or external grounding... But suppose that [my positive, exegetical 
project concerning concepts of 'life- form', etc., is successful]. Then the employment 
of  such  concepts  within  ethical  theory  would  merely  make  articulate  something  
already implicit in pensée sauvage practique – and it  might  seem  that  a....neo-
Aristotelian is looking at things head on, not sideways on. (2008, 31-2).
Clearly, Thompson means this as a riposte precisely to the McDowellian worries that I have
described – 'sideways-on' is classic McDowell. What is more, as I shall show, Thompson's
relatively pure concept of life-form, without the potentially reductive glosses that Foot and
Hursthouse offer, stands the best chance of supporting a plausible neo-Aristotelian naturalist
ethic; perhaps this relative purity is partly the result of greater attention to anti-reductionist
concerns. There is also the grain of a dismissal of those concerns here, however, that I should
respond to. Thompson, in effect, notes that accusing a thesis of reductionism can be little
more  than  a  rhetorical  flourish,  overlaid  upon  a  more  straightforward  attack  on  the
plausibility of the specific claims the thesis makes. As he says, if a version of neo-Aristotelian
naturalism is plausible as an exegesis of our discourse and practice surrounding ideas like
'good', 'virtue', etc., it will hardly be an objection to say that it is reducing ethics to something
else. In that case, the naturalist would be revealing what ethics  is. This is not an effective
rebuttal of McDowellian worries, however (if that is what Thompson intends), because the
anti-reductionist evidently doesn't think that the exegesis is plausible, and points to features
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of ethics in evidence45. Accusations of reductionism about ethics are valid just in case the
theories they aim at are implausible revisions of ethical thought, as opposed to exegeses of it;
and whether or not this is the case here is, of course, precisely the point at issue.
It  appears,  then,  that  neo-Aristotelian  naturalism's  vulnerability  to  anti-reductionist
argumentation is somewhat mixed46. Each of the views I have sketched has some degree of
defence against such arguments, but each remains vulnerable, not least because of continuing
unclarity. It is, therefore, hard to definitively establish whether or not Hursthouse's or Foot's
versions of naturalism are problematically reductive. It seems possible, for all I have said,
that  what  Foot  and Hursthouse have  offered is  not  a  theory that  tries  to  shortcut  ethical
judgement at all, but merely an (occasionally quite implausible) ethical account of the good
life47. This possibility notwithstanding, the source of the problems that threaten them is clear:
both Hursthouse and Foot seem to seek a basis for ethical judgement that lies, to some extent,
beyond ethics itself, and conceive of natural goodness within that frame. The direction to
turn, in looking for a neo-Aristotelian theory that will be immune to such worries, is then
equally clear: the life-form, and the judgements of natural goodness that it supports, must be
located within the sphere of ethical thought. Explaining how this can be done effectively will
45 Perhaps the reductionist could admit that what they offer is not a plausible exegesis of ethical thought, or 
anything connected with it, but insist that there is some entirely separate kind of practical thought that is 
implicated by concepts like 'natural defect'. It is sufficient to note that it is not clear what this alternative 
could be. Firstly, such a system of evaluation would inevitably have to compete with ethics, if it did not 
aspire to ground it – sometimes the evaluations would diverge – and that looks like a competition it couldn't 
fail to lose. Secondly, people (or most of them anyway) already engage in and care about ethics; I see no 
reason to think that anybody cares about this other sort of evaluation. Of course, people do sometimes 
engage in Aristotelian-sounding evaluative talk about humanity – some behaviours are described as 
'inhuman', others as 'unnatural'. But I do not know how to hear such things except as engagements in ethics. 
If someone were genuinely to evaluate me as (e.g.) not being a very good human on the grounds that I have 
31 healthy teeth rather than 32, I do not know what to think except that they are doing ethics (badly).
46 John Skorupski has attributed a form of reductionist Aristotelian naturalism to Terrance Irwin (2012; 319-
21); if his exegesis is correct, Irwin's version is more clearly reductionistic than Foot's, Hursthouse's, or 
Thompson's.
47 This would be the case iff their theories can be reconstructed so as to meet the two conditions I give in 
§2.3.2 below.
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occupy the rest of this Chapter.
I'll conclude this section by offering a first attempt – at a way of expressing the link between
humanity as a life-form concept and the concept of the good life – that is not reductionistic in
the way that Foot and Hursthouse's links threaten to be. Before, in my summary of the neo-
Aristotelian naturalist grounding of the capability approach, I said that an individual has a
good life  to  the  extent  that  they adequately instantiate  the  species  norm;  a  standard that
fundamentally  expresses  what  it  is  to  be  a  member  of  humanity.  It  is  perhaps  unclear,
assuming that the argument of this section is correct, and no reductionistic account of how
ethical good relates to biological humanity is plausible, why there should be any connection
between these concepts at all. On one level, the intuitive plausibility of the basic connection
is  not  entirely  relevant,  because  one  of  my purposes  throughout  the  Thesis  has  been  to
provide  an  account  of  humanity  which  involves  a  clear  link  to  ethics  (and  particularly
justice).  Even if  neo-Aristotelian naturalism had no inherent  plausibility,  this  would be a
benefit,  because it  would help to clarify the basis  for universalism. There may be limits,
beyond this motivation, to what I can say; if people genuinely do not feel the pull of the
thought that better exemplifying humanity could be the same sort of thing as living a better
(human) life, I may not be able to make that thought attractive. However, I think it is deeply
attractive – what the good person is is a good example of humanity. Once we get clearer on
the nature of this standard of humanity and its complex interconnections with ethical thought
– which I hope the next section will achieve – the plausibility of this basic link should be
clearer, too.
§3 An Alternative View
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I  have  claimed  that  neo-Aristotelian  naturalism,  as  developed  at  least  by  Foot  and
Hursthouse, contains a tension between an implicit impulse to reduce ethics to something
more primal, and (occasionally) the explicit endorsement of the view that no such reduction is
either necessary or possible. In this section, I describe and defend an insistently non-reductive
version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism.
§3.1 The Human Life-Form and the Virtuous Life
§3.1.1 Life-Form and the Good Life
As I have said, the problem with many forms of neo-Aristotelian naturalism is the extent to
which they attempt to reduce the human good, and the virtuous perspective from which that
good is uniquely visible,  to a basis that is ill-suited to account for the particular rational
character  of  human  life,  and  that  is  not  clearly  of  ethical  relevance.  It  is  not  clear  that
'development,  self-maintenance,  and  reproduction'  (Foot),  or  'individual  survival,...the
continuance of [the relevant] species,... characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic
enjoyment,...and...the  good  functioning  of  [the  relevant]  social  group'  (Hursthouse)  are
significant enough to ground virtue, right action, or ethical goodness. Indeed, it is not really
clear  that  such  things  are  intrinsic  goods  at  all.  This  seems  to  leave  neo-Aristotelian
naturalism in a very bad position. However, it does not mean we have to abandon all of the
connections that recent Aristotelians have sought to defend; nor does it mean that we have to
discard all of the ways in which they have defended them. We can rehabilitate something of
the  ambitions  of  Foot  and  Hursthouse  (inter  alia),  by  seeing  the  human  life-form as  a
thoroughly ethical  idea – not something extra-ethical  to  which ethical  concepts  might  be
reduced – and by reconstructing the neo-Aristotelian naturalist story in that light.
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Consider Thompson's idea of 'life-form', as described in §2.1.1 above. The core thesis is that
life-form concepts supply normative standards, of a kind; they specify a set of functionings
that organisms48 must have if they are to count as exemplifying that form well. Since it is
extremely rare  for  any individual  organism to  perfectly  instantiate  such a  standard,  it  is
necessary to  distinguish  between  minimal and  full exemplification.  Once  an  organism is
recognised as minimally instantiating a life-form F, the standard that F gives applies to it, and
it will be evaluable in terms of its distance from full exemplification. As Thompson says:
If someone...asks, “But what does 'what most of them do' have to do with what [some 
individual] does?” the answer will have to be “Not much, really.” But if, in the other 
case, someone asks, “What bearing does 'what they do' have on what [that individual] 
does or is doing?” the answer will have to be “Everything.” For, again, every thought 
of an individual organism as alive is mediated by thought of the life-form it bears. A 
true judgement of natural defect thus supplies an 'immanent critique' of its subject.49
(2008, 81) [My italics.]
Being  human  means  being  disposed  to  go  on  in  a  certain  way  –  to  exhibit  certain
functionings; a certain form. But, given our actual concepts of humanity, it also brings in a
broader  conception  of  functioning  that  most  human  organisms  might  never  actually
instantiate50. In thinking of a being as human one brings in this more-rarely-realised standard
of humanity as much as the everyday, minimal one.51
Notice, however, that there is nothing in this concept of 'life-form' that specifies that all such
life-forms have to be characterisable without using sui generis concepts, such as those which
belong to ethics. Nor is there any suggestion that all life-forms must have much in common –
48 Arguably, what it is to be an organism is to be evaluable in terms of one life-form concept or another, as I 
suggested in §2.1.2 above. Compare Thompson 2008, 56-62.
49 Compare Nussbaum 1995, 118-9.
50 Remember that there is no logical barrier to this – life-form concepts are not based upon statistical 
regularities.
51 It might not be the case that this rare standard has to be implicated along with the common, minimal one. 
Perhaps the concept could work differently, specifying only some very basic and clearly ethically irrelevant 
characteristics. If it did, this might give rise to suspicion that there is not, actually, anything worldly that we 
are making contact with in using life-form concepts as evaluative standards. But I take it as sufficient for my
purposes to claim that this is in fact how life-form concepts, or at least the life-form concept 'human', works.
Compare Thompson's contrasts between 'logical', 'local', and 'substantive' 'Footianism' in his 2003.
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that they all count as life-forms is a meta-level, logical52 fact about them, and is compatible
with a wide range of other differences. Perhaps there could be living beings composed of
silicon materials, rather than carbon ones, for example. It is not clear, then, that all life-forms
have to be glossed in terms of (e.g.) reproductive advantage, or individual survival, or typical
bodily development. Nor is it clear why the life-form must exclusively involve things of that
'natural'53, seemingly culturally-invariant sort. The reason why such features are exclusively
emphasised by Foot and Hursthouse is, perhaps, that they aim to be characterising 'humans',
qua 'homo sapiens', and it does not seem very plausible that members of prehistoric  homo
sapiens exhibited much behavioural continuity with contemporary humans (unless cultural
specificity is ruled out). But, firstly, another notable feature of life-form concepts is that they
don't have to match up to scientific concepts of species (Thompson 2008, 53-62), so there is
room to claim that pre-historic homo sapiens weren't really 'humans', in the ethically relevant
sense,  at  all.  And,  secondly,  even  if  we  need  to  preserve  a  close  extensional  similarity
between the concepts homo sapiens and 'human', it is not really clear why culturally-specific
features  couldn't  be  included.  After  all,  all  members  of  homo  sapiens probably  had  the
biological potential to instantiate many culture-specific modern functionings, if only the right
process  of  enculturation  had  been  present  in  their  environment.  And,  given  life-form-
membership is  a  matter  of  disposition towards characteristic  functioning,  evidence of the
relevant biological potentials potentially just is evidence of life-form-membership54.
Once this is established, it is open to us to formulate a definitively non-reductive version of
52 Cf. especially Thompson's endorsement of Frege's project of logical analysis (2008, 13-22).
53 McDowell would say 'first natural' here. Compare Appendix B, §4.
54 Compare §1.3 above. Arguably, what I am here referring to as 'biological potential' will include many of the 
features which form the set of human 'basic capabilities'. On the other hand, perhaps some basic capabilities 
will not reduce to anything straightforwardly biological, standing for a complex interaction between 
biological materials and (perhaps cultural) features of the environment.
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neo-Aristotelian  naturalism,  using  the  same  basic  analysis  of  life-form  concepts  that
Thompson has provided, but insisting that it is a matter of ethical evaluation what 'humans'
are,  and what is good for them as such. Many of the specific normative theses that neo-
Aristotelian naturalists emphasise, like the importance of human sociality and habituation, or
the ubiquity of vulnerability and dependence on others55,  can still  be (and, plausibly,  are)
correct,  on  this  interpretation.  But  they  are  correct  because  they  are  excellent  ethical
assessments of human lives, accurately described, and not because they are able to reach
down below the level of ethical evaluations of features of life to a supposedly deeper one.
Rather than thinking of such evaluations as registering that certain ways of living rather than
others serve the continued existence of particular homo sapiens bodies and their statistically-
regular organic functionings (which they often will, irrelevant as this may be) we can think of
them as directly serving the continued existence of good human lives.
I can now reconsider the language of Foot and Hursthouse, and evaluate whether or not it has
continuing relevance. I shall show that it does, given certain revisions. For we can reinterpret
talk of (e.g.) 'development, self-maintenance, and reproduction', not as processes that occur
(or fail to occur) in organisms – conceived of independently of any ethical frame – but as
processes that operate within the human  life-form itself56. That is, what is preserved by the
processes is the formed life, not merely life simpliciter. In the human case, what is preserved
is  the  good life  (ethically considered),  where  this  is  a  life  of  virtue,  and where  it  is  the
continuous  inculcation  and  practice  of  virtue  itself  that  does  the  preserving57.  This
55 See MacIntyre 1999, which provides a detailed exposition of various ways in which Aristotelian thinking 
can help us to recognise the significance of our animal fragility, including helpful links to similar work by 
feminists such as Eva Feder Kittay and Virginia Held (e.g. 3).
56 If so reinterpreted, there would be far less significant conflict between Foot's thesis and my proposal at this 
point. Despite e.g. what Thompson says in his 2003, which would support this rapprochement, I still have 
my doubts as to whether this would be a fair reading of Foot, but I cannot go into further detail here.
57 As should be clear from Ch.4 (esp. §§1.3-4), this is tautological within the McDowellian framework: virtue 
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preservation of value will be of two kinds. Firstly, the practice of virtue is itself a major part
of the human good, and so working to make people more virtuous (most straightforwardly by
becoming  more  virtuous  oneself)  will  constitutively  realise  the  goods  the  virtuous  life
involves. There are several reasons to make this claim. A) it is essentially the same as Foot's
emphasis on the distinctive centrality of practical rationality – the 'good will' – to human life,
and preserves the cogency of that point58. B) it seems to be necessary to accommodate the
epistemic significance of virtue, as the disposition to see things aright. Plausibly, having this
sort of knowledge is of value even apart from the good actions that it causes – especially
when the affective components of such knowledge are kept in mind. And finally, C) the life of
virtue has many other elements whose intrinsic value seems clear, prima facie. To give some
specific  examples,  the  virtuous would  exhibit  proper  dispositions  of  care  for  others,  and
would respond with appreciation to the goodness of others and of external objects, which
cannot fail to make their lives better – these are valuable functionings if any are. Secondly,
virtuous dispositions will have an instrumental link to goods that they cannot realise alone59.
Although it  might  not  be possible  to  guarantee the existence of valuable friendships,  for
example, by individual virtue alone, individual virtue will make them more likely to come
about. Looking at it this way makes it easy to see why the telos of the processes of virtue-
creation  –  of  its  'development,  self-maintenance,  and  reproduction'  –  can  ground  ethical
is a name for the disposition to judge and act rightly; in accordance with the good. The virtuous then cannot 
fail to preserve the good, if anything can. As I also stress later (arguably, contra McDowell) it is not 
plausible that virtue is sufficient for the good life, and so there is no guarantee that the successful practice of
virtue will lead to the preservation of the good over time. But it is the only thing that could be expected to 
do that. (Consider: a supernova could wipe out all life on Earth tomorrow, even if everyone was perfectly 
virtuous. This would bring the human good to an abrupt end. But it would not follow that someone must 
have been unvirtuous despite appearances. There are no guarantees.)
58 See §2.3.1 above.
59 This follows, again, from the McDowellian conception of virtue with which I am working. The virtuous will
act, in response to existing value, or the prospect of greater value, in such a way as to contribute to its 
preservation and further realisation. The virtuous are able to promote the good so effectively because they 
are excellent epistemic agents where it is concerned – they see things aright, where ethics is concerned; and 
they are disposed to act in accordance with their normative judgements.
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value60; for what these processes aim at just is ethical value: the particular shaping of homo
sapiens materials that is the good human life.
§3.1.2 Cultural and non-Cultural Formation
The claims of the last paragraph may remain unclear,  or seem wildly revisionary of neo-
Aristotelian orthodoxy, or both. To try to allay these worries, I shall offer a diagnosis of the
difference between my view of life-form and the Foot-Hursthouse view I reject. In summary,
a thoroughly non-reductive naturalism must meet two conditions. Firstly, the contents of the
human life-form concept must be a matter of ethical evaluation – evaluation, that is, from the
perspective of virtue. Secondly (as a consequence), theorists must allow cultural processes of
formation into the content of the human life-form; in particular, they must include precisely
those cultural processes that result in virtuous agency61. If virtue is of constitutive value, and
through its link to the general promotion of the good is of overwhelming instrumental value
too, virtue should be our focus. The only way to know what the good life – the life of true
humanity – looks like is to cultivate virtue; the only possibly reliable way to live that life is
also to cultivate virtue62. Why then would we pretend that virtue itself is justified only by
some extrinsic, prior good that it has no standing to critique?
Reductive views, it now appears, are distinguished by their reticence to endorse this sort of
60 It is a good question whether or not it really makes sense to say that what is going on here is 'grounding'. 
Ultimately, what I am saying here is that ethical value grounds itself (we have a diverse family of normative 
concepts, but they are all intertwined). Cf. McDowell 2009e. I discuss these issues somewhat further in 
Appendix B.
61 There are likely to be other cultural conditions on a good life, apart from those that enable virtuous agency, 
and these must be included in the life-form too, but it is especially clear that the human good depends on 
virtue, whatever else it may depend on; in any case, the virtuous would promote these virtue-external goods 
insofar as they can be promoted anyway.
62 Of course the virtuous will endorse the processes that lead to their becoming so – whatever quality they 
have been able to add to their lives will have depended on those processes. This is insubstantial, and of itself
provides no practical guidance. Only an actual, first-order image of virtue can do that.
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theory, most likely because their 'naturalist' aspirations lead them to view it as a trivialising
evasion; not really a substantive theoretical contribution at all. This suggests two potential
problems for the view I have offered. Firstly, it threatens its putatively 'naturalistic' status.
Secondly, it implies that it is a total break from the tradition it claims to preserve. I shall say
little about the first problem here. However, it may help to note briefly that two of the ways
that 'natural' is used, in ordinary contexts and in philosophical discussion, would preclude the
anti-reductive theory I  have offered from counting as naturalistic.  The first  is  'natural'  as
opposed to 'cultural' or 'learned'; this is the contrast implied by the (thankfully now infamous)
dichotomy between 'nature' and 'nurture'63. If a 'naturalism' were a theory that does not invoke
cultural elements by definition, then of course this non-reductive form of Aristotelianism will
not be naturalistic. But it is not clear why such naturalism would be desirable: enculturation is
a worldly process, and learned behaviours are no less real than innate ones. The second is a
usage idiosyncratic to recent metaethics. According to this, naturalistic views are just those
that do not treat the ethical as sui generis, attempting to provide accounts of ethical concepts
(or properties, psychological states, methodologies, etc.) in non-ethical terms.64 Given that my
non-reductive version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism precisely  does treat the ethical as  sui
generis,  following McDowell, it  cannot be naturalistic in this  sense either. Despite this, I
think there are significant senses in which this view is naturalistic, and this is enough to retain
the description, but I cannot defend this claim fully here65. Ultimately, the nomenclature for
the approach is of no deep importance.
63 Cf. Mill 1904, which offers a similar distinction. On the latter sort of conception, it is obvious that ethics is 
non-natural, because ethical practices are clearly (if to a disputable extent) an artefact of human social 
construction. Disputes about 'naturalism', so construed, would be of little philosophical interest.
64 See Ridge 2014 for an overview of the vast number of ways these distinctions can be made. Not all 
naturalistic theories (so thought of) are naturalistic through-and-through: 'non-reductive naturalism', such as 
the Cornell Realism of Sturgeon and Boyd, is against sui-genereity at the level of methodology, but content 
with it at the level of concepts.
65 Appendix B supplies the beginnings of a defence.
237
The second problem is a worry that in constructing my view I have done great violence to the
tradition to which it claims to belong. It is easy to see why this might be the case: if the point
of neo-Aristotelian naturalism was to relate ethics to the notion of  life,  simpliciter,  I  will
appear to be entirely outside the tradition. But this issue is not as clear-cut as it seems to be.
Against this implication, it is significant that Aristotelians like Foot are  already not talking
about the preservation of life just simpliciter – for it is specifically the life that belongs to an
individual's  kind that  is  supposed  to  be  developed,  preserved  and  reproduced  by  that
individual. There is, in fact, no notion of life simpliciter available within the neo-Aristotelian
framework, at least as formulated by Thompson; to be alive is just to bear a life-form, and so
anything that is alive will bear some specific life-form or other. For contrast, consider a gene-
selectionist  variant  of  ethical  naturalism,  according  to  which  individual  organisms  are
vehicles for genetic material, and individual success is a mere proxy for the success of that
material66. On such a model, there would be something characteristic of life (the presence of
genetic material) that would be more basic than species-identity (because species-identity is a
property of organisms, not individual genes). Then, there would be something apart from any
species-specific life that might (or might not) be continued by the success or failure of the
individual. It would then make sense to say, on this view, that the preservation of life (qua
genetic material) was served or vitiated by the success or failure of individual organisms. But,
clearly, this is very far from the view that Foot et al. propose67. Once we see this, it should be
easier to place culturally formed life at the heart of neo-Aristotelian naturalism.
66 What I have in mind is a normative transformation of a caricature of Richard Dawkins' thesis in The Selfish 
Gene (1976) and later works. I do not mean to suggest that anyone really holds a view as implausible as 
this.
67 Cf. Lott 2012a, esp. (422), here. Lott 2012b provides an interesting attempt to deal with recent objections to 
neo-Aristotelian naturalism (especially those of FitzPatrick (2000) while preserving the independence of 
life-form judgement from ethics. I believe that the cost of this is an even greater than usual obscurity of the 
grounds to view life-form judgements as ethically relevant, but I cannot defend this here.
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§3.2 The Right and the Good
I have endorsed the view that the image of the life of the virtuous agent, and the image of the
exemplary human life, are closely related concepts. In this subsection I explicate further the
proposal that the life of the virtuous agent and the good life are connected. Specifically, I
shall  claim that the virtues are  necessary (but not sufficient) ingredients of the good life.
Firstly, I'll explain this proposition, and its place in the tradition, in a little more detail. Then
I'll address the question of what consequences this has for the abstract relationship between
the right and the good.
Given what I have said so far, the availability of a strong claim about the relationship between
the right and the good should be clear. After all, I began by explaining that the human good is
characterised (for neo-Aristotelian naturalists) in terms of life-form evaluation. In turn, life-
form  evaluation,  when  applied  to  humankind,  picks  out  the  quality  of  rational  will  as
centrally important. When this is then glossed in terms of the disposition to see things aright
and act accordingly, the circle is complete. The connection between the right and the good
here is twofold. Firstly, it is (constitutively) good to act rightly, in virtue of the centrality of
the good will. Secondly, right acts will be just those that are properly responsive to the values
that things have68. Human goodness requires right action; right action is responsiveness to the
good.
68 In Chapter 6, I introduce a complication in this schema, with reference to the virtue of justice, specifically. 
The upshot is that we are likely to need two notions of right action; one which connects to D-reasons, and 
the other to V-reasons (see Ch.4 §2.2, and especially Ch.6 fn.72. Only the conception of right action which 
connects to V-reasons will connect to virtue, as something both necessary and (partially) sufficient for the 
human good. To clarify, when I refer to 'rational will' and 'the good will' above, I am still not talking about a 
faculty whose deliverances can be individuated apart from consideration of what they are connected to in 
the external world: the rational will which connects to virtue (and is a constitutive part of the good) is a will 
which responds to the reasons that there are.
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That  said,  it  is  not  yet  entirely clear  either  how strong these connections  are,  nor which
elements of the tradition I am being faithful to in asserting them. As to the first question, there
are four  options.  Firstly,  virtue (and the right  actions it  enables)  could be necessary  and
sufficient for the good life.  Working within the naturalist framework I have described, this
would amount to the claim that goodness of the will  exhausts the human natural good. An
organism would then be a good example of the life-form 'human' – and, thus, a 'good human'
– to the extent that, and only to the extent that, she possesses a good will. Arguably, Foot
comes close to endorsing this position when she emphasises the overwhelming importance of
the good will for human life (2001, 66-80)69. Secondly, the virtues could be sufficient for a
good human life, but not necessary for it.  On this view, virtue merely opens up one of a
myriad of different equally good ways of living, the rest of which do not require a person to
act rightly. Thirdly, the virtues could be necessary but not sufficient for a good life. As I have
said, this is the alternative I endorse. Finally, they could be neither necessary nor sufficient.
This last seems to be Hursthouse's preferred view. She claims that “[Virtue] is not necessary,
since it is generally acknowledged that the wicked may flourish like the green bay tree. And it
is not sufficient, because...[a]s soon as it is admitted that exercising virtue on a particular
occasion may lead to my life's being cut short, or to its ruin, [that] claim is undercut” (1999,
172). Rather, 'for the most part, by and large' (1999, 185), virtues benefit their possessor.
It is not clear to me, especially if the other McDowellian alterations in the structure of neo-
Aristotelian naturalism are made, why virtue should not be considered necessary for the good
life. Recall that, on the view I have urged, the connection between virtue and the good is not
69 She certainly seems to endorse the necessity claim: “virtues play a necessary part in the lives of human 
beings as do stings in the life of bees” (2001, 35). See fn.70 below, however, for remarks that suggest that 
she doesn't after all think that virtue is sufficient.
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instrumental  but  (at  least  partially)  constitutive.  Virtue  just  is goodness  of  the  will,  and
goodness of the will  just is part of what makes a human life good. A life lived with a bad
(evaluatively inadequate) will, then, cannot fail to be a bad (evaluatively inadequate) life. On
the other hand, there seems to be little reason to hold that virtue, so conceived, is  sufficient
for a perfect – or even a minimally good – life. If someone is impeccably and invariably
virtuous, they will do no wrong, and so a major element of their good will be fully present.
But goodness of the will is not plausibly the whole of the human good, and one individual's
being perfectly virtuous cannot guarantee that they will not starve and die, or be in constant,
abject  misery,  if  only worldly conditions beyond their  control  are  sufficiently harsh.  The
world does not mysteriously conspire to reward virtue with extrinsic goods; it  is its own
reward70.71
Even given this, though, it is not entirely clear what sort of relationship is implicated here. In
particular, it may seem that what neo-Aristotelian naturalism proposes is a reduction of the
right  to  the  good.  Some  recent  Aristotelians  have  seemed  to  endorse  such  a  reduction.
Hursthouse, for example, seems to do so in her initial statement of the core premiss of virtue
70 Cf. McDowell 1998p; 2009c. Both Foot and Hursthouse, notably, hold that McDowell's account of how 
virtue intrinsically benefits its possessor is too strong. However, I think both read McDowell wrongly here. 
Foot claims that McDowell identifies the good life with the life of virtue (Foot 2001, 97-8). Hursthouse 
claims that McDowell cannot make sense of tragic losses that virtue might entail (Hursthouse 1999, 179-
87). Both rely heavily on McDowell's claim that “no sacrifice necessitated by the [virtuous life]...can count 
as a genuine loss” (1998p, 17). On the face of it, this does seem to depend on a tacit thesis that virtue is 
sufficient for the good life (which I have already dismissed as implausible). However, two things need to be 
noted. Firstly, McDowell's thesis quoted above seems to depend on his thesis of silencing (18), which I 
already reject (see fn.50 in Ch.4). With silencing removed, there is no need to say anything as strong as the 
above. I can concede that some features of the nevertheless-virtuous act are tragic losses, which deny the 
agent the full realisation of their good, without denying that the rightness of their action is of constitutive 
benefit to them; a benefit that is not excised by the tragic context. Secondly, in any case, McDowell offers a 
gloss on the species of good that virtue is sufficient for that makes his claim much more plausible. “[T]he 
life [of virtue] is...the most satisfying life possible for its subject, circumstanced at each point as [she] is.” 
(19). Even if tragic circumstances prevent the virtuous person from living a perfect life, their virtue allows 
them to live as good a life as they can. If the controversial claim is only supposed to be true in this restricted
sense, it is not clear why Foot or Hursthouse (or myself) should object to it.
71 An obvious connection here is to Nussbaum's work on luck and vulnerability in the good life. See (2001b, 
318-72).
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ethics: 'An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in
character) do in the circumstances' (1999, 28). If this statement were trivial, this would be
unproblematic (and it would fit well with the McDowellian view I am proposing to treat it
precisely as trivially true). However, Hursthouse specifically rejects any interpretation of this
statement  according to  which it  is trivial  (30-1).  Interpreting it  as a  substantive claim,  it
amounts to a reduction of one thing: right action, to another: action that flows from virtue
(substantively  construed).  When  the  connection  between  virtue  and  the  human  good  –
whereby states of character are virtues just when they are appropriately oriented towards that
good – is considered too, it follows for Hursthouse that the rightness of actions is reducible to
their contribution to the human good. Later I shall endorse an argument, suggested by David
Copp and David Sobel, to the effect that this reductive stance is implausible. Before that, I
want to clarify that not all neo-Aristotelian thinkers think that a reduction is available here.
Foot, for example, seems to hold that we can assess kinds of act independently of assessing
any states  of  character  that  they are  (contingently)  associated with  (e.g.  at  2001,  113-5).
McDowell too seems to deny this reduction's validity, but for quite different reasons. Recall
that the virtuous agent,  for McDowell,  just  is the person who sees things aright and acts
accordingly. This leaves no room for any distinction between the image of the virtuous agent
and the image of right action: the connection between them is (mutually) constitutive, and
they are required to cohere. Given the further necessary connection between virtue and the
human  good  that  I  mentioned  above,  it  will  follow  that  those  who  act  rightly  thereby
contribute to their good. But this does not follow because one separate thing – right action –
is reducible to another – virtue – but because right action and virtue should not be understood
independently of one another in the first place.72
72 There are echoes of McDowell's quietistic rejection of the Euthyphronic choice here, as discussed in the last
Chapter. Similarly, the Copp-Sobel argument below is reminiscent especially of his 'siblings' metaphor 
(1998o).
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It is fortunate that Hursthouse's reductive stance here isn't mandatory for neo-Aristotelians,
because it does not seem particularly compelling. Consider the following:
For  Hursthouse...the  alternatives  we  face  are  morally  neutral  in  themselves  and  
they only  gain  a  moral  color  by  reflecting  the  moral  color  of  the  states  of
character...that we can  turn  toward  them.  This  view  does  not  make  sense  of  our
admiration for the virtues... We admire the fact that a virtuous person is attuned to and
energized by the morally relevant facts that she detects in the world. We do not see her
virtue as a searchlight penetrating a world that would otherwise have no moral features at
all; we see it as a telescope and source of energy that detects and strives and is admirable for 
these reasons. (Copp and Sobel 2004, 552).
In line with the McDowellian, quietistic account of metaethics that I advanced in the previous
Chapter, I think there is something right about this, but that it does not tell the whole story.
Hursthouse's picture here plays the role that the constructivist played there, while Copp and
Sobel play the role of the 'robust' realist. Their claim is that Hursthouse cannot account for the
sense in which there are norms of right action that do not depend on the subjective character
states that individuals just happen to have (however appropriate those states may be in their
own terms). On the other hand, it may seem mysterious why those norms of right action are
norms for people if we can't make sense of the idea that acting in accordance with them
would be good for them. From any even vaguely Aristotelian point of view, it is hard to see
how something can be good for an agent if it has nothing to do with their particular identity73.
The McDowellian version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, however, does not have either of
these problems. The relation of the virtuous to facts about right action is not one of creation,
but it is not much like astronomical discovery either. We cannot make sense of virtue (and its
admirability) without reflecting on the appropriateness of what the virtuous do, but we cannot
73 Compare Williams on Kantian theory in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (2011, 60-78). More generally, 
the attack on the 'peculiar institution' of 'morality', which Williams typically contrasts with a broader, less 
inhumane 'ethics', also resonates to some extent with my claims here. A properly Neurathian methodology 
stands a good chance of avoiding the alienating features he identifies so well, without falling into the 
quagmire of relativism and subjectivism that his own account responds skirts so near to (e.g. 156-173, on 
the rejection of universalism, and 192-3, on subjectivism about reasons).
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make sense of that very appropriateness without reflecting on the quality of a life of virtue74.
The right cannot be strictly reduced to the good using the concept of virtue, but it cannot
reasonably be thought of as entirely independent of it either.
In this  Chapter,  I  have aimed to present  a  revised version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism
which preserves the first-order potential of that view – as a motivation to introduce a broader
range of anthropocentric considerations into ethics,  and as a way of making sense of the
significance of humanity for global justice – without introducing the difficulties that it has
often been thought to pose. My conclusion is that, although there are serious problems within
the tradition, as I've interpreted it, it can be made compatible, both with the McDowellian
metaethical framework which I laid out in the previous Chapter, and with plausible first-order
judgements about humanity, the good life, and the role of virtue. In the last Chapter, I build
on this conclusion with the ultimate aim of producing a framework for a capability approach
to global justice which makes sense as a whole.
74 The Neurathian theme here has been an emphasis throughout, but it is worth noting a difference in the way 
it is useful at this point. Before (Chapter 3, esp. §§2.3-4; Chapter 4, esp. §1.4), Neurathian epistemology's 
primary significance lay in a feedback loop between first-order normative judgements and judgements about
the epistemic significance of different agents' contributions; an 'epistemological naturalism' that allowed us 
to reason about biases, marginalisation, etc. in a way that cohered with a plausible metaethics. In this 
Chapter, however, it has been of significance in establishing a feedback loop between various concepts, 
some clearly first-order norms, some more metaethical in origin. Rather than attempt to isolate one 
particular concept (justice, say), and proceed to make decisions about its construal and significance 
independently – perhaps relating it back to other concepts at the end of this process – the framework I 
propose encourages attempts to find a version of the concept that coheres with others, working on each with 
the others in mind. Cf. esp. McDowell 1994i, 78-82, and Hursthouse 1999, 153-7 and 165-7, for some 
different Aristotelian endorsements of the project of, so to speak, 'unifying from within'.
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Chapter 6: 
Humanity as the Polis
In this Chapter, I return to the focal topic of the Thesis, focussing on a clarification of the
connection  between the  individual-focused Aristotelian  naturalist  account  of  the  previous
Chapter, and global justice proper. Throughout the Thesis I have maintained that plausible
accounts of justice require plausible accounts of the human good. But so far, the latter notion
has received greater attention than the former. I have said that justice can be construed as
requiring that  every individual  instantiate  some diverse bundle  of  functionings,  including
many capabilities,  suitably  distributed  over  the  course  of  their  lives.  Further,  in  the  last
Chapter I claimed that we can and should think of right action as itself of constitutive benefit
to the agent, of appropriate emotional response as of constitutive benefit to the responder, etc.
This implies that the connection between justice and humanity is (at least) twofold: firstly, the
greater  presence  of  justice  is  of  constitutive  benefit  to  all  those  (all  humans)  who  are
implicated in that fact, and secondly, the presence of justice will be of instrumental benefit to
all  subjects  of  justice,  because  justice  involves  their  having the  wide  range of  goods-in-
themselves that I have been calling 'dignity'.
In  Chapter  5,  §1.2,  I  sketched the neo-Aristotelian view that  I  believe to  be suitable  for
providing a basis for a capability theory concerning global justice. The core of this view is
that every human being possesses (eo ipso) a relational connection with every other, and that
there are  certain minimal  norms which hold of all  such connections,  whatever  additional
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layers of relationship may exist in particular cases. A sufficientarian version of the capability
approach, like that of Nussbaum, is then an excellent candidate to give an account of those
norms, since no relationship can flourish if one party to it does not have dignity. The central
thought,  then,  is  that  there  is  a  strong link  between the  contribution  to  the  good life  of
individual human beings of the ways they relate to one another, and the justice or injustice of
even large-scale political states of affairs, including (e.g.) the institutions that comprise the
global economy.
There are a number of significant barriers to the acceptance of this link, which it will be the
primary aim of this Chapter to reduce or avoid. Firstly, it may seem that a basis for justice in
the lives of individual beings and their dyadic relationships is problematically individualistic,
and will not have the resources to account for many social dynamics which are relevant to
justice.   Secondly,  it  may appear that linking justice with the idea of human relationship
vitiates the potential benefits of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, in a way suggested by a paper by
Candace Vogler (2006). Thirdly, it may seem that linking justice with what is necessary for all
people to live a decent human life will be overly demanding, and that this severs a necessary
connection between justice and responsibility. Fourthly, it remains to be seen what practical
roles I propose that a capability theory can fill, especially given some of the difficulties which
my discussion in this Chapter will  uncover.  Fifthly,  more needs to be said to situate this
approach relative to existing proposals about global justice, in particular with reference to
articulating and defending the idea that each human is related to every other.  And finally,
apart from the work of diminishing these threats, the original aim of the Thesis – to establish
a capability approach more solidly, with special attention to the role of metaethics – needs to
be re-appraised, and final conclusions drawn.
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The Chapter begins, in §1.1, by recapitulating the central features of the approach I favour,
describing some of its benefits, and then arguing that, despite appearances, it need not be
vulnerable to at least the most straightforward accusations of individualism.  §1.2 then uses
some of Michael Thompson's work to give more detail  to the central idea of justice as a
personal  disposition  pertaining  to  relations.  §1.3 responds  to  the  second potential  barrier
above, giving an exegesis of Vogler's 'promulgation problem', which threatens the coherence
of a second-natural approach to human form with a neo-Aristotelian approach to justice, and
then arguing that it  poses no real threat.  §2 responds to the first  and third barriers noted
above, by distinguishing the notion of personal-relational justice that I think primary, from a
structural notion that is overwhelmingly useful in non-ideal – radically unjust – contexts like
most of those that make up the contemporary world. After drawing on Iris Marion Young's
work to elucidate the notion of structural injustice and the differences it makes, I present an
interpretation of it that coheres with my broader claims, and defend this interpretation from
two alternatives. §3 discusses the implications of these arguments for the practical role of a
capability  approach,  which  I  link  to  recent  disputes  about  'ideal'  and 'non-ideal'  political
theories, and address the fourth barrier. After this, §4.1 deals with the fifth barrier, by arguing
that  the  idea  that  every  human  is  necessarily  related  to  every  other  can  be  plausibly
understood  as,  or  as  equivalent  to,  a  basic  commitment  of  a  variety  of  ethical
cosmopolitanism that is widespread in theories of global justice today. Finally, §4.2 concludes
the Thesis with a summary of my argument.
§1 Justice as a Property of Individuals and Relations
§1.1 What is essential to an Aristotelian approach?
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As I've suggested, the most important element of an Aristotelian approach to justice is the
idea that justice is concerned with one component of the good life of every individual human
being. This respects the thought that there could be nothing unjust about a pattern of social
interactions, or an individual interaction1, if no wrong were done to some affected individual2.
Instead, it is precisely when wrongs are done to individuals that relationships are marred, and
it is when relationships are marred that a central element in the human good is diminished.
Within this tradition, justice, quite generally, can then be thought of as pertaining to right
relation to others3. Thus, a person is (fully) just iff she is disposed to be rightly related to all
wrongable others4. There are a wide range of possible contributing factors to a relationship's
right- or wrong- constitution, and it is a further question in turn how precisely these factors
relate to dignity. For example, it might be that any relationship can only be rightly constituted
if it involves certain successful dispositions of care5, and genuine care cannot fail to recognise
lack of dignity as a negatively salient feature of its possessor; thus, a just person would be
committed to experiencing the lack of dignity of the related other as a serious and wrongful
failure of their care-disposition to achieve its end6. However, I do not need to take a position
on the details here, over and above the claim that lack of dignity, in the capability-theoretic
sense,  is  incompatible  with  right-relationship.  Regardless  of  those  details,  if  justice  is
something that pertains to relationships, and universalistic, global justice must be something
that  relates  to  every  human  being7,  then  it  must  be  the  case  that  every  human  being  is
1 On my view, injustices – as occurrent events – only happen when other-affecting actions do; what I later call
'structural injustice' is not an event but a worldly state of affairs, and what I call 'personal justice' is not an 
event but a virtue – a personal disposition to act justly, thereby occasioning just events.
2 As Thompson notes (2004b, 339-40), this is not to say that someone cannot 'do wrong' in some broader 
sense without wronging someone, it is just to say that nothing can be unjust unless someone is wronged.
3 As usual, I do not pretend to non-circularity here – the relevant kind of 'rightness' may not be specifiable 
independently from the notion of justice itself.
4 This is not incompatible with the thought that there are beings to whom humans can relate, but which are 
not subjects of justice, since in such a case any way of relating to such a being would be a right way.
5 It is easy to imagine close alternatives centring on notions of respect, or even agapeic love, for example.
6 Cf. Held 2006 here.
7 I have stressed before that neo-Aristotelian naturalism needn't build in the idea that only humans can be 
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(essentially)  disposed to  have  some minimal  kind  of  relationship  with  every other8.  The
distinctively neo-Aristotelian naturalist ethical claim is that, given opportunities to interact,
humans qua human are disposed to interact in right, if minimal, ways.
This basic way of thinking about justice has at least two clear benefits. Firstly, it recognises
that all human lives are necessarily bound together, with a significant amount of the good of
each  depending  on  the  good  of  others  not  merely  instrumentally  but  constitutively,  and
provides a way of accounting for that interconnection and its practical import that transcends
the vicissitudes of family, culture, nationality,  or even acquaintance. It seems possible for
human  beings  with  nothing  else  in  common to  recognise  something in  one  another  that
immediately  provides  a  basis  for  beneficial  mutual  engagement,  and  no  more  parochial
account of our interconnection can make straightforward sense of this9.  Secondly,  if  it  is
workable, this kind of account promises to generate a conception of justice that is continuous,
recognising no private/public  dichotomy that  would exclude many interpersonal  or social
considerations from being assessed as just or unjust10. On this view, 'justice' names the first
subjects of justice, although my focus throughout the whole Thesis is on humans and what justice might 
require vis-a-vis them. This approach does suggest, however, that the extent to which non-human animals 
can be subjects of justice will be the extent to which humans and non-human animals are constitutively 
capable of entering into relationships of equal dignity with one another, or (correlatively) the extent to 
which humans can wrong non-humans (and/or vice versa).
8 I intend this as an abductive inference. Although it is logically possible that each human being could be only
indirectly related to certain others, and so acquire reasons of justice involving them similarly indirectly, 
through complicated webs of (some kind or kinds of) relationships which just so happen to connect each 
individual to every other, this is not an especially plausible explanation of the facts in question. Most 
inessential kinds of relationship are A) extremely fragile and contingent, B) not genuinely human-universal, 
and C) do not seem adequate to ground global justice per se. For example, familial and nation-state relations
are clearly not human universal. Also, economic and political-institutional connections are mostly not 
human-universal, are generally fairly fragile, and are not obviously ethically relevant in a general enough 
way – clearly, capability-theoretic justice extends far beyond economic or political-egalitarian factors; these 
institutional connections also relate many non-human beings, which might not be thought to be proper 
subjects of justice. For these reasons: because it will at least be the case that an Aristotelian account of 
global human relations will be clearly and robustly universal, and able to accommodate the right range of 
subjects, the univeral-relationship account gives the best explanation of the phenomenon. Cf. §4.1 below.
9 Cf. Nussbaum (1993, esp. 292-6) on this point.
10 See the discussion in Chapter 2 §1.3 here.
249
virtue11 of interpersonal relations and interactions per se, not merely of abstractly-conceived
'institutions'  or  the  'basic  structure'12.  This  is  an  advantage  not  merely  because  of  its
inclusivity and broad scope, but because it presents the hope that we can make sense of social
interactions at very different scales in fundamentally the same way.
However, there is an obvious potential threat, which I noted above, and which should be
addressed immediately. This is that the view I'm proposing will be individualistic, in a way
that is problematic either because it will miss details that are essential to a proper assessment
of  justice,  or  because  it  is  implausible  in  its  own right  e.g.  because  it  misrepresents  the
workings of individual agency or the self. At the most basic level, this criticism is relatively
easy to rebut.  Although this  approach is  'individualistic'  in a sense – it  does require  that
anything that makes a difference in terms of justice make a difference to an individual's life –
it  does not restrict  the evidence base for enquiries about justice to only those features of
individuals  that  can  be considered  in  abstraction  from the  social  context13.  It  allows that
injustice-constituting features can affect people by affecting those to whom they are related,
or by affecting groups of which they are a constituent. Since I also accept a potentially very
broad-ranging externalism about mental content (see Chapter 4, esp. §1.1 and §1.3), it is also
likely to be the case that many individual mental states depend for their very existence and
identity on features of other people or of social groups. All that appears to be ruled out by the
kind of individualism that this Aristotelian view involves, then, is the thesis that a 'group'
could be a  subject  of  justice,  or  have a  good more generally,  where that  'group'  is  itself
considered in abstraction from the individuals that are supposed to compose it. But even those
11 It is extremely likely that justice, construed (as it is here) as a relational compatibility with dignity, does not 
exhaust the goods (or the corresponding virtues) that can be realised by human relationships. But this is 
unproblematic: it remains the case that justice is of primary importance in the relational parts of our lives.
12 Cf. Rawls 1999, 3.
13 In fact, it may not require that there even be any such features.
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who rail most fervently against methodological individualism in political philosophy do not
usually propose anything along these lines. Doing so would constitute an equally problematic
inversion of individualistic (usually, liberal) atomism – a kind of group atomism – rather than
a correction to it14. On the face of it, then, this individualism is unlikely to be problematic in
the way that it might seem. However, I'll return to these issues below, in the context of the
notion of social structure.
§1.2 Thompson's Dikaiological Matrix
As I've  said,  the  virtue  of  justice,  on  this  view,  is  a  disposition  to  be  rightly related  to
wrongable others. In this section I'll explain further what this means, by giving an exegesis of
some of Michael Thompson's relevant work, and arguing that his basic framework is a good
fit for my project here. Thompson also raises two worries about his own proposal, however,
which I shall argue are not well-founded, and should not pose major trouble for my account. 
According to my sketch, relations of justice exist in precisely those cases where there are two
beings that can have pairwise relations with one another of one particular kind – a kind that
humans clearly can have, and are apt to become conscious of when certain familiar conditions
are met. When I realise that justice is a factor in my relationships15, I realise that those to
whom I relate can be  wronged by me, and that our relationship can be marred in this way.
Plausibly, if I realise that I have failed to be a good friend to S, what I think is not merely that
14 Compare Ch.2, §1.3.3 here.
15 I recognise that most of the instances of human interrelation that are typical of i.e. global citizenship are not,
on an everyday sort of understanding, really 'relationships' at all. What is more, we should not move too 
cavalierly from the goods embedded in – or, more strongly, embodied by – our more obvious kind of 
relationships (familial, erotic, friendly, neighbourly, etc.) to this radically more expansive kind. However, 
this would only provide materials for a solid argument against this relational conception of justice as a 
contribution to the human good if it were plausible that the way we relate to relatively distant others has 
nothing in common with more local sorts of relationship; I do not need to claim that every good that can be 
realised in any relationship can be present in the relationships that implicate norms of global justice.
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I have behaved wrongly in a way that involves S in the background, but that I have wronged
S. Thompson's main claim in his paper 'What is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice'
(2004b)  is  that  what  is  involved  in  the  normativity  of  justice  and  injustice  is  a  special,
essentially relational, logical form. Where this form is involved, normative judgements make
reference not merely to one subject, but to two; they say, of one, that it bears a relation to the
other. For example, Thompson renders the Hohfeldian notion of a claim-right as 'X has a right
against Y that [s]he do A'. The thought is that the argument-places for X and for Y, as well as
the content of the relation between them, are unalterable in this kind of normative proposition
without the meaning being lost. One illustrative example of a point at which this form of
thought  seems  to  operate,  which  Thompson  notes  (2004b,  343-5),  is  in  the  distinction
between civil and criminal law. Traditionally, criminal law is concerned with legal wrongs
simpliciter, while civil law solely concerns the legal wrongings of (some specific) one against
(some specific) other. Whereas in civil law a finding against someone will be a finding that
they related in some wrong16 way to someone else, in criminal law a guilty verdict need not
signify that. Even if another person is harmed by the crime, according to the law they will be
'the occasion, and not the victim, of my fall' (2004b, 340). 
The overwhelming advantage of using this sort of relational norm – in addition to its clear
plausibility as an exegesis of what is involved in thinking about the role of justice in people's
lives – is that it can be used to do normative work that many have aimed to accomplish, but
whose achievement has often seemed difficult or obscure. In particular, treating claims about
justice  as  essentially  involving  (some  potentially  massive  number  of)  relations  between
specific  people  can  do  work  in  avoiding  the  excesses  associated  with  consequentialism
16 Wrong, that is, perhaps only according to the standards embodied by the legal system, which might be 
completely corrupt – Thompson rightly notes that this form of normativity is no more immune to being 
badly or even appallingly deployed than any other (2004b, fn.19, 345).
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without collapsing into the opposite extreme of an inflexible deontology (Thompson 2004b,
334). Closer to home, it can also be used to elucidate the notion of tragedy which Nussbaum
deploys in her discussion of sufficientarian justice (2000a, 81). The basic point is that because
this form of thought cannot be reduced to any non-relational proposition, we are forced to
preserve certain things that seem correct in the domain of justice, but which a less pluralistic
'monadic' sort of theory would militate against. It might be, for example, that a decision to
personally shoot one person to prevent a similar shooting of twenty people by others is, in the
final analysis, the right (certainly the best) thing to do overall17. Similarly, the best possible
strategy for  a  policy-maker  to  adopt  might  involve  building  a  dam and  displacing  (thus
harming the dignity of) the people of a small community, because the more pressing needs of
other  affected people that would be afforded must also be given due weight.  It  certainly
appears,  then,  that  in  some  of  the  appalling  situations  which  the  world  generates,  it  is
appropriate (in some broad sense) to do things which are nevertheless not just; in these sorts
of cases, people are genuinely wronged by aspects of the world in which your agency is
involved, even if not in a primary or immediate sense18 by you as an individual, and this does
damage to the rightness of your (essentially potential) relationship with them. In this way,
some choices that any human agent must make are likely to be  tragic,  in something like
Nussbaum's sense: even the best option involves wronging someone. But because, within this
category of concepts, we cannot reduce the wrong of an injustice done to x, and y, and z, to
some aggregate non-relational wrong (x+y+z), there is no risk that the genuine weight of
these  wrongings  will  vanish,  as  it  so  often  threatens  to  do,  within  the  tide  of  worse
alternatives.
17 Cf. Williams 1973, 93-118.
18 I still hold that they are wronged by you simpliciter, however, since you are a part of the world, and it would
hardly be virtuous to i.e. pursue a goal of self-isolation in order to minimize your immediate responsibility 
for injustice, even if pursuing that goal would indeed effectively promote that end. Cf. Young 2011, esp. 95-
122.
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As well as giving an account of the basic conceptual machinery at work here, Thompson also
proposes  a  neo-Aristotelian  naturalist  interpretation  of  its  basis,  when  its  application  in
judgements about justice is involved. His account of this is, unsurprisingly, similar to the one
I've given – justice is a 'natural' virtue belonging to humankind as such, and it is thus species-
normal to develop both thoughts about justice and practices reflecting those thoughts (2004b,
359-60).  The scope of justice will  then be determined by the bounds of our species, and
membership in our species will (in some senses if not others) be what grounds justice-claims.
However,  Thompson  thinks  that  his  interpretation  of  this  background  of  justice  has  two
significant problems (although he still prefers it to the Humean and Kantian alternatives he
identifies). Firstly, he thinks that there are potential ethical objections to it, arising from the
treatment of (probably hypothetical) non-human but rational and social animals. Secondly, he
holds  that  this  way of  thinking  about  justice  has  difficult  epistemological  consequences,
because he thinks that there must be non-empirical but substantive moral knowledge if it is to
be true. (2004b, 376-9).
The first issue is relatively easily dealt with. It is perfectly compatible with the basic neo-
Aristotelian picture that different life-forms can share elements of their proper form without
collapsing  into  one  another.  So,  if  there  is,  or  were  to  be,  a  non-human  species  who
nevertheless  appeared  to  be  capable  of  engaging  in  the  sort  of  social  engagements  and
relationships that we regard as regulated by justice – if they genuinely appear to be wrongable
– there is no deep barrier to accepting that justice belongs to their life-form too19. Accounts of
justice  should  then  include  reference  to  the  human  life-form  and this  other  life-form.
19 Compare my point, at the end of Chapter 4 (§2.3), that it is not deeply inconsistent with the use of a thesis of
anthropocentricity in articulating the secondary-quality nature of realism to relax this restriction if that 
appeared to be well-motivated.
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Alternatively, it  could be that the proper response to the recognition of wrongability is to
think  of  this  putatively  alien  species  as  really  being  identical  in  form to  us,  superficial
differences notwithstanding. This preserves the basic neo-Aristotelian naturalist thought, and,
more importantly, it preserves the species-universalism that has been a desideratum for me
throughout. It is not entirely clear why Thompson doesn't consider this a possibility; perhaps,
however, it is another relic of a too-narrowly biological interpretation of life-form.
The second issue is more difficult, because Thompson's grounds for thinking that life-form
concepts and their  normative substance must be non-empirical remain obscure to me; his
position  is  that  although  which  beings  are  bearers  of  a  given  life-form is  an  empirical
question, the constitution of the life-form is not (2004a, 377-8; cf. 2008, 63-82). It seems to
me that this is a mistake, and we should regard life-form attributions as empirical in the same
way that the property of being 'good' is empirical – we gain knowledge of it by experience of
worldly facts. It is true that we have to avoid the thought that life-form is just a matter of
statistical regularity, so the epistemology of life-form cannot be simply empirical; we cannot
simply be bundling up functionings into generalised types according solely to the regularity
of  their  co-instantiation.  But  this  hardly exhausts  the possibilities for  an empiricist  view,
especially  if  we  recognise  the  continuity  of  life-form  judgement  with  ethics.  If  this  is
recognised, there does not seem to be any reason to think of life-form judgements, including
ones  about  the  constraints  of  justice  upon  the  shape  of  human  relations,  as  any  more
epistemologically troubling than ethical judgements in general.
§1.3 Against Vogler's 'Promulgation Problem'
Next, I turn to consider a prominent contribution of neo-Aristotelian thought about justice,
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which  I  think  goes  badly  wrong;  doing  so  should  head  off  some  possible  internecine
objections  to  my  proposal  about  global  justice.  Vogler's  concern  is  to  revisit  a  set  of
considerations that she thinks are present in Anscombe's renaissential paper 'Modern Moral
Philosophy'  (Anscombe  1958),  and  argue  on  that  basis  for  some  desiderata  for  neo-
Aristotelian  ethical  theorising,  focussing  on  theorising  about  justice.  She  begins  by
identifying a need, within any species of virtue ethics, to identify various agents as acting
from a single 'source'. Examples of candidate sources are easy to come by – social practices
such as sports or etiquette, or language games such as contract-making will provide such
sources for all their participants (Vogler 2006, 354-5). However, the mere fact that someone is
participating in a practice of these kinds does not do anything to explain why someone should
act a certain way, if that is in serious doubt (i.e., if we question the worth of the practice
itself).  Thus,  practices,  conventions,  and language games are not good candidates for the
single source of just action (356-7). The characteristically Aristotelian idea is then supposed
to be that, as a response to these considerations, it is  human nature that provides both the
single source – because humans as such are disposed towards justice – and the justification.
Our human nature 'promulgates' the norms of justice to us, as a lawmaker promulgates a law
to receptive citizens, and enables us all to act accordingly (357-60).
Vogler's idea seems to be that it is required, for justice to be on a sure footing, that both A)
anyone who acts justly acts from a source that is common to all just agents, and B) this very
source is what gives agents reasons of justice, explaining why they should act justly. It is not
clear  that  neo-Aristotelian  thought  can  meet  both  of  these  demands  in  the  way  Vogler
requires. But this is hardly surprising; it is not obvious that most varieties of thought about
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justice could be expected to meet both demands20. Her requirement seems to be that we can
identify something that is guaranteed to be present in each and every subject of justice – each
person to whom norms of justice apply – and which is also substantially responsible for the
acts of  just  agents21.  However,  surely we want  to  claim that  even non-just  humans have
reasons  to  act  justly!  Since  it  is  prima  facie unlikely  that  the  just  will  share  many
motivational tendencies with the unjust, this suggestion is unlikely to work. This is strange
for another reason, too: the obvious candidate for the immediate 'single source' of just actions
is the virtue of justice. Like all virtues, this is acquired, not innate. (There would be no point
in dubbing elements of our innate first nature as virtues: ex hypothesi, such elements would
be universal!) Although it is obviously true that the processes of enculturation that give rise to
any virtue operate upon – and must therefore be consistent with – homo sapiens' first nature,
it  is the developed ('second-natural')  virtue,  and not the 'first-natural'  prerequisites, that is
distinctively  present  in  the  just.  But  Vogler  requires,  in  supposing  that  neo-Aristotelian
naturalism can solve the promulgation problem, that the 'single source' be, precisely, first-
natural22. In doing so, she seems to set Aristotelian naturalism a task that it could not possibly
complete.
So, where does Vogler's conceptualisation of the issues go wrong? The diagnosis I offer is
that she requires far too tight a relationship between the immediate source of just behaviour
and the common human form which is both its ultimate source and its justificatory basis. It is
20 One potential counterexample is theological voluntarism in some Abrahamic mode; as Vogler (and, 
famously, Anscombe 1958) points out, e.g. the Biblical character 'God' would be capable of playing this 
'promulgating' role, given that 'He' would be capable both of giving people ethical reasons, and of being 
causally responsible for anyone's virtue in acting in accordance with those reasons.
21 It is possible, here as elsewhere, to see certain neo-Aristotelians treading very close to the quicksand of 
normative (e.g. reasons) internalism, with the threat of relativism/subjectivism that it generates. The 
insistence that norms apply in just those cases where they already play some psychological role, or could 
very easily come to do so, is a classically internalist thought. Compare Chapter 4 §2.2.
22 This is clearest at (2006, 358).
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true that, if justice is to be a virtue, it will have to be a singular source in the sense that it can
be realised in multiple – indeed, since there are no Aristotelian 'natural slaves'23,  in all  –
individual humans. But it is not at all clear that we have any need for universal human nature
to  be  anything like  the  immediate –  most  explanatorily  relevant  –  source  of  just  action.
Rather, we must hold that our human life-form disposes us to act justly, but accept that this
disposition is extraordinarily easy to disrupt, only coming close to fruition in circumstances
that are and have been (at best) very rare – it will not, then be the case that the existence of
this disposition will function as a source of just behaviour in any practically important sense.
A second way that neo-Aristotelian naturalism can go wrong is evident in Vogler's discussion
of what can be called 'the argument from non-recognition'. This argument begins from the
observation that the norms that an Aristotelian naturalist claims to be implicit in the human
life-form have not, in fact been widely recognised or put into effect throughout the history of
human  life24.  On  that  basis,  someone  might  conclude  that  such  norms  cannot  really  be
implicated by human life as such. Thompson anticipates this form of objection, pointing out
that since life-forms are not statistical regularities, there is no more inconsistency in thinking
that almost all particular humans have ended up unjust, even though their form involves a
tendency to justice, than there is in recognising that almost all particular mayflies die before
breeding,  even  though mayflies  qua  mayfly  breed  before  dying.  However,  Vogler  notes,
against this counterargument, that it is not merely isolated individuals, but entire societies
(arguably,  indeed,  almost  all  historical  and contemporary human beings almost  all  of the
time) who have been systematically wrong about either the bounds or the requirements of
justice, or both (360-2). She evidently thinks that even though the ubiquity of actual injustice
23 Cf. Aristotle 1998, 5-12.
24 Compare Hope 2013, 163-5. Also compare Elijah Millgram's similar argument against Foot, as discussed in 
Appendix B, §3.
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is not logically inconsistent with the thesis that justice is an element in human form, it does
tell against it25. However, the move to an explicitly ethical conception of the human life-form
helps here. It is indeed plausible that were we to look at the history of our species without
engaging our ethical sensibilities at all, we could not coherently arrive at the conclusion that
justice is something that belongs to our kind26. But, as I have argued in Chapter 5, this should
never  have been the aspiration.  When life-form recognition is  correctly thought  of  as an
ethical enterprise, it makes sense to insist that humanity as such is constituted (inter alia) by a
disposition to be just, even though it is undeniably true that this disposition may have always
and everywhere been thwarted.
Avoiding  these  missteps  is  crucial  to  formulating  a  plausible  account  of  the  relationship
between our human nature and our  need for justice.  If  we expect  mutual  recognition-as-
human to be easy, rather than merely possible, or if we insist on using non-ethical tools to do
ethical work, we will severely limit the normative import of our humanity27, and give succour
to the view that it is something else – something less essential and so more hospitable to
relativism – that provides the framework for ideas about global justice.
§2 Personal and Structural Justice
I  have  argued that  a  personal-relational  model  of  justice,  based on that  of  Thompson,  is
highly promising as a component of a capability approach. However, there is a huge barrier to
25 Given that Vogler appears to go along with Thompson in thinking that life-form concepts are non-empirical 
(359-60), it is especially unclear why she thinks this!
26 Compare: if we were to look at the world in general without our folk-biological concepts in play, we could 
not recognise any species at all!
27 This is something that Vogler shows signs of recognising, but appears to rest content with (e.g. fn.30 on 
362).
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such  an  account's  success.  It  may  still  be  unclear  how  this  view  can  accommodate
paradigmatically institutional candidates for justice/injustice such as government policies or
private-corporate structures. My approach thus threatens to be least successful for precisely
its central target case: that of policies, institutions etc. which operate at the global level. What
is  more,  there  might  be  good  reason  to  think  that  there  are  some  injustices  that  a
person/relationship-level  view  cannot  help  us  think  about:  some  injustices  may  be
distinctively  structural. In this section, I'll acknowledge the important and complex role of
structural factors in injustice, but argue that they can be incorporated in a way that coheres
with the basic personal-relational thought.
I  have claimed that  justice solely concerns  wrongings within human relationships,  and it
appears absurd in any case to think of something as unjust if it is in no way contingent upon
the ways that humans have related, or do relate, to one another. Given this, it appears that
something can only be relevant to justice if it is contingent28 upon human relational form
and/or its history.29 However, this does not imply that the justice or injustice of my relations
and interactions depends entirely upon  my relational form or  its history, at least when it is
narrowly construed; upon my dispositions to respond variously to related others, or the things
upon which those dispositions depend. This is of great importance, because there are good
reasons to think that many or even most injustices outstrip the capacity of any individual to
28 Although, as I'll note later in this section, there are complications that make it implausible to propose a 
strong necessary connection between claims about justice and deliberation-relevant ought-claims, there is 
also something close to an 'ought-implies-can' rationale here: it would make little sense to say that there was
something wrong with someone's interactions which could not possibly be (/have been) remedied by 
altering those interactions.
29 Alternatively, one could note – as Nussbaum has (1995) – that claims about justice must be keyed to what 
can be expected of human beings, rather than gods. For example, while it might make sense to wish that – 
for example – the Earth inherently contained more resources so that people could live what would in some 
sense be better lives, it would not make sense to regard such a lack of resources as constituting or 
contributing to an injustice unless that lack were due to the shape of human interrelations.
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remedy them, and are not, in this way, reducible to individual agency.30 Perhaps the most
obvious  application  of  this  thought  within  the  dignity-centred  capability  approach  I've
recommended is the inability of any individual agent to ensure the dignity of all the global
others to whom they owe it in the face of the massive inertial force of the global economic
structure. It is wildly implausible that the lack of equal dignity of so many people in the
world today can be wholly assigned to the vice of any single individual, even when we count
(for example) failures to engage constructively in collective action as vicious31.  As Simon
Hope (2013, 159) has recently put it: “[o]ne cannot, as Aristotle’s own implausible attempts
to the contrary show, infer the justice of a society from the virtues of its members, because
some injustices are purely systemic.”  There are many different reasons why it might be the
case that global justice cannot be attained through individual agency, with the result that no
individual can live a fully just life. However, all of them have in common the irreducibly
social nature of some of the factors which affect human relationships. This implies the need
for a distinctive notion of  structural injustice, to which this sociality is central. Where the
injustice  of  my relationships  is  something over  which  I  currently have  control,  it  is  not
structural;  where  I  cannot  bring  it  about  that  my  relationships  are  just,  the  injustice  is
structural.
§2.1 Structural Irreducibility, and the Difference it Makes
There are two species of structural factor, given this basic account of what it is for a justice-
relevant factor to be structural. Some factors which bear on the rightness of my relationships
30 On the face of it, given that there are some cases like this, Thompson's relational view of justice cannot be 
plausible unless it is supplemented by a set of structural concepts like those I sketch below.
31 I recognise that this may only follow given a moderately high set of thresholds for dignity, and a 
correspondingly fairly demanding account of justice. However, I think that few would genuinely defend any
threshold for dignity that would be low enough that this would not follow; at least, it seems unlikely that 
any contemporary theorist of cosmopolitan justice would be inclined to do so.
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to  others  are  reducibly structural  –  although  they cannot  be  attributed  to  my  actions  or
omissions, they can be wholly attributed to the actions or omissions of others. Thus, although
they are not the results of my current vice, they may be the result of someone else's, or of a
past vice of my own the injustice of which I alone cannot now rectify. This is sufficient for it
to be the case that I cannot ensure my own personal justice, or (correlatively) the justice of all
of  my interrelations,  and so these  factors  alone  are  enough to  mandate  a  more  complex
account of the relation between agency and justice. However, there is also a more interesting
and significant category of irreducibly structural factors, which ensure that the full virtue of
justice may be unattainable for all individuals even in the absence of any individual vice at
all. Most theorists are likely to agree that the first set of structural factors has many members,
if they are willing to countenance a relational or otherwise social conception of justice at all;
few individuals are so corrupt that absolutely everything that mars their interrelations flows
from their current actions alone! The existence and prevalence of factors of the latter kind is
likely to be somewhat more controversial, however. In this subsection, I investigate further
the  idea  that  many  global  injustices  are  irreducibly  structural,  and  begin  to  assess  the
consequences of this insight.
Probably the most significant theorist of structural injustice over recent decades has been Iris
Marion  Young.  Over  a  number  of  (mostly posthumously published)  recent  works  (2004,
2006, 2009, 2011), Young developed powerful arguments for the conclusion that irreducibly
structural  injustices  are  a  hugely  important  feature  of  our  contemporary  world,  and  that
dealing with them requires considerable modification of traditional approaches to normative
theory.  Young's  conception  of  structural  injustice  turns  on  the  thought  that  these  are  not
'traceable' (2011, 44) or 'attributable' (45) to either specific 'interactions between individuals'
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or 'the specific actions or policies of states and other powerful institutions' (45). She uses a
central  example,  Sandy,  whose  insecurity  in  housing  (and  consequent  vulnerability  to
homelessness) is  not caused in any identifiable way by aberrant vices of (e.g.) malice or
sexism on the part of landlords, nor by the purely random churn of events we call 'bad luck',
nor  by  identifiable  unreasonable  actions  (or  vices)  of  her  own,  nor  by  any  particular
identifiably poor governmental policy decision(s) (43-52). Nevertheless, it seems unjust that
Sandy is at severe risk of homelessness through no fault of her own, given that the resources
which would remove this vulnerability exist in the broader social context, and given that the
social structures which shape the distribution of these resources are malleable in principle
(45). She gives evidence that her narrative is realistic, and so it supplies a good motivation for
her claim that structural injustice, as she conceives it, is a genuine and widespread problem.
Later, Young provides an excellent theoretical discussion of the ways that dynamic social
practices can constrain and otherwise shape the possibilities for action of differently situated
individuals,  and, over  time and across  space,  create  enduringly divergent  social  positions
(2011,  52-64).  As  well  as  problems  arising  from  economic  and  other  paradigmatically
institutional structures, Young also argues that large parts of the social injustices of racism,
sexism and heterosexism can be identified as structural, in this sense32. For example, just as
innumerable  small-scale  interactions  within  the  housing  market,  in  conjunction  with  the
large-scale  institutional  features  which  structure  it,  can  give  rise  to  individual  economic
vulnerability, so can many (apparently isolated) interactions give rise to (e.g.) racial or sexual
disadvantage  (Young  2009,  esp.  363-9).  For  instance,  an  individual's  apparently  benign
disposition to react more positively to more familiar features of others (of dress or dialect, for
32 Presumably, some portion of these injustices is more straightforwardly caused by those varieties of 
unequally-distributed individual malice or explicit prejudice which commonly attract the names 'racism', 
'misogyny', 'homophobia', etc. But, arguably at least, these wrongings (or dispositions to wrong) are only 
reducibly structural, if they are structural at all.
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example),  or  to  features  of  conventionally  higher  status,  can  reinforce  racial  (and
sexual/gendered, and disability-based) disparities when ramified over larger periods of time
and greater masses of people.
On Young's account, examples such as these abound. What unites them seems to be the fact
that it  is impossible (at  least  in practice) to reduce the ethically-relevant aspects of these
structures to  the individual  acts  (e.g.  of wronging)  which are elsewhere the paradigmatic
subject-matter of ethics. At the very least, the task set by the epistemology of a traditional
ethical account of human interactions, requiring as it does an untangling of different lines of
social influence to establish individual causal contributions, is intractable when faced with
structures  of  these  kinds.  As  a  consequence,  she  argues  that  accommodating  structural
injustice requires numerous revisions to the way we construct normative theories. Firstly, we
need to replace the individual-centric 'liability model' of responsibility, which aims to assign
blame and punishment according (mostly) to causal contribution to an injustice, with a 'social
connection' model, which aims instead to motivate changes in the lives of all those socially
implicated by an injustice, with the degree of change warranted depending both on the extent
of  any individual  benefit  from the injustice,  or from its  prospective removal,  and on the
degree of ability to enact such change (Young 2011, 95-187, esp. 142-51). Rather than a
backward-looking perspective,  on which responsibility is  always connected to blame,  she
proposes a forward-looking conception, for which responsibility is connected to the means of
rectification. Secondly, on Young's understanding, many instances of injustice-relevant harm
(discrimination,  exclusion,  deprivation,  etc.)  should be represented as the normal  state  of
affairs within a social practice, requiring a disruptive response, rather than a rare aberration
that requires a normalising response (2011, esp. 106-9). Finally, because this understanding of
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injustice does not require an identifiably tight connection to (abnormally) harmful current
acts,  it  is  able  to  incorporate  analyses  of  injustices  which  typically  exhibit  few  such
connections.  The  most  important  categories  of  these  are  global  injustices  such  as  trade
inequality or cross-border patterns of deprivation (2011, 123-51, cf. Young 2004; 2006), and
the enduring relevance of historical injustices such as slavery and colonialism (2011, 171-87).
Before  I  make  explicit  the  role  that  Young's  account  of  structural  injustice  plays  in  my
argument, it will be helpful to sketch some criticisms of her attempt to argue for a change in
our conception of ethical responsibility and/or its  practical consequences.  This is  because
some of these potential problems are apt to be inherited by my view33. Firstly, several thinkers
(e.g. Barry and Ferracioli 2013, Jubb 2013) have argued that Young's attempt to replace the
liability model is unsuccessful, as she presents it, because it relies on an overly simplistic
understanding of liability,  and because it  is  vague about  the notion of social  connection,
which must impute some kind of causal influence to agents in order for her to claim that they
should respond by changing their behaviour. In particular,   Robert Jubb argues that many
cases that Young classifies as beyond the reach of liability-based conceptions are really not
so,  because  individuals  are  liable  for  'cases  where  individual  agents  have  their  wills
implicated in  the patterning institutions achieve by their  acceptance of them' (702)34.  For
example,  he notes that even someone who actively hopes that their employer's (injustice-
33 Several others are not, including many strands in Barry and Ferracioli 2013, and Jubb 2013, which I need 
not discuss here. For the most part, criticisms in this category are irrelevant because I need not endorse the 
claim that the liability model is inappropriate in every case where irreducible structures are implicated, 
because given the distinctions I shall make, it is possible (prima facie at least) that both the liability model 
and a more forward-looking model could coherently be applied to the same case. Other examples, such as 
the effective critiques of elements of Young's revised 'social connection' model of responsibility at (e.g.) 
Jubb 2013, 705-6 and Barry and Ferracioli 2013, 255-6 are irrelevant because I need not endorse Young's 
specific criteria for greater responsibility for rectification; particular judgements about responsibility are 
best left for non-ideal theory, rather than any species of theorising conducted at the holistic, evaluative level 
that is my focus. 
34 Cf. the central arguments (concerning the 'negative duties' of developed-world citizens) of Pogge 2008, 
which mostly trade on this indirect, participatory sort of liability.
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contributory) projects will fail may not be automatically removed from complicity; they may
not intend the employer's bad ends, but they intend to work, where this work supports those
ends (703-4). However, it remains highly questionable how far this mode of response could
take us, even if we grant that some individuals can reasonably be expected to refuse injustice-
involving employment35. It might be suggested here, against Jubb, that many injustices which
are  largely caused by bystandership  or  other  forms of  traceable complicity36 are  still  not
helpfully dealt  with by a liability model,  because the alternative courses of action which
would reject the institutional forms in question are not things that individuals can reasonably
be expected to choose, or sometimes even to know about, before significant social change has
occurred.  For  example,  there  are  probably  alternatives  to  the  various  gender  norms  that
currently govern sexual relationships (or,  equally,  divisions of household labour,  or many
sites  of  academic  discussion),  and  which  would  not  ramify  to  create  structural  gender
injustices. However, it is not clear that many contemporary individuals are in a position to
readily inculcate these different norms in themselves; they are unlikely to vividly know37
what forms such behaviours could take, and the process of inculcation may involve heavy
personal costs, because many other individuals are likely to refuse to co-operate in, or even
respond punitively to, such attempts. Sometimes, this epistemic lack may follow a fortiori,
since it may be that no-one has a live, detailed sense of these possible norms. However, it is
open to Jubb to respond that this counterargument motivates a different kind of conclusion to
Young's own: rather than implying a change in the conception of responsibility,  it  can be
taken to show that such individuals are  excused for the complicity for which they would
35 Personally, I doubt that most individuals have such employment options available to them, because almost 
all employment can be expected to require participation in injustice at some point. This is just a reflection of
the larger point that most action of any kind involves participation in injustice in the contemporary world. 
But I cannot argue for this hypothesis here.
36 My thought is that these are paradigmatic members of Jubb's set, i.e. 'cases where individual agents have 
their wills implicated in the patterning institutions achieve by their acceptance of them'.
37 Cf. the discussion of Little's point against the Humean theory of motivation in Ch.4, §2.1.
266
otherwise be liable; this conclusion arises from within the liability model itself38.
Secondly, Justin Weinberg (2011) has noted that some of the considerations which lead Young
to postulate irreducibly structural injustices as a distinctive category also threaten her own
conclusions.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  fact  that  individuals  are
systematically ignorant about the ways in which their actions impact global others necessarily
rules out culpability related to structure-involving injustices. Perhaps such individuals are
culpable for their continued ignorance, even if not for the injustice-contributory actions that
must result? On the other, if ignorance of the precise dynamics of social structures is really as
pervasive and stubborn as Young's account implies, how are we to arrive at conclusions about
possible paths to rectification (227)?39 
Many aspects of Young's account can be deployed in support of the position I am developing
here. Others are inessential,  and can be put aside, as would independently be desirable in
order to avoid criticisms such as those I have adduced. Most importantly for my project:
given the irreducibility of the structures themselves, it does seem plausible that backward-
looking, blame-implying culpability cannot be assigned to the individuals who participate in
structural injustices (per se), even though – from the wider perspective I've developed – the
personal  justice  of  these  individuals  is  precluded  by  them.  The  category  of  irreducible
structural injustices incorporates several distinct types, which are united by their resistance to
the  individual  treatments  of  contribution  and/or  prescribed  rectification  that  typify  the
38 Barry and Ferracioli also make this sort of point. Cf. 2013, 254.
39 He also wonders whether it is obvious that structural injustices necessarily require collective solutions – it 
might well be the case that systematically different individual patterns of response would reduce or 
eliminate many injustices even absent institutional or other collective change (Weinberg 2011, 228). Since 
my account need not build in the idea that collective change is necessarily the only means to rectification, I 
am not vulnerable to this point.
267
liability model  of  responsibility.  Some cases  are  structural  because  alternative  courses  of
action are epistemically unavailable (at least to individuals), others because alternatives are
too  costly  to  be  reasonable  at  the  individual  level,  and  yet  more  because  the  social
mechanisms involved in the injustice itself, rather than (or as well as) the just alternatives, are
unknowable at the requisite level of detail. It is also plausible, as Young suggests, that many
contemporary structures should be represented as normally unjust, and thus that the kinds of
relational wronging that they mediate should be regarded as equally normal. This fits with the
generally anti-conservative, disruptive orientation that I'll advocate when discussing some of
the  practical  implications  of  frameworks  like  mine  (in  §3.2  below).  It  also  serves  to  re-
emphasise the futility of attempts to pick out individual acts of participation as instances of
wrongdoing: although some may be worse than others, all involve wronging, and so none can
be presented as different in kind to the norm. Any individual agents that are singled out for
blame will necessarily be scapegoats, at least in some respect. Instead, it makes sense to see
at least some part of the ethical weight of global structural injustice (considered as a whole)
as resting on every human being alive40.
However,  other  elements  of Young's  account  are  inessential  for my purposes.  Firstly,  the
possibility that the notion of exculpation can be used to accommodate irreducible structural
injustice within the liability model, while preserving the general connection to individualised
attributions and to blame that I want to deny, needs to be taken seriously. I do this, after
40 Some (e.g. Lawford-Smith 2012) have argued that argumentation which proceeds via consideration of the 
causal contribution of individuals to global injustices may be more effective at motivating rectificatory 
action than humanity-based arguments. This may well be correct, ceteris paribus. However, given the 
limited practical aspirations of my humanity-based claims, this is largely irrelevant to my position; it has not
been shown that humanity-based arguments are ineffective at motivating regret or an impulse to imagination
and continued engagement. Secondarily, it also seems doubtful that things will always be equal – it seems 
evident that humanity-based arguments are inherently more flexible than causality-based ones, so they are 
likely to apply in more cases.  Cf. also Tronto 2012.
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presenting my alternative in more detail, in §2.3. Secondly, the concession that some kind of
causal influence over injustices must be present needs to be made. Fortunately,  this  does
nothing to damage the basic case against traditional ways of thinking about responsibility,
because that case rests on the intractability of attempts to attribute strong causal influence in a
particularly fine-grained way, not on the inability to attribute influence in weaker or more
general senses. I have already noted that it would make little sense to connect the notion of
justice to states of affairs which do not depend upon human inter-relational form, and the
acknowledged fact that each individual's form could be different does enough to attribute
some general kind of influence to them, even though this falls short of the stronger causal
power  that  liability  models  require.  Thirdly,  I  can  accommodate  Weinberg's  criticism by
allowing that individuals can be liable for failures to act in such a way as to lessen their
ignorance,  at  least  to  the  extent  that  such  actions  would  not  be  so  costly  as  to  provide
exculpation41. Finally, there is a genuine threat that acknowledging ignorance in structure-
involving domains leaves normative theories without prescriptive power, and it needs to be
clarified  how  my  approach  avoids  this  threat.  Both  of  these  last  two  problems  will  be
discussed further in §3.2 below.
Returning to the more general level, acknowledging the severe limits of our knowledge in the
social domains that are most relevant to normative questions concerning global justice may
seem to leave views like the capability approach with little or nothing to say about individuals
in the contemporary world. As a result, it may seem that the capability approach must fail as
an ethical perspective, if not necessarily as a higher-level political one42. In the rest of this
41 As elsewhere, this invocation of exculpation is compatible with the liability model (at least prima facie), so 
the liability model remains in effect, if only on one level of evaluative analysis.
42 Most of the accounts that may seem relevant to my target questions – about which actions (courses of 
action, policies, etc.) are possible, and what kinds of difference possibility makes to theories about justice – 
are actually unhelpful because they do not even attempt to include the discussions of individual agency that 
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section and throughout the next, I'll provide an account which shows why this is not so.
§2.2 Structural Injustice as a Barrier to Virtue
There  may  be  several  different  ways  of  integrating  a  Young-style  analysis  of  structural
injustice  with  a  relational  conception  of  global  justice  like  that  which  I've  described.
However, in the remainder of the Thesis, I'll defend one which seems to incorporate all of the
desiderata I've motivated hitherto. I have already gestured at the core idea that I'll develop.
On this account, structural injustices (whether they are reducible or not) are barriers to the
personal virtue of justice, and the constitutive and external goods it enables. Where the world
is structurally unjust, at least some of the (at least (essentially) possible) relations which every
individual  has  will  be  wrongly constituted,  at  least  in  some respects.  As a  corollary,  no
individual  can  be  completely just  –  can  instantiate  the  virtue  of  justice43 –  while  global
structural injustice persists. And, given that everyone has reason to live a flourishing life, it
will  be the case that every individual has reason – of at  least  some kind – to  desire the
elimination of such injustices, and to undertake whatever actions are reasonable means to that
are necessary to link justice in the polis to ethics tout court. As an illustrative example, Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith 2012 consistently discusses what 'we' can do, and what is feasible for 'us'. If 'we' denotes, as 
it generally seems to, an abstract representation of the entire polis as a single agent, this is of some use for 
my purposes, since what the polis can do seems to be identical to what depends on the shape of human 
relational form, as I've used that notion. The (probably very spare) limits on this are what Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith call 'hard constraints' (811-13). Cf. fn.54 below. But, of course, what is feasible for 'us' will 
only extremely rarely be feasible for 'me'.
43 A less stringent concept of virtue might be able to avoid this result: if virtue is merely the best instrumental 
means, rather than something which embodies constitutive value of its own, it might make sense to exploit 
the non-sufficiency of virtue for the good here. Given such a view, it might appear that structural injustices 
could be considered barriers to goods that are external to agential constitution alone. This strategy, however,
precludes the thought that structural injustices prevent constitutive goods of justice from coming into being, 
rather than just blocking the normal external-good-promoting effects of the virtue (/disposition). This 
position should only be palatable to those who are prepared to accept that there is nothing constitutively 
worse about being unable to relate rightly to others, but doing the best that can be expected regardless, than 
doing the best that can be expected, and relating rightly to others as a (perhaps partial) result. If such a 
position is plausible, much of the most distinctive argument in this Chapter, and some of my earlier 
arguments too, can probably be rejected in favour of weaker alternatives. Cf. Tessman 2009b, which offers 
some argument for maintaining this strictness.
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end. There are two ways in which structural injustices constitute barriers44 to just flourishing
of  our  interrelations,  which  correspond  to  my  earlier  distinction  between  reducibly  and
irreducibly structural injustices. Most clearly, where injustice is irreducible to the relational
form of any individual human, no agent will be able to act with a reasonable expectation that
just  relations  will  be  the  result.  However,  even  those  structures  whose  justice-relevant
inadequacies can be attributed to the agency of some set of individuals other than the current
agent prevent the current agent from rectifying things, ensuring that elements of wronging
will persist in the way she relates (/would relate) to the affected others. In both kinds of case,
structures make it impossible (however contingently) for rectification to occur by the current
agent's  action alone45.  And, given the prevalence of such structures,  it  is  overwhelmingly
plausible that all contemporary agents are incapable of the virtue of justice simpliciter46.
One possible problem with this line of argument is that it may seem to be the symptom of an
inwardness that is entirely inappropriate to the subject-matter of justice. It may seem self-
obsessive to even  consider personal virtue or personal flourishing when severe deprivation
and  appalling  inequality  are  in  the  frame.  It  is  worth  elucidating  why  this  thought  is
misplaced before I continue. In line with the flexible McDowellian concept of virtue argued
for in earlier chapters, the theoretical function of virtue is not to provide an independent or
44 This kind of barrier to virtue is different to at least many of those postulated by Lisa Tessman in her 
important account of the 'burdens' that oppression imposes on agents, burdens which militate against virtue 
(see especially her 2005 monograph), and consequently against flourishing (see especially her 2009b). 
These are often different in two ways – firstly, in that many of these barriers are specific to the most 
oppressed, unlike those I postulate, which are universal to all participants in an irreducibly unjust social 
structure; secondly, in that (again, most of) these barriers involve the absence of specific circumstances 
necessary to inculcate virtue, rather than preclusions of the conditions necessary to instantiate it more 
broadly.
45 It is worth noting that this follows even for actions aimed at co-operation with others. Even such actions 
depend for success on external conditions, so this negative result obtains even when the current agent is as 
well disposed as can reasonably be expected towards collective action.
46 As I have noted before, this is compatible with its being the case that they are rightly related to certain 
individuals.
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foundational  ethical  idea,  but  to  unify  the  otherwise  disparate  elements  of  our  ethical
perspectives. Bearing this in mind reveals that the connotations of self-regarding moralism
that might accompany much of the language that I have been using are entirely misleading47.
The claim that it is important to recognise structural injustice as a barrier to personal virtue
and (consequently) to individual flourishing should not distract attention from our (de re)
wrongings of others, or the plight that this may leave them in; rather, it places those external
facts in the context of our whole lives, and helps to make clear their full significance. On such
a way of thinking, there is no conflict between the thoughts 'racism is bad because it prevents
me from living well' and 'when I perpetuate racist structures I wrong/harm others terribly'.
The benefit of a well-ordered conception of virtue is that it reveals these to be two parts of an
integrated whole.
The revisions that I am arguing are required in order to incorporate the insights of a view like
Young's are philosophically difficult, relying on the generation of distinctions that, in some
ways,  go  against  the  grain  of  (at  least  large  sections  of)  traditional  practical  thought.
However, there are links to be made which help to alleviate such difficulties. In particular, I
have already argued48 that there is a category of reasons ('V-reasons') of which it is true that,
when they are distinctively present49, they cannot function so as to motivate action within
their immediate contexts of deliberation. Likewise, I have accepted that it is not plausible to
connect  such  reasons  to  practices  of  blame.  Unsurprisingly,  my  suggestion  is  then  that,
although  the  existence  of  structural  injustices  drives  a  wedge  between  claims  about  D-
reasons (and best-possible action, and potential blameworthiness), and claims about virtue
47 This claim would bear comparison to the more general line of criticism of virtue ethics that it is 
fundamentally narcissistic. See (e.g.) Hursthouse 1999, 190; Cox 2006. Unfortunately, I cannot examine this
tangent in the Thesis.
48 See Chapter 4, §2.2.
49 That is, when they are non-identical to the D-reasons which are present.
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(and the internal goods of justice, and the sort of non-tragic action that we should  accept
rather than merely tolerate50) there need be no such disconnect with V-reasons51. Thus, it is
still possible, despite the difficulties which social complexity generates, to make claims about
the  reasons  of  all  individuals  on  the  basis  of  the  conjunction  of  two  facts  alone:  their
humanity, and the fact that the bundle of functionings I am calling 'dignity' is not universally
attained  in  the  contemporary  world.  If  this  is  so,  the  capability  approach  remains  an
extremely promising ethical/political  framework. The price is  that  we have to restrict  the
scope of the theoretical claims that the framework includes to a comparatively holistic and
idealised  kind  of  evaluation,  rather  than  necessarily  aspiring  to  provide  specific  action-
guidance for the actual, non-ideal world. My conclusion at this point is this: to the extent that
irreducible structural injustices are a persistent feature of our world, we should view theories
of global justice such as the capability approach as, most basically52, theories about V-reasons
and about acceptably, rather than tolerably, just action.
An additional benefit of the connection can be seen by reflecting on the fact that although V-
reasons are reasons for action53, the point of noting them is not necessarily to motivate action,
50 See §3.1 below for more on this distinction.
51 The correspondence between D-reasons and non-structural features, and V-reasons and structural ones, is 
not a perfect one. As I noted in my original discussion in Ch.4, there are some examples of gaps between D-
and V-reasons which result from circumstances that, although they are non-ideal in some respects, are not 
structurally unjust (or, at least, not obviously so). Examples would include the lack of needed skills which 
take time to acquire, or the presence of ingrained vices or biases on the part of an agent. The claim is that all
structural injustices generate divergences between D- and V-reasons, not that only structural injustices can 
do so.
52 There are many who deploy the capability approach as what would, in my terms, be very much a non-ideal 
theory. Much of Sen's work has fit this general pattern (see especially Sen 2009), even when it is not used 
to, for example, contribute to UN poverty measurement strategies (ul Haq 1990, esp. 26-9). See also 
Robeyns 2006 for discussion of several foci of non-ideal deployment. There is no reason why the broad 
notion of 'capability' cannot find a place in both sorts of theory.
53 It is important to stress this, since it might seem natural to interpret them merely as reasons to have 
emotional responses such as regret (for example). Although I am claiming that people do have such reasons 
in the sort of non-ideal contexts in question, it is important to preserve the idea that people have reasons to 
act well even when they cannot, precisely because the failure that doing so registers is what generates the 
reasons to regret. If people were not failing to act well (e.g., justice-wise) – failing to do something they 
have reason to do – it would not be clear why they have reason to regret the actions that they must perform 
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given the contexts in which they are reasons. Instead, the function of postulating V-reasons
(in those non-ideal contexts where D-reasons and V-reasons come apart) is more holistic and
evaluative than atomic or deontic. Rather than primarily aiming to describe what individuals
are obliged to do, or what is best for them to do, situated as they are, accounts of V-reasons
('ideal theories', in the sense I'll explicate) mostly regulate our agency less directly. In §3, I
shall do more to elucidate this distinctive (but also strongly limited) function.
§2.3  Two  Alternatives:  a  Conditional  Interpretation,  and  Exculpation-
Maximalism
Before I move to consider the consequences of this conception of the role of a capability-
theoretic  framework,  it  will  be  helpful  to  quickly  distinguish  it  from two  possible  rival
attempts to accommodate some of the desiderata I've noted. The different ways in which they
fail to do so are illustrative of the distinctive benefits of the 'barrier'-based interpretation,
despite its perhaps more radical departure from philosophical orthodoxy.
The  first  of  these  alternatives  is  a  development  from  the  tradition  of  'fact-insensitive'
idealising  political  theory  epitomised  by G.A.  Cohen  (esp.  2008,  2009),  but  excellently
summarised  in  recent  work  by  Pablo  Gilabert  (esp.  Gilabert  2011).  Cohen's  distinctive
contribution to debates about ideal and non-ideal political theorising involves the insistence
that  there  are  fundamental  principles  which  do  not  depend  (either  epistemically  or
metaphysically) on whether or not a wide range of facts about the actual world obtain. For
example, Cohen thinks that the truth of many (the 'fundamental') normative principles does
not presuppose any facts, including most importantly facts about 'the human situation' – e.g.
to do the best they can.
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about existing economic structures, or concerning the values espoused by the majority (2008,
229-273). One implication of this is that normative principles are true whether or not they can
feasibly be put into practice. This may seem paradoxical, since the feasibility of an action
involves whether or not an agent can perform it, and, in the classic Kantian slogan, 'ought
implies  can'.  Gilabert  urges  us  to  resolve  this  tension  by  reading  Cohen's  fundamental
principles  as  making  'evaluative'  rather  than  'prescriptive'  claims.  The  distinction  is  this:
evaluative claims are of the form 'A ought to  Φ in C if they can', while prescriptive claims
have the form 'A ought to Φ in C given that they can'. As a consequence, while prescriptive
claims are defeasible by (because inconsistent with) certain facts about what can be done,
evaluative claims are not so defeasible. (Gilabert 2011, 55-9). In Cohen's words: 'we find
fundamental54 justice within claims of the form: if it is possible to do A, then you ought to do
A' (2008, 252). For Cohen and those within this tradition, there is a distinctive, 'ideal' kind of
theorising  in  political  philosophy,  whose focus  is  on evaluation,  rather  than  prescription,
construed as above. One alternative interpretation of the content of the capability framework
I've offered, then, is as an ideal theory of this sort.
The problem with a Gilabert/Cohen-style proposal, if it were reintroduced in an attempt to
accommodate the need for ideal and non-ideal species of normative thought, is that it does
not  make  good  sense  of  the  impossibility  of  good  (evaluatively  adequate)  action.  It  is
probably the case that there are many true conditionals of this 'evaluative' form. Recognising
these truths might also be linked to an appropriate wishful sentiment, to the effect that it
54 Although the position I am developing in this Chapter agrees with most of Cohen's claim that 'what's true in 
“'ought' implies 'can'” does not show that fundamental normative truth is constrained by what it is possible 
for people to do' (2008, 250), I do not claim that the truths of ideal theory are more 'fundamental' than those 
of non-ideal theory. In particular, unlike Cohen I cannot claim that non-ideal theory is in some sense a 
derivation from ideal theory, in conjunction with numerous empirical truths; I think that no such derivation 
is possible. Also, my position may be less radical than Cohen's, in that I accept the restriction of justice to 
what depends on human-relational form.
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would be better (justice-wise) if some (or all) individuals were able to do certain things that
they  cannot.  However,  the  difficult  conclusion  that  I  have  argued  is  motivated  by  the
recognition of structural injustice is that all the possible options are inadequate ('bad') justice-
wise, not merely that they could be better. A conditional claim is not sufficient to recognise
this, precisely because the relevant conditionals do not, actually, warrant negative evaluation
of action in non-ideal circumstances; the claims 'S was virtuous in not-Φing', and 'S's not-
Φing was just' are perfectly compatible with the conditional 'S ought to Φ if she can', given
that she cannot55. This is not what I have argued we want: it cannot make full sense of what is
regrettable about the tragically unjust action that inevitably accompanies structural injustice.
The second alternative exploits the possibility that wrongful action in contexts of structural
injustice might be systematically exculpated, which I noted in §2.1 above. As I implied there,
if this possibility can be utilised across the board, this would remove the motivation for the
claim that just action is genuinely impossible in such contexts, by providing an alternative
within the confines of the liability model of responsibility. The most promising version of
such a broad-based exculpatory strategy would work by noting that the difficulty of structural
injustice arises because of the serious epistemic limits it involves. Against such a background,
knowledge of any possibly rectificatory actions would be extremely difficult to come by, and
this explains the inappropriateness of blame: rather than being because the best available
actions are still bad, it is because they are sufficiently hard to know about that everyone who
fails to perform them has an excuse. My response to this has two parts. Firstly, at least while
55 I should make clear why the account I'm developing does not, in fact violate 'Ought implies Can', any more 
than Cohen's must. The different kinds of 'ought' judgement that would accompany the two kinds of 'reason' 
judgement simply refer to correspondingly different reference-classes for 'can'. There are conceptual 
restrictions on what can be asserted using 'V-ought', just as there are using 'D-ought'. My references to what 
depends on the shape of human interrelations provides an (intuitive, vague) reference-class for 'V-ought'. I 
am indebted here to Amy Berg, who has (in Chapter 2 of her forthcoming Thesis (2015)) given an account 
of one way these different levels of 'ought's and 'can's could work. Cf. fn.42 above.
276
we remain at the individual level, it just does not seem likely that there will be any available
actions that it would make sense to think acceptable, whether or not the situated individuals
could know about them if they did exist. To think this involves supposing that there is a way
in which an individual could act such that, as a result of their action(s) alone, they will realise
a disposition to be rightly related to all human beings. It seems wildly unlikely that such
options exist with any regularity in the contemporary world56. Secondly, as a result, it does
not seem true that those agents who behave most justly in the contemporary world are, in fact,
acting massively far from optimally, such that they would be liable to blame if only their
epistemic position were not so poor. (Think of Martin Luther King, for example...) It does not
seem plausible,  then,  that  the  general  explanation  for  the  inappropriateness  of  blame  in
circumstances  of  global  structural  injustice  is  the  fact  that  otherwise  liable  actions  are
systematically exculpated, rather than the fact that all available options are unacceptable, and
tragic choices must nevertheless be made.
Given that these alternatives are inadequate in the ways that I've indicated, I conclude that my
way of incorporating a recognition of structural injustice into an ethical framework for global
justice is well-motivated. In the next section, I'll move on to consider the consequences that
acceptance of the idea of barriers to virtuous (acceptable, etc.) action has for the practical
functions of theorising about global justice.
§3 What are the Practical Consequences?
Most of what I've said thus far concerns the internal structure of a capability approach to
global justice, rather than what pragmatic roles it can play in issuing normative verdicts on
56 Note that, in formulating this challenge, I do not need to refer to the individual's epistemic situation, only 
their actual set of options.
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actions,  policies,  personal  dispositions,  and  other  contributors  to  the  shape  of  human
interrelations.  In  this  section,  I  remedy this  deficit  by further  locating  the  approach  I've
argued  for  relative  to  recent  debates  about  ideal  and  non-ideal  theory,  and  so  bringing
together some elements of the approach that might otherwise remain inchoate. 
As I've already hinted, I think the best interpretation of a Nussbaum-style capability approach
is as an ideal theory. On the distinction I'm deploying here, ideal theories aim at relatively
holistic evaluation of situations and exhibit relatively low levels of epistemic dependence on
detailed description of existing conditions, while non-ideal theories draw heavily upon such
description in order to generate (potentially fairly fine-grained) prescriptions for immediate
action. These prescriptions, unlike the evaluations that ideal theories are apt to issue, may be
appropriately  connected  to  detailed,  situation-specific  judgements  of  liability,
blameworthiness, and obligation, in addition to their central judgement about which of the
immediately  available  actions  are  most  choice-worthy  (most  supported  by  D-reasons)57.
However, the degree of abstraction from the non-ideal features of the contemporary world
that is necessary to produce an account of acceptable agency – agency consistent with the
disposition towards right-relationship – makes it unlikely that ideal theorising could produce
reliable judgements of these kinds about similarly specific cases. Instead, as I have already
emphasised, the central role of ideal theories of global justice should be to deliver negative
evaluations of contemporary actions, and to provide as coherent and unified an account of the
grounds  for  such  evaluations  as  possible.  Doing  this  will  involve  precisely  the  kind  of
reflection on the human goods that justice implicates – on 'dignity'  – that Nussbaum-style
57 As this should make clear, I am not claiming that it is plausible that contemporary individuals have few 
obligations of global justice, or that they are not liable for their failures to satisfy these obligations, or that 
these do not provide them with powerful D-reasons. All I am claiming is that it is not plausible that a 
framework such as the ideal-theoretic capability approach I've developed can be expected to generate a good
account of such things to the extent that they do exist.
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capability  approaches  have  at  their  methodological  centre.  This  may  appear  to  be  a
frustratingly thin remit for ideal theory, however, so in the subsections below (§§3.1-2) I note
two important subsidiary functions that such theory can play too58.
Before I move on to that, it is important to make explicit why methodological aspirations like
those of my proposed 'ideal' theory-type need not be scuppered by the ignorance of structures
and  their  connection  to  individual  agency  that  it  avows.  Primarily,  this  is  because  the
ignorance here is of the detailed ways in which individual agency gives rise to the non-ideal
structures  that  actually exist.  It  is  not,  in  general,  clear  why ignorance  about  the precise
mechanisms that  current  injustice  involves  would  vitiate  apparent  knowledge about  what
justice requires. However, some knowledge of the ideal might depend on knowledge of social
mechanisms59.  Specifically,  it  is  likely  that  such  ignorance  does  rule  out  very  detailed
knowledge of capability-theoretic dignity; exactly which labour regulations are compatible
with the capability to enter into relationships of meaningful recognition with other workers60,
for example? Fortunately, though, capability approaches modelled on Nussbaum's own have
little reason to aspire to this fineness of grain61.  Such detail  would only be of significant
practical relevance at the point where choices between multiple  prima facie good options62
became realistic; because such feasibility would require dramatic convergence towards the
58 Because my proposed framework deploys a sufficientarian distributive principle at the ideal-theoretic level, 
but remains neutral about which kinds of distribution are warranted in non-ideal domains, it can more 
clearly accommodate prioritarianism about the kinds of case for which it is most plausible. That is, it can 
accommodate the thought that non-ideal actions aimed at rectification of injustices should prioritise the 
worst affected by those injustices. See Arneson 2000 (55-9), for a critique of Nussbaum's view on this issue.
59 Given that I am conceding that justice-claims can only be made against the background of the judgement 
that the relevant circumstances are affected by the shape of human relations, such claims also have 
empirical presuppositions, which are defeasible in principle. I think it is defensible to neglect this, however, 
because I take the claim that human-relational form affects most aspects of human life to be extremely well-
supported, and because, to the extent that it might be the case that no amount of change in human-relational 
form would eliminate some (putative) injustices, we do not have good evidence that this is so. Compare 
Gheaus 2013; Gilabert 2011, 60-63.
60 See Appendix A.
61 Compare the discussion of epistemic limits in Nussbaum's theory in Chapter 2, §2.3.2.
62 Which is to say, apparently non-tragic choices; choices apparently between genuinely acceptable options.
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ideal,  we  could  expect  our  epistemic  position  with  respect  to  such  fine-grained  ideal-
theoretical  questions  to  improve  concurrently63.  As  a  result,  a  view  with  the  limited
aspirations I have proposed faces relatively little threat from contamination by our ignorance
of structure and its agential correlates.
A conception of global justice that builds within the framework I've presented can function as
a regulative ideal for global-justice discourse and practice more generally, in the sense that it
provides a standard against which the world can be assessed. However, as I've stressed, this
does  not  mean that  it  can  generate  many particular  prescriptions  about  how people – or
institutions – should act so as to make the world more just64. This contrasts with Nussbaum's
strategy in recent years, which has been to accept (as I do) that her approach cannot generate
fine-grained prescriptions even regarding the policies of fairly large institutions – much less
individual agents – but to insist that it does generate prescriptions at the extremely abstract
level of constitutional principle. One reason to prefer my strategy is that it does not build in
the  notion  that  any  particular  institutional  form  (the  nation-state,  for  example)  will  be
sufficient for justice to be done65; all that matters is that everyone be assured a life of equal
dignity, it does not matter whether, for example, this is the outcome of national-constitutional
guarantees.
§3.1 Regulating Regret
63 After all, at the limit of such progress, ideal and non-ideal theory would collapse into one another, and the 
distinction would cease to be of any use.
64 Certainly, a filled-in picture of the just world in the vein of my suggestions should not be taken as an end-
point in a consequentialistic sense, with the only questions about justice then concerning the best way to get 
from here to there. This kind of 'ideal theory' would indeed be vitiated by the extent of our ignorance about 
social mechanisms; because the absence of such ignorance would signal the end of structural injustice, this 
would also lead to the collapse of the two theory types into one another.
65 Compare Ch.2, §1.3.
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The first subsidiary function that ideal theories can play involves the articulation of reasons
for regret. As I have already suggested66, cases where one has acted, or faces the prospect of
acting, unacceptably are cases where it is appropriate to regret this fact67. In this subsection, I
shall draw on work by Lisa Tessman68 to elaborate on and support this contention.
Much of the background to Tessman's argument is reflected also in what I have said above.
Tessman's work is located in a recent tradition of proposals for non-ideal theorising which is
associated most strongly with Charles Mills' 2005 paper 'Ideal Theory as Ideology'. There,
Mills provides an effective argument for the conclusion that ideal theories – construed, in
Rawls'  sense69,  as  theories  which  justify  principles  using  a  model  that  assumes  full
compliance of participants to its governing norms (169)70 – are systematically unreliable and
will tend to perpetuate structural injustices. For example, he argues that because Rawlsian
principles are designed for a world in which there would be no racist biases (arguably,  a
world containing no races at all), they will not generate useful principles for the actual world,
with its history of racial oppression and its continuing effects (169-182). Such a constraint
militates  against  (e.g.)  justifications  for  potentially  rectificatory  policies  like  affirmative
action  programmes,  because  such  programmes  must  involve  discrimination  on  (ideal-
theoretically)  arbitrary  grounds.  As  Mills  puts  it,  'by  assuming  the  ideal...one  is  only
guaranteeing the perpetuation of the non-ideal' (182).
66 Throughout this Chapter, and also in Ch.4, fn.88.
67 Arguably, the connection to regret is also implicit in Young's account (e.g. at 2011, 106).
68 Cf. also Gheaus 2013, 454-5.
69 See, e.g. Rawls 1999, 8.
70 Mills actually lists a variety of features of theories that makes the ideal in the sense he is concerned to attack
(2005, 168-9). However, all of these can be seen as aspects or consequences of the full compliance 
assumption. For example, it is only necessary to assume that everyone has idealised capacities of rationality 
because such capacities will (on the relevant views) be required for everyone to reliably comply with the 
norms of justice (whatever those are then argued to be).
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Tessman (like  myself)  accepts  the  general  thrust  of  this  argument  (2010,  805-8;  cf.  esp.
2009a, xvi-xviii), and so accepts that the methodological stance of the non-ideal theorist is
largely correct. In particular, she accepts, as I do, that 'action-guidance'  – the issuance of
prescriptions  –  needs  to  be  the  exclusive  province  of  non-ideal  theorising  (2010,  808)71.
However, she thinks that because non-ideal  theorising is so much better at performing this
role, its proponents tend to fail to recognise that this is not the only thing that we should want
from a theory:
What is displaced by this sort of non-ideal theory is an acknowledgment that there are 
irrectifiable wrongs, irreparable damage, and uncompensatable losses, as well as ways
in  which  oppositional  acts  aimed  at  challenging  (or  surviving)  some  aspect  of  
oppression may conflict (as in a dilemma) with other such acts to produce a situation 
in which new or continued moral wrongdoing72 is unavoidable. Just as Mills points
out that aiming at  the ideal  of a society with no (acknowledged) history of injustice  
obscures the wrongs that need to be righted, I am suggesting that aiming (only) to  
rectify the wrongs of oppression can eclipse the inevitability of failing at this task  
(809).
Rather, she proposes:
an addition to action-guiding normative theorizing: some kind of theorizing that can 
witness and evaluate the particular piece of moral experience that lies in the gap  
between a nonideal world and the unattainable, worthy ideals of someone who has not
suffered the adaptation of normative expectations (813-14).
One of the functions of ethical thought is to motivate, and make sense of the motivations for,
the distinctive experience of someone who must act unacceptably: the experience of tragic
regret. The capability approach to global justice, construed as an ideal theory in my sense, is
well-equipped to perform this role.
71 It is less clear what she thinks about deontic statuses, attributions of liability, and so on.
72 One issue that remains undecided here concerns the choice between linking 'right' action to the balance of 
D-reasons – which is the interpretation that seems closest to ordinary usage and philosophical orthodoxy – 
and linking it to V-reasons. On the former interpretation, what I have been saying in this Chapter is that right
action often involves wronging someone, and that right action comes apart from virtue in such non-ideal 
instances. On the latter, right action as well as virtue (and action from virtue) becomes impossible in 
situations of structural injustice. Tessman generally seems to take this latter line, arguing, for example, that 
'[i]t is especially repugnant, however, to use a cost-benefit analysis that produces a prescription for moral 
wrongdoing but to think of the prescribed action as morally right' (2010, 810-11). Cf. Ch.5 fn.70.
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§3.2 Motivating Imaginative Engagement
The second function is even more important. The recognition that we must currently tolerate
bad actions, by ourselves and others, can play a role in pressing us to look beyond the present
moment  for  opportunities  for  more  radical  change  that  might  disrupt  the  normality  of
injustice. This is of especial importance when, as I have urged is the case, the immediate
(unjust) situations in which individuals find themselves are fringed by significant uncertainty
about the extent of change that may be possible, and thus about which, perhaps radically
better, ways of living might become available over time.
A recent paper by Anca Gheaus (2013) is particularly suggestive of an effective argument
here73.  Her (most relevant) aim is to argue that 'a willingness to apply the label 'unjust' to
regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance the action-guiding potential74 of a
conception of justice, by providing an aspirational ideal' (448.) The critical point that Gheaus
makes is that we do not securely know what the limits of possibility for human relations are;
indeed she suggests that we may well be better at knowing what we ought to do than what we
can do, at least at such a broad level (460). Since this is so, we will better at acting, given the
73 One potentially important difference between my position and that of Gheaus is that I do not need to accept 
that 'there is a gap “between the idea of injustice, on the one hand, and the idea that some people are treating
others unjustly, on the other”' (448, the embedded quote is from Stemplowka and Swift, 2012). On my 
account, there is no such gap, because the existence of structural injustice necessarily renders individual 
relationships (and the interactions they include) unjust (dispositionally/virtue-theoretically speaking). On the
other hand, elsewhere Gheaus puts the question in terms of whether or not 'justice necessarily involves 
rights violations' (448). Especially if rights are given a Hohfeldian interpretation – as something with 
inherent deontic relevance – or are viewed as inherently connected to a reliable means of enforcement, it 
would make sense to view me as accepting this version of the gap. A second important difference is that 
Gheaus is concerned to argue that even with claims of justice 'addressed to humanity', it would be remain 
useful to propose 'ideal' (infeasible) conceptions of justice (449). This invites contradiction, because I have 
been accepting that justice is the first virtue of (and depends upon the possible shape of) human relations. To
avoid confusion, I run a more moderate version of her argument, rather than one conducted at the level of 
humanity as a collective.
74 This conclusion may seem to be at odds with my position, because Gheaus regards the (relevantly) 'ideal' 
theory as generating action-guidance, which I have explicitly denied. This apparent tension is illusory: it is 
not that Gheaus thinks that the ideal theory can directly tell us what to do (she is implicitly conceding that 
the ideal-theoretic prescriptions are probably impossible for us, at least as things stand), rather, the existence
of a currently-infeasible ideal generates pressure to make things such that it is no longer infeasible.
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presence of larger numbers of agents, and over larger periods of time, if we devote some
resources to making the infeasible feasible, than simply trying, at each given level of 'zoom',
to secure the most possible justice from that narrow vantage point. Because there are different
levels of feasibility,  depending on how far out we 'zoom' (the individual, a community, a
territory,  humanity  itself),  and  which  time-scale  we  restrict  ourselves  too,  there  is  no
contradiction between conceding that injustice is a tragic necessity for individuals, here and
now,  and  holding  that  nevertheless  justice  is  a  possible  condition  for  humanity,  in  the
unforeseeable future. As a result, any uncertainty that there may be about the limits of the
possible at a wider level than the level of action (for my purposes in this Chapter, the level of
the individual agent) generates some degree of (D-)reason, at the level of action, to pursue
activities that have the potential to expand those limits. Given that, as I have argued, the
limits of possibility for individuals in situations of structural injustice are often themselves
due  to  epistemic  limitations,  these  feasibility-expanding  actions  will  frequently  involve
attempts  to  improve  our  epistemic  position,  for  example  by  generating  better  non-ideal
theories of justice75 and the social structures it involves, or attempting to invent new ways of
relating to others that might be less corrupting.
One illustration of this might refer to the gender norms that contribute to structural gender
injustice, as referred to in §2.1 above. As I said, it is likely that few contemporary individuals
have  a  live  sense  of  exactly  which  patterns  of  interrelation  would,  if  widely inculcated,
eliminate gender injustice. However, the socially-constructed and historically fluid nature of
such norms suggests that even very rapid change is possible (at least, if we 'zoom out' a little).
This  generates  a  motive  for  imaginative  experimentation  and  open-minded,  potentially
75 In this way, somewhat paradoxically, ideal theories may function to focus more attention on the activity of 
non-ideal theorising itself, while removing some attention from the other prescriptions those non-ideal 
theories might generate.
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transformative76 engagement with diverse others, which would not be present on a view that
restricted  itself  to  current  epistemic  horizons.  Such  pressure  increases  the  likelihood  of
improvements  in  our  epistemic  positions,  which  may  in  turn  make  much  more  just
relationships a possibility.
Because most such actions are not very costly, and do not (at least initially) require massive
changes to the patterns of activity in most individuals' lives, it is unlikely that they will be
subject to exculpation77.  In one respect,  then,  an ideal,  sufficientarian capability approach
would provide some input into non-ideal theory: it would describe the conditions in which
there would no longer be strong, justice-based reason78 to seek the relevant improvements in
one's epistemic position. In so doing, it makes clear that such (D-)reasons are still powerful.
If the rest of the components of a non-ideal theory are 'co-operative', so to speak – if the
actions that imaginative engagement involves are not so costly as to generate exculpation,
and would not interfere with other D-rational actions such as to become unjustified (e.g. sub-
optimal, or impermissible) – then the content of an ideal theory can (indirectly) affect D-
reasons even for non-ideal circumstances. 
These  two  subsidiary  roles  effectively  complement  the  general,  holistically  evaluative
function of ideal theories that has been my emphasis throughout  §3. In both cases, it is not
that the ideal theory directly justifies particular actions, it is more that the shaping of general
76 That is, of the kind that I identified in Ch.4, §2.2.
77 Cf. Weinberg's first criticism of Young, as discussed in §2.1 above. Here I am conceding that – because 
action-guidance is the domain of non-ideal theory, even if ideal theory can affect it indirectly – it may be 
that people are liable (and, e.g., blameworthy) for any failure to do at least low-cost things to improve their 
epistemic position and those of related others over time.
78 Of course, this is not to say that there would no longer be any such reason: inquiry may be valuable for its 
own sake, and it may well be that the virtuous would persist in such reflection and engagement even in the 
absence of structural injustices.
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motivational forces (dissatisfaction, curiosity, regret) that the content of the theory regulates
has  knock-on  effects  within  most  immediate  contexts  of  deliberation  (which  remain
nevertheless the basic province of non-ideal theory). In concluding the section, I'd like to
return to the bigger picture this Chapter has laid out, and sound a relatively harmonious note.
As this section has clarified: even in the face of all the difficulties I have noted, an agent can,
intelligibly,  aim  at  a  just  life  within  a  just  world  –  as  with  the  other  components  of
eudaimonia – at least in the sense that she will not rest content unless we get there. In this
sense, it can be the telos of our action even when our action does not (because it cannot) 'aim'
at it by being a predictably effective means to that end.
§4 Capability-Theoretic Justice Revisited
The theoretical framework I've presented in this Thesis is not, in most respects, a radical
departure from existing proposals.  In particular, as well  as the work in feminist  and neo-
Aristotelian metaethics (especially in epistemology), the recent work in political philosophy
that has been the focus of this Chapter, and the starting point that Nussbaum's work provided,
there is a further connection to a dispute within cosmopolitanism concerning the basis for
cosmopolitan reasoning. Roughly, one faction in this dispute argues that cosmopolitan claims
are based upon the existence of (universal) contingent social connections, while the other
argues that such connections are not necessary for cosmopolitan conclusions to be warranted.
Because my framework takes a side in this  dispute,  I  shall  begin the final section of the
Thesis by locating it within this terrain. In doing so, I shall further describe the universal
human relationship which I've postulated, urging that, far from being an outlandish proposal,
it is an exegesis of a commitment which many – if not most – cosmopolitans already possess.
After that, I shall complete the process of drawing the Thesis to a close, by stating some final
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conclusions.
§4.1 The Wider Context: Cosmopolitan Universalism
I have claimed that the right way to interpret claims about cosmopolitan justice – justice at
the global level, without essential reference to sub-global institutions – is as claims about the
right-/wrong-relationship of individuals to one another, with the universal relevance of these
considerations  explained  in  virtue  of  an  essentially  human  disposition  towards  such
relationships, whether actual causal social connections exist at a given time or not. In turn,
the capability approach, interpreted as an ideal theory, provides the prospect of a reasonably
systematic articulation of the sufficient conditions for compatibility with right-relationship, in
terms of a diverse bundle of functionings and capabilities. If worldly conditions are not such
that every individual possesses this  bundle – possesses 'dignity'  – no individual can,  at  a
personal  level,  realise  the  virtue  of  justice.  This,  abstractly,  is  the  harm which  structural
global injustice does to every human alive; the source of the reasons that we all have to
eliminate it.
Because  this  interpretation  does  not  base  the  demands  of  cosmopolitan  justice  on  the
contingent existence of overarching social practices, but on the fact of humanity itself, it is
'humanity-based' rather than 'interdependence-based'79, in the sense given by Simon Caney
(2009,  390-1)80.  As such,  it  fits  within a  significant  tradition,  many of  whose  supporting
arguments  can  be  relied  upon to  defend the  claim of  essential  disposition-to-relationship
which is at the core of the framework I propose. Unfortunately, I cannot provide an expansive
79 Of course, this terminology is misleading, since the account of 'humanity' I've been sketching claims, 
precisely, that all humans are necessarily 'interdependent'.
80 The cosmopolitan view I've defended is a version of 'juridical' and 'ethical', but not necessarily 'political' 
cosmopolitanism, in the senses stipulated by Caney (389).
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comparison  of  approaches  here,  but  must  rest  content  with  the  bare  recognition  that
substantial similarities exist across the tradition81. I will not describe the arguments given by
Caney  against  'interdependence-based'  approaches82 (391-4),  but  rather  respond  to  an
illuminating  challenge  that  has  been  offered  to  'humanity-based'  interpretations  by  a
proponent  of  an  'interdependence-based'  model.  Darrel  Moellendorff  has  argued83 that  a
person is no more bound by duties of justice 'to intervene into the affairs of [humans] with
whom we have no intercourse but only an awareness of their existence...say, [humans] on the
second planet orbiting some distant star', than they have duties of justice to intervene in the
affairs of 'rocks and plants' (2002: 31). The prima facie implausibility of claiming that such
duties  exist  may  seem to  damage  the  prospects  for  a  humanity-based  cosmopolitanism.
However, on my view all that would follow from the fact that such isolated humans did not
have equal dignity with us is that this should be regretted, that we would not genuinely have
the constitutive goods of justice unless it were remedied, and that we might have reason to
perform actions with the potential to bring us closer together in terms of mutual influence
over time. Even these things would only follow given certain assumptions: it might be that no
possible  alteration  in  the  form of  human interrelations  could bring such causal  influence
about, and if so justice (for us) would genuinely fail to extend to these particular people. This
is not an absurd implication at all, in fact it has considerable plausibility in its own right84. I
conclude that a humanity-based version of cosmopolitanism, such as the one I've provided,
has good prospects.
81 For example, as well as much of Nussbaum's work which has already been cited, and that of Caney himself, 
see especially the argument of Barry 1989, 238-41.
82 But cf. fn.8 above, which gives a schematic argument which has some similarities to those which Caney 
provides.
83 This is charitable. Really, he simply describes a possible implication of an alternative view in such a way as 
to invite the interpretation that it is absurd.
84 I have slightly modified Moellendorff's argument: his wording refers to 'intelligent beings'; I have changed 
this to 'humans' so that I would more clearly be targeted by it. Cf. Caney, 397-9.
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§4.2 Drawing the Threads Together
I began this Thesis with the aspiration to provide a clarified, better defended framework for a
capability approach to global justice. In each Chapter, I have progressed towards this aim by
integrating further elements into this structure.
After introducing the historical debates around justice in Chapter 1, I moved on to discuss
several problematic aspects of Nussbaum's development. I argued that a plausible version of
the capability approach must deploy what I called 'strong capability',  as part  of a bundle
including both capabilities and other valuable functionings. By the end of the first half of
Chapter  2,  I  had  concluded  that  although  Nussbaum's  sufficientarian  deployment  of  the
notion of 'dignity' could be used to do important work, the domain of justice needed to be
given a more expansive interpretation than Nussbaum has offered. In the second half of that
Chapter,  I  introduced  a  distinction  between  'constructivist'  and  'realist'  understandings  of
methodology, and argued, both by identifying unclarities in Nussbaum's account, and then by
taking up a  critique by Alison Jaggar,  that  more needed to be done to  preserve a realist
understanding of methodology. 
In  Chapter  3,  I  deepened  my critical  focus  on  the  relative  merits  of  constructivism and
realism, and supplied a number of motivations to seek what I called a 'culture-laden' realist
understanding of  ethical  epistemology.  I  argued that  constructivism had little  prospect  of
satisfyingly accounting for the phenomenon of adaptive preferences (§1), and that it had no
significant advantages, and actually several disadvantages, when attempting to account for
the role of first-order values within ethical epistemology (§2). I also (§2.5) focussed more
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tightly on John Rawls' 'political constructivism', arguing that this paradigm of the type does
not hold much promise for the development of a solid methodology. I concluded that we have
reason  to  seek  a  well-founded  culture-laden  realist  orientation,  since  that  stood  the  best
chance  of  cohering  with  the  insights  from  feminist  epistemology  that  I  had  introduced
throughout the Chapter.
In Chapter 4, I presented just such an orientation, drawing heavily upon my understanding of
the  metaethics  of  John  McDowell  to  provide  a  philosophical  background  capable  of
supporting culture-laden realism. I argued that his metaethical stance – perhaps uniquely –
fits perfectly with the requirements of ethical epistemology (§1). Then, in §2, I noted further
connections between his ideas and feminist-epistemic claims, in particular by providing an
account of two different kinds of practical reasons. The anti-reductionist flexibility of this
metaethical perspective has formed the background for everything that has followed.
In Chapter 5, I offered a reinterpretation of the recently revived tradition of neo-Aristotelian
naturalism,  which offers a  promising means of  making sense of  the basis  for  the ethical
universalism that is presupposed by the capability approach. Firstly, I gave a sketch of the
way in which capability-theoretic justice can be placed within an Aristotelian account. Then, I
argued such accounts should not, on pain of serious implausibility, be interpreted as attempts
at an independent grounding for ethical claims, but as an application of ethical thought to the
domain of species  and their  natures.  I  closed with a clarifying discussion of the relation
between virtue – as I'd already placed it within a McDowellian frame – and the human good.
Finally, in this Chapter I have returned to the question of the roles that a capability approach
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is suited to play within our thought about, and practice of, global justice. After giving a more
detailed description of the core Aristotelian understanding of justice I favour, I noted a major
threat to it, in the form of distinctively structural injustice. In the ensuing discussion, I have
distinguished between two kinds of political-philosophical theory, 'ideal' and 'non-ideal', and
argued that sufficientarian capability approaches are best placed to play the former, rather
than the latter, role. 
The capability approach has, since its inception, been the site of wide-ranging philosophical
controversy.  In  this  Thesis,  I  have  moved  through  several  areas  of  this  controversy,
developing  a  consistently  Aristotelian  account  of  methodology  and  epistemology,  of  the
distinctive  first-order  contribution  that  capability  approaches  make,  and  of  the  kinds  of
theoretical aspiration that are appropriate to an approach with this nature. I conclude that, if it
is interpreted in the way that I have urged, the capability approach is more philosophically
promising than ever.
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Appendix A: 
Nussbaum's List of Essential Capabilities
 Life.  Being  able  to  live  to  the  end  of  a  human  life  of  normal  length;  not  dying
prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
 Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
 Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
 Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and
reason—and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated
by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in
connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice,
religious,  literary,  musical,  and  so  forth.  Being  able  to  use  one's  mind  in  ways
protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and
artistic  speech,  and freedom of  religious  exercise.  Being able  to  have  pleasurable
experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
 Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to
grieve,  to  experience  longing,  gratitude,  and  justified  anger.  Not  having  one's
emotional  development  blighted  by  fear  and  anxiety.  (Supporting  this  capability
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their
development.) 
 Practical  Reason. Being able  to  form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical  reflection  about  the  planning of  one's  life.  (This  entails  protection  for  the
liberty of conscience and religious observance.) 
 Affiliation. 
◦ Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other
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humans, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the
situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of
assembly and political speech.) 
◦ Having  the  social  bases  of  self-respect  and  non-humiliation;  being  able  to  be
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails
provisions  of  non-discrimination  on  the  basis  of  race,  sex,  sexual  orientation,
ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species. 
 Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants,
and the world of nature. 
 Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
  Control over one's Environment. 
◦ Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's
life;  having  the  right  of  political  participation,  protections  of  free  speech  and
association. 
◦ Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having
property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment
on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and
seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason
and  entering  into  meaningful  relationships  of  mutual  recognition  with  other
workers. 
(Nussbaum 2006, 76-8)
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Appendix B:
 Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism?
In  Chapter  5,  my  central  conclusion  was  that  the  only  plausible  interpretation  of  neo-
Aristotelian  naturalist  theses  views  them  as  moves  within  ethical  discourse,  broadly
construed, rather than as claims about an extra-ethical domain of reality. The straightforward
consequence of this is that the meta-level status of such naturalistic normative philosophy
cannot differ from that of ethics more generally. In this Appendix, I build on this claim, with
two main aims. Firstly, I shall complete the task of incorporating the basic neo-Aristotelian
account of the human life-form and its good within the McDowellian metaethical framework
set out in Chapter 4. Secondly, I shall provide a defence of my account against what may be
the most immediately pressing meta-level objection to it: the objection that it is not really a
form of naturalism at all, and thus falls foul of standard naturalist objections.
The Appendix comprises five sections. In §1, I make explicit the meta-level status of neo-
Aristotelian naturalism as I understand it, thus largely fulfilling the first of the above aims in
short order. §2, 3, and 4 then provide the bulk of the discussion about naturalism. §2 sets out
a distinction between two sorts of naturalist challenge – methodological and metaphysical –
and argues that the first kind of critique does not pose a major threat to the view I propose. §3
and §4 then consider challenges based upon the metaphysical variety of naturalism. In §3, I
bring out a dilemma for neo-Aristotelian accounts, and conclude that my version sides firmly
with one horn; this renders worries about metaphysical naturalism more pressing for me than
they  might  otherwise  be.  In  §4,  I  examine  McDowell's  'naturalism  of  second  nature',
evaluating its worth as a means of defence here, and concluding that it stands or falls with
McDowellian  answers  to  broader  metaphilosophical  questions.  §5  then  briefly  considers
those answers, and argues for a minimal conclusion: that, although the questions at hand are
far  beyond  the  possible  scope of  this  thesis  (or  any other),  it  is  far  from clear  that  the
perspective that motivates reductive naturalism should win out.  I  conclude,  then,  that the
meta-level  framework  for  a  capability  approach  that  I  propose  is  secure  enough  to  be
effective.
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§1 What are the Meta-level claims?
In Chapter 5, I discussed a number of difficult issues of interpretation that are implicated by
some recent  varieties  of  neo-Aristotelian  naturalism.  I  concluded that  the best  hope of  a
plausible neo-Aristotelian framework lies with a robust non-reductive position. However, this
might appear to some to threaten the realist aspirations of such positions. This is a particularly
pressing problem because both Foot and Hursthouse have indicated – to some extent at least1
– that they think that one important role of neo-Aristotelian theses is to support realism in this
area. My response to this is predictably brief, given the arguments of Chapter 4: there is no
clear connection between realist status and non-ethical domains of thought, such as those of
the natural sciences, or the typical (perhaps stereotypical) features of those domains.2 There is
no conflict  between realist  status and – for example – being emotion-involving, or being
linked to  agency by functionally broadcasting  intentions,  or  being  dependent  on  specific
patterns of enculturation. So the apparent tension between preserving the realist appearances
of ethical thought and acknowledging the role of these features within it was never genuine in
the  first  place.  If  this  was  the  only  motivation  for  deploying  neo-Aristotelian  naturalist
concepts, they would be of no value. If this confused motivation is dispensed with, then, what
are the correct  things to  say about  the meta-level  status of life-form judgements  and the
connected judgements about the human good?
Applications of life-form concepts are cognitive, aiming at worldly facts, and having roles in
the ordinary logical and pragmatic relations of implication, probilification, contradiction etc.
that discourse and practice involves. However, they are also norm-involving: to say (with
adequate understanding) that a particular organism is 'human'3 is to commit to responding in
1 See esp. §§2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in Chapter 5.
2 In any case, there are other ways that a version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism might be used to do pro-
realist meta-level work. In particular, even insistently non-reductive versions of neo-Aristotelian Naturalism
can help to support 'companions in guilt' argumentation. To wit: if Thompson is right in claiming that 
natural-goodness concepts are deeply implicit in ordinary thought, discourse, and practice, and especially if 
he is right that we cannot make sense of everyday concepts of life, species, etc. without them, then a 
powerful companions in guilt argument will be available here. (However, see §2.1 below on this point.) 
Briefly, if ethical claims are rendered suspect (probably, by anti-realist argumentation) their loss might be a 
cost that some would be prepared to bear. Once the deep connection between ethics and natural-goodness 
concepts is revealed, however, the cost increases greatly. Interestingly, the availability of this kind of 
argumentation actually relies on the meta-level equivalency of natural-goodness concepts and ethical ones 
that the reductive sort of argument must contradict.
3 In the relevant sense, that is: neo-Aristotelians need not claim to be providing an exclusive analysis of 
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paradigmatically norm-related ways to certain facts about the functioning of that organism. If
certain functionings are present, that will be judged good, while their absence will be judged
bad; if others are present, that will be judged bad, while their absence will be judged good. In
this  way,  the  psychology and  semantics  of  life-form judgements  –  properly  construed  –
resembles  that  of  ethical  judgements  per  se.  The  metaphysics  of  life-form  and  'natural
goodness' facts should also be thought of in much the same way that McDowellians think of
ethical facts generally. These are sui generis facts, supervening on but irreducible to the facts
presented by biology, physics, etc. These facts are independent of individual minds, but their
metaphysical nature includes a connection to one particular set of human responses – the
responses of the virtuous.
What is more, these normative judgements about proper functioning should be expected to be
fully bound up with the rest of the array of ethical/political concepts which play a role in our
lives. Thus, this assimilation of life-form concepts to the ethical domain extends also to their
epistemology.  I  have suggested in  particular  (especially in  Ch.5  §1.2)  that  not  obviously
connected concepts like 'distributive justice' or 'equality of opportunity' must be viewed as
parts of the same Neurathian epistemic web. Arguments based upon new evidence from (e.g.)
evolutionary biology will be, in principle, no more and no less valid in altering conceptions of
the human life-form than arguments based on (e.g.) considerations of institutional equality.
Finally, we should also expect the general dependence of ethical cognition on enculturation to
be replicated here. As a result, different social/cultural locations may be more conducive to
understanding  different  aspects  of  the  human  life-form,  and  some  such  locations  might
overall be better suited to appreciating the human life-form than others. Regardless of this,
facts about humanity are facts concerning all humans, regardless of the cultural locations they
contingently have.
Hopefully,  enough  has  already  been  said  to  suggest  that  these  claims  are  coherent:  the
naturalist  and  McDowellian  realist  elements  do  not  contain  any  obvious  tensions.
Furthermore, I hope that they can be seen to exhibit a harmony with one another that goes
beyond mere compatibility; I aim to build upon this sense of harmony in the remainder of the
ordinary word-use. Depending on their response to the dilemma posed in §3 below, indeed, they might not 
want to claim to be saying very much about ordinary language at all. Cf. Ch.4 fn.36 here.
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thesis. In Chapter 6, I do this by returning to the issue of justice with which I began, and
integrating the neo-Aristotelian basis with a  capability approach more explicitly. The rest of
this  Appendix,  though,  will  focus  on an important  challenge to  this  set  of claims,  which
threatens its plausibility, if not its coherence.
§2 Living up to the Label
I have, throughout Chapters 5 and 6, used the term 'naturalism' in the name I give to the view
I have been developing. To some extent, this word-choice would make sense on historical
grounds alone, since the Aristotelian tradition that my view belongs to has consistently been
referred to as a form of naturalism in recent literature. However, one might hope that it is also
defensible  as  a  description of  my  view,  highlighting  one  of  its  important  philosophical
characteristics,  and  thus  aligning  it  with  some  tendencies  in  philosophical  thought,  and
distancing it from others. The question of what makes a view count as a form of naturalism
has been fraught, however, especially over the last few decades since naturalism has become
a predominant philosophical stance, and so it  is to be expected that one major variety of
criticism  that  my  proposal  will  face  will  be  putatively  internecine:  'naturalist'  against
'naturalist'.
This is compounded by the fact that the McDowellian inspiration for much of what I've said
comes with relevant baggage; some philosophers who strongly identify as naturalists have
claimed  that  McDowell's  thought  is,  if  anything,  determinedly  anti-naturalistic4,  and
McDowell has endeavoured to defend himself against these charges. There are two broad
ways of thinking about 'naturalism'; one concerns methodology, and the other metaphysics5.
I'll now provide preliminary characterisations of each in turn.
Methodological  naturalism can  be  summarised  as  the  following  thesis.  Philosophy,  as  a
4 A good example is Fodor 1995.
5 This taxonomy is used by Miller 2003 (he calls metaphysical naturalism 'substantive naturalism'), amongst 
others. In a number of places (e.g. 178-84), he cites Railton, who disavows any deep metaphysical 
commitment of this kind, claiming that his explicitly reductive metaethical naturalism relies on 
methodological considerations alone. (One general worry is that methodological naturalism might 
undermine metaphysical naturalism, insofar as the former might be supposed to involve a disavowal of any 
irrevisable empirical commitments, which the latter seems to involve.) This manoeuvre might appear to 
make views like his immune to the considerations I draw upon later. I can't give a response to this here, for 
reasons of space.
297
distinctive set of questions, is methodologically continuous with the sciences, such that it
possesses no significant unique methods, and such that evidence from those sciences will in
principle be relevant in answering philosophical questions6. There are three potential threats
arising from adherents of this sort of naturalism7. Firstly, the view I've presented requires that
the domain of ethical inquiry be sui generis relative to all other domains of inquiry, and that
the involvement of full-fledged ethical concepts is necessary to even begin such inquiry. This
demand might  appear  to  violate  methodological  naturalism,  because there is  a  distinctive
constraint  in  operation  here  that  is  not  in  operation  for  the  natural  sciences8.  This  is  an
illusion, however. The constraint is only on which  specific sets of concepts can enter into
inquiry  on  particular  questions;  it  does  not  amount  to  a  fundamentally  distinct  kind  of
method. In principle, ethical enquiry could still be as fundamentally empirical as the sciences
are9.  I contend that, if people are suspicious of this response, it can only be because their
naturalism  is  tacitly  metaphysical,  and  not  just  methodological:  it  is  characteristic  of
metaphysical naturalism to insist that certain 'natural' sets of concepts are privileged and must
be at the centre of every theoretical story. 
Secondly,  there  is  an  additional  threat  insofar  as  ethical  concepts  arguably10 bring  in
additional mental faculties, beyond the minimal cognitive set that is involved in thought as
such, and/or play different roles in individual psychology or social practice. It is less clear
6 This can take two forms. Either the proponent can regard this as compatible with traditional philosophical 
inquiry, but just hold that some past philosophers have misdescribed their own enterprise, or they can regard
this as a radically revisionary discovery, replacing the methods of philosophy with alien imports from the 
sciences. Either way, philosophy done, and conceived of, correctly will be methodologically continuous 
with science.
7 There are other threats falling within this category that are merely apparent, but which might have arisen 
from too close an association between my view and that of other neo-Aristotelian naturalists. Thompson, for
example, has claimed that the epistemology of life-form concepts must be distinctively non-empirical, since 
they involve deploying a distinct logical category, rather than engaging in ordinary acts of predication. See 
Thompson 2004a. As my acceptance of epistemological naturalism indicates, this is not something I need to 
claim. However fraught the status of logical categories within thoroughgoing empiricism will be, it should 
be clear that these must lie near the 'core' of any constructive-empiricist web, and are not readily revisable in
practice.
8 Compare, at this point, distinctions between different sciences. If (as is currently popular – see Cat 2013) we
take the view that not all sciences are reducible to physics, this kind of epistemological constraint will also 
operate within natural science itself. A powerful companions in guilt argument would be made available 
thereby.
9 Note here that methodological naturalism is just a continuity-claim. It is compatible with an array of views 
about the proper methodology of natural science, just so long as that methodology is much the same as that 
for philosophy; in practice, however, it tends to be associated with thoroughgoing Quinean empiricism.
10 I say 'arguably' because I do not want to commit to the claim that non-ethical concepts cannot constitutively 
involve affective/conative elements of psychology; I am not treating it as arguable that ethical concepts do. 
See Ch.4 §2.1.
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that  this  does  not  add up to  a  methodological  difference.  However,  this  problem can be
avoided by noting that, strictly speaking, it is only cognitive content that plays a direct role in
ethical epistemology, even on a McDowellian picture. The point here is not that the non-
cognitive/social-pragmatic  elements  can  be  stripped  off  from  an  independent  cognitive
remainder; clearly it would violate shapelessness to suppose this  could be done (cf. Ch.4
§2.1). But we do not need to be able to dissect a concept from the outside to see it as playing
some of the roles it plays in virtue of some of the kinds of faculty it involves and not others.
Indeed, this is presupposed when we note, for example, that the emotional content of ethical
concepts has a special connection to agential motivation. In this case, the cognitive aspect of
ethical concepts is what does the work of putting them into Neurathian contact with other
concepts,  and thus  enables  epistemology to  occur11.  So,  as  above,  there  is  not  any clear
discontinuity between ethical  methodology and natural-scientific  methodology,  apart  from
differences in the content of ethical and scientific concepts, to which only a metaphysical
naturalist can object.
The previous two threats targeted the claimed epistemic autonomy of ethics. However, a third
potential  problem  concerns  the  methods  used  within  metaethics  itself,  with  which  that
autonomy claim is  supported.  Some methodological  naturalists  will  insist  that  even with
reference to meta-level questions, the methods used in the natural sciences are appropriate.
This threat can be dealt  with by drawing attention to the quietist  nature of McDowellian
metaethics. On this view, the 'questions' with which much of metaethics is concerned are not
genuine  questions  at  all;  as  such,  they  do  not  require  substantive  answers.  Instead,  the
relevant parts of metaethics should be regarded as mired in confusion, requiring therapeutic
rather than substantive treatment. I cannot go into further detail here12, but any version of
quietism worthy of the name will hold that the areas of discourse it targets do not involve
genuine questions. Since methodological naturalism is a claim about the right way to answer
philosophical questions,  it  appears to be compatible with quietism. The combination of a
quietist  anti-substantivalism  for  many  of  the  traditional  'questions'  of  philosophy,  and
11 This is not to say, contra the claims I made in Ch.4, §2.1, that facts about an agent's affective states, or their 
position in a particular social practice, cannot play an evidential role in ethical practice; they can, since 
given the inseparable connection between these aspects and the cognitive content, an agent without e.g. 
proper affective responses will thereby not possess the cognitive content either (they will not be relevantly 
virtuous). This could make a difference, i.e. to the evidential status of their testimony. The point is just that 
in every case the presence of cognitive content is required for a concept to enter into epistemic relations.
12 See Ch.4 §1.1, and §5 below on this topic.
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(roughly) a substantive empiricism for everything else, seems to be entirely coherent.13
The discussion above suggests that methodological naturalism is not a significant threat to a
McDowellian view like mine. The other form of naturalism, on the other hand, is far more
challenging.  As I  have said,  this  second type  can be called 'metaphysical  naturalism'.  Its
defining characteristic is an insistence that everything in reality has to be related to some
'natural' kind of entities, modelled on – if not identical to – those which populate natural-
scientific theories. Corrolarily, if it is thought that ethical facts/concepts are not 'natural' in
their own right, then they must be satisfactorily related to non-ethical ones, or some subset
thereof14.  The  kinds  of  view  in  metaethics  that  would  be  most  clearly  compatible  with
metaphysical naturalism, then,  would be either eliminativisms about ethics,  or views that
reduced  ethical  facts/concepts  to  non-ethical  ones,  such  that  they could  then  be  seen  as
identical. As I have explained in Ch.4 §1.3 however, McDowell holds that although there will
be some determinate set of non-ethical features upon which each ethical fact supervenes, it
does not make sense to regard the non-ethical features and the ethical facts as identical, since
there is no prospect of reducing ethics to something that can be independently understood,
because we cannot even recognise the ethical facts' existence in the absence of an acquired
ethical sensibility. If the non-ethical base facts – but not the supervening ethical ones – are
considered to be 'natural', the absence of any constructive theoretical account of how these
levels are related will  make this  view a kind of metaphysical  non-naturalism.  Unlike the
methodological kind, I do not think that the McDowellian view I've proposed can readily be
shown to comply with the constraint of metaphysical naturalism, and thereby avoid naturalist
attacks of this sort. Because his view is so closely linked with anti-reductionist realism, there
is  little  prospect  of  satisfying  metaphysical  naturalists  on  their  own  terms.  Instead,  the
strategy McDowell uses, and which I'll broadly follow, aims to remove the motivation for
thinking  of  ethical  facts/properties  as  'non-natural'  from  the  start,  and  so  support  the
conclusion that, if metaphysical naturalism comes to anything at all, a realist ethics will fall
13 It might even be possible to reconceive of quietism within the Quinean frame, by treating it as an attempt to 
resolve confusions whereby 'core' theses are thought of as more peripheral than they really are. (Cf. Ch.3 
§2.4 above.) If this is possible, even McDowellian metaethics would be methodologically continuous with 
natural science. I won't pursue this line of thought further here, however.
14 It is unclear whether only clearly natural-scientific concepts will suffice, or whether it is enough simply for 
non-ethical ones to be involved. The latter option seems to be more commonly accepted, although it is 
unclear why this is so, given naturalism's motivational origins. This is a moot point when it comes to 
McDowell, however, since his strong anti-reductionism would have significant trouble satisfying either 
requirement.
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within it by default.
For the rest of this Appendix, then, I shall be concerned with metaphysical naturalism, the
threat it poses, and McDowell's attempt to defuse that threat. In the next section, I consider a
tension that arises for versions of neo-Aristotelian naturalism concerning the extent to which
life-form judgements  and  judgements  of  natural  good  can  be  closely  tied  in  to  broader
conceptual  domains  –  both  pre-theoretical  and  natural-scientific  –  with  attention  to  the
possibility  that  placing  them in  this  wider  context  might  help  to  assuage  metaphysical-
naturalist concerns.
§3 Anti-Reductionism vs. Pre-Theoretic Ubiquity
Neo-Aristotelian  naturalists  commonly  emphasise  that  the  conceptual  domains  that  they
describe are ubiquitous in ordinary thought, and, prima facie, also play a significant role in
biological  theorising.  Examples  of  this  abound  in  the  second  chapter  of  Foot's  Natural
Goodness (2001,  25-37),  as  well  as  throughout  Thompson's  work.  If  the  distinctive
characteristic of metaphysical naturalism is the attempt to demonstrate continuity between
(e.g.) ethics and (e.g.) biology not merely in terms of methods, but also in terms of utilised
concepts, postulated properties, and so on, this ubiquity thesis will likely reduce the degree to
which neo-Aristotelians are vulnerable to metaphysical naturalist critique. This section will
firstly flesh out this thought, and then argue that this way of avoiding confrontation with
metaphysical naturalism is not available to an anti-reductionist Aristotelian view like mine,
because the relevant kind of ubiquity thesis vitiates any plausible ethical role for life-form
concepts.
To see the potential for ubiquity claims to support aspirations to metaphysical naturalism,
consider the sort of judgements that Thompson focuses on, such as 'the female bobcat gives
birth  in  the  spring'  (2008,  63).  Prima facie,  this  kind of  judgement  is  required  to  begin
biological theorising about how different animals live, and (thereby) about the processes that
determine  how animals  live,  including over  evolutionary time-scales.  Famously,  Darwin's
close observations of different features of animal life, both morphological and ethological,
were essential to the development of his theories of evolution. On the other hand, there is
considerable room for doubt about how deeply embedded these sorts of judgements are in
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contemporary  biology15,  since  cladistic  models  of  species  have  largely  displaced
morphological ones, amongst other things.16 This might well reduce the extent to which neo-
Aristotelians can claim to be making proposals that are continuous with the current biological
mainstream,  but  ubiquity claims  are  somewhat  likely to  improve their  standing  vis-a-vis
metaphysical naturalism, nevertheless.17
 
This does not show that a view like mine is on similarly firmer ground, however, because
there are  good reasons to  think that  an  ethically-laden conception  of  life-form like mine
cannot help itself to this ubiquity thesis. Some points developed by Elijah Millgram illustrate
why. Part of his argument focusses on what he calls 'the method of the nature documentary'.
This names the central epistemological practice that pro-ubiquity neo-Aristotelian naturalists
would have in mind for thinking about life-forms. It involves, at its base, straightforward
observation  of  animals  (including observation  of  other  humans),  and deployments  of  the
logical category of life-form to make sense of what are seen to be typical traits.18 (Millgram
2009). Notably,  it  is only in virtue of the thought that life-form judgement involves such
straightforwardly  observational  methods  that  the  metaphysical  continuity  claim  has  any
plausibility:  if the account of the logical structure of life-form judgement were uncoupled
from activities that natural science probably involves, there would no longer be reason to
think that natural scientists (as such) use life-form judgements at all. Both elements are, then,
required  for  the  ubiquity  thesis  to  have  any prospect  of  improving  neo-Aristotelianism's
standing as a metaphysical naturalism. 
However, Millgram presents a convincing case that the method of the nature documentary is
spectacularly poorly suited to provide for the kind of description of humanity-as-such that
15 At least one strand in some anti-realist metaphysical naturalisms seems to be defeated by ubiquity claims, 
regardless: if life-form concepts have played a role in biological science, even if this were confined to the 
19th century, it would follow that they are not a metaphysically queer sort of entity, given that 'queerness' in 
this sense picks out certain kinds of difference from the entities that natural science postulates. Compare 
Mackie 1977.
16 See FitzPatrick 2000, and Lewens 2012 for argument along these lines.
17 As I noted in the previous section, some kinds of metaphysical naturalism do not require continuity with 
natural science specifically, but just continuity with non-ethical concepts, properties, etc. If this is so, the 
potential for ubiquity to support Aristotelianism's metaphysical-naturalist credentials will clearly be much 
greater. Regardless of which view is in play, the considerations against ubiquity below will undermine this 
sort of argument.
18 As Millgram emphasises, this does not have to involve a crude empiricism of the kind that Thompson 
explicitly rejects (2009, 559-60).
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might do normative work, in the way that neo-Aristotelians require. His point can be put quite
simply: it is extremely implausible that what would result from an observational method such
as  this  would  be  a  conception  of  the  human  life-form that  would  have  tolerable  ethical
implications. He gives compelling examples of this from the work of anthropologists and
other scientists, who have argued on such observational grounds that infanticide, rape, and a
desire  to  hierarchically  dominate  others  are  all  species-normal,  at  least  in  certain
circumstances  (2009,  361-2).  If  the  method  of  the  nature  documentary  has  the  ultimate
implication that such functionings are good in the humans who instantiate them, it should be
rejected completely.
Finally, it is clear that a view like mine will not have such abhorrent implications, but this is
just  because  a  view like  mine  does  not  involve  the  method  of  the  nature  documentary.
Instead, observations of human functioning are undertaken from within a perspective that is
always-already ethical to its  core.  This has the potential  cost,  however,  of precluding the
ubiquity  thesis  from  being  available  for  anti-reductionist  views19.  As  a  straightforward
consequence,  any  help  that  ubiquity  theses  would  provide  in  avoiding  the  threat  from
metaphysical naturalism will be equally unavailable.
In this section I've shown that claims about the ubiquity of life-form judgement, whatever
their plausibility for some forms of neo-Aristotelianism, are of no help to varieties of it which
take its ethical role seriously. This reinforces the thought that such anti-reductionist forms of
neo-Aristotelian naturalism are seriously divergent from metaphysical naturalism, of the kind
I've described, and will face considerable challenge from that quarter, unless there is some
other way of ameliorating the threat. The next section, then, will consider McDowell's own,
very different, attempt to head off naturalist criticisms, under the banner of a 'naturalism of
second nature'.
§4 On Second Naturalism
19 It is possible that emphasising the ethical dimension here will reduce the scope to claim that lots of 
everyday thought and talk can be captured by this Aristotelian account, but if metaphysical naturalism aim 
were disavowed, this would not be very problematic. It is not clear that there is any reason to think that life-
form judgements of the relevant type have to be ubiquitous, or that we cannot tolerate a split between one 
type of life-form judgement and another. At any rate, ubiquity is of little relevance to the central role of life-
form judgement in this thesis: providing a sound basis for a capability approach to global justice.
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In §2 above, I claimed that the threat of metaphysical naturalism for a McDowellian view like
mine  arises  because  no  constructive  theoretical  account  is  provided  of  the  relationship
between  ethical  facts  –  and  ethical  psychological  states/processes  –  and  the  non-ethical
counterparts which appear in (e.g.) biology. Instead, all that is postulated is some species of
supervenience,  which  is  very  unlikely  to  satisfy  critics  who  hold  that  features  like
normativity,  or  a  connection  to  emotion  and  motivation,  are  'queer',  and  need  to  be
demystified through a comprehensive reduction to the entities that already populate natural-
scientific theory20. This reductionist impetus has two sorts of target in an approach to a region
of human cognition such as metaethics. Firstly, it can target the kind of facts that the approach
postulates, demanding a reduction of these facts to more 'natural' ones. Alternatively, it can
target the psychological processes that the approach identifies as being in play. Of these two
strategies, the second has received far more attention, and as a result I'll concentrate on this
aspect in what follows.21 In the rest  of this section,  then,  I'll  briefly describe McDowell's
notion of 'second nature', which is, precisely, intended to defuse reductionist threats of this
second kind. I'll then consider the impact of an important critique of McDowell's tactics here,
and conclude that the notion of second nature is of little independent use, apart from the way
that it fits with other areas of his thought.
Roughly, the idea of second nature is as follows. Human beings, as animals governed by
biological (physical, etc.) laws, have a 'first nature' consisting of the space of functionings
that these laws include as possibilities.22 There will then be explanations for certain classes of
events in human life, certain kinds of differences between humans, etc., based upon these
20 As I mentioned above, this is not quite right: some metaphysical naturalisms don't obviously involve 
reduction to natural-scientific properties, and some metaphysical naturalists probably don't think this is 
required. Nevertheless, they require reduction to non-ethical concepts/properties in a way that shapelessness
prevents, and so all such views will be incompatible with McDowellian realism.
21 It remains quite unclear why this is; if people are willing to countenance sui generis worldly facts, why are 
they repulsed by the idea of sui generis mental processes? Both supervene in the same way on otherwise-
describable parts of the world, and neither are reducible in the same way to that supervenience base; 
ultimately, cogniser-side shapelessness and cognised-side shapelessness then appear to be on a par. This 
thought notwithstanding, however, in what follows, I'll concentrate on the cogniser-side processes, 
following McDowell and his main critics.
22 Relative to the bounds of humanity itself, that is: at least, we are always implicitly committed to some set of
states of affairs or patterns of events that would not be compatible with counting as human, or continuing to 
do so (e.g. spontaneously decomposing into a soup of one's component atoms). However compatible such 
events would be with the laws of nature, they will not be compatible with human first nature ex hypothesi. It
is possible that a non-Aristotelian conception of life-form is at work here (perhaps a statistical or cladistic 
one), at least superficially. (It is not plausible however that ultimately all such conceptions derive their 
power from an implicit Arisotelian conception. Cf. Thompson 2008 (33-48) here.)
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laws. For example, certain differences in human genital  morphology can be explained by
referring, for the most part at least, to facts about chromosomes and the role these play in
natural  laws.  Prima  facie,  however,  this  'first'  human  nature  radically  explanatorily
underdetermines  the  psychological  states  and  dispositions  –  including  intrinsically  other-
involving states  and dispositions such as those that  social  practices  involve – that  actual
human  beings  come  to  have  as  a  result  of  their  normal23 process  of  development  and
enculturation. Correspondingly, it also underdetermines the ways that actual human beings
interact with the rest of the world, including in cognising it, at least where these interactions
involve such complex psychological states. Instead, at least much of fully-developed human
psychology can be conceived as a kind of 'second nature', the result of processes of formation
that carve out particular paths through the space of possibilities set up by first nature, but not
further explicable by it alone.
A better grasp on the notion of second nature can be gained by considering the following.
One immediate contrary response to the appearance of underdetermination might be to claim
that  some  future  science,  epistemologically  continuous  with  contemporary  non-ethical
thought  (but,  accordingly,  epistemologically  discontinuous  with  current  ethical  thought),
would fill in the requisite gaps. This misses the point, however: the issue is not simply that
we do not yet have an adequate first-natural understanding of psychology and (especially) the
processes of enculturation and cultural change that it is bound up with, however transparent
the inadequacy of current theory in this area may be. The issue is also that it does not appear
that  increasing  knowledge  and explanatory power  of  these kinds  does  anything at  all  to
preserve the distinctive features of (e.g.24) ethical thought and practice. To a large extent, to
assert  this  is  simply  to  reiterate  that  the  characteristics  in  question  (most  importantly
normativity) only appear from  within a developed sensibility of the relevant kind. Further
study of  the  supervened-upon  (first-natural)  level  is  possible,  and  will  very probably be
fruitful and important in its own terms. But it will never generate a faithful account  of the
23 This could be read either as a statistical claim, or as a neo-Aristotelian-style norm-involving claim. On 
either interpretation it is extremely plausible.
24 This is actually a radically general point: the features that belong essentially to second nature and the points 
of view it creates are implicated far more widely than in ethics alone. Normativity, for example, is certainly 
involved in epistemology, and the massive array of social practices which involve it; it may also be involved
in semantic meaning itself. I do not strictly have to take stands on these issues here, but the extent to which 
a comparably anti-reductionist stance is mandatory in those other areas too will be the extent to which there 
will be a powerful companions in guilt argument for McDowellian metaethical realism in particular.
305
second-natural  dispositions  (their  phenomenology,  pragmatic  roles,  etc.),  without  using
information generated by those dispositions themselves. Thus, elements of human psychology
whose  explananda involve the relevant sort of feature (normativity, etc.) will not be fully
explicable using first-natural explanantia alone. Instead, these elements can only be explained
as parts  of an acquired 'second nature';  the events and processes that  they cause and are
caused  by  are  all  themselves  sui  generis,  and  so  no  more  comprehensive  program  of
explanation will be available.
This approach looks initially promising. 'Second nature' seems to be no more or less a variety
of human nature than 'first nature' – in particular, it (or rather its specific components) seems
to play the same role in explanations of different human functionings that 'first nature' does –
and resistance to this claim appears to rest (question-beggingly) on metaphysical naturalism
itself,  since  the  sui  genereity claim  appears  to  be  a  straightforward  corollary  of  anti-
reductionism. However, there are a  number of important criticisms of the notion of second
nature that cast doubt on its utility here. For my purposes here, however, I'll only consider
one: that of David Forman (2008).  Forman begins by noting that McDowell's concept of
'second nature' involves an analogy with the case of language-learning:
The basic  idea  is  that  the  initiation  into  the  practices  of  a  linguistic  tradition  is  
something that is clearly part of the normal and therefore natural maturation of human
beings  even  though  the  norms  embodied  in  that  tradition  cannot  somehow  be  
constructed out of elements that are merely natural in the relevant sense: the norms 
embodied in that tradition are not merely natural since they are not intelligible with 
reference to nature considered apart from that tradition. (567)
This is essentially the same as the explication I've just given. However, Forman makes two
important critical points. 
Firstly, there is a sense in which an Aristotelian concept of 'second nature' cannot serve a
helpful  dialectical  purpose in  discourse  with someone – a  metaphysical  naturalist  –  who
doubts  whether  the  components  or  features  of  non-reductive  ethics  are  natural.  This  is
because  the  relevant  notion  of  'natural'  seems  to  mean  something  like  'not  subject  to
interruption by acts  of mind':  on the Aristotelian account,  the understanding of (e.g.)  the
concepts that are involved in virtue is second nature because the comprehending agent no
longer needs to deliberate afresh each time to come up with an answer in accord with the
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norm (Forman 2008, 573).25 Thus, second nature simply refers to acquired instincts, rather
than  innate  ones.  However,  someone  who  is  skeptical  (e.g.)  of  the  natural  position  of
normativity as such will be unimpressed by this: norms when adequately internalised become
like natural entities, in this respect at least. But if normativity26 as such is queer, this will not
provide good reason to think that they become (or are revealed to always have been) natural
tout  court,  since  the  (queer)  normativity  remains  untouched  by  this.  This  consideration
suggests that dialectically speaking, a 'naturalism of second nature' can do no independent
work; the only people who might find it reassuring will be those who are already comfortable
with the idea that normativity just is a feature of the natural world.
Secondly, Forman notes that there is a difficulty in using the notion of habituation in talking
about  sui  generis conceptual  contents,  and  expecting  this  to  form an  intelligible  bridge
between one uncontroversial region of nature, and a second more controversial one. This is
because in order for habituation to lead someone to possess a fuller, and more thoroughly
integrated,  disposition  to  instantiate  some  functioning  it  already  has  to  be  possible  to
instantiate the functioning in a primitive form. But:
[i]f we want to say that the most basic conceptual abilities we draw upon in perception
are acquired by means of developing a kind of habitual second nature, then we will 
have  to  say that  such perceptual  habits  differ  from Aristotle’s  habits  in  one  key  
respect: the perceptual habit and the corresponding conceptual ability would have to 
be  considered  coeval,  e.g.,  the  habit  of  responding  to  red  things  in  a  certain  
conceptually informed way would have to be considered coeval with the ability to see 
something as red in a particular case. For if we possess the conceptual ability before 
we have the habit, then the habit cannot itself be what distinguishes a conceptually 
informed perception from a merely natural response to the environment. And, in that 
case,  the  account  of  a  habitual  second nature  has  no  role  to  play in  making  us  
comfortable with the idea that we can acquire conceptual abilities that are responsive 
to an autonomous space of reasons. (575.)
That is, when faced with someone who doubts whether the stuff of concepts (i.e. placement in
a normative nexus) is part of nature as such, it can't help to appeal to the way that habit
integrates concepts into human life in much the same way that (e.g.) motor response to a pin
pricking a finger is integrated, because, on the face of it, habits can only be formed from
ingredients  that  are  already  present.  If  normativity  is  not  natural  –  not  already
25 Compare Pippin 2002 and Wright 1996, on this point.
26 Forman consistently talks of autonomy at these junctures. Although this accords with some of McDowell's 
Kantian talk, I suspect he reads too much (or the wrong) Kant into the concepts, such that sponteneity and 
norm-responsiveness begin to appear like separate features.
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unproblematically  present,  at  least  as  a  potentiality  waiting  only  on  the  right  kind  of
responder to reveal itself – habituation cannot make it so; if normativity is natural in this sort
of way, habituation is not needed27 to tell us how it comes to play a role in human life.
These two considerations illustrate the extent to which McDowell's  'naturalism of second
nature' is quite limited in its efficacy at defusing the threat from metaphysical naturalism.
Indeed, it begins to seem that this should never have been surprising: nothing can defuse this
threat because metaphysical naturalism is simply brutely different from other philosophical
stances.  As  such,  perhaps  the  reductionist  impulse  cannot  be  accommodated,  but  only
refused. In the next section, I'll turn more broadly to some metaphilosophical questions that
bear  on  this  issue,  and  argue  that  McDowell's  alternative  to  metaphysical  naturalism is
compelling,  but only as part  of his  overall  perspective.  Neo-Aristotelian naturalism, then,
cannot be defended by taking metaphysical naturalist motivations for granted.
§5 Quietism and the Point of Metaethics Redux
This  section,  finally,  concludes  this  Appendix  by  re-emphasising  the  metaphilosophical
origins  of  naturalist  worries.  Because  the  role  of  metaethical  (including  the  relevant
metaphilosophical)  claims  in  this  Thesis  is  strongly  limited28,  I  have  little  scope  for  an
expansive discussion of these (sometimes quite obscure) topics. However, I can do a little
more to link the impasse reached in the previous section to McDowell's broader philosophy.
In  this  Appendix,  I  have  suggested  that  there  is  a  species  of  naturalism,  'metaphysical'
naturalism, which cannot be productively engaged with by views like McDowell's, because it
begins from entirely incompatible metaphilosophical assumptions. These generate an all-or-
nothing  methodology which  insists  upon  reduction  to  a  privileged  core  of  metaphysical
posits.  Because  McDowell's  view  is  distinguished  by  its  distinctively  anti-reductionist
27 This is not to say that habituation isn't a useful, or even essential, concept for other purposes. It simply has 
no dialectical efficacy here.
28 Throughout the Thesis, there are many points at which I have implicated questions to which I have either 
not given answers, given very vague answers, or given answers without completely adequate support. 
However, this reflects the upshot of my discussion in Chapter 4 (§1.4): that many of the issues involved in 
the background to theories of global justice such as Nussbaum's capability approach, although they may 
appear to be traditionally meta-level problems, cannot be resolved in abstraction from the sort of complex, 
substantive, and controversial first-order ethical/political thought and debate that is necessarily beyond the 
scope of my project here.
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orientation,  no  real  argument  seems  to  be  possible  in  either  direction:  the  metaphysical
naturalist insists that without reduction to the privileged class nothing is explained; the anti-
reductionist insists that the domain is simply irreducible, and that questions which cannot be
answered are not well-formed questions at all. 
This conclusion invites a brief return to the idea of quietism. I have already, in Chapter 4
(§1.4),  argued  that  quietism  about  meta-level  philosophical  topics  does  not  imply  that
philosophy cannot perform any useful tasks, or reveal any substantial truths, in the connected
first-order domains. What is more, the articulation of a coherent and helpful non-reductionist
meta-ethical  perspective  might  play  the  'therapeutic'  role  that  Wittgenstein  urged  for
philosophy, removing the impulse to demand reductive theories at its root. What is left will be
a species of metaethical framework which proceeds in harmony with first-order ethics, rather
than deploying a contentious conception of philosophical method to force ethical conclusions
from above.
Ultimately, I suggest that if there is a way of resolving these issues more conclusively, it will
not  be  separable  from more  broadly metaphilosophical  debates,  which  I  can't  address  in
detail.  I  conclude  that  although  there  are  many extremely difficult  and all-encompassing
issues  in  play in  metaethical  debates,  the  challenge  from metaphysical  naturalism is  not
powerful enough to discredit a neo-Aristotelian approach, and so its role in an account of
objectivity in judgement about universalist justice remains tenable.
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